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I DECLARE THAT THIS THESIS IS MY 
OWN ORIGINAL WORK. 
ABSTRACT 
This work evaluates the fruitfulness of the central theme 
of Capital for the understanding of modern society. This 
evaluation is carried out by discussing the relationship 
of Marx's thought to Hegels, for not only is this 
relationship of the foremost importance in the, as it 
were, internal fashioning of Marx's thought, but it is 
through this relationship that- the wider social 
theoretical stature of that thought is developed. Hegel 
posits the fundamental project of the critique of 
existing alienated conditions which faces modern society 
and social theory as its principal task. But he does so 
in an ineradicably theological manner which prevents the 
fully rational grasp of the requirements of fulfilling 
this project. In Marx, the refashioning of this project 
in a social scientifically corrigible fashion is 
attempted, and the value of Marx's work is to be measured 
in proportion to the success of this attempt. 
More precisely, one of Hegel's programmatic statements of 
the method of critique - the introduction to the 
Phenomenology, f Spirit - is explicated at length, and 
the influence of this method on Capital is discussed in 
the rest of the work. The core theme of this discussion 
is the vexed interpretative idea of Marx's having 
"inverted" Hegel. Marx's materialist account of social 
change is said to have been developed by inverting 
Hegel's idealist scheme of history as the realisation of 
self-conscious Spirit whilst retaining a common dialectic 
form. 
I conclude that Marx is broadly successful in rendering 
the critique of alienation in a rationally corrigible 
fashion. His critique of political economy and the 
capitalist mode of production are of a form which is 
essentially able to win intellectual conviction. This is 
indeed an inversion of Hegel. It has been claimed that 
such an inversion would carry implications of serious 
weakness, for Hegel's dialectic is too thoroughly 
idealist and theologically determinist to allow of its 
being rationally appropriated. But in fact Hegel's 
thought is far more sensitive to, and richly appreciative 
of, the most pressing social issues, and is far more 
encouraging to a materialist epistemological reworking, 
for Marx's work to suffer from this inversion. However, 
a problem of transposing the dialectic from idealism to 
materialism remains to trouble Marx, and indeed trouble 
him because of the directness of his inversion of Hegel. 
For in respect of the crucial issue of determining the 
proletarian establishment of socialism, Marx's 
materialism so directly opposes idealism as to collapse 
into naturalism. Marx's argument on this issue is 
expressed in a very close analogy with what Marx takes to 
be the laws of natural science; and is thus seriously 
deficient in describing what Marx himself in the best 
parts of his work insists is a movement of social 
self-consciousness. 
This thesis is dedicated to my parents Ian and Vera 
Campbell. 
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THE PROBLEM OF MARX'S "INVERSION" OF HEGEL 
Marx as the "Inverted Hegel" 
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commentary, based on the 'Introduction' to the 
Phenomenology, of Hegel's mature objections 'fro 
Gýa4 ( 4ý ea and a summary account of 
critical epistemological consequences. I do not think it 
possible to doubt that these arguments, not only as 
present in the Phenomenology 6, x'k also as subsequently 
developed in the Science of Lo is and in the 
Encyclopaedia Logic, were the basic resources upon which 
Engels and Marx continually drew in reaching their own 
positions on these fundamental epistemological matters. 
Engels and Marx overall held to the essential knowability 
of the objective world, and the essential incorporation 
of human subjectivity within it in a fashion 
categorically indebted to Hegel. 
Establishing this there is, firstly, their own direct 
testimony in this respect. This is consistent on this 
point from the time of the writing of Marx's thesis (1) 
to that of Engel's Ludwig Feuerbach (2). Secondly, of 
course, there is the very substantial weight of those 
interpretations of Marx's marxism, amongst which we must 
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again count the later Engels' work, which have in fact 
been marxism's knowledge of these parts of its 
intellectual history up to well into the latter half of 
this century (3). These have pictured that history as 
Marx's taking over Hegel's winning of the possibility of 
truth but "inverting" Hegel's subsequent theocratic 
constructions in order to give the materialist - or 
sociological, or humanist, or historical, or economic, 
etc. - construction of the class struggle. One might 
peremptorily single out, apart from Anti-Dühring (4) (and 
works to which this and other of Engels' later writings 
rather directly gave rise such as Plekhanov's The 
Development of the Monist View of History (5)), Lenin's 
Philosophical Notebooks (6), Lukäcs' History and Class 
Consciousness (7) and Korsch's Marxism and Philosophy 
(8), Gramsci's Prison Notebooks (9), Stalin's Dialectical 
and Historical Materialism (10), marcuse's Reason and 
Revolution (11) and Lefebvre's Dialectical Materialism 
(12) as perhaps, after their different fashions, 
particularly significant expositions of these 
interpretations. Despite its length, this list, as a 
list, is certainly indefensible, but it does serve to 
illustrate a point crucially at issue here. These are 
obviously diverse and divergent, indeed in many respects 
explicitly opposed, interpretations, containing reading's 
of Marx's marxism as the bases of such a wide variety of 
historical marxisms that it seems illegitimate to join 
them even in this clearly collective noun. Nevertheless, 
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when taken, as I think it legitimate to do on these 
matters of intellectual history, as a whole, they 
represent a common crisis in the understanding of Marx's 
marxism and its relation to Hegel. 
Criticism of the Metaphor of Inversion 
For as it is now able to be recognised, a Hegel inverted 
or a Hegel with the rational kernel of materialist method 
extracted from within the mystical shell of idealist 
system is nonetheless still Hegel, though now to be 
called by another name - Marx (13). If I may again be 
allowed a merely illustrative list, I would link Della 
Volpe's Logic as a Positive (Historical) Science (14), 
Althusser's For Marx (15), Zeleny's The Method of Marx 
(16), and the second part of Colletti's Marxism and Hegel 
(17) with the successful criticism of the representation 
of Marx's relation to Hegel as a mere inversion or change 
of subject. Indeed these writings and others have firmly 
established the necessity of a radical discontinuity of 
method between Hegel and Marx were the latter to have 
laid even the foundations of a science of history and of 
a marxist politics which is informed by that science. 
Hermeneutic Difficulties in Reiey ctinc the metaphor of 
"Inversion" 
We are clearly faced with a conflict of interpretations 
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around the notion of "inverting" Hegel, and a conflict 
which involves a special hermeneutic difficulty (18). 
For if we accept, as I think we must, the criticisms of 
the adequacy of the metaphor of "inversion", then this 
conflict amounts to a paradox in respect of two figures 
who put forward this metaphor - Engels and Marx 
themselves. 
Firstly, consider the position of the later Engels. The 
difficulty in assessing the significance of Engels' later 
contributions has already been registered above by these 
writings being, as it were, counted twice. There are 
immediate obstacles to any attempt (ºc) to deny or 
severely restrict Engels' authority to speak for Marx, 
which is certainly necessary if Marx is to be separated 
from the metaphor of inversion, since these efforts of 
Engels to systematise marxist philosophy involve the 
guiding idea of Marx and himself having inverted Hegel. 
There is, brought to mind by the explicit links spanning 
more than fifty years of the preface to On the Critique 
of Political Economy, the foreword to Ludwig Feuerbach 
and The German Ideology (20), and between Socialism: 
Utopian and Scientific and The Holy Family (21), the 
extent to which Engels' efforts were the explication of 
work, particulary philosophical and overt political work, 
of the period up to 1847 upon which, after Marx, Engels 
was uniquely priveliged to comment. And further there is 
Marx's continued support for the later Engels' work, 
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which is exemplified by the former's interest in, 
assistance with, and approval of Anti-Dühring. 
This leads by a circular route to the second figure who 
presents especial difficulty to the rejection of the 
metaphor of inversion; the figure of Marx himself. Not 
only did Marx unto his death repeatedly affirm his debt 
to Hegel, but furthermore he did so in the very terms 
which have made the inversion metaphor of central 
importance. He famously expressed this debt in this way 
in the afterword to the second German edition of the 
first volume of Capital (2Z). Furthermore, he saw fit to 
reproduce this rare published methdological explication 
of his principal achievement as an explicit commentary, 
though allowing the omission of the metaphor of kernel 
and shell, in the last edition of volume one he saw in 
print, the French edition of 1873 (23). 
Theoretical Difficulties in Rejecting the Metaphor of 
"Inversion" 
I do not believe that these hermeneutic difficulties will 
allow of resolution if treated in a basically negative 
fashion, as largely a problem of determining when Marx 
was able to free himself from Hegelian influence. In so 
far as their interpretations involve a Marx at his best 
when wholly opposed to Hegel, this is the problem for 
both Althusser and Colletti. The former has devoted most 
6 
attention to this. 
It is not merely that if posed in this way these 
difficulties must, as we have seen, on the direct 
testimony of Marx himself be flatly denied a resolution 
before the mid- to late-1870s; indeed, this has compelled 
Althusser to withdraw his claim of an epistemological 
break with Hegel not merely from 1845 but behind Capital 
itself to the critique of the Gotha Programme and the 
notes on Wagner (24). It is that such a retreat leaves 
substantially unanswered the vital question of how did 
Marx accomplish his own development in work earlier than 
that which is approved? (25), and in fact presumes, on 
the basis of Althusser's own rejection of Hegel, that 
Hegel's presence in Marx's later writings can be treated 
as an incidental survival (26). After the achievement of 
his preliminary indication of the necessary existence in 
Marx of a fundamental departure in method from Hegel, 
particularly in 'Contradiction and Overdetermination' 
(27), Althusser seems to have proceeded to evaluate 
Marx's work to determine how far they measure up to the 
conclusions of that essay. It is wholly incorrect to 
treat this as an investigation of how Marx himself 
accomplished the indicated departure, and in fact to do 
so necessarily involves misunderstanding the character of 
Marx's own intellectual development. Hence Althusser's 
interpetations of, and even detailed commentaries on, 
Marx's writings contain perhaps the most fantastic 
-7 
infelicities that can be found in any reading at all 
sympathetic to Marx (14'). Althusser's contributions do, 
I believe, cast light on certain of the basic thrusts of 
Marx's work in an interesting way (2 ), but by no means 
explain the genesis or fully describe the significance of 
these within Marx himself, and thus in the end are 
inadequate even to what is approved within those 
writings. That is to say, as has often enough been said 
(3o), that Althusser's substantive accounts of ideology 
and capitalist institutions fall far beneath the 
positions won by Marx himself. As Althusser would be the 
first to insist, it is only within an entire body of 
thought that any particular aspect of it may be fully 
understood, and this tells us a great deal about the 
replacement of the metaphor of "inversion" with that of 
"break". It is clearly the case that Althusser's marxism 
requires that Hegelian influence be eradicated. But it 
is only if this is quite falsely presented as Marx's 
marxism that the critique of the Gotha Programme, one of 
the principal sources of Marx's developed political 
formulations of alienation and its transcendence (31), 
and the notes on Wagner, the most extenive of Marx's 
defences of the method of volume one of Capital 
especially in respect of its debt to Hegel (32), can be 
said to be totally free of Hegelian influence. Equally, 
it is only upon this basis that the section on "The 
Fetishism of Commodities and Its Secret", which is the 
key to Marx's political economy in its summary of the 
s 
critique of value as the critique of the alienation of 
capitalist production (33), can be regarded as a flagrant 
and harmful Hegelian survival (3ý). But this is to 
seriously violate the boundary between critical 
exposition and independent criticism, and Althusser can, 
I think, be severely censured for not paying sufficient 
attention to this. 
Much the same could be said of what I am afraid appears 
to me to be Colletti's wholly arbitrary, from the point 
of view of interpretation, attempt to link Marx and Kant 
to the exclusion of Hegel. Having suppressed the Hegel 
in Marx, Althusser was driven to seek the philosophical 
sources of Marx's thought in other antecedents, and 
alighted upon Spinoza (35). Colletti's recasting of 
Marx's intellectual ancestry is more explicit, though the 
direct evidence of Marx's indebtedness to the figure 
chosen is even more slight than in the case of Spinoza. 
It seems as if, at whatever cost of violence to Marx's 
own clear testimony with respect to his evaluation of 
German idealism and the English and French sources of his 
materialism, Colletti felt compelled to press on with the 
challenge to the heuristic value of the metaphor of 
inversion until he had completely bridged Hegel. He 
thereby directly connects Marx to the materialist intent 
in Kant's defence of phenomenal knowledge. The 
epistemological result is indeed hardly an an advance 
upon Kant, and it certainly cannot represent Marx (36). 
q 
There is a further paradox here, though I think a more 
instructive one than the earlier. I can find but little 
trace of Marx's ever complex conjunctural analyses in the 
simple functionalism (31) of 'Ideology and Ideological 
State Apparatuses' (38), nor of Marx's materialism in the 
irremediably idealist method (3q) set out in Colletti's 
introduction to Bernstein or in his essay on 'Marxism: 
Science or Revolution? ' (40). One is lead back to Marx 
because there is a clear gap between the departure from 
Hegel in Marx which has been indicated and the explicitly 
anti-Hegelian marxisms which have been put forward as 
rigorous marxism fully cognisant of this departure. 
particularly important because the gap shows to the 
detriment of the latter. But in recognising this, it is 
vital to retain the positive contributions which have 
been Mwde. We must now begin with the recognition that 
it is fruitless to regard Marx's relation to Hegel as that 
of a simple inversion. In so far as it fails to do this, 
Timpanaro's valuable defence of, and building upon, the 
significance of the philosophy of the later Engels (41) 
tends to merge with complete acceptance of or even 
accentuation of the mechanistic tone of that philosophy 
(42. ), and is thus in severe danger of returning to 
certain of the positions of the Second International 
which least merit revival. For marxist philosophy to 
have to free itself from these positions once again would 
indeed be a farce (, y 37 
to 
Outline of the Coming Argument 
This seems to me to lead to further consideration of what 
it exactly meant to "invert" Hegel. There stand as the 
conclusions of earlier investigations that this metaphor 
cannot be discounted as merely a figure of speech, and 
nor can it be accepted at face value. But it may be 
investigated again, drawing upon the instructive 
successes and failures of these earlier contributions in 
order to move towards some resolution of their opposing 
insights. This is indeed something of a necessity. For 
if criticism of the metaphor of inversion threatens our 
lines of theoretical supply from Hegel and Marx (44), the 
threat arises principally because the criticism exposes 
serious existing weaknesses. At issue now must be, for 
all responses other than the unproductively dogmatic 
defence of established positions, the fundamental issues 
in the interpretation of Hegel and Marx. 
I would like to use the idea of Marx's "inversion" of 
Hegel as the guiding thread of a commentary upon both of 
these figures and their relation in order to address 
these issues. I think this will be a fruitful tack, more 
so than has I think been hitherto imagined, because of 
the strong and strongly self-conscious way in which both 
Hegel and Marx did wish, as the central aim of both of 
their works, to actually invert contemporaneous social 
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consciousness. The whole issue remains vital in that 
both Hegel and Marx demonstrate the inestimable 
importance of the project of inversion they set out; but 
the project remains to be realised. 
Firstly, then, as Althusser has suggested in calling for 
further work on the idea of inversion (45), a little more 
light on. Hegel himself; which involves us in to 
the 'Introduction' to the Phenomenology. 
IL 
PART 
HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY: THE OVERCOMING OF ALIENATION 
THROUGH RECOGNITION OF THE ABSOLUTE TRUTH 
v3 
CHAPTER ý- 
HEGEL'S CRITICISM OF THE CLASSICAL EPISTEMOLOGICAL 
PROJECT 
The Impasse of the Classical Epistemological Project 
In the opening paragraphs (1) of what is now known (2) as 
the 'Introduction' to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel 
distinguishes his aims in the Phenomenology from what 
he quite properly regards as the classical project of 
modern European epistemologies (3). He criticises the 
very idea of the attempt, in its modern form begun by 
Descartes (4), to gnoseologically establish the 
fundamental foundations of, and boundaries to, potential 
knowledge prior to the achievement of any substantial 
knowledge as such. 
Hegel identifies in the classical epistemological project 
two conceptions of cognition, as either the instrument 
by which knowledge is produced or the medium through 
which it is perceived (5). Though Hegel wants these 
metaphors to stand as characteristics of classical 
epistemology, it is in fact particularly Kant which he 
has in mind here. This is so not least in that Hegel 
does not think it necessary to consider the plausibility 
of epistemologies of direct perception. That is to say, 
he presumes Kant's firm establishment of what may be 
tit 
regarded as the fundamental implication of the classical 
epistemological project, that cognition is a creative 
process. By this I mean not merely that knowing can be 
predicated only of a subject (which Kant recognises as 
the transcendental unity of apperception (6)), but 
further that the subject contributes an active 
interpretation to the formation of knowledge (7). Given 
that cognition involves this moment of interpretation, 
Hegel does not deny the justified scepticism which the 
classical epistemological projects directs at the 
effectiveness of the cognitive instrument or the 
transparency of the cognitive medium. Rather he argues 
that the cognitive use of an instrument or medium indeed 
necessarily must in someway affect the to-be-known or 
cognition itself would be redundant. However, this means 
that the positive intentions of rigorously pursued 
scepticism must ultimately collapse into a total 
rejection of the possibility of gaining knowledge, at 
least of the properly true kind of unmediated 
acquaintance with the to-be-known envisaged at the 
beginning of the epistemological effort. 
Following this line 
paradox of the 
epistemology in the 
knowledge, such as 
conceptual thinking 
infinite truth (8), 
of argument, Hegel notes that the 
complete eschewing of considered 
name of the achievement of true 
Jacobi's intuitionist criticism of 
as an obstruction to belief in God's 
is immanent in Kantian epistemology 
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(9). For if the employment of the instrument or the 
medium prevents the achievement of the desired result, 
why bother with it at all? Is it not better to just 
intuitively grasp the result? Unfortunately, of course, 
the beliefs adopted through such hasty manoeuvres are 
open to the basic scepticism of the classical 
epistemological project, which the "philosophy", of those 
beliefs denies but cannot answer (10). 
Hegel next considers a possible solution to this impasse, 
which may lie in examining the qualities of the 
instrument or medium of cognition and then in subtracting 
these from the products of cognition to leave unmediated 
knowledge. Hegel would seem to have in mind here a 
reference to Reinhold's post-Kantian attempt to 
neutralise the seemingly unfortunate consequences of the 
subjectivity of thinking (11). Reinhold's proposed 
method of coming to terms with an acknowledgement of the 
existence of ineradicable presuppositions in all 
cognition, by successively holding to different ones in 
order to lay every one potentially open to inquiry (12), 
undoubtedly exercised an influence on Hegel, and 
particularly upon the form of argument of the 
Phenomenology, somewhat beyond Hegel's own 
acknowledgement. However, rather than take this up in 
what I believe would be rather unrewarding detail for the 
purposes of evaluating basic epistemological positions, I 
think it more fruitful at this point to consider the 
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implications of Hegel's argument for an evaluation of the 
analogous case of the constructive aims of empiricism. 
Locke's account of the sensationalist ground of the 
simple ideas of the human understanding (13) aims to 
provide a sure foundation of unmediated knowledge on 
which the creative contributions of the understanding to 
more complex ideas may be based. Hegel stresses, against 
such an approach, that if the results of cognition are 
subtracted from knowledge, then, given the recognition 
of creativity in cognition which motivates the 
epistemological effort, this amounts to a return to a 
position prior to knowledge. The isolation of the 
subject's contribution can never leave a residue not 
affected by that contribution, because, of course, we 
must know what that residue is. That is to say, the 
residue must be subjected to the cognitive effort. Even 
within its own terms, the greatest contribution which 
Locke's approach can really make is a reduction of 
certain aspects of cognition to other perhaps more 
fundamental ones (14). With regard to these latter, the 
basic episteMOlogical inquiry cannot be pursued with any 
other result than a complete scepticism (15). Hegel 
indeed observes that immanent within this procedure is a 
thoroughgoing agnosticism with regard to true knowledge 
and a concession of the redundancy of epistemology. When 
Hume followed Berkeley's exposure of the wholly arbitrary 
nature of Locke's distinction between primary and 
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secondary qualities (16), rigorously cutting away such 
restraining inconsistencies, he moved the basic 
destructive potentialities of Lockean empiricism on to a 
completely nihilistic conclusion (17). 
The Self-Contradictory Form of the Classical 
Epistemological Project 
Having consistently pushed forms of classical 
epistemological doubt through to ineradicable scepticism 
about their own ability to reveal a valid cognitive 
approach to gaining any substantive knowledge, Hegel 
proceeds to extend his questioning to their formulation 
of their own basic project. He demonstrates that in 
depicting cognition and the object to-be-known as 
radically separate and in assuming that the former is an 
instrument or medium through which the latter is to be 
grasped or is to be percieved, this project in itself is 
making a presumptive knowledge claim about the character 
of cognition itself. Furthermore, whilst the argument of 
the Phenomenology must be regarded as undeveloped on this 
point, Hegel certainly shows elsewhere that the project 
must make such a claim. He argues that whilst it may be 
possible to test other instruments or media by means 
other than setting them to their intended tasks, this is 
not so in the case of cognition. One cannot search for 
truth with spears and staves; the very examination of 
cognition must itself be necessarily conducted through an 
I% 
act of cognition. Or, as Hegel also says, one cannot 
hope to swim before one ever enters the water. In sum, 
any possible epistemological scrutiny of cognition's 
adequacy to provide true knowledge must itself involve 
established knowledge of cognition (18). 
For example, let us return (though Hegel does not do so 
until a later passage and in a somewhat different 
connection (19)), to the attempt to subtract from the 
results of cognition the qualities of the cognitive 
instrument or medium. Such an attempt, we can see, could 
possibly proceed only from an initial possession of 
absolute knowledge of the character of cognition. This 
immediately involves a circular argument from 
indefensible assumptions, as Berkeley and Hume observed 
with regard to Lockets primary qualities. Or. if an 
attempt is made to provide a defence of the knowledge of 
cognition, it will decay into an infinite regression of 
argument, since it is necessary to inquire into the 
cognitive distortions of the earlier knowledge of 
cognitive distortions and so on. 
It is, Hegel contends, as a consequence of its own 
particular characterisation of potential knowledge that 
the classical epistemological project yields only 
scepticism. Proceeding as an inquiry into what cognition 
does, this project, in setting the to-be-known apart from 
iC' 
any possible cognition, from the outset ensures that true 
knowledge -is rendered unavailable. For as cognition must 
accomplish something if it is necessary for the 
attainment of knowledge, yet the to-be-known is wholly 
separate from this act of knowing, then, nonsensically, 
any true knowledge can be only knowledge not arrived at 
through cognition. 
Hegel acknowledges the possibility that after reaching 
the sceptical conclusion of classical doubt one may 
consign true knowledge to some unreachably distant area 
and then accept some sort of knowledge, if this is the 
correct word, which has eschewed claims to being true. 
Indeed, the common-sense necessity of this is at the root 
of Hume's insincerity in distinquishing between the 
philosophical and the vulgar standpoints, the latter 
necessarily embracing natural beliefs (20). Hegel 
remarks, however, that this position again posits the 
necessity of epistemological investigaton renewed at this 
new level if other than an unacceptable and, in fact, 
ultimately unsupportable total relativism is to be 
professed. This may be read as an allusive account of 
Kant's aims in the first Critique (21), where Kant 
accepts Hume's theory of causality but nevertheless tries 
to bring science and not merely natural beliefs into the 
realm of possible standpoints (22). 
Hegel insists that this position is at root a compound of 
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absurdities. If the essential characteristic of 
knowledge is that it strives to be true, then what can be 
the status of this other knowledge which does not do so? 
The vocabulary of epistemology - knowledge, truth, 
adequacy, etc. - cannot be simply duplicated for this new 
level but must take on new meanings expressive of 
untruth. The Kantian attempt to answer scepticism with 
regard to knowledge of noumena by claiming possible 
knowledge of phenomena (23) must fail, because it 
proceeds from an acknowledgement that there cannot really 
be a sure foundation for this knowledge. Acceptance of 
the unknowability of the thing-in-itself destroys the 
truth of even phenomenal knowledge (24). 
The Unknowability of the Thing-in-itself 
I want now to turn-to a further, and, in the narrow sense 
of criticism, final observation which Hegel makes on the 
classical epistemological project. This concerns Hegel's 
particular formulation of the most common theme of 
immediately post-Kantian epistemology - the rejection of 
the thing-in-itself. This is not to be found in the 
'Introduction', though Hegel had aleady made the argument 
in 'Faith and Knowledge', because in this 'Introduction' 
Hegel is not so much concerned to bury the classical 
epistemological project as to develop from it more 
fruitful positions, and in seeking to put forward his 
thought on the point most fully we must consider the 
'It 
Science of Logic and the Encyclopaedia Logic (25). 
If the separation of the to-be-known from cognition 
vitiates the possiblity of true knowledge, what then, 
Hegel demands, is it possible to say with regard to the 
to-be-known? What is it possible to know of it? Clearly 
the answer is absolutely nothing. If knowledge is 
rendered always flawed by the assumptions of the 
classical epistemological project, then, equally, the 
to-be-known is rendered unimportant. If it is 
inaccessible to cognition, then it is also purely 
abstract in the bad sense, as it is impossible to have 
knowledge of it by which it might be known. Playing on 
one of the most famous of Kant's many neologisms, Hegel 
points out that the thing-in-itself, as it cannot be 
available for knowledge, is, precisely, merely in-itself. 
Whilst I am unsure as to the extent to which Hegel 
himself presses the point, it seems quite permissible to 
extend the above argument on to an exposure of the basic 
contradiction inherent in the concept of the 
thing-in-itself which emphatically underlines the 
shortcoming in the characterisation of knowing in the 
classical epistemological project. This is that in 
claiming that it is impossible to know the 
thing-in-itself one is, of course, in fact claiming to 
know something about it; at least that it exists and, 








of true knowledges and of other 
assumptions 0c- the classical 
oject thus completely disrupt the 
Hegel's arguments against the 
certainly be seen as exposing this 
In fine, the thrust of Hegel's argument so far is not 
only to point out the general frustrations which follow 
from the idea of the thing-in-itself, but more than this 
to destroy the very quality of being in-itself which 
shields that idea from criticism. Accepting that the 
thing-in-itself is actually given, one must accept the 
frustrations to which it leads as the frustrations of 
philosophy or even of human life as such. Hegel, I 
believe, shows that the in-itself actually arises from a 
specific philosophical position. Rather than the 
in-itself being a given with which we must come to terms, 
it is now explained as being given . the alienation of 
the Power to know within a specific epistemology. 
Truth and Absolute Truth in Hegel's Criticism of the 
Classical Epistemological Project 
To summarise: Hegel argues that it is ultimately 
nonsensical to presume an object to-be-known wholly 
unconnected to the procedure by which it might be known. 
Not only are such presumptions completely indefensible 
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according to the criteria of the epistemological project 
in which they are made, but from the outset they further 
involve this project in an inevitable failure to achieve 
its goals and ultimately ridicule these very presumptions 
themselves. The positive moments of epistemology are 
undermined in its classical formulation. The eradication 
of possibly recognisable deficiencies in knowledge is 
clearly a valuable undertaking which is of the essence of 
cognition. However when flatly posed in terms of an 
empty cognition and a separate but equally empty 
to-be-known, this undertaking becomes that of the 
eradication of some unspecifiable inadequacy between 
knowledge without content and an unknowable. It is thus 
a hopeless and absurd task. 
As should be made perfectly clear, Hegel's critique of 
classical epistemology through this defence of the 
possibility of truth is carried out in order that Spirit 
might be recognised as the Absolute. However, expressed 
in his particular procedure is a profound and important 
departure from intuitionism such as that of Jacobi (21). 
For it is Hegel's profound intent to bridge the gap 
between knowledge and faith (26) and to establish a 
knowledge of God which is not merely constituted of the 
assumptions of faith but which is subject to and is 
confirmed in reasoned cognition. Hegel regards 
Philosophical Truth as the highest form of the knowledge 
of God, higher than that which he shows to be in art and 
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in religion (2-1ý), because of the manifest clarity of, 
precisely, Philosophy (30)'. Taking Hegel seriously 
entails recognising this fundamental motivation in all 
his mature work (3t), however critical it might prove 
necessary to be with regard to his attempts to realise 
it. This involves acknowledging that the critique of 
classical epistemology is not an intuitionist eschewing 
of philosophy but is itself firstly epistemological (31). 
As it is developed, this critique involves an attempt to 
deny the possibility of a project of epistemology at all 
separate from a universal theocrasy. But the necessity 
of this is to be argued within epistemology, broadly 
concieved as the reasoned investigation of knowledge. 
Hegel grounds his identification of the Absolute as the 
moment of self-knowedge of Spirit upon, properly 
speaking, a prior, polemical demonstration of the 
possibility of any such identification. Now, whilst I 
believe that this identification contains a number of 
fundamental mistakes, it is only after Hegel has opened 
up the possibility of truth, through the criticism of 
dominant epistemological approaches which deny this 
possibility in advance of any particular attempt to 
realise truth, that is concievable to characterise his 




THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT AS HEGEL'S PROOF OF ABSOLUTE 
TRUTH 
Introduction 
In the order of the exposition of the 'Introduction', 
after having exposed those characteristics of the 
classical epistemological project which necessarily 
render any cognition as flawed, Hegel goes an to consider 
the possibility of dispensing with the inevitably bleak 
positions of this project and independently developing 
knowledge of the to-be-known. This developed knowledge 
is, once established, to make its claim to truth 
perfectly clear through the then possible comparison of 
itself with classical epistemology (1). 
Hegel is here situating the Phenomenolo9Y with respect to 
contemporaneous philosophy, referring in particular to 
Schelling's flat contraposition of objective idealism to 
subjective idealism as developed from Kant by Fichte. 
This nexus is certainly the crucial one for a philological 
understanding of the development at Jena of the mature 
thought of Phenomenology (2). This is so, however, in 
the peculiar sense that its full significance is to be 
found in its treatment as a subject of Hegel's thought. 
For not only was the contemporaneous philosophic milieu 
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an obvious influence on the character of Hegel's thought, 
but furthermore he made his attitude to that milieu a 
vital component of his views. 
Hegel sets out the aims of the Phenomenology in the 
context of contemporaneous philosophy by. insisting both 
that objective idealism is true and that this may be 
demonstrated in accord with the reasoned examination of 
subjective cognition as in the critical philosophy. 
Hegel on Fichte and Schelling: The Necessity and 
Possibility of Winning Conviction in the Absolute 
Hegel questions whether, whatever may be the rights of 
the matter, an inadequate conception might just come to 
accept true knowledge, even when, as Schelling's 
procedure envisages, directly confronted with such 
knowledge. The very problem is, of course, precisely 
that such a conception is not able to recognise truth. 
Were a true knowledge to merely insist upon its own truth 
and urge that is should be believed because of its 
insistence, then clearly it could be equally met by a 
similiar insistence made on behalf of the inadequate 
conception, and any one such bare insistence is as good 
as any other. The upshot could be only an unseemly 
haggling between rival "truths" (3), for why should any 
belief obey what is virtually a demand that it stand on 
its head and accept its opposite? (4). 
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Whilst he had, as is well enough recognised, the greatest 
regard for the intent of Schelling's earlier philosophy 
and for the substance of its positions (5), Hegel's 
raising of these difficulties marks the extent of his 
departures from Schelling (or at least from positions 
readily identifiable with Schellingian philosophy (6)) 
at the time of the writing of the Phenomenology. 
Schelling insists that true knowledge is quite different 
from ordinary beliefs (7), but identifies the gaining of 
that knowledge with a basic intellectual intuition of the 
supreme principle of the identity of subject and object 
(8). Schelling's transcendental deduction of empirical 
consciousness explicitly presupposes and moves from that 
intuition (9), which he comes to locate in an almost 
unconscious moment of aesthetic production (10). This 
moment, it seems, represents an acquaintance with the 
highest truth specifically because it is mysterious and 
not able to be fully and explicitly understood. 
Schelling's transcendental account of empirical 
consciousness gives a sophisticated development of the 
principle of objective idealism into ostensible forms, 
and in this respect is hardly comparable to an 
intuitionism of Jacobi's type which contents itself with 
the all encompassing and, therefore, completely 
featureless truth of God's infinite being (11). However, 
in respect of the ground of these intuitions there seems 
to be little more to secure Schelling's philosophy than 
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Jacobi's anti-philosophy. Hegel insists that Schelling's 
method of grasping true knowledge avoids the difficult 
but indispensable work of the reasoned establishment of 
itself as true (12). The effect of this, we can see, is 
that Schelling's position seems to be based on an 
unwarranted assumption because it eschews coming to terms 
with the philosophic milieu which is its audience. 
Hegel's attempts to restore the possibility of truth 
through criti. 't of the classical epistemolgical project 
do not, by contrast, involve him in outright rejection of 
reasoned cognition as such. He is unable to accept 
neither a simple intuitionist grasp of truth nor a basic 
statement of assumed truth even though accompanied by the 
most sophisticated philosophical development because when 
it comes to establishing their vital basic truth they are 
indifferent to reasoned criteria of proof. 
Truth, Hegel says, must actively turn against inadequate 
conceptions and destroy their belief in their own truth 
so that those conceptions might come to recognise the 
genuine truth as such. He insists that the full sense of 
such destruction, rather than the sense conveyed by 
suppression (or its synonyms), can be accomplished only 
if it is effective within the inadequate conceptions 
(13). This full sense of destruction is realisable only 
when the assertion of their own untruth has been accepted 
by inadequate conceptions in a fashion which is initially 
secured on a ground which those conceptions can recognise 
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and understand. The recognition of truth from this 
starting point becomes a process of developing 
enlightenment, not an imposition from above which can 
never achieve its aims as its method contradicts those 
aims (14). Unless it is initially secured within 
inadequate conceptions and organically develops from 
there, any change in the acknowledged truth will not 
properly speaking be an acceptance of truth, even if the 
new belief is the truth, but a failure to win such 
acceptance. In so failing, though it might force an 
acknowledgement of its dominance, the truth will not gain 
recognition of its truth (15). 
For Hegel, the works of Fichte, and Schelling represent 
the final opposition of equally necessary aspects of 
truth, the overcoming of which opposition will establish 
the philosophical statement of truth. His early 
comparison of their works refers to The Difference 
Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy, 
the use here of "system" in the singular and not the 
plural turning on Hegel's conviction that these two 
writers represent moments in the overall development of 
the true philosophy (16). He will not allow Schelling's 
simple identification of truth through an intuition which 
will, because it is an intuition, remain unclear and 
powerless to win conviction. Equally he will not, 
recalling his initial polemic against classical 
epistemology, allow Fichte's conflation of the point of 
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view of the self-positing ego with the e]mination of the 
sense of objectivity in truth (17), and indeed he makes a 
rare direct statement to this effect in the 'Introducton' 
(18). Rather he takes these as both being constitutive 
of the point where truth is basically known, but awaits 
its full and clear demonstration as true, which can come 
only through the deliberately explicit awareness provided 
by philosophically reasoned cognition. He aims to enrich 
not only Fichte's empty subject but also Schelling's 
paradoxically equally empty object. 
Hegel's Conviction that Truth is on the Scene 
Hegel's arguments against Schelling certainly have a 
biting tone, and the issues of difference between them 
are important, as I have said. But these arguments also 
articulate Hegel's fundamental sympathy with positions 
which Schelling had brought to public attention, and we 
must not lose sight of this because in this polemic there 
are contained the definite beginnings of Hegel's posing 
of the problem of gaining truth in his own fashion, as 
the prelude to his own solutions. Though it is perhaps 
eventually unhelpful, Hegel's own metaphor of content and 
form (19) may be used to provisionally describe his 
attitude to Schelling. Hegel endorses the basic content 
of objective idealism, but is critical of the merely 
objective form of its presentation. Hegel's close links 
to Schelling make it clear how closely there must be an 
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analogy here to Hegel himself (20), to his own earlier 
"theological" (21) and objective idealist (22) opinions. 
The Phenomenology must be read as an attempt at an 
adequate form of presentation of views already worked up 
in detail in the Jenenser system (23). Truth, Hegel is 
saying in response to Schelling, is on the scene, and the 
task of contemporaneous philosophy is to realise that 
truth (24). 
Now there is a very interesting sense, one which Hegel 
does much to formulate, in which any important 
intellectual effort must be able to relate itself to its 
past, because in the past lies its own origins. 
Schelling's objective idealism must, unless it actually 
is arbitrary and unfounded in the most random way, 
potentially be communicable through dialogue with the 
classical epistemological project since, whether 
Schelling himself acknowledges this or not, the 
significance of his work lies precisely in the way it 
stands as a development from that project. Not only will 
Schelling's work have roots in preceding philosophy, 
because this is necessarily the soil in which his thought 
will have grown, but the philosophic importance of that 
thought lies in its relation to its own past. It would 
be to deepen Schelling's self-consciousness and 
consequently the foundations of his philosophy were he to 
be dissatisfied with intuition and directly attempt to 
ground that philosophy in the reasoned fashion of public 
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dialogue. One cannot conclude these observations without 
mentioning that Schelling's painstaking efforts to relate 
his thought to the development of Fichtean philosophy 
continually internally challenge his reliance upon 
intellectual intuition (25). 
We must be aware that Hegel's argument to this point 
contains elements that are neither entailed in nor 
justified by putting the above case against Schelling. 
For whilst Hegel has developed the point that the 
conceptions of classical epistemology are inadequate and 
in advance of any specific consideration could not 
recognise or allow of truth, in the argument we are now 
discussing he sets up an opposition between those 
conceptions and the truth which can proceed only from the 
basis of his own identification of Absolute Spirit as 
Truth being true (26). What this means we will of course 
have to consider shortly. However, we must preface our 
consideration of Spirit with a recognition of the way 
Hegel himself prefaces his own setting out of Spirit with 
an assumption of Absolute Spirit as Truth. Hegel does 
not find in Schelling an interesting explicit response to 
classical epistemology but a blunt statement of the truth 
of the identity of subject and object, and that 
particular truth is from the outset taken by Hegel to be 
the culmination of philosophic development from classical 
epistemology. Hegel in fact moves from criticising the 
foreclosure of the possibility of truth in classical 
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epistemology to a presumptive possession of truth after 
the fashion of objective idealism. Thus, the problem of 
gaining truth is subtly but extensively changed to that 
of the recognition of the claims to truth of a certain 
position, which are presupposed to be correct. Hegel's 
way of speaking in this passage of the 'Introduction' 
seems rather strange. The Truth, he claims is on the 
scene, and it must be established as such. This would be 
senseless, unless, as is actually Hegel's belief, the 
truth is already fixed as he writes the Phenomenology and 
we must recognise this state of affairs. As Hegel puts 
it a little later (27), his project is that of relating 
Truth to inadequate knowledges so that the Truth may be 
seen as true (28). 
It is necessary to examine Hegel's elision of his polemic 
against the empty foreclosure of the possibility of truth 
and his assertion of a fixed truth in order to see how 
intuition, in fact, plays a very important role in the 
Phenomenology. There is no source, epistemologically 
speaking, for Hegel's conception of Absolute Spirit other 
than intuition (or its synonyms) (29). The radical shift 
in the most basic aims of the project of "phenomenology" 
in and after Husserl, although by no means always 
providing a contrast unfavourable to Hegel, does speak of 
the total impossibility of generating the Hegelian Spirit 
from any possible human analysis of being (30). Efforts 
to reintroduce Hegelian themes into post-Husserlian 
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phenomenology have perforce involved a substantial 
reconstruction of those themes. From the opposite point 
of view, as it were (31), Kierkegaard's so completely 
negative (32) evaluation of Hegel explicitly relocates 
Christian religious belief in the specifically 
incomprehensible leap of faith that is its only element 
in individual experience (33). Hegel elsewhere says that 
he writes the Phenomenology, in order to provide the 
ladder which it might be reasonably requested be made 
available in order to climb to the Absolute (34). Even 
were one to accept this claim, it would leave unanswered 
the rudely obvious question about Hegel's own ladder 
(35). 
T\, \ e way in which Hegel has managed to involve hisbw, \ 
conception of Truth in his argument so far becomes clear 
as he moves on to setting out his own position. He 
develops his consideration of the procedure of 
confronting inadequate conceptions with the Truth by 
further arguing that it is not open to the latter to 
demonstrate its truth by means of bluntly claiming that 
the former contains intimations of truth as the 
beginnings of movement towards its, the latter's, own 
self. Initially, it may be noted that this procedure 
clearly again turns on true knowledge being recognised as 
such in order that presentiments of it may be seen as 
leading to the Truth, and that therefore this is a 
subordinate argument to the earlier objections Hegel has 
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raised rejecting one particular form of the overall 
procedure. Hegel allows that such an appeal might be 
made, his objection to it being that it will not succeed 
not that it is unfounded, and this further confirms his 
identification of this relation between these beliefs as 
that of the true and the false and also begins to reveal 
how he precisely concieves of that relation. Hegel 
insists that this procedure must be unconvincing because 
the Truth will not be demonstrating its truth in an 
adequate fashion but will merelybc statically and 
dogmatically appealling to an untruth which precisely 
cannot express or recognise truth. However, though 
critical of the simple assertion implicit in this 
approach, it is certainly along these lines that Hegel 
thinks that an adequate demonstration of Truth will be 
achieved. 
For Hegel closes his discussion of the blunt opposition 
of inadequate conceptions and the Truth by declaring that 
it is because the static appealling to earlier 
intimations of Truth will not win the recognition of 
truth that the Phenomenology is to undertake the 
exposition of the process by which Truth came to appear. 
This exposition will actually illustrate the dynamic 
movement from inadequate belief to Truth and not just 
flatly claim this relation to be the case (36), and will 
thus show exactly how justified was an appeal to 
intimations of Truth in earlier inadequate conceptions. 
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This is to say that Hegel directly locates the possible 
achievement of the recognition of Truth in his proposal 
of giving an exposition of how Truth makes its 
appearance. Why this should be successful is by no means 
immediately clear. It is open for any belief to try and 
show how it is, in a sense, the result of earlier 
beliefs, and to the extent that this is so the later 
belief will win recognition of its own importance. It 
will stand as the furthest development of what was most 
valuable in earlier thought. Obviously the use of words 
such as "result" in this connection rather stretches the 
point. The sense of development involved is teleological 
to the extent that later thought can consciously direct 
itself to the development of earlier resources, but there 
is nothing necessary, in a strong sense, about this. But 
Hegel here wants to use "result" in a strong way. For 
him the fixed Truth which is now on the scene is a 
necessary result of earlier thought. In fact, Hegel's 
arguments here articulate the critical themes of his 
conception of Spirit, and further understanding of his 
procedure of. winning recognition of Truth requires some 
account of these themes which are the basis of all his 
mature work. 
Hege l's Notion of Spirit 
In the briefest outline: Hegel holds that Spirit posits 
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the appearance of its own finite limitation in the 
initial estranged form of Nature, and that human History 
is the progressive recognition, or realisation, of 
Spirit's own Absolute Self. Spirit's real struggles 
travelling this route are the necessary means by which it 
comes to be aware of its own infinitude. Let me try to 
make this more clear, in part at least, by showing how it 
is to constitute a source of productive development over 
Schelling's positions. 
Hegel believes that this conception of Spirit allows an 
answer to his own criticisms that Schelling fails to pay 
attention to the winning of conviction in the Truth 
because it has, at its heart, a crucial role for just 
such an effort. It is Hegel's basic contention that it 
is radically insufficient for God to be understood merely 
as objective, even were He all infinite objectivity, for 
even such all embracing omnipresence, though it is 
certainly a characteristic of God, is meaningless unless 
God knows himself to be omnipresent. In part, this is an 
argument of logical entailment. On occasion Hegel seems 
to be saying that, for example, infinitude can have no 
meaning unless it is contrasted to finitude. For God to 
be the infinite unity, He must have overcome the 
limitations of finite individuality, otherwise His 
infinity cannot have any sense (37). However, such 
logical arguments obviously turn upon adopting an 
epistemologically subjective standpoint in the assessment 
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of the requirements of certain types of knowledge, and it 
is Hegel's point more generally that God must see his own 
constitution of all objectivity if He is to know it in a 
full sense (38). That is, God must come to know this 
from the position of subjectivity. He must be not only 
object but also subject. (39). It is only by becoming 
aware of His own presence in objectivity and thus, in an 
important sense which follows from the conterminity of 
what God may know and what He Himself is, overcoming the 
distinction of subject and object (40), that God may 
recognise His own omnipresence. God thus has to posit 
finite subjectivities (41) within an initially 
independently objective realm (42) as the vehicles 
through which He may come to know His own infinitude. 
Human History as the overcoming of the alienation of lack 
of self-knowledge is central to Hegel's Spirit. Hegel 
does not shirk from accepting the positions to which this 
account of God's reliance on the World must lead. The 
core of the argument is that God may recognise His 
character only by striving after the realisation of it. 
That is, the very comprehension of the existence of both 
human beings and God turns on recognising in God some of 
the characteristics - particularly characteristic needs - 
of personality (43). These lead to an understanding of 
God needing to posit Human History as fulfilment of the 
requirement of subjectively coming to know himself. 
History is, in essence, God's autobiography (44). In 
sum, Hegel argues that God must be concieved not only as 
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objective substance but as the subjective realisation of 
His own constitution of objectivity (45); that is to say, 
as Spirit (46). 
This conception of Spirit gives us the principal meaning 
of Hegel's use of "alienation" in his philosophy. In 
saying this, I must make it clear that alienation has 
further senses in his thought, and that this is 
particularly so in the Phenomenology and the Philosophy 
of Right (47). However, what I want to draw attention to 
is the way in which Hegel unites two German words - 
"Entäusserung" and "Entfremdung" - which can certainly be 
separated, in order to give a single idea which it is 
therefore quit e correct to translate by the single 
English term of "alienation". Entäusserung refers to 
alienation in the sense of relinquishing _a power 
to hold 
or do somethin g, a legalistic sense used to betoken the 
economic aliena tion or sale of a commodity (including 
human power). For Hegel, Spirit alienates its being in 
this sense in that it externalises itself in what seems 
at first a di stinct otherness (48). Through his use of 
Entfremdung Heg el narrows down this idea of otherness to 
stress ap articular characteristic of Spirit's 
externalisation of itself. Entfremdung denotes the 
making strange or even antagonistic of a person or a 
situation, a possible English equivalent being 
"estrangement". Spirit's externalisation of itself is 
specifically an estrangement in in that Spirit does not 
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immediately know itself in its externalised form of 
Nature and History (49). Entäusserung and Entfremdung 
are convolutely intertwined throughout the Phenomenology 
mainly because in his idea of alienation and its 
overcoming he is driving at the abolition of otherness in 
Absolute self-knowledge in a way wholly dependent on his 
conception of Spirit. 
The obvious - but nevertheless very forceful - critical 
response to all this is to insist that there is 
absolutely no reason to accept it in its own terms. Let 
us allow that there is great interest in Hegel's 
conception of Spirit. This idea indeed is surely one of 
the most striking and fruitful allegories of human 
existence in modern thought. Let us even further allow 
(though I think this is to go too far) that this 
conception of alienated Spirit may serve as a coherent 
understanding of God and His creation of humanity which 
overcomes the traditional theological conundra associated 
with these matters. Even so, this formulates n remains 
purely speculative, a mere spinning of ideas. As it 
stands, it is merely an ingenious construction of God's 
image. 
Now, attempts to entail God's existence in the very 
possibility of concieving of Him have of course played a 
major part in the history of theology. Such attempts are 
particularly strong forms of a more general argument 
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which in one form or another is more or less coeval with 
western philosophy but which has as its modern statement 
the idea that existence is a predicate whose denial is 
absurd. After Kant's insistence upon the synthetic 
character of knowledge of existents, his argument that 
existence cannot be regarded as a predicate amply 
provided a convincing refutation of the ontological 
argument (50). I do not think it is now for us or was 
then for Hegel an. issue that such attempts could be 
regarded as in themselves successful. Hegel, as is well 
known, did defend the ontological proof against Kant, 
but, as we shall eventually see, this defence comes, so 
to speak, at the end of his own proof of Absolute Spirit 
rather than at the beginning; for Hegel certainly did not 
think that the ontological argument could be just 
re-asserted in even its best (51) pre-Kantain forms (52). 
I have said that as he writes the Phenomenology Hegel 
holds that the Truth is on the scene, and that it is the 
task of Philosophy to demonstrate this. This 
demonstration is to follow from giving an account of how 
truth was developed. Bearing in mind what we now know of 
the place of History in Hegel's conception of Spirit it 
is clear why this should follow. Let us start from any 
inadequate belief. Merely by following where pursuit of 
this belief will lead we will necessarily arrive at 
Truth. This is so because the development of the 
Absolute must lie in such inadequate belief; or, to put 
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this the other way round, such inadequate belief must 
have its place in the development of the Absolute. For 
when the exposition of how truth makes its appearance is 
of the Absolute Truth conceived in the fashion of Hegel's 
Spirit, the exposition must locate inadequate belief 
within his infinite Truth and must equally recognise the 
germs of the Absolute within such belief. No particular 
inadequate belief can be outside of Spirit, nor can 
(merely here to establish Hegel's argument) any external 
guide to Truth from outside Spirit be provided. The 
development of Absolute Spirit must take place in and 
through the flow of inadequate belief only, because such 
belief and the directions in which it leads are the very 
stuff of that development (53). The Phenomenology will 
be able to start from any inadequate position a, \A follow 
the implications of that position right up to the 
Absolute because the development the book is to chart is 
in and of inadequate positions. 
Later, at the end of the 'Introduction', Hegel affirms 
what was the original title of the Phenomenology (54). 
The Phenomenology is to be the "Science of the Experience 
of Consciousness" because the Truth of that Experience is 
Absolute Spirit. The Truth will appear for all 
inadequate belief, and inadequacy revealed for what it 
is, by the locating of such belief in its place within 
the development of Absolute Spirit. 
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The Method of Phenomenological Proof: The Empirical 
Study of Beliefs. 
That the Phenomenology will establish Truth in this way 
constitutes a remarkably interesting form of proof. We 
should note firstly that the starting point(s) Hegel 
envisages satisfies one of his conditions for winning 
truth. To start with inadequate beliefs secures 
Phenomenology in those beliefs in the way Hegel feels 
essential. What of the development from these beliefs 
which will lead to recognition of the Truth? There are 
two points I should like to discuss at length. 
Firstly, this development is to furnish an essentially 
empirical, as opposed to merely speculative (in the bad 
sense), proof (55). It is to win conviction by taking 
any inadequate conception and, by analysis of it, 
revealing that at its heart is a moment of the 
development of Absolute Spirit. The understanding of 
such a conception will, on an, in principle, corrigible 
empirical truth claim, be shown to require the location 
of the conception within this development. Beginning 
from the point of view of this conception, Hegel is to be 
able to show by analysis of it that it-is part of the 
realisation of Absolute Spirit (56). The form of this 
analysis, the famous Hegelian Dialectic, will involve 
showing that any inadequate conception expresses an 
internal contradiction which can be resolved only by 
moving on to a new, more adequate conception - one in 
which the contradiction is solved - until the overall 
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contradiction between all inadequate conceptions and the 
Absolute Truth is overcome. I mention this briefest 
outline at this point - rather ahead of it proper place - 
in order to stress that this is not understood by Hegel 
as a question of a "dialectical approach" which can be 
adopted and taken to the analysis of various conceptions. 
It is rather the analysis which will generate the 
Dialectic. Hegel's claim is that it will prove 
necessary, in order to understand any inadequate 
conception, to place it within History understood as the 
development of Absolute Spirit. 
It is this theme which allows us to identify what Hegel 
meant by the project of "phenomenology". This term was 
actually not Hegel's own (57), and he included it in the 
title of his book only mid-way through writing it (58), 
replacing what I have already mentioned was the original 
title: "Science of the Experience of Consciousness". 
"Phenomenology" was in fact coined in 1764 by J. H. 
Lambert, a distinguished elder friend of Kant, to 
describe, through an obvious Greek derivation, his 
doctrine of mere appearance (as opposed to true essence) 
(59). Kant himself is known to have envisaged, in 
correspondence with Lambert and others, a similiar 
project -a purely negative (60) exposure of the limits 
of sensibility *(61) as a propadeutic to the examination 
of the pure reason (62). This project was not carried 
out, but of course it has its echo in the dialetic of the 
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Critique of Pure Reason. The main difference between 
Kant's envisaged phenomenology and his accomplished 
dialectic would seem to be that the former would have 
amounted to little more than the professed clearing away 
whereas in the latter certain inadequate beliefs are 
explained as mistaken, but nevertheless inevitable, 
functions of reason (63). Linked to his wider criticism 
of the place of "phenomena" in Kant's philosophy, Hegel 
greatly extends this reincorporation of inadequte belief 
back into philosophy in his project of Phenomenology. 
Though retaining the sense of the examination of 
inadequate conceptions, this project turns on the 
conviction that it is profoundly mistaken to treat such 
conceptions as just obstructive os truth. Classical 
epistemology decays into unrelieved scepticism because 
its demonstration that our beliefs are all necessarily 
phenomenal is taken to mean that those beliefs are 
thereby separated from truth. For Hegel, it is precisely 
through inadequate beliefs that we can be led to the 
Absolute because such beliefs must be of Spirit. 
Typically, attempts to demarcate a boundary of 
truth/falsehood (or science/ideology, etc. ) consign that 
latter to a category whose very purpose it is to contrast 
with the former. Bacon's use of "idols" represents this 
very closely (64), and this of course set a pattern for 
many further such attempts. Subsequent rediscovery of 
the plausibility of, say for example, the phlogiston 
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theory or pre-Copernican cosmologies merely confirms what 
we would hermeneutically expect to be able to say about 
these attempts. The rigid demarcation of claims to truth 
from their past, the circumstances of 100%0, C C\A,, s 
production, marks their own lack of self-comprehension, 
not any actual absolute break with that past. We have 
seen Hegel stress this point against Schelling, and the 
way in which he presents Phenomenology as an open 
commitment tot/ empirical encounter with a History of 
inadequate conceptions which will, if Hegel's own belief 
is right, lead to recognition of Truth articulates it 
again. The thrust of his argument is that we must be 
able to trace in its past the development of any valuable 
position, though of course any point in that past will 
not, if we care to put it this way, be fully adequate to 
the eventual position. By Phenomenology, Hegel hopes to 
find a proof of Truth by genuinely casting himself into 
inadequate positions. 
The Method of Phenomenological Proof (Continued): 
Reflexive Re-comprehension 
Let us consider 
in this way in 
the Phenomenoloo 
holds, of the ac 
would mean that 
presentation of 
the place of "Phenomenology" understood 
Hegel's entire mature philosophy. That 
was written at the time, as Hegel 
complished development of Absolute Spirit 
the Phenomenology could have been a 
the complete System of Absolute Spirit - 
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"The True in its True Shape" as he himself put it (65). 
However, though Hegel undertook to provide this in his 
published System (66), this is not the form of the 
Phenomenology. It is the task of the Phenomenolocy to 
describe how Truth came to be on the scene as a way of 
leading up to recognition of the Absolute, which can then 
be set out in the System. The book is, then, in an 
important sense, to be a persuasive introduction to the 
System. 
Hegel has, it might be said, come full circle to 
providing a prolegomena to the truth. But I think he can 
legitimately claim not to be subject to the strictures 
which he himself levelled at classical epistemology 
because of the peculiar way in which we can take the 
Phenomenology to be an "introduction" (67). To be sure, 
posing this function for the Phenomenology raises a 
complex of problems, which I will pursue because their 
resolution makes clear a further important aspect of 
phenomenological proof. 
Bearing in mind Hegel's criticisms about accepting a 
truth that is not ultimately thought to be true, what can 
we think about the Phenomenology? Hegel himself 
recognises here (68) that in so far as the Phenomenology 
differs from the System this must raise a question about 
the truth of the Phenomenology itself. Hegel initially 
designated the Phenomenology, "the first part of the 
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System"; but in the second edition of the book, on which 
he had begun work when he died, he omitted this (69). 
This latter placing of the Phenomenology out with the 
System, in so far as it registers the important 
difference from the System, seems to be the more correct 
position (70). However, the Phenomenology is connected 
to the System, and is not an introduction which falls 
under Hegel's own criticism of being outwith the truth, 
because the movement of inadequate conceptions is of 
Spirit, and thus the Phenomenology comes to cover much of 
the same ground as the System. Hegel's final thought on 
the truth of the Phenomenology as an introduction to the 
System would seem to be that they articulate Truth in two 
different, complementary ways. We are not really dealing 
with a change in subject between the Phenomenoloay and 
the System, but with a change of viewpoint. The former 
follows the movement of inadequate beliefs from their own 
viewpoints. The latter reorders this from the point of 
view where the later knowledge specifically denied to 
inadequate beliefs is now available. Making clear what 
is precisely meant by this change in viewpoint brings me 
to the second point I would like to discuss in the notion 
of phenomenological proof. 
The possibility of setting out a System of Truth which 
has a different form to the Phenomenological following of 
inadequate conceptions is predicated upon those who held 
inadequate beliefs, in the very act of coming to 
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recognise the Absolute, being thereby enabled to 
reflexively recognise the development of their own 
recognition as such. The winning of recognition of the 
Absolute involves those who are now enlightened looking 
back upon their own earlier conceptions and seeing them 
in their true light, that is to say, as overall 
inadequate conceptions. This they could-hitherto not do, 
since they first experienced the development of which 
they were part not as such a development but as "truth" 
itself, the "truth" of belief in inadequate conceptions. 
Hegel will gain the goal of convincing those who hold 
inadequate beliefs by showing that those beliefs both 
lead to the Absolute and, from this, how earlier beliefs 
were incorrect. There is a necessary critique of earlier 
experience involved in the phenomenology (71), a critique 
which provides a double sense of enlightenment (72). 
There is the recognition of the Absolute initially, but 
also a further securing of conviction by the implication 
of a critique of the earlier experience through the very 
locating of that experience in the development of 
Absolute Spirit. Such location casts a new rearward - 
that is, reflexive - illuminaton on what was experienced 
in the movement forward. In the phenomenology, nothing 
can be presupposed, we merely go forward where we are 
lead. In the Enclyclopaedia and in his later lectures, 
Hegel reorders his material guided by a hindsight which 
has as its principal feature knowledge of the character 
of earlier beliefs which was denied to those who held 
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those beliefs (73). 
This second moment of phenomenological proof expresses 
the key sense of Absolute Truth. In following the 
Phenomenology one is not lead to some transcendent truth 
such as a proof of the existence of God as a distinct 
being. The Absolute is only (if this is the right word 
to use) what has gone before in order to reach the 
Absolute, but now understood (74). The Absolute is the 
whole externalisation of Spirit, but now recognised for 
what it is, that is to say, understood as the 
externalisation of Spirit (75). 
The progressive expansion of what was involved in Hegel's 
efforts to show this in the Phenomenology during the 
writing of the book have left major obstacles to the- 
reader. I do not mean here the troubled circumstances of 
Hegel's life in 1806-7, though the shortcomings these 
were instrumental in introducing into the book are well 
known (76). I mean a fundamentally unplanned-for 
increase in the scope of the book which produces a 
confusion expressed in the extraordinary table of 
contents (, 77). As originally conceived the book was to 
include only the first three of its final six sections, 
and that the 'Introduction' was strictly speaking written 
for these first three sections only seems 
incontrovertible (78). Hegel's initial idea of the 
Phenomenology would "seem to have been of an account of 
x .. W 
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the subjective development within cognition of the Truth 
of the identity of subject and object through the stages 
of Consciousness, Self-consciousness and Reason. Such a 
project has as its counterpart in the System only a 
section of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, and 
Phenomenology was rendered in this more narrow way in the 
Propadeutic and in the Encyclopaedia (79). We must ask, 
then, why the Phenomenology of Spirit itself embodies so 
much more material than this? 
The massive enlargement of the book whilst it was being 
written testifies, I would say, to Hegel's mounting 
acknowledgement of what reflexive proof of the Absolute by 
Phenomenology entails. Within Absolute Truth must be 
found (to use the terms of the Encyclopaedia (80) which 
Hegel had come to clearly envisage as a development from 
the Jenenser System by the end of the Phenomen ology 
(81 )), Objective Spirit and Absolute Spirit as well as 
Subjective Spirit. The System presents Spirit in its 
Absolute development. I have tried to say why the 
Phenomenology is not intended as the same sort of effort. 
But certainly, if the Phenomenology is to introduce the 
Absolute it cannot leave out areas of Spirit. That it is 
to say, it must, in its own way cover as much ground as 
the System. Hence Phenomenology is but a moment of 
subjective Spirit from the point of view of the System; 
but the actual conduct of this moment will cover the 
whole area of the System from its own point of view (82). 
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And within its completed structure the Phenomenology 
displays stages of reflexive illumination. 
I suggest that the book in its finished form can be 
understood to be divided into three main parts. There is 
the first. moment, which Hegel at first saw as exhausting 
Phenomenology, of coming to know Spirit's subjective 
constitution of objectivity - sections, A, 8 and C. In 
section 88, Spirit's constitution of the ethical world is 
demonstrated in a similar way. Finally, in sections CC 
and DD, Hegel charts conscious attempts to grasp History 
as Spirit in Religion, Art and finally Philosophy. There 
could be little satisfaction of Hegel's demands of 
Phenomenological proof if he rests with the conviction 
that subject constitutes object. He must go on to show 
how this constitution is present in the ethical world, 
and then on to the way Spirit has, prior to the 
revelation of the Absolute, attempted to know itself. In 
this light, the very shortcomings of the riotous 
profusion of thought that is the Phenomenology, 
especially in its latter half, inform us eloquently about 
the aims of the book's composition. Hegel's acceptance 
of these shortcomings, despite his own admission of the 
book's weaknesses (83), speaks of the compulsion which he 
felt to go beyond the Truth of subjective cognition and 
provide by stages of reflexive illumination a complete 
phenomenology of the spiritual realm. The book is 
therefore a Phenomenology of Spirit and not merely a 
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Phenomenology of mind. 
I want to close this section with a few words on the 
problem of translating the German verb "aufheben" and 
associated forms. This word is often given as 
"transcend", "sublate", "supercede", etc. But such 
renderings are usually accompanied in diligent 
translations by a note to the effect that they do not 
capture the crucially two-fold sense of aufheben (84). 
This sense is on the one hand one of abolition of what 
went before, but on the other hand of preservation of 
aspects of an earlier state of affairs. The necessity of 
such. textual comments is enforced by Hegel's having 
himself stressed the important duality to the German 
meaning of aufheben. In the Science of Logic Hegel 
describes moments of the process of becoming as 
"sublating" (to follow miller) earlier moments, going 
beyond them but incorporating aspects of them within 
itself (85). 
The sense of the term is certainly difficult to grasp, 
and in the absence of such a grasp the use of aufheben to 
reconcile apparently contradictory elements of Hegel's 
(or Marx's) attitude to an institution or belief. and the 
possibility of improving upon it (86) seems a casuistic 
word play in a more than usually large gap between 
languages left by translation. To say that Hegel's (or 
Marx's) attitude with respect to a certain belief is that 
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it must be rejected but also that the better position 
must incorporate the rejected belief is hardly clear, and 
clarity is not achieved by referring to a German sense of 
auf heben not really available in English. To say that 
the sense of a philosophic terms is not renderable in a 
particular language is to admit that that sense is 
deficient in philosophic rigour. 
On the basis of what I have said of Hegel's ideas of 
phenomenological proof, I hope it is clear that what is 
at issue here is not a problem of translation, narrowly 
understood, but of philosopic comprehension of a 
difficult concept. The "annihilation" and yet 
simultaneous "preservation" of the existing can make 
sense only after understanding Hegel's (and Marx's) views 
on the possibilities of re-comprehending alienated 
conditions. In the Logic Hegel is using aufheben to show 
how the presence of Spirit in Becoming takes the form of 
a succession of mediations of Being and Nothingness, each 
mediation being posited by, that is to say is the 
determinate negation of, each previous one. Though the 
German meaning(s) of aufheben no doubt lent themselves to 
the economic expression of Hegel's idea here, indeed they 
may have played some part in suggesting it, this is not 
to say that the meaning of that idea can be considered to 
be available though etymology rather than philosophy. 
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Intuition and Its Absolution 
I would like to conclude this outline of the type of 
proof Hegel seeks to provide in the Phenomenology by 
directly asking what success can be achieved by him upon 
the basis of what we have seen so far. It has been 
argued that Hegel can do no other than take up this 
position intuitively. It must be allowed, however, that 
the import of this sort of objection, the ascertaining of 
whether it is merely embarrassing in the light of Hegel's 
failure to be explicit about his position or is 
destructive of his entire project, does depend on his 
success in establishing his position through the 
demonstration proposed. For, were this demonstration 
successful, Hegel's intuitive taking up of his position 
would not be able to be posed as a criticism. Hegel's 
opinion of intuitions, it will be recalled, is that they 
recognise the Absolute but are powerless to establish 
their Truth. Should that Truth be otherwise 
demonstrated, then the intuitions will be shown to be 
intuitions of that Absolute Truth. The proof of the 
Truth will imply that the characterisation of the 
intuitive position as an intuition of Truth was indeed 
correct, for the demonstration of the Absolute will 
locate the intuition within itself. There is an 
unmistakable theme of the completely circular character 
of Truth here upon which Hegel insists. This is 
certainly true in the System. The Science of Logic 
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contains an expression of this in so many words (87), and 
the naming of the complete presentation of the System as 
an "Encyclopaedia" Hegel considered a deliberate 
evocation of this motif (88). It is just this sense of 
circularity which also characterises the Phenomenology. 
The logical criticism of a circular argument rests on the 
demonstration of an unjustified foreclosure of 
alternative possibilities by the effective presumption of 
a conclusion. This involves a basic claim that such 
possibilities are real alternatives whose outright 
rejection is, precisely, unjustified. Now, such an 
objection cannot be made to the intuitive impulse of the 
Phenomenology without considering a strength Hegel claims 
for his argument. If the circular argument is shown to 
be really circular in the sense that free 
Phenomenological development did lead uc Absolute, then, 
as I have indicated, the intuitive position will be 
retrospectively justified. Indeed, the problem of taking 
a particular starting point would be seen to be 
immaterial, in that wherever a start is made it would 
lead to the same conclusion. The Phenomenology's 
presuppositions would no longer be able to be properly 
regarded as such, for they would dissolve into the 
movement described (89). "The Absoluteness of the 
Absolute absolves itself", as Heidegger says (90). 
This is the, as it were, retrospective fashion in which, 
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because of the nature of the Truth it is trying to 
establish, the Phenomenology may provide a proof of its 
case despite, or perhaps rather because, Hegel's initial 
position contains its conclusions. It is a fashion which 
would certainly negate any deleterious effect of Hegel's 
own assumptions, and provide a defence against the 
allegation that such assumptions are illegitimate which 
has been continually levelled against epistemologies of 
essence. At least this would be so if it works. To 
ascertain whether it does or not it is necessary to 




DETERMINATE NEGATION AND. THE CRITICISM OF INADEQUATE 
CONCEPTIONS 
Introduction 
Hegel's own intentions of winning conviction in Truth 
clearly must involve the criticism of inadequate 
conceptions, and he does not shrink from emphasising that 
to follow the progression of the Phenomenology will 
entail continously recognising that what were formerly 
held to be satisfying truths were not so (1). The 
Phenomenology follows, as he puts it, the way of despair. 
But, recalling the nihilistic criticism put forward in 
the classical epistemological project, Hegel is at great 
pains to distinguish the type of doubt this will involve 
from that which he identified in that project. He does 
this by advancing two arguments which mount complementary 
attacks upon that project's notion of doubt. For the 
sake of exposition, I will substantially merge these in 
the following discussion. What I want to discuss is 
Hegel's aim of formulating a method of constructive,, 
rather than entirely negative, doubt. 
The Emptiness of Classical Epistemological Doubt 
Hegel affirms, drawing upon his argument at the outset of 
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the 'Introduction', that it is senseless to regard doubt 
as a wholly negative procedure. Once a conception has 
been shown to be inadequate, it is the way of classical 
epistemology to consign it to a bottomless abyss of 
untruths. The contribution to knowledge of this 
indiscriminate scepticism is to pronounce a blanket 
condemnation upon whatever conception is put forward. To 
his opinion that this situation is completely 
unsatisfactory, Hegel now adds that it is simply 
fallacious to regard the classical epistemological 
project as actually establishing the total emptiness of 
all claims to truth. The full comprehension of its bleak 
results turns on seeing that these results are the 
results of that very Project and not the results of 
epistemology as such. The emptiness left by the 
classical epistemological project is fully understood 
only when seen as being left by it. 
Hegel preceded this point with an inquiry into the nature 
of that emptiness, disparaging the authenticity with 
which it is professed. He concedes the value placed upon 
doubt and its stress that all beliefs must pass the test 
of reasoned personal conviction. His whole idea of 
philosophy turns, as I hope it is now clear, on precisely 
this attitude. However, in classical epistemology doubt 
is not, in fact, identified with inquiry into the value 
of any particular conception, but with scepticism about 
the fruitfulness of cognition as such. Epistemology is 
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reduced to gnoseology since cognition and the object 
to-be-known are rendered as wholly separate and the 
possibility of truth is identified with that of absolute, 
unmediated knowledge. After setting the to-be-known 
apart from cognition in this way, the very admission that 
knowledge is a project of active cognition is enough to 
debar it from being true. Thus the gnoseological enquiry 
might well be continued forever without it contributing 
in the slightest to knowledge, for discussions about the 
character of such a delimited cognition do not say 
anything about its relation to the to-be-known, which is 
the crux of the epistemological problem. However, if the 
basic doubt is in this way made irremediable, what can be 
the result of the initially valuable resolve to examine 
everything? The result is nothing. What is being 
criticised is not a particular conception whose merits or 
lack of them it would be rewarding to know, but rather 
the faculty of cognition as such, in an empty, abstract 
fashion without concrete content. No specific conception 
is examined on its merits; all are condemned with their 
fellows simply because they are acts of cognition. 
The consequences of this can amount to little more that a 
mere display of criticism whose bad faith Hegel 
chastises. The result of such empty criticism is that it 
will in effect lapse into a mere preliminary which is 
gone through before in fact coming back to the initial 
set of beliefs. 
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Hegel's allusions to this fate of classical epistemology 
bring at once to mind Descartes' basic aim to submit all 
beliefs to personal test. It is, indeed, to do more they 
follow received opinion to make that opinion genuinely 
one's own (2). However, it is not of itself a great deal 
more, in so far as gaining truth is concerned, for the- 
truth of an opinion does not reside in the fashion in 
which that opinion is held (3). Descartes in fact 
examined only his own capacity to believe as such, his 
ability to believe irrespective of content, and, 
furthermore, did so with the express intention of 
rebuilding the beliefs with which he started after 
satisfying himself that he might believe in them (4). 
Not only do the endemic shortcomings of the narrowed 
conception of cognition involved mean that this renewed 
belief can never be convincingly demonstrated from the 
intended position of doubt (5), but more fundamentally 
this sort of effort does not improve, because it does not 
even consider, the substance of the belief at all. It is 
as if Descartes begins with truth and has only to 
convince himself of this. Even if the unwarranted 
assumption of truth is dropped in respect of many 
particular beliefs, what is left does not contribute to 
the substantive evolution of any specific conceptions 
involved (6). 
The culmination of modern philosophy's attempt to rid 
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itself of rationalistic assumptions such as those of 
Descartes is perhaps to be found in Hume. Here we find, 
as we might expect from what we know of the classical 
epistemological project, that such an attempt cannot stop 
short of complete philosophical scepticism. In saying 
this, however, we must add that this is so because Hume's 
position is not fundamentally different from that of 
Descartes. It is perhaps the essential theme of Hegel's 
position here that he is fully convinced that to claim to 
dispense with philosophy (understood as the reasoned 
explicit examination of ideas) is ridiculous. In so far 
as he makes this claim, I do not know of any sensible way 
of now evaluating Hume's epistemology other than to 
affirm that in the employment of the notion of natural 
belief he is simply avoiding the problem. It is 
inconsistent to demand of a true knowledge that it be 
other than an act of cognition, for after doing so one 
then necessarily proceeds to commit just such acts and to 
evaluate them after the fashion which motivated the 
initial epistemological effort. Hume therefore has, of 
course, to allow that knowing involves confidence in 
statements about the real, but this is hardly to his 
credit as it is made against, indeed in defiance of, his 
own philosophy (7). Hume does not recognise in the 
unacceptable scepticism of his philosophy a shortcoming 
of that particular philosphy, but rather claims to have 
exposed a sad result of philosophy as such. The 
consequence is that philosophy is essentially pointless, 
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and Hume moves on to himself accepting natural beliefs 
(8). Even Hume's famous contrast of the ridiculous 
errors of philosophy and the dangerous ones of religion 
at the end of the first book of the Treatise (9) 
involves, of course, just the sort of causal claim he 
thinks he has demolished. It is then difficult to see 
what was the point of this demolition (10). 
If we further consider the implication of these arguments 
of Hegel's for assessing Kant's attempt to dispell Humean 
scepticism, we can see that to the degree that this 
attempt becomes confined to purely subjective categories 
it is rendered quite powerless to realise its goal. That 
Kant sought to remedy the destructive effects of Humean 
scepticism and to show how natural science was possible 
does not mean that he will make fundamentally 
constructive developments when we see that he was 
concerned basically with a narrowed cognition and not the 
relation of cognition to the to-be-known. Furthermore, 
epistemological efforts circumscribed in this way cannot 
provide a ground for evaluating particular conceptions in 
the vital respect of their relation to the to-be-known 
(11). 
If I might, after Hegel's fashion, try to sum up this 
argument and the lesson of these illustrations 
aphoristically, then I would say that it shows that if 
every conception of truth must be criticised, then none 
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can be. The evaluation of the potential fruitfulness of 
any particular conception is paralysed by a rejection of 
the possibility of truth at all. Paradoxically, then, 
the adoption of a truly critical attitude becomes 
extremely difficult. For on what grounds could this 
stance be justified if any alternative is just as bad? 
Empty and Determinate Negations 
The very intelligibility of epistemological criticism, 
Hegel argues, turns upon recognising the determinate 
significance of any such criticism. The negation, as he 
puts it, of any inadequate position must not be conceived 
as a completely negative procedure, but rather as an 
effort to learn from what has earlier been done by seeing 
its particular contributions and shortcomings (12). 
Though one form of what we can now see as an inadequate 
conception of knowing, the classical epistemological 
project, reduced all cognitions to nothing by an, as it 
were, empty negation, we si, ou\& learn from the specific 
consequence of this type of epistemology that we must 
treat criticism of this and other inadequate conceptions 
as determinate negations. 
By this point, Hegel's argument has amounted to saying 
that foundationalism is an absurd project and that we 
must begin with the subject's ability to know. Accepting 
this, the question of "how can we know? " shades into that 
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of "what do we know? " If it is impossible even to give a 
meaningful answer to the first question which can rejoin 
sundered cognition and to-be-known, answers to the second 
can be very fruitful in telling us how we can improve 
what we know. It is not that Hegel accepts philosophical 
scepticism but then concludes that this position cannot 
be maintained even though it should be. It is rather 
that he destroys the foundation of unrelieved scepticism. 
As I shall go on to argue, the consequence of this is 
that he is able philosophically to ground knowing, and 
not lapse into the bad faith of positions such as 
phenomenalism. These are continually haunted by their 
inconsistency in allowing that we can know, and 
consequently construct knowing in terms which are 
studiedly hesitant about making clear the fact that 
knowledge- certainly includes making claims about the 
real. 
Hegel's stress upon the determinateness of criticism 
finally renders untenable the two position - the 
identification of truth with absolute truth and the 
identification of epistemology with gnoseology - which 
characterise the classical epistemological project. It 
does this by giving a philosophically persuasive account 
of how epistemology not only finds it impossible to 
proceed from foundationalist positions, but also how it 
nevertheless does proceed. The first position is shown 
to be not only inevitably frustrating and, in fact, 
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unsupportable, but also in itself contradictory. The 
second, which follows from the first, is shown to be 
wholly misdirected. Forced into the examination of a 
narrow notion of cognition separated from the 
to-be-known, it can, of itself, contribute nothing to 
epistemology, which is directed at, precisely, the 
relation of cognition to the to-be-known. In declaring 
that the only plausible evaluation of a particular 
conception must be one which assesses its adequacy to 
potentially reachable truth, Hegel makes epistemology 
fully aware of what it must do, and thus able consciously 
to direct its efforts towards this. This is essentially 
the criticism of epistemological alienation The power to 
know is not created, it is made apparent by being 
recovered from the obfuscated form in which it had 
hitherto been exercised. Conscious reflection on knowing 
and knowing itself are to be reunited in a way which 
makes redundant any separation of philosphical scepticism 
and practical belief. 
In sum, the position which Hegel has reached here is 
this. He has recovered the possibility of the valid use 
of "truth" and associated terms within discourse about 
our beliefs, and has thus established the possibility of 
direct (that is to say, not equivocatory) epistemological 
criticism. He has not done this by altering in some way 
the meaning of these terms, but, indeed, has stuck 
rigidly to their most immediately forceful meanings. He 
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has shown that the dominant understanding of their use, 
which makes them completely redundant or, more usually, a 
meta-language in the negative sense of being outside 
possible discourse on knowing, is an alienated position; 
that is, a position which, by its construction of the 
process of knowing, itself estranges us from our power to 
know (13). 
Having carried out this (still) essential preliminary, we 
might expect Hegel to go on to construct his idea of 
knowing in order to fashion a non-alienated epistemology. 
This would be, to draw on the terms of a later 
phenomenology, an epistemology of knowing 
being-in-the-world, rather than an epistemology which 
seeks to establish knowing being-in-the-world and 
necessarily fails (14). In fact, he does nothing of the 
kind. In what we have discussed, he has again begun to 
elide his own view of the form of the process of knowing 
with a view of what there substantially is to know under 
the ostensible aspect of a polemical clearing away of 
obstructions to truth, and we must now examine this 
issue. 
Determinate Negation and the Realisation of the Absolute 
Hegel's summing up of these arguments through the use of 
the term "determinate negation" is a play on the 
Spinozist maxim that "determination is negation" which it 
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will prove fruitful to pursue further. By this maxim, 
Spinoza drew it to the attention that the act of defining 
a thing implies the exclusion of possible attributes of 
the thing other than the ones affirmed in the definition. 
To recognise that a thing has the specific determination 
of possession of a particular quality involves the 
exclusion, or negation, of alternative qualities. Hegel 
wants to reverse this maxim in order to aphorisitically 
conclude his arguments at this point of the 
'Introduction'. He affirms the positive side of 
epistemological criticism by claiming that negation is 
determination. He argues that once the determinate 
consequences of any particular claim to knowledge are 
recognised, it is then possible to see even in the 
criticism of that claim a movement towards truth. Seeing 
the unrelievedly sceptical outcomes of classical 
epistemology as the results of that epistemology enables 
one to avoid what are thus revealed as its mistakes. In 
this fashion, then, Hegel comes to ally the demonstration 
of the emptiness of the scepticism of classical 
epistemology to the progressive movement to be undertaken 
in the Phenomenology. As on the earlier occasion when he 
effected such an elision between criticism of others' 
positions and the establishment of his own, Hegel here 
covers a very considerable distance in the matter of a 
very few lines. To follow the course he takes more 
carefully, it is necessary to inquire in some detail into 
Hegel's intention in reversing Spinoza's famous maxim. 
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Hegel regards this maxim as the central principle of 
Spinoza's philosophy (15), and we must be clear exactly 
why this is so. The formulation "determination is 
negation" is known from one of Spinoza's important 
letters in explication of his doctrines (16), and is not 
as such present in his metaphysics as they are given in 
the Ethics (17). Yet the principle articulated in the 
maxim is continually present in the metaphysics, and 
indeed it is possible to construct them from this 
principle without forcedness. The principle affirms that 
the particular determination of the possession of a 
quality implies the negation of all other possible 
alternative qualities. Finite things as defined by their 
particular determinations must, in a sense, be the 
negation of other finitudes. Regarding God as being 
absolutely infinite, it follows that. he must contain the 
negativity of all finite things. That is to say, that as 
a finite thing negates the infinite number of all other 
determinate finitudes, God, as that infinitude, must 
embrace every particular finite thing. Having, in fact, 
immediately understood finitude quite rationalistically 
as a matter of logical construction, Spinoza 
unproblematically treats all this (which is quite 
unobjectionable, but also in itself quite trivial -a 
mere exercise in logical implication) as an analysis of 
the ontology of finitude. If we can for our purposes of 
exegesis allow this translation of logical into 
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ontological statements, then it occurs that finite things' 
negatºAS others becomes the very constitution of those 
things by their negations. The importance of this is 
that Cod's infinitude is seen as the ontological ground 
of every finite thing, for the existence of the thing 
does not in this metaphysics inhere in itself but in its 
partial negation of God's infinitude. This treatment of 
determinate finitude renders God's infinitude not as 
something beyond and outside of finitude but as 
conterminous with it, as the omnipresent ground of each 
and every finite thing. This is, as Spinoza says in 
another letter (18), the "actual infinite". Arrived at 
in rather a different fashion, to which I will return, 
this position, to the effect that finite things are 
inessential modifications of one infinite substance which 
is God, is the basic conclusion of the Ethics. In an 
initial sense, then, the maxim of "determination is 
negation" can be seen to be at the centre of the Ethics 
in the sense that it expresses the crucial principle of 
the treatment of the relation of the finite and the 
infinite at the heart of Spinoza's philosophy. 
Hegel is extremely enthusiastic about the potential of 
this representation of God's infinitude to ground an 
understanding of Spirit, even going so far as to declare 
Spinozism to be the source of all truth in modern 
philosophy (19). However, in Spinoza the consequences of 
this representation are ambiguous. All determinate 
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finitude, in being shown to be part of the one infinite, 
is denied actual substance. Its lack of substance is its 
truth. But if this is so, what reliance can be placed 
upon a proof of God's infinitude which begins with the 
acceptance of that finitude as a sound basis from which 
to start? The end point of Spinoza's argument involves 
the destruction of his fundamental presumptions. In 
making this argument, I would like to distinguish it 
carefully from the way in which Spinozism has been 
accused of having illegitimate presuppositions, in a 
rather trivial sense, virtually from the time of the 
publication of Spinoza's "posthumous works". 
The Ethics is presented after the fashion of a Euclidean 
geometrical deduction, and begins with a series of 
definitions which amount to a statement that God is all 
substance from which the subsequent arguments are said to 
be deduced (20). Whilst Hegel is certainly critical of 
this form of presentation, arguing that it fails to 
provide any proof of the initial definitions (21), it is 
not. really the presumptive character of the definitions, 
narrowly understood as a matter of more presentation, to 
which he objects. The full meaning of. these definitions 
emerges only as one goes further into the Ethics, and it 
is quite possible to begin from almost any point, in the 
first part at least, and to recapitulate the initial 
definitions. The definitions themselves could surely 
also be reformulated. We have ourselves seen in the 
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previous pages an alternative way of constructing 
Spinoza's metaphysics. It is probably both inaccurate 
and unhelpful, then, to attempt to closely identify any 
of these definitions as such as the fundamental illicit 
presumption upon which Spinozism rests. Hegel's 
criticism of Spinoza's presumptions, which I have here 
reconstructed from his interest in the idea that 
determination is negation, is far more profound than 
this. For to reject an indefensibly close association of 
a particular formulation in the Ethics and Spinoza's 
presuppositions is not to say that he does not have any 
such presuppositions. He has, and they amount to this; 
he allows finitude into his metaphysics and thus 
generates his contrast of finite modes and infinite 
substance. The full significance of this is, of course, 
that this is no arbitrary, removable assumption. The 
attempted destruction of finitude in Spinoza founders on 
the rock that finitude is the given material of the human 
intellect. 
Hegel's conception of Spirit in many ways takes its form 
from the attempt to avoid these difficulties in 
Spinozism. This conception, it will be recalled, 
involves Spirit positing its own finite limitation and 
being brought full awareness of its own infinitude 
through the progressive development of that awareness in 
human history. Hegel's Spirit is not to destroy 
finitude, but is to rise from it and incorporate it. 
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Hegel will show finite limitation to be not a mere 
modification of actual substance but an inadequate stage 
in the development of Spirit which is nevertheless an 
integral moment in the progression to the Absolute. This 
is so in a narrow sense in that Hegel pursues the concept 
of finitude through to its, as he claims, own dissolution 
into self-consciousness as a specific stage of the 
Phenomenology (22). More widely taken, it is clearly the 
case that any particular conception which has not grasped 
the Absolute is to be a moment in Spirit's positing of 
its own finite limitation, which the Phenomenological 
progression will show to be such. In summing up his 
earlier insistence upon the determinate consequences of 
criticism, Hegel as we have seen terms each such 
criticism a determinate negation. It is a sequence of 
determinate negations which is to constitute the 
progression of the Phenomenology (23). Bearing in mind 
that finite limitation understood in the way Hegel has 
taken it over here is a partial negation of the infinite, 
the theologically positive result of the sequence of 
determinate negations is captured in Hegel's presentation 
of its sum elsewhere as the "negation of the negation" 
(24). 
Let us be clear how Hegel has run together his insistence 
upon determinate criticism and the progressive 
realisation of the Absolute. In Spinoza, the maxim 
"determination is negation" has a compelling modal 
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logical force in respect of recognising specific 
determinations. To attribute to a thing a particular 
quality does allow the negation of all alternative 
possibilities, though this is indeed a rather trivial 
point without Spinoza's rationalistic understanding of 
finitude. This is to say, "determination is negation" 
establishes a particular quality as a logical. necessity. 
Now, the reversal of this to give "negation is 
determination" does not have the same form (25). The 
negation of one possible quality does not thereby 
identify a particular quality, but leaves us with a range 
of possibilities. Furthermore, to say that we might 
characterise a thing by saying what it is not, obviously, 
is to envisage an infinite task. The progression Hegel 
will chart has, of course, a particular content, but this 
can only come by the presumption of a delimited field 
within this infinite range of possibilities (26). The 
Phenomenological sequence of determinate negations is 
given its content not by logical identification of 
specifics but by being immediately incorporated into 
Hegel's own scheme rather in the way as was his earlier 
stress on the possibility of gaining truth; the criticism 
of inadequate epistemologies being conflated with the 
project of establishing Hegel's Truth. What Hegel has in 
mind is that his relation of finitude to the infinite 
will reproduce the sense of necessity (though certainly 
in a different way) that this had in Spinozism in order 
that he might claim the circular proof 'which we have seen 
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is offered by Phenomenology. We can see then that at the 
outset of the Phenomenological movement Hegel immediately 
establishes for it a necessary character. 
HeQel's Idea of Necessity 
What exactly is to be understood by "necessity" in 
Hegel's philosophy is a both controversial and rewarding 
issue. In turning to it, we are fortunate in being able 
to draw upon a polemical clarification of his views which 
Hegel provided in 1802 (27) and repeated in 1827 (28). 
In response to the claim that a completely adequate 
philosophical system would be able to deductively derive 
all existents (which I am sure he had a warrant to think 
present in Schelling (29)) one W. Krug, a distinquished 
contemporary of Hegel's (he was to succeed Kant at 
Konigsberg), challenged such a system to deduce the pen 
with which he wrote his criticisms (30). Hegel's 
response to this sarcasm is to turn its intended thrust 
against itself. The task which Krug would wish to see 
performed is a trivial one indeed, and therefore Krug 
must wait until far more pressingly important matters 
have been dealt with before he can really hope to see his 
pen glorified by being placed within a system of true 
philosophy. It seems quite clear from his replies that 
Hegel allowed that, in principle, Krug's pen could be 
found such a place, and I do not think there can be a 
retreat from such a belief without misrepresenting 
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Hegel's intentions. For Hegel's proof of the Absolute 
sets requirements for itself which would certainly 
involve just such an all-encompassing sense of necessity 
as is obviously envisaged here, and I think that this 
vital aspect of Hegel's project would become 
incomprehensible if this sense in his philosophy were 
unduly weakened (31). However, although Hegel retained 
the use of the word "deduction" in 1827 despite having 
quibbled about it earlier, I do not think this at all 
conveys the way in which the necessity involved in being 
able to philosophically locate Krug's pen is actually 
understood by Hegel in his own post-Schellingian 
positions. It is precisely a strong necessity (expressed 
in terms other than those of a formal deduction) that 
constitutes the peculiar endurability of Hegel's claims 
to Absolute Knowledge (32). 
For formal deduction in Philosophy is, I am sure, thought 
quite pointless, or rather counter-productive by Hegel. 
(I have implied this in my remarks on Hegel's opinion of 
Spinoza's Euclidean form of presentation, and we shall 
see him make similar comments on Kant's, Fichte's and 
Schelling's treatment of triadic dialectic). In the very 
formality with which it is conducted, the deduction is 
emptied of the real significance which it should hope to 
claim as Philosophy - the significance of actually 
expressing the Absolute. It is Hegel's belief that the 
pattern of the setting out of Philosophy should be one 
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which captures the way in which the Absolute has actually 
come to pass. When we have grasped the Absolute, the 
representation of this will perforce have the form which 
we have grasped. Spirit's externalisation in phenomena 
must be portrayed in the way in which it actually has 
been found to have been developed. I hope it is clear 
that it is of the essence of this that the pattern of 
this portrayal cannot be specifiable in advance, neither 
as a deduction nor in any other way. This portrayal 
should be the result of Philosophy, not its presupposed 
way of proceeding (33). 
The description of the pattern of Truth is, then, for 
Hegel a task of comprehension and not of deduction (34). 
Hegel attempts to generate an idea of necessity in his 
accounts of events by claiming that it is possible 
ultimately to comprehend everything within Spirit, not by 
presuming that everything is deductively relatable. The 
relation of phenomena which is to be discovered will be 
presented in Philosophy. In this sense, to hold out the 
hope of Krug's pen being Philosophically explained is 
not, I think, a fanciful one. Though we are under no 
obligation, of course, to accept Hegel's construction of 
such an explanation, which will take the form of 
glorifying the pen by consciously exposing its location 
within Spirit; to hold out the possibility of this 
explanation seems, in principle, to be as valid as 
holding out the possibility of other explanations which 
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we might easily envisage. It must also be said, this 
explanandum seems as little worthy of the effort for 
those who would put forward other explanations as it 
appears to Hegel himself. 
Within the System Hegel works with a number of forms of 
this all-encompassing comprehension which necessarily, 
locates the phenomena comprehended; each form, it is 
important to note, corresponding to a different object 
the study of which, Hegel says, generates the forms. 
One such form, brought directly to mind by Hegel's 
comments on Krug, is that set out as the Philosophy of 
Nature, and noting this allows me to attempt to clarify 
another aspect of the use of deduction in the 
interpretation of Hegel. I have mentioned that in 
attempting to turn the trivial character of the task Krug 
sets Philosophy against Krug himself, Hegel suspects that 
no philosopher could be bothered to carry out this task 
until other, far more important tasks have been carried 
out. Whilst the solar system itself remains to be 
comprehended - and this therefore faces philosophy as its 
most sublime and supreme task - Hegel says Krug will have 
to wait. Hegel used a very similar locution when 
describing his own earlier attempt to perform this 
supreme task (35). His dissertation on the orbits of the 
planets is most often remembered for Hegel's explanation 
of the relatively (by comparison to the distance between 
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the orbits of the inner planets) vast emptiness between 
Mars and Jupiter, which was put forward just at the time 
when the discovery of asteroids in this space was being 
made. However, Hegel is not really guilty of 
speculatively deducing a necessary emptiness which 
outlawed and thus was ridiculed by the discovery of these 
asteroids (36). Using the extant empirical evidence, 
(the astronomical discovery of the asteroids was not 
available to him), Hegel tried to furnish an explanation 
of this relatively vast distance. His explanation not 
only strenously tried to fit the facts but actually did 
so in polemic against the idea of presuming there to be a 
strict arithmetical relation between the planets (37). 
Of course, this acceptance of given data as ineluctable 
is almost as little scientific as would be imposing 
deductive constructions against such data, but it 
nevertheless remains that Hegel's Philosophy of Nature 
purports to be an attempt to comprehend a system in 
nature and not to be an attempt to impose a deductive one 
on it (38). It doubtless goes without saying nowadays 
that we are not obliged to accept either the specific 
pattern of comprehension advanced or the very idea that 
such an attempt is a feasible project. 
The system set out in the Philosophy of Nature is one of 
flat, exteriority which exhibits no internal dynamic of a 
dialectical (or evolutionary in any sense) form (39). I 
mention this in order to stress that Hegel is quite 
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prepared to find, as he says, a philosophic form in 
nature quite different to that which he sets out in his 
Philosophy of Spirit (40). Even when he does not treat 
of these two concrete sciences of Spirit, but turns to 
Logic (41), this is not a formal logic whose shape is 
determined extrinsically to the subject matter described, 
but rather a logic intended directly to represent the 
principles of Spirit's externalisation (42). This is to 
say that this logic is an ontology, but an ontology of 
the externalisation of a universal subject and the 
process of its self-recognition. 
The subtlety of this idea of necessity is perhaps best 
shown by stressing the existentialist (as it were) themes 
it is able to embrace through allowing Hegel to discuss 
contingency itself. Recalling the way in which Hegel set 
up his conception of Spirit, we might expect that if 
there is to be a sense of necessity '; ̂  Hegel's 
Philosophy, then there would have to also be contingency, 
as the one (dare I say necessarily? (43)) implies the 
other and can be manifested only in oppositon to it (44). 
As I have described Hegel's intentions in his conception 
of Spirit, it emerges that this turns on a commitment to 
braving an uncharted openness in order to realise 
Spirit's true nature in a way now most celebrated in 
existentialist thought. Spirit is to commit itself to 
the test of overcoming the appearance of limitation which 
arises from its externalisation, and the result will be, 
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Hegel seems to claim, whatever the result is. Spirit 
proves to be the rational acknowledgement of necessity 
(45), but this is found to be so only after passing 
through stages of arbitrariness, caprice and inadequate 
reason in both Nature (46) and History (47). 
It is certainly part of the meaning of the realisation of 
the Absolute that Historical events at least should be 
increasingly brought within the freedom that arises from 
the rational recognition of necessity (48). I mention 
this here only to contrast it to the sense of necessity 
evoked by the general setting out of the Philosophy. For 
the claim for the present existence of the rational state 
does not mean that contingency is removed from Spirit's 
development. Contingent events are ineluctably part of 
the course of that development, but the sense of 
necessity present in Philosophic comprehension remains 
covering even these, for it does not involve denying 
their contingency. From the point of view of actually 
going through the development of the Absolute, an 
infinite number of contingent events are found to happen 
and to have been embarked upon. It is quite essential to 
grasp the openness which Hegel means to include in 
Spirit's commitment to its own realisation. From the 
position of the realised Absolute, Spirit knows itself to 
be rational necessity. That is to say, Spirit knows its 
own nature and in doing so is able to bring its actions 
into accordance with that nature. The rational 
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acknowledgement of this necessity is Spirit's self 
consciousness and making actual of itself. This state 
is, I think the argument demands, an achievement rather 
than a pre-ordained conclusion. However, looking back 
from the Absolute, we can study the course for what it 
is. We can distinguish the developments which furthered 
Spirit's rational acknowledgement of necessity and 
developments which were contingent to this. This is not 
to say that these latter are inexplicable. From the 
point of view of the Absolute we can now explain them as 
contingent, as being performed outside of Spirit's 
self-consciousness. ' Contingent events, I would say, are 
very plausibly retrospectively explicable on the quite 
empirical lines which Hegel envisages in the 
Phenomenolocy. These events are not thereby robbed of 
their contingency - it is precisely this which is now 
attested to by their comprehension. 
Nevertheless this reflexive comprehension does express 
something akin to a necessity. Absolute Knowledge of 
Spirit must allow us at least in principle to give the 
final, authoritative account of all events. That is to 
say, the comprehension which is the goal is potentially 
total. In his reply to Krug, Hegel makes it clear that 
his may not be expected all at once, and yet although 
some phenomena may seem too trivial for anyone to ever 
both giving an account of them, all phenomena must be 
held to be potentially open to their finally correct 
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explanation. Hegel certainly thinks that the 
glorification of Krug's pen by making clear its place 
within Spirit is possible. We can, I think, generalise 
this and say that Hegel must hold it possible that we can 
give an account of all phenomena in such a way that, 
although we cannot- claim that particular events had to 
happen, we may come to know, with a necessity that arises 
from having given an unsurpassable explanation, why they 
did happen. "The Truth", Hegel famously declares, "is 
the Whole" (49), or "the Totality" (50). 
The System, I hope we can now see, carries on in this 
respect what I have called the empirical character of the 
proof to be furnished in the Phenomenology. The 
following of inadequate conceptions to the point where 
they have lead us to see their location within Spirit 
turns on the necessity which stems from the potential 
ultimate comprehension of all such conceptions through 
Absolute Truth. The necessity which is to give force to 
the Phenomenological proof is a necessity following from 
locating the ultimate truth of any conception by having 
to place it within Spirit. As one sees immediately from 
reading any of the studies in the Phenomenology, this 
location is no vulgar reduction but a wonderfully 
varied and sympathetic account of the forms of 
consciousness. However, linking these studies, in ways 
which often seem irremediably forced, is a necessity 
which is insisted upon. All conceptions will be brought 
84 
within Spirit, and the truth of their character 
ultimately settled by this. Is even this sort of 
necessity acceptable? (51). 
The End of History? 
Having I hope made clear the way in which Hegel sets 
about proving the Absolute, I would now like to examine 
this closely and identify what I think is objectionable 
about it. Intrinsically bound up with the stress on the 
specific enabling conditions of knowledge in the idea of 
determinate negation is, as the other side of the same 
thing, an emphasis on the specific limitations to the 
potential knowledge which can be generated within any set 
of conditions. Recognition of the limitations, which are 
the statement of the exhaustion of the possibilities of 
any particular enabling resources, is what motivates 
criticism in determinate negation. The corollary of the 
stress on the positive side of criticism in determinate 
negation is, then, Hegel's famous insistence that no 
philosophy could adopt views ahead of its time (52) 
(though we can see that for Hegel all previous 
philosophies contain views which make their own time 
obsolete). But in a manoeuvre which at first seems 
incredible given its basis in this position (53), Hegel's 
Absolute is founded by a twist of the argument which 
essentially nullifies for this Absolute the appreciation 
of historical relativity which is so central to the idea 
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of determinate negation. For Hegel's principal belief is 
that he lives and writes at the birth-time of a new era 
quite unlike any other. His is the time when Absolute 
Truth is on the scene, when the key principles of 
understanding all phenomena are now known and wait only 
to be applied. Obviously more can be known, but this is 
now a question only of extending the margin of knowledge, 
of bringing more and more things (even Krug's pen) within 
knowledge, rather than fundamentally improving our 
knowledge (which can change even our perception of events 
previously explained rather after the fashion in which 
Hegel presents the impact of the Absolute). 
This belief, of the completion or end of History (54), 
has been treated as ridiculous, but this is hardly a 
correct response. Hegel is by no means denying that new 
events can or will take place - he makes it plain even in 
so famous a text as the introduction to the lectures of 
the Philosophy of History in reference to North America 
as the land of the future that this view cannot be 
attributed to him (55). Rather he is arguing that the 
basically rational forms of social organisation and the 
fundamentally correct truth of knowing have been 
developed and no fundamental improvement on these 
principles will ever be possible. The making actual of 
these principles may remain to be done, to a greater or 
lesser degree, but nothing radically new will ever arise 
again (56). 
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As we now have ample historical testimony to show, this 
conviction is not so much ridiculous as terrible in the 
power of the dogmatism it can generate (57). We must 
register the essential dogmatism of the claims made for 
Hegel's Absolute. R wareness of historical 
relativity lapses when the historical location one grants 
ones-self transcends history (58). The point emerges 
most clearly in Hegel's attitude to previous 
philosophies, for in dealing with this it is possible to 
abstract from the differing forms of privilege he claims 
for philosophy over other than philosophical beliefs, and 
I will initially state my point with respect to the 
lectures on the History of Philosophy. The tone of these 
lectures is principally formed (59) by Hegel's rising 
above narrow criticism, it is the positive contribution 
made in all philosophies which is Hegel's concern (60). 
However, this in itself is intolerably condescending (61) 
because, and this introduces profound contadictions into 
the History, the positive contributions made are all to 
Hegel's Truth (62). That there is truth in all 
philosophies is a tautology for Hegel; a necessary 
condition of a belief being a Philosophy is that it is 
part of the development of Absolute Truth (63). As they 
stand, these lectures can be read with profit only if 
read obliquely to the overall pattern they portray, that 
is to say, not as history at all. 
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We must be quite precise here. As his usual restriction 
of information about social context to a few biographical 
notes preceding each discussion shows, nothing could be 
further from Hegel's intention than to give an actual 
history of the social practice of philosophy. His is an 
effort which we might preliminarily identify as an 
intellectual history of philosophical thought - though I 
stress that this is only a provisional manoeuvre. The 
division of the time spent in the lectures on each period 
is given by his assessment of its internal intellectual 
significance in Philosophy (64). Now, not only is such a 
reconstruction of the internal rationality of the 
discipline valuable in itself if the history of the 
discipline is to be consciously utilised as a resource 
for contemporary undertakings, but furthermore such an 
effort is necessary for an actual history of philosophy. 
For grasping the internal significance of any 
contribution enters into those truth claims about the 
real philosophical significance of particular episodes 
(as blind alleys, as productive lines, as politically 
induced deviations, etc. ) which an actual history must 
make. But even bearing this in mind in our evaluation, 
Hegel's lectures are invalid history. For they force the 
internal rationality of the discipline into the mould 
Hegel requires. 
At any period in the history of philosophy it is in 
principle possible to look back and to sum up what seems 
88 
to be the most important issues, and to genetically 
comprehend one's own position in this light. Such a 
procedure is itself inextricably historically bound, that 
is to say that the truth claims about what is most 
valuable in philosophy are historically relative. These 
judgements do not have to be considered completely 
relativist if the genetic location of the contemporary 
viewpoint is sympathetically exploited. If we do not 
simply impose contemporary categories but enter into 
self-conscious dialogue with the past, intellectual 
history, far from having special hermeneutic problems, 
has hermeneutic priveleges (though of course remaining 
subject to the interpretative conditions of all 
dialogue). However, in Hegel it is precisely this 
dialogue, remarkable to say, that is militated against, 
because the standpoint of the Absolute is merely the 
other side of relativism. In the way it subsumes all 
other philosophies beneath itself it is dogmatic. Like 
the relativist, Hegel does not derive his present from 
its past. From the point of view of the Absolute Hegel 
is not making a (debatable) claim about what constitutes 
the most important issues, he is claiming that philosophy 
has always been directed by what he regards as its most 
important issues, and that those issues are Philosophy. 
It is, I submit, a mistake (65) to accept that the lesson 
of these lectures is that philosphy is no more than its 
history. From the point of view of the Absolute, the 
history of philosophy is given by its one Truth. 
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Hegel had, of course, to learn his philosophy, and no 
doubt he learned his in a wonderfully erudite engagement 
with the history of the discipline. He first gave his 
lectures, and indeed wrote them out, before he wrote the 
Phenomenology. It is the thrust of his initial 
formulations of determinate negation in the Phenomenology 
to make such an engagement an open dialogue, sure in the 
conviction that it is the site on which philosophic truth 
may and must be built. When these formulations are 
linked to the erected structure of a Truth which is 
Absolute in that it recasts the past as an approach to 
itself, then this possibility is sacrificed to a 
dogmatism. This is the dogmatism of a final truth 
appended to determinate negations as the negation of the 
negation. This absolute is in fact susceptible to 
historiographical criticism. Any actual history of 
philosophy, even a narrowly intellectual one, that 
utilised Hegel's reconstruction of the internal core of 
the discipline, would find so little of philosophy's past 
explicable that it would be quite easy to devise a new 
reconstruction which would lead to much greater 
explanatory power. (To the extent that one allows that 
Hegel's is the most important intellectual contribution 
to contemporary social and political understanding this 
is, perhaps, a remarkable thing to have to say). 
However, this is to appeal to history, and Hegel, I 
believe, does not do this. 
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This complex of unacceptable positions represented by the 
Hegelian Absolute - of a'claim to have the ultimate key 
to explanation of all phenomena which makes further 
extension of knowledge purely amatter of bringing other 
things under interpretation by this key (66) - is, I 
think, displayed quite as much in Hegel's other mature 
works as in his history of philosophy. I leave it to the 
reader to consider the implications of ordering material 
in this supremely confident way in the Philosophy of 
Right (67) and the Philosophy of History (68), and will 
take them up in respect of the Phenomenology below. In 
sum, it is the break with historical dialogue, even in 
the midst of the most interesting historical studies, 
which is in the end the fundamental characteristic of the 
Hegelian Absolute, and this pushes Hegel's studies quite 
to the periphery of any concern to understand how we 
might develop real understanding through 
historiographical hermeneutics (69). 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUBJECT AND OBJECT IN HEGEL'S REPRESENTATION OF KNOWING: 
THE UNITY OF SUBJECT AND OBJECT 
Introduction 
We are now faced with the issue of assessing the 
character of the phenomenological method. We have 
discussed Hegel's idea of Truth and how he thinks such 
Truth may be substantiated. The fashion in which the 
substantiation may be undertaken remains, however, to be 
explained. In order to begin this, let us now turn to 
that point in the 'Introduction' where Hegel himself 
declares that he intends to add to the foregoing remarks 
about the necessity of the Phenomenological inquiry to be 
undertaken and about the nature of the undertaking, 
something further on the method of carrying out this 
inquiry (1). 
Hegel on the Necessity of a Criterion of Truth in 
Epistemological Criticism 
Hegel at this point recapitulates some of the earlier 
problems he has emphasised in classical epistemology in 
order to subject them to the power of a solution which he 
now proposes. He focuses his discussion on the problem 
of the necessity of a fixed criterion of truth in 
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epistemological criticism. If Hegel's project is an 
investigation of what is actually carried out in 
cognition and an indentification of inadequate 
conceptions and their relation to truth, then, he 
continues, that project would seem to require a criterion 
by which specific conceptions can be evaluated. To say 
this immediately runs us into difficulties which we have 
already encountered, especially in respect of Hegel's 
attitude to Schelling. For on what ground could such a 
criterion be justified if it is to demarcate inadequate 
conceptions and truth. Obviously such a justification 
requires an agreement on truth, and this is what is 
sought by the employment of the criterion. If we say 
that such a criterion is unavailable, it remains 
difficult to see how the examination of particular 
beliefs can then take place. 
Natural Consciousness and the Possibility of a Criterion 
of Truth 
Hegel prefaces his response to the paradox he has 
formulated with an exposition of the nature of knowing 
consciousness. By this he aims to show on what basic 
conception of knowing the demand for such a criterion of 
truth could arise. Hegel's use of "consciousness" at 
this point is to refer to a type of belief which he 
elsewhere in the 'Introduction' calls, more precisely, 
"natural consciousness" (2), and by which he means the 
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representation of subject and object in the common 
understanding. In the epistemology of this consciousness 
there is envisaged a knowledge of objects distinct from 
the subject by a subject. who is aware of the act of 
cognition. This consciousness distinguishes itself from 
objects by simultaneous attempts to relate itself to them 
in order to make the objects available for itself. 
However, an object's being-for-consciousness in this way 
is also distinguished from an object's being-for-itself, 
and an object's being related to a subject in knowing is 
also distinguished from the object's being outside of 
this relationship. It is this being-in-itself that is 
the essential to-be-known, and it is knowledge of this 
that is truth. I think it is clear enough that what 
Hegel has done here is given an account of natural 
consciousness which identifies it with the positions of 
the classical epistemological project, in which we have 
already seen him expose an untenable indentification of 
truth with knowledge uncontaminated by cognition. Now, 
as a beginning, this characterisation of the then (and 
now) dominant epistemological explications of natural 
consciousness, is acceptable; indeed it shows something 
of a remarkable aptitude for synopsis. However, Hegel, 
in referring to this as "consciousness", identifies it as 
the epistemology of knowledge of objects distinct from 
the subject. I do not say this in criticism of Hegel, 
for this identification was surely correct when he wrote 
(3). However, we are able to hold this open for- 
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consideration in a way in which Hegel did not. Bearing 
this in mind, let us turn to the fashion in which Hegel 
relates this representation of consciousness to the 
demand for a fixed criterion of truth in epistemological 
criticism. In advance I will say that having argued for 
determinate negation on the basis of the criticism of the 
classical epistemological project, Hegel proceeds here to 
explore the possibilities of immanent development from 
that epistemology. 
If we inquire into the truth of a particular knowledge in 
the ways made possible by this consciousness, the inquiry 
becomes the determining of what that knowledge is 
in-itself. From what we have already seen, we can hardly 
expect such a project to be practicable. All that can be 
discussed is the subject's cognition of this knowledge, 
and this cognition is, of course, thereby vulnerable to 
the scepticism which this consciousness levels at any 
cognition whatsoever. Hegel insists that any 
unfavourable evaluation of a particular knowledge can be 
seriously doubted by those holding to the criticised 
knowledge as not capturing the truth of their belief. 
Hegel claims that the problem, or as he says the 
semblance of the problem, of the dissociation of 
subjective knowing and objective truth is overcome by 
virtue of the object of the inquiry we are considering, 
an inquiry into particular forms of knowledge. This 
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dissociation seems to render impossible the reaching of 
an acceptable criterion of truth because the subject is 
apparently restricted to only one side of epistemological 
relation of subject and object, that of the former. 
However, in this inquiry consciousness can be pushed to 
the point of recognising that it provides its own 
criterion, for it is necessarily within consciousness 
that both particular cognitions and the object 
to-be-known are available for knowledge. Hegel is here 
attempting to turn what appears to be the pernicious 
consequences of the dissociation of subject and object to 
his own advantage. He stresses, on the basis of his 
earlier discussion of classical epistemology that there 
is no simple grasp of objects but they are available for 
knowledge only in active cognition. Consciousness must 
be the site not only of every subjective cognition but 
also of every possible grasp of the object. Putting the 
argument this way, it seems that the object is still only 
an object for-consciousness and there is still left the 
difficulty of knowing the object in-itself. The solution 
of this difficulty is to be found in the fact that 
consciousness may ever know an object at all. Accepting, 
as I do, Hegel's criticism of positing an in-itself which 
is in principle unknowable, the only meaningful in-itself 
must be one which is for-consciousness. It is the 
evaluations of particular knowledges that arise in 
consciousness that are the only valid criteria of truth, 
for at criterion based on knowing the in-itself is absurd. 
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Knowledge and the improvement of knowledge take place 
within consciousness. This is to say, as Hegel puts it 
in a typically paradoxical fashion, in knowing something 
is for-consciousness the in-itself. Thus in 
consciousness there is a particular cognition, and also 
the criterion of truth by which, the cognition can be 
evaluated, the criterion which takes over the role of 
being-in-itself. 
Summary of Hegel's Position on the Availability of a 
Criterion of Truth 
At this point, I should like to take stock of Hegel's 
argument so far. In order to do this, I shall enlarge 
upon what Hegel has here called the problem of 
dissociation as it applies to Kant. In order to sustain 
his transcendental deduction against empiricist 
scepticism, that empirical knowledge involves being 
informative about objects distinct from the subject (4), 
Kant argues that there are two sources of knowledge 
united in synthetic judgements. These are, of course, 
the a priori forms contributed by reason and the 
empirical substance contributed by the object (5). If we 
accept this as the broad thesis of the Critique, then we 
can say that in outline Kant fails to overcome the 
problem of dissociation. For though we seem to be given 
both sides of consciousness in the sense Hegel has used 
his term so far, in fact we are not because the object 
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remains a brute object, external in the unreachable sense 
of being in-itself. Kant, in this summary rendering of 
his argument, fails to challenge the epitomically 
empiric. st identification of objectivity. The problem 
still remains of uniting these irreconcilably separated 
sides of what, it is stressed, is a relation. I am sure 
that the predominant Kantian reply to this problem is to 
distinquish phenomena and noumena. Unable to link 
subject and object, Kant, as we have seen, attempts to 
make the subject's knowledge of object more or less play 
the role of noumena (with the caveat, however, this 
knowledge is really only of phenomena). 
How is Hegel's argument, as we have taken it so far, 
different to this? I believe that it is different in the 
particular- way in which it displaces the thing-in-itself 
from epistemology. Truth is located within consciousness 
in the sense that what is in principle outside of 
consciousness cannot be relevant to knowledge. This 
provides an initial uniting ground of subject and object 
in consciousness. In Kant, to repeat, there is of course 
an emphatic criticism of direct perception. However, 
Kant's epistemology even after this remains subjective in 
the bad sense that its criterion of truth remains 
identified with such perceptions. What is so interesting 
about Hegel's response is that though - and there should 
be no mistake about this - his argument is, as we shall 
see, put forward as part of an attempt to establish a 
98 
most radical idealism, it is not, as it goes so far, a 
specificially idealist argument. (In fact I will argue 
that it cannot support his idealism). In uniting subject 
and object in consciousness Hegel is making an 
unexceptionable statement, but he separates that 
statement from the sceptical conclusions which had 
hitherto been held to inexorably follow from it. What 
his argument so far does support, I submit, is a realism, 
for it makes epistemology realise knowing's commitment to 
being informative about objects necessarily distinct from 
the subject but which are also in principle knowable in 
consciousness. 
Perhaps the best way to stress the particular 
fruitfulness of Hegel's solution to the problem of 
dissociation is to contrast it to Fichte's and 
Schelling's attempts to also dispense with the 
thing-in-itself after Kant, which we can here take up 
again. Schelling's predominant tack was, in effect, to 
allow a form of direct perception in intellectual 
intuition. (Though a perception of a radically different 
content to empiricist perception). Fichte substantially 
does just the opposite of this. In Fichte, the ego 
posits otherness in an apparent non-ego, and although the 
otherness of non-ego is in fact held by Fichte to be 
immutable as it is a condition of consciousness (6), the 
full sense of distinctness from the subject which 
originally characterised objectivity is clearly lost, 
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which consequence Fichte himself welcomed (7). It is 
perhaps worth stressing in regard to Fichte that his 
epistemology, in attempting to alter the status of 
objectivity, is just as much as Schelling's erasure of 
subjectivity a withdrawal from the epistemological 
problem as Kant presents it (8). Hegel's efforts to, as 
he himself believed, reconcile this opposition begins 
with the uniting of subject and knowable object in 
consciousness whilst not destroying the distinctness from 
the subject of the object. Both Fichte and Schelling in 
the end respond to Kant from within their own developed 
positions. In Hegel, however, there is a profound 
restatement of the content of consciousness which stands 
on its own merits in advance of Hegel's account of that 
content. 
It might be responded that Hegel has not provided the 
link between subject and object which is sought by the 
foundationalist project of classical epistemology. Let 
me repeat in this new context, however, that he has 
emphatically refuted both the necessity and the 
possibility of forging such a link, and has therefore 
destroyed the ground of unrelieved scepticism. I see no 
fundamental difficulty, once we have distanced ourselves 
from what have seemed inevitable empiricist 
presuppositions, in accepting this outline 
epistemological groundwork by Hegel. Subject and object 
constitute the domain of consciousness. Of course some 
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ontological account of this domain now arises as a 
pressing demand. However, we can say in advance of 
trying to satisfy this that Hegel's arguments were 
necessary to _ open up 
the possibility of any such 
satisfaction (9). 
Hegel's achievement is, let me say again, the exposure of 
epistemological alienation. He reveals the possibility 
of truth by criticism of its foreclosure the, for him 
and for us, dominant currents of epistemology. In an 
important sense there is not, and cannot be, a convincing 
reply to foundationalism which accepts its terms, because 
the obstacles to truth which it erects are internal to 
its formulations. Hegel's thrust is to explicitly site 
truth, cognition, objectivity, etc., in the only possible 
area where they can have a ground - that of human 
knowing. Epistemologies which demand that knowledge go 
beyond itelf and secure its own foundation elsewhere are 
shown not merely to demand the impossible and to display 
bad faith by their professions, but further to be 
themselves the authors of their difficulties by making 
contradictory demands upon knowledge to know that it 
cannot know. 
Acceptance of Hegel's position so far is not, I insist, 
to be committed to an idealism. Following Hegel's use of 
"consciousness" up to this point, our discussion can 
quite legitimately be restricted to epistemology, that is 
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to say, to an examination of thought. His insistence 
that objects external to the subject must be available in 
consciousness can be allowed, I think, because it 
accomplishes much whilst leaving the ontological 
understanding of the objectivity involved quite open. 
However, we have united subject and object, particular 
belief and the standard by which any such belief can be 
criticised, in recognising the knowability of objects in 
consciousness. It is within Hegel, I believe, that there 
is the historical foundation of philosophically coherent 
realism in modern epistemology. 
Hege1's Solution of the Problem of Dissociation 
If my interpretation of Hegel's argument so far be 
accepted, it remains of course the case that his negative 
achievement of a convincing criticism*of the barriers to 
a workable realism in classical epistemology requires 
much development before it can itself claim to be such a 
realism. Amongst the number of ways in which this is so 
I would like to mention one in particular. If, as I 
suggest, we accept a restricted sense of "consciousness" 
as corresponding to Hegel's usage of this term so far, as 
a reference to only epistemology, then further 
development must surely raise questions about the 
ontological sources of the character of this 
consciousness. Indeed, the full understanding of the 
alienated positions which have been criticised must 
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involve some reference to this, in the form of a grasp of 
the non-alienated conditions which give counter-factual 
sense to the explanation of the classical epistemological 
project as alienated. Now some such developments are put 
foward by Hegel, but in a fashion the peculiarity of 
which it is vital to grasp. Hegel does not broaden out 
epistemology into an empirical investigation of the 
acquisition of knowledge, neither in the sense of the 
general transcendental ontology which I have argued he 
makes possible, nor even in the more restricted sense of 
an examination of the subjective psychological processes 
involved in coming to know. In failing to take up even 
the latter, Hegel does represent a regressive step from 
the psychological efforts of empiricism and Kant. He 
does not proceed in these ways because he is attempting 
to develop a most radical idealism in which the objects 
of knowing can be directly predicated of consciousness. 
Hegel does not even seek to pursue a line such as that of 
Descartes when the latter attempted to divorce 
subjectivity from the materiality of the body (10). The 
idealism which Hegel envisages is one in which 
epistemological statements about consciousness can also 
immediately stand as ontological statements about the 
objects of consciousness. Obviously a Consciousness in 
which not merely all knowing but also all being is 
grounded is a rather different consciousness to the one 
we have so far discussed, and we must look into the 
difference between these more deeply. 
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After having located within consciousness the criterion 
by which specific cognitions may be judged, Hegel sums up 
this argument which we have just discussed in the 
following way. If knowledge is designated as the Notion, 
he says, and the true as the Object in-itself, then 
examination of the truth of a cognition does indeed turn 
on whether Notion corresponds to that Object. We have 
seen that such a procedure yields nothing. However, 
Hegel now proposes in opposition to this fruitless 
project, VA-A-4-JA call the Object in-itself the Notion, and 
call the Object for-consciousness as established 
in any particular cognition the Object. Now examination 
of the adequacy of cognition consists in seeing whether 
Object corresponds to Notion. It is evident, Hegel 
claims, that the two are the same. 
Hegel's way of putting his point is extraordinarily 
difficult, and I have thought it best, as far as I can, 
to initially simply put forward his own statement and 
then try to explain it. For the first thing we must note 
is that he does not even convey what he wants his readers 
to believe. If the two ways of setting up the 
examination of the adequacy of a cognition were the same, 
having argued that the first one is fruitless, there 
would seem to be little point in Hegel's turning to the 
second. What he is, in fact, claiming is that the two 
procedures describe the same state of affairs, only the 
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second, unlike the first, allows us to see what that 
state of affairs is. 
Hegel is suggesting that as an object for-consciousness 
is the only criterion that can possibly be relevant to 
the assessment of a particular cognition, this amounts to 
saying that objectivity is constituted by consciousness. 
His use of the term "Notion" or "Concept" ("Begriff") 
here arises from his thinking of this issue within the 
framework of his idea of Spirit. Here the place of the 
Object in-itself is taken by Absolute Truth, or the 
adequate notion of Spirit's self-consciousness. In 
calling the beliefs of particular cognitions Objects, 
Hegel is immediately representing these beliefs as 
concrete externalisations of Spirit, particular forms of 
Objectivity being given by particular stages in the 
development of Absolute Spirit. Understood in this way, 
Object must have to correspond to Notion because the 
Truth of all Objectivity is Spirit's self-consciousness. 
This is the basis of Hegel's solution to the problem of 
dissociation. Subject may know Object because both are 
of Spirit (11). In Hegel's vocabulary, the Object 
in-itself is Absolute Spirit, and hence will be known by 
Spirit. We can, however proceed to Absolute Knowledge 
through Objects for-consciousness because these are also 
of Spirit. The consideration of a succession of Objects 
for-consciousness will lead to Absolute Truth because far 
from such truth being unreachable for the Subject, it 
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will be found to be only the Notion, the Subject's own 
presence (12). The dissociation of Subject and Object is 
to be shown to be Spirit's self-alienation, and this will 
be overcome as Spirit is progressively revealed as the 
foundation of Objectivity. 
We can, at this point, return briefly to an earlier 
passage in the 'Introduction' (13) where Hegel, having 
preliminarily outlined the development of the 
Phenomenology, says that the goal of this development is 
as necessarily fixed as the development itself. This 
goal is the point where knowledge no longer needs to go 
beyond itself, where Notion corresponds to Object and 
Object to Notion. The sense to be made of such a goal 
is, I hope, now apparent. It is Hegel's explicit 
statement of the situation in which he envisages the 
solution to the problem of dissociation in the complete 
identification of what were earlier thought to be 
separate (14). 
The force of Hegel's solution of the problem of 
dissociation, if I may stress the point, is to lie in the 
way that the stressing of the grasp of an object 
for-consciousness can, within the framework of Spirit, 
amount to the same thing as grasping the object 
in-itself. That is to say that, to all intents and 
purposes, the object in-itself in the Kantian sense must 
lose all relevance because the brute objectivity which it 
106 
registers is made a product of the subject. To be sure, 
a certain difference between object for-consciousness and 
Object in-itself remains in the 'Introduction' in that 
Hegel notes their difference at this early stage of the 
Phenomenological investigation. But the recognition of 
their difference is now split from the initial 
understanding of them in consciousness as separate 
categories, the former denoting being and the latter 
being that is known (15). Hence the possibility of their 
reconciliation through complete mutual identification is 
opened. 
Hegel's Writings Elsewhere in the 'Phenomenology' on the 
Solution of the Problem of Dissociation 
The key to understanding Hegel's own solution to the 
problem of dissociation lies, I would say, in recognising 
that this solution contains a great deal more that 
requires detailed scrutiny than the brevity with which it 
is expressed would lead us to believe. I note this 
further instance of this stylistic feature of Hegel's 
writing in full awareness that the first three chapters 
of the Phenomenology purport to argue the movement from 
perception of objectivity to self-consciousness. Let us 
consider the relevant aspects of these three chapters. 
The notion of Spirit positing Objectivity and eventually 
realising in this the Subject obviously Owes a great deal 
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to Fichte (16). What can be identified as 
characteristically Hegelian about the discussion of this 
in the Phenomenology 
, 
is the manner of the development of 
self-consciousness. For when, by the end of the chapter 
on 'Force and the Understanding', Hegel declares the 
Truth of consciousness of Objectivity to be 
Self-consciousness, this position has been argued in the 
most intimate, if allusive, relation to Kant as the first 
stage of the Phenomenological movement. Hegel's argument 
in the section on 'Consciousness' has a form very 
substantially set by an attempt to immanently develop, to 
use the Kantian terminology, intuition into understanding 
and then on into the unity of apperception. That is to 
say, Hegel tries to move from perception of objectivity 
(intuition in Kant) to conceptual comprehension 
(understanding in Kant) to the fact that all knowing is 
predicated of a subject (the transcendental unity of 
apperception in Kant) (1? ), these three being related by 
the last being the immanent truth of the first. The 
difference of the form of Hegel's response to Kant from 
that of Fichte's similar response is enormous. It was a 
principal, and eventually somewhat notorious, claim of 
Fichte's, that the content of his philosophy was but the 
Kantian categories set out in a coherent deductive 
relationship to the basic principle of human knowledge - 
the absoluteness of the Ego (18). Of course Kant 
encouraged this, one of the first post-Kantian 
"completions" of the critical philosophy, by setting out 
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the categories in seemingly arbitrary manner (19), and 
Hegel certainly agreed with Fichte upon the necessity of 
some proper linking of (again to use the Kantian terms) 
the unity of apperception to the specific categories of 
experience, such as Fichte had provided (20). However, 
Hegel found the deduction by which Fichte claimed to have 
accomplished this (21) to be wanting (22). It is in the 
very movement of Spirit itself - in this case in Kant's 
and his successors' thought as the philosophic expression 
of natural consciousness - that Hegel sought to locate 
self-consciousness as the truth of objectivity. One need 
only read these brilliant first three chapters to see the 
power this Phenomenological method grants to Hegel's 
arguments (23) - though of course this is not to say that 
one must agree with them, merely that one must register 
their marked superiority to presentations such as 
Fichte's. 
The progress of the first part of the Phenomenology is 
recapitulated in the System (24), in line, of course, 
with the wider character of Hegel's relation of 
Phenomenology and System proper. This particular moment 
of Absolute Truth has its place in the System because 
Hegel is trying to argue that there is a necessity in 
encountering the problem of dissociation, in that it is 
in the very overcoming of this that the self-awareness of 
Spirit begins to emerge. 
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In sum, in all these passages we have discussed Hegel is 
locating the form of (natural) consciousness as a moment 
of Spirit, with a profound change in the meaning of 
"consciousness" being effected. As opposed to facing a 
distinct objectivity, Consciousness as a moment of Spirit 
has to face, essentially, only its own self. 
An Evaluation of Hea_el's Own Solution to the Problem of 
Dissociation 
It would seem, then, that what is required in order to 
evaluate Hegel's full solution to the problem of 
dissociation is to turn to the first section of the 
Phenomenology. However, I do not propose to do so, for I 
believe that for the purposes of a deeper understanding 
Hegel's own thinking on this point, it is crucial to 
realise that the basis of this solution is to be found in 
the passages of the 'Introduction' which we have 
preliminarily discussed. It goes without saying that I 
do not by this mean to imply that there is nothing of 
interest or lasting value in that first section. (There 
is, for example, a refutation of the possibility of 
descriptions of singular sensations that, in my opinion 
quite adequately, more than one hundred years before this 
episode took place, covered the important issues in the 
collapse of logical atomism or logical positivism under 
the acknowledgement of the public interpretative 
framework upon which even natural scientific discourse is 
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built (25)). 
I have claimed that Hegel's criticisms of classical 
epistemology lead towards an examination of the character 
of subjectivity given in relation to real, distinct, 
objectivity; and yet he himself has summed up his 
argument in a fashion which undoubtedly expressed one of 
the most thoroughgoing idealisms in modern philosophy. 
If my understanding is correct, Hegel has again run his 
polemic against the classical epistemological project 
immediately into the broader setting out of his own 
conception of the gaining of truth without acknowledging 
that he has done so. What is vital here, both for 
assessing the strength of Hegel's eventual position and 
for gauging the felicity of my interpretation of this 
position, is that, as I will. now argue, what Hegel 
accomplishes in this surreptitious way is not defensible 
under open scrutiny. 
In the shift in the meaning of "consciousness" on which 
Hegel's conclusion of his argument rests, an essential 
characteristic of natural consciousness is, without any 
warrant, simply eliminated by not being carried on into 
Consciousness as a moment of Spirit. It will be recalled 
that from the very outset Hegel's discussion of classical 
epistemology has turned on showing how it is unable to 
ground truth once it has recognised the creative 
contribution of cognition to knowledge. Hegel's solution 
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to the problem of dissociation turns on making this 
essentially synthetic understanding of cognition 
redundant by identifying subject and object. Hegel 
claims not only to have shown that any potential 
criterion of truth must be found in consciousness, but 
also thereby to have shown that there is no distance 
between what is found in consciousness and objectivity. 
Or rather, there is the illusory show of distance created 
by the alienated form of Spirit's externalisation which 
must be overcome. In Kantian terms, what Hegel is doing 
is reducing the effect of the categories on judgements to 
the unity of apperception, reducing the cognitive 
contributions of the subject to the mere fact of 
subjectivity. 
Hegel makes this quite clear when he says that the point 
arising from these observations which we must grasp in 
understanding the method of Phenomenological proof is the 
following. As particular cognitions (being-for-another) 
and the object as criterion (being-in-itself as it is 
for-consciousness) fall within knowledge, it is just when 
we abandon all our presuppositions and simply follow the 
developments of successive cognitions we will eventually 
reach an exhaustive, an Absolute, knowledge of being. 
This idea of knowing exhausting being makes sense given 
the way in which, on Hegel's understanding of 
Consciousness as a moment of Spirit, objectivity itself 
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drops out of consideration. As there is no object, there 
can hardly be the category of subjective contributions to 
synthetic judgements. The subject constitutes all there 
is to "judgements", and to have Truth we must immerse 
ourselves in the subject. Hegel is here advocating a 
kind of optimistic direct perception (I hope this 
vocabulary is not misleading) in which the source of 
epistemological problems is nullified at the point of the 
object rather than the subject. 
Taking up the problem of knowing in the light of 
subjective contributions to cognition has, however, 
another side to it than the one which in the classical 
epistemological project leads to the positing of the 
thing-in-itself. This is the registering of, again to 
use Kant's terms, an intuition of materiality as the 
recognition of objectivity distinct from the subjebt. 
Whatever difficulties there may be in understanding 
knowing after registering this intuition, there is no 
sense in which the original setting up of the problem 
ever conceives of knowing actually breaking down the 
distinctness of object from subject. Knowing in the 
light of this distinctness is the epistemological 
problem. Hegel's solution to this problem is to dissolve 
the very distinctness, as we have seen. However, there 
is no warrant for this outside of understanding natural 
consciousness as Consciousness as a moment of Spirit. In 
shifting from one to the other, Hegel fails to translate 
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the ineradicable sensation of materiality which, 
certainly for Kant, identifies natural consciousness. 
His argument that in Kant this sensation becomes posited 
as an absurd thing-in-itself is, though correct, not 
nearly sufficient to dispose of the underlying sensation, 
even when absurdly conceptualised (26). Of course, were 
Hegel's argument in the first section of the 
Phenomenology successful, then he could claim his 
identification of subject and object to be the solution 
of the epistemological problem. But I think we can see 
that here, in the 'Introduction', he has prefaced this 
nullification of objectivity with a shift in the meaning 
of "consciousness" that makes the nullification possible. 
Instead of thought and being standing as ontologically 
distinct, Hegel now construes the latter as predicated by 
the former. In his discussion in the first three 
chapters forms of objectivity are always considered to be 
completely exhausted through treatments of ways of 
knowing them. Hence by merely following successive 
cognitions without making any contributions of our own to 
the process, Hegel is able to make subjectivity the 
foundation of objectivity, and thus claim this the 
Absolute Truth of Being (27). 
HeQel's Re-statement of the Ontological Proof 
Earlier I have argued that Hegel is sure that the 
ontological proof in the form given to it by Anselm 
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cannot hold against Kant's attack upon it. His 
acceptance of this is always coupled with the reservation 
that there is a fundamental truth indicated. by the proof 
which can and should be recovered in a more adequate 
formulation. In this light Kant's thoroughly critical 
dismissal of the proof constitutes a mistaken rejection 
of a most valuable philosophical resource (28). Not only 
did Hegel famously try explicitly to revive this truth 
after Kant (29), but, as I think we can now see, his 
attempt was based upon the principal thrust of the whole 
of his fully developed response to Kant (30). 
For natural consciousness, Hegel concurs, the concept of 
God and His existence are radically different. However, 
he manages to turn even this to own ends. He argues that 
Kant's refutation of the proof acquired a rather flawed 
brilliance by being 'given in a polemic against the 
weakest possible rendering of the proof, that given to it 
most famously by Mendelssohn (31), in which existence. 
certainly is thought of as a formal logical predicate and 
in which, therefore, "the identity of Idea and Reality 
was made to look like the adding of one concept to 
another" (32). Hegel's revival of the proof seeks, as we 
might expect, to break with consciousness' way of 
treating knowledge itself, this being a way of securely 
defending the proof against attacks such as Kant's which 
are based on consciousness' categories. Hegel's reply to 
Kant takes the tack of stressing that the proof is not 
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referring to consciousness' concepts but to the Notion of 
God; and, he says, there is a greater difference between 
these two types of "concepts" than between thought and 
being (33). Taking Consciousness to be a moment of 
Spirit, it becomes quite open for Hegel to claim the 
fundamental truth of the ontological proof (34), because 
the essence of Consciousness understood in this way is 
that it is part of a movement in which knowledge of 
existents is to be shown to be itself the ground of 
existence. What remains ineluctably formal in the proof, 
and therefore seemingly sophistic, is its logical 
predication of existence. However, for Hegel this can be 
recovered and entirely vindicated in its essentials by 
being made part of a full argument which sets out the 
role of Consciousness in the development of the adequate 
Notion of Absolute Spirit (35). If this overall argument 
is successful, then the empirical sensitivity to 
materiality which stands behind Kant's rejection of the 
proof can be of no consequence, for it is this 
materiality itself that is to disappear. 
Summary of Hegel's Views on the Unity of Subject and 
Object 
My own understanding of the rights of the matter has lead 
me to argue that Hegel's conception of the unity of 
subject and object contains a central and yet 
indefensible elision of two senses of "consciousness" 
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which makes crucial epistemological problems dissolve by 
being artificially integrated into a theocratic scheme. 
However, we must remember that this elision comes at the 
end of a determined polemic made not expressly against 
objectivity but against the thing-in-itself. Here we 
must draw on Hegel's valuable arguments, and not attempt 
to return to the genuine, but nevertheless inadequate, 
materialist aspirations in Kant for the advance of 
realist, empirical epistemology. This can be seen quite 
clearly by considering one of the principal ways in which 
Kant's philosophy also shades into theocrasy. When Kant 
sets out his doctrine of faith in God, one ground for it 
is his belief that God's existence is necessary as a 
postulate of practical reason in order for happiness and 
morality to be in harmony (36). That is to say, Kant's 
faith figures in the solution to that disjunction between 
duty and the validation of duty as good which parallels 
his disjunction of phenomena and noumena, the former 
disrupting the second Critique as the latter does the 
first (37). There is, then, no productive fashion in 
which we can simply return to Kant as a response to 
Hegel's arguments. 
I think that again Hegel leaves us with problems arising 
from his coupling of a successful description of aspects 
of what epistemology can and must do to an unacceptable 
depiction of the character of the operations which he 
tends to think are thereby also established. Not least 
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in its contribution to the unacceptable character of 
Hegel's depictions is the way he entails their specific 
forms in the earlier, quite open and general, often 
merely negative, arguments. In this instance, criticism 
of the demand that the thing-in-itself be the criterion 
by which particular cognitions be judged, which grounds a 
compelling realist commitment to the knowability of 
objects in consciousness, is summed up in such a way that 
it seems to entail the disappearance of objectivity 
distinct from the subject. The issues of true 
philosophic interest left by Kant, those of coming to 
terms with the distance between subject and object known 
to be mutually constitutive moments of knowing, are, in 
the end, of no concern to Hegel (38). 
Hegel centrally argues the idea of shunning all 
preconceptions in order to absolve epistemology of any 
distance from the essence of objectivity. In the way in 
which cognitions's contributions to knowing are thereby 
rendered meaningless as they are now all of knowing, 
Hegel is putting forward a construction of the unity of 
subject and object which is a simple break with the basis 
of classical epistemology and his criticisms of that 
project. There is no immanent development here, merely 
the erasure of what had earlier been the starting point 
of productive development. 
What is more, the identity thinking at which Hegel 
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thereby arrives can have only pernicious epistemological 
consequences. There can be no corrigible check upon 
Hegel's conduct of the Phenomenological progression, 
because when treating cognitions as objects he is now 
claiming to directly represent them. Absolute 
presuppositionlessness is the methodological injunction 
arising from his doing away with an effective moment in 
knowing of objectivity. When we reject this injunction, 
indeed reject its very possibility and restore the 
essential sense of the subject making contributions to 
knowing, then Hegel's construction of Phenomenology must 
be seen as giving far too much licence to his own 
representations of those cognitions. The check on 
speculation provided by respect for the object is 
removed, and the overall implausibility of the 
Phenomenology as a history to which disregard of this 
check leads finally refutes Hegel's Phenomenological 
method. 
In sum, Hegel leaves us with a paradox. We are, I think, 
shown by him to be committed to the knowability of 
objects in consciousness. We can also see from him that 
this knowability cannot be on the grounds of an assumed 
identity of subject and object. The task that remains, 
then, is one of comprehending knowability, which posits 
the unity of subject and object, in the knowledge of the 
perpetual non-identity of these two moments of knowing, 
that is to say in the knowledge of the "untruth of 
identity, the fact that the concept does not exhaust the 
thing conceived" (39). 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUBJECT AND OBJECT IN HEGEL'S REPRESENTATION OF KNOWING 
(CONTINUED): THE STRUCTURE OF LEARNING 
Introduction 
Having united subject and object in a ground of potential 
knowledge and thereby having secured the possibility of 
knowing, Hegel now turns to the problem of their 
relative, but not absolute, dissociation and to the means 
of resolving that dissociation. That is to say, he turns 
to the problem of learning. For subject and object are 
not entirely as one - bring them closer together is of 
course a perennial task. It is to bring this within 
his overall uniting of subject and object that Hegel now 
turns. 
The Testing of Particular Cognitions and Th= Ob ects 
Not only, says Hegel in continuation of the argument we 
have just discussed in the previous chapter, is the 
contribution- of a criterion by us superfluous or even 
harmful, but we need not even stage a testing of specific 
claims to truth (1). For since both claims and objects 
are, as we now recognise, for-consciousness, it is this 
very consciousness that knows their comparison. 
Consciousness itself is the awareness of any discrepancy 
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between claim and object, or, to put it this way, is the 
assessment of the adequacy of the former by use of the 
criterion of the latter. Here Hegel is continuing to 
press home his criticism of epistemological alienation by 
showing how the basic epistemological impulse distorted 
in the classical project is actually grounded. 
Determinate negation is explicated, partially at least, 
as a process of progressive evaluation of cognitions by 
the only citeria that can be available for this, the 
objects they establish in consciousness. Consciousness 
of the inadequacies of knowledge claims even to the 
objects they postulate spurs investigation through 
improved cognitions. 
Hegel had previously argued, as we have seen, that to 
regard the thing-in-itself as the object of knowledge, 
and therefore as the criterion by which particular 
cognitions must be judged, is an absurd epistemological 
position. The objects that can be of pertinence to 
knowing must be for-consciousness. He is now trying to 
set out the way in which these objects may serve as 
criteria for the testing of cognitions in the development 
of knowledge. Knowing consciousness is composed of 
cognitions and the objects they postulate. We are now 
discussing consciousness, and this identification of two 
elements in knowing, which amounts to the distinction of 
subject and object, must be justified without reference 
to an object-in-itself. This can, I think, readily be 
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done, though 'I must point out that here I am more adding 
to Hegel's position than directly interpreting it for he 
is very brief indeed on this point. Knowing consciousess 
"layers" its constituent beliefs, distinguishing by 
degree of relative certitude attached to these beliefs 
between the' relatively new and on into more or less 
settled beliefs. These latter take on more the status of 
objectivity as they have gained a relatively large degree 
of corroboration in earlier investigations, and new 
cognitions are undertaken to address issues which arise 
within the broad framework of these existing objects 
for-consciousness. These objects are, then, the criteria 
by which new cognitions are assessed. As opposed to this 
objective inner core of knowing consciousness' set of 
beliefs, there are graduated belts of relatively fragile 
contributions to knowing which are therefore, precisely, 
subjective. 
Though Hegel's argument in fact depends upon some such 
layering of subject and object in consciousness as I have 
set out, he devotes virtually all of his attention to a 
subsidiary position. This is the shift in the pattern of 
the objective which follows from the evaluation of any 
cognition. Should a belief fail the test of comparison 
to its object and be rejected, it must of course be 
regarded as inadequate. But, Hegel says, so too must the 
criterion be rejected. For the criterion is the 
framework in which the belief arose, and when that belief 
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is shown to be inadequate, so this must call into 
question the criterion. This seems sophistic, but again 
it is the extreme economy of Hegel's manner of expression 
which more or less conceals a valuable point. When a 
belief's being revealed as inadequate has lead to the 
rejection of the belief and perhaps also to that of its 
object, certainly to the rendering suspect to some degree 
of its object, then, Hegel says, this is not only a 
testing of what we know but of what knowing is. 
Hegel rather over-emphasises the degree to which patterns 
of objectivity can be called into question, as it is very 
doubtful whether the rejection of one particular belief 
can of itself ever be crucial for the general framework 
in which that belief arose. Hegel is himself concerned 
with major shifts in belief and organisation of ethical 
life, and his studies of the later parts of the 
Phenomenology tend to have this acute form as a corollary 
of the way they focus down to what are said to be the 
crucial issues for Spirit's development that arise out of 
each historical episode discussed. However, the 
underlying commitment to openness in all our beliefs is a 
valuable one, as is the indication of how relatively 
settled structures of objectivity can be called into 
question. When these structures lead to the framing of 
new subjective conjectures that are found to do little or 
nothing to improve our knowledge in the areas they cover, 
then the possibility of a major shift in our 
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understanding as a precondition of such improvement has 
to be countenanced. In this sense, earlier objects may 
become changed, for radical alterations in our 
understanding through reflexive reassessment of hitherto 
developed knowledge refashion even relatively stable sets 
of beliefs. They call, as we have just noted Hegel say, 
our very ideas of what knowing is in these areas into 
question. 
It is the characteristic motif of dogmatism that such a 
call goes unheeded. Inadequacies are treated not so much 
as requiring explanation but as requiring to be explained 
away in terms which preserve the original core ideas of 
the character of objectivity in the area of inquiry. 
Hegel's own criticism of the classical epistemological 
project exemplifies authentic determinate negation which 
refuses to leave even the most apparently ineluctable 
beliefs inviolable. Hegel's particular contribution is 
to insist on the complete unacceptability of denying 
philosophic adequacy to cognition, and to go on to have 
the good faith to call into question the fundamental 
standard of knowledge that can yield only inadequate 
cognition. Hume's attitude to natural belief is, in my 
opinion, by contrast lacking in true philosophical 
spirit, and a readiness to work within the absurdity of 
Hume's position has characterised British epistemology in 
this century. A failure to go so far as Hegel renders 
even avowedly post-empiricist philosophy's explanations 
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of the actual processes of (scientific) knowing subject 
to a guilt which is based on fundamental acceptance of 
foundationalism, and makes this philosophical current's 
name an irony at its own expense. 
With these comments Hegel details, as he now says, the 
Dialectical movement which is given its content in 
experience. What characteristics of experience as Hegel 
depicts it are brought out by this discussion of the form 
of movement by which it develops? One above all is 
emphasised. Consciousness is the ground of its own 
development. Consciousness embraces both claim to 
knowledge and object and is their comparison. Attempts 
to close this distance are the very essence of 
dialectical development. Of course the dialectic does 
not have to be progressive, but it can be so in as much 
as it is possible to draw upon the lessons of the past. 
Knowing then becomes teleological in the sense that it is 
consciously guided. It is in pursuit of the improvement 
of knowledge that consciousness must spoil the limited 
satisfaction which attends acceptance of any belief. In 
search of development, consciousness suffers the violence 
of the exposure of inadequate beliefs at its own hands 
(2). 
Hege l's Attitude to Triadic Dialectic 
Though an issue of genuine pertinence to Hegel's own work 
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is raised by broaching this issue, it is particularly 
interpretations (3) and avowed developments (4) of 
Hegel's philosophy subsequent to his death that make it 
necessary for us to now turn to the assessment of the 
hermeneutic value of attributing a triadic form to his 
dialectic. 
It was Kant whom Hegel correctly identified as having 
initiated the modern revival of triadic dialectic - an 
infinite merit of the Kantian philosophy as Hegel 
believed (5), but not of course acceptable to him in the 
form in which Kant left it. Kant's transcendental 
dialectic is, as I have mentioned earlier, an attempt to 
account for those illusions which arise when the 
understanding, driven beyond those empirical bounds 
within which it may comprehend by those perenially 
pressing speculative conundra which we can all 
immediately call to mind, undertakes purely conceptual 
ratiocination. We can see that though Kant may revive an 
ancient form of argument, he does so in order to 
contribute to the polemic against speculation by which 
modern empirical thought explicitly distanced itself from 
its past. However, unlike, for example, Bacon's use of 
the concept of "idols", Kant does not aim at the complete 
removal of these questions. Rather their persistent 
presence is to be transcendentally explained; that is to 
say, they are given a fixed place in human reason (6). 
Their presence is thereby to be rendered harmless, 
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because it is now able to be rationally explained. 
Kant's transcendental analysis cannot, by its very 
nature, seek to dispell what it reveals, but nevertheless 
Kant can claim that these are false questions in the 
sense that the understanding cannot make a coherent 
response to them in their own terms. Kant tries to show 
this by demonstrating that attempts to make such a 
response must decay- into one of three types of 
inextricable confusion (7). The second of these as he 
sets them out, the antinomies, is of most interest to us 
here. An antinomy is a set of two propositions, each of 
which is required for speculation and indeed have in one 
form or another been continually put forward. However, 
these propositions are mutually antithetical, which of 
course precludes any consistent satisfaction of the need 
to hold them both (8). 
The conclusion that the understanding by which we 
comprehend only finite things will fall into 
contradiction when grappling with speculative truth is, 
when subtly re-interpreted, one Hegel is prepared to 
celebrate (9). But of course he is hardly prepared to 
conclude further that such truth is therefore 
unreachable. That Kant did so, Hegel attributes to an 
excess of tenderness for the finite things of the world 
(10). Though we can be sure from such expressions that 
Hegel's intent is ultimately speculative, and though the 
dialectic is, notwithstanding the revulsion it inspires 
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in much of contemporary analytic philosophy, one of the 
most explicitly empirically minded parts of the Critique 
of Pure Reason, we must initially allow that Hegel, and 
other post-Kantians notably Fichte, are on familiar and 
secure ground in attacking the Kantian dialectic of 
antinomies. 
In so far as Kant is unable to restrict his attribution 
of an antinomical character to archaic cosmologies and 
the like, but carries this over into his description of 
what remain the fundamental problems of epistemology, 
then the essentially derogatory nature of an antinomical 
description cannot be maintained. It is quite literally 
true that in the antinomies Kant more or less gives the 
form not only of problems he would regard as fruitless, 
but also of ones he would regard as crucial. The feature 
of the antinomies which Kant takes to be the mark of 
incomprehensibility is the mutual antithesis of the 
propositions involved. It is very difficult indeed to 
base a sound rejection of the speculative issues 
discussed here on this ground, for the overall impression 
which Kant gives is that he has just not made a 
sufficient effort to resolve or synthesise this 
antithesis. Not only is his own epistemology built on a 
notion of synthesis, but when he actually describes the 
categories of reason they themselves have a form very 
like that set out in the antinomical dialectic, only 
expanded to the third term missing in the antinomies. 
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His presentation of the categories is of triplicities in 
which there is a mediate term formed by the combination 
of the other two (11), and there is no reason of form why 
this syllogism could not be extended to the antinomies 
and their speculative problems. It is, Hegel believed 
(12), and he was surely correct, more a matter of the way 
in which Kant sets out the account and proofs of the 
antinomies that blocks off their mediation, rather than 
any profound dislocation between their form and that of 
categories; a point Hegel proves by resolving the 
antinomies in arguments which are as sound as Kant's 
description of the categories (13). 
In Fichte a solution to the antinomies, or rather the 
problems they take up divorced from Kant's particular 
formulations, is linked to the fundamental comprehension 
of the self-positing Ego (14), and this solution is 
expanded throughout the Science of Knowledge as the 
explication of Ego. Having looked at the fundamental 
substance of this explication at a number of points 
earlier, we are now concerned with the form. We find 
that the flat opposition of antinomical thesis and 
antithesis in the Critique of Pure Reason is to be 
overcome by Fichte's expanding of these to a mediated 
third term of the synthesis of the two. We run here into 
Fichte's more general response to the scheme of the 
categories which we have already discussed. The form of 
the self-positing of Ego is conceived in a triadic 
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fashion as a mediation of Ego and posited non-Ego. This 
essential form of Fichte's explanation of knowing (15) is 
incidentally - for I do not intend to further discuss 
this point as the treatment is derived directly from 
Fichte though of course subjected to a change of object - 
also found throughout Schelling's early philosophy (16). 
Now, as we have seen Hegel to be in broad sympathy with 
the aims of Fichte and Schelling, we can expect him to 
more or less endorse their responses to the Kantian 
dialectic. Though this is so (17), we can equally expect 
that the formalism of this application - and this is the 
right word - of thesis-antithesis-synthesis would be 
anathema to him (18). Hegel is indeed withering in his 
criticism of the use of this scheme by Fichte and 
Schelling as a "monotonous formalism" (19). This 
criticism must, I think, be accepted without reservation, 
for in its formalistic use this scheme repeats a dry 
reduction of all moments of determinateness to moments of 
synthetic mediation which is as abstract and barren as 
the Spinozist reduction of all finitude to inessential 
modes. It must be categorically stated that one cannot 
even begin to successfully interpret Hegel's own writings 
through the employment of the heuristic of a stiff 
thesis-antithesis-synthesis template (20). For one 
thing, these terms are but very rarely to be found in 
Hegel's writings (21), other than where he takes them 
over in commentary, and never, subject to this proviso, 
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to my knowledge together (22). More importantly, if one 
forces the text into the mould of this syllogistic 
scheme, then the very vivacity, in the fullest sense, 
that distinquishes the Hegelian Phenomenology from the 
philosophies of Fichte and Schelling (23) is thereby lost 
to view. Hegel's Dialectic of determinate negations is 
to proceed, as we have seen, by following the 
self-movement of Consciousness, and is in no way to 
impose a pattern upon this development. Its mechanism of 
movement, immanent critique structured by the moment of 
subjectivity and objectivity, in no sense resemble a 
fixed pattern of theses and antitheses, much to the 
embarrasment of attempts to criticise Hegel for not 
providing a clear enough triadic pattern to his dialectic 
such as the critic's formalistic understanding requires 
(24). 
We are not, however, entitled to conclude from this that 
Hegel's Dialectic displays no intimate connection with a 
triadic form. The essentially approving character 
of Hegel's comments on Kant's revival of this form should 
alert us to this, as should the marked literary 
predilection for overall triadic arrangementA which he 
displays throughout his work - as a brief perusal of any 
table of contents which he provided would reveal. The 
fundamental reason why the triad has an important role is 
that the Dialectic is set within the scheme of the 
realisation of Spirit. This is to say that, as much as 
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with Fichte or Schelling, Hegel sets his overall solution 
to epistemological problems with a broad triad, for Hegel 
composed of oppositional or contradictory characteristics 
of Spirit and their progressive mediation. The relation 
of the course of the Hegelian Dialectic and the Hegelian 
conception of Spirit is essentially described when Hegel 
asserts that all that is rational is syllogistic in form 
(25), and when he sets out Determinate Being as the 
mediation of Being and Nothing in Becoming (26). The 
sequence of determinate negations that makes up 
experience can be only a progessive synthetic mediation 
of contradictions of Spirit, for it is this mediation 
which is the whole aim of Hegel's Philosophy. Of course 
there is very little here to do with a formal triadic 
scheme. I am trying to draw attention to a subtle 
forcing of his materials throughout Hegel's 
Phenomenological treatment of forms of consciousness. As 
the plausibility of Phenomenology as proof of the 
Absolute ultimately turns on this point, I must now 
consider it in greater detail. 
Evaluation of the Triadic Dialectic 
We are now hard up against the crucial problem of 
Hegelian Phenomenology. It must fulfill certain 
requirements if it is to demonstrate Absolute Truth, and 
yet it is to secure conviction by being wholly given in a 
presuppositionless following of the development of 
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consciousness. The point is of course that there is to 
be no contradiction between these two aims, which is why 
the latter will prove the former. Dialectic, to focus 
upon this, is to be given by a series of determinate 
negations which follow from the immananent criticism of 
forms of consciousness. Here we have the vital question: 
is it possible for Hegel to sustain his essentially 
empiricial treatment of forms of consciousness and yet 
bring them within his overall theological scheme? This 
question has been present throughout this commentary. 
However, I think I may safely say in defence of this that 
this very question is present throughout the 
Phenomenology, particularly in the 'Preface' and the 
'Introduction'. Hegel's opinion is clear - following the 
Dialectic reveals it to play out the pattern of Absolute 
Truth, and it is this discovered quality which admits of 
overall triadic formalisation in a Logic that is 
descriptive of the structure of Being. There is really 
only one way in which one can judge the veracity of this 
opinion in a way sufficiently sympathetic to Hegel's 
profoundly important way of setting out his argument and 
to the extraordinary interest of the substance of that 
argument. This is to read his works; but most 
especially, for reasons with which we are familiar, to 
read the Phenomenology of Spirit. 
However, I do not feel that anything is to be gained for 
the appreciation of Hegel's achievement by failing to 
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state my opinion that it is absurd to regard the 
Dialectic of the Phenomenology, as successfully bearing 
the enormous weight placed upon it (21). It is enough to 
say, from the epistemological joint of view taken in this 
commentary, that it is trivially easy, and in itself 
unrewarding, to insist upon the many discontinuities, and 
unfounded elisions that paper over these, in the book's 
movements through and transitions between forms of 
consciousness and ethical life. (Such elisions are 
equally present in Hegel's other writings). This 
response to Hegel must be made if one is to assess his 
work in the light of his own evaluations of and 
professions about his philosophy. But this response had 
served its purpose as soon as Trendlenburg first made it 
in 1840 (24), and a positive way to approach these 
continual break-downs in Hegel's argument is to recover 
from them the resources they obscure. 
On one point we must be particularly careful. The 
arguments of the Phenomenolocy may follow in a literary 
sense as internal to the book. I personally do not find 
this to be so, but opinion to the contrary is available 
(2-1). This is, however, an issue quite distinct from 
taking those arguments to be empirically and necessarily 
secured in the way that Hegel requires for the public 
winning of conviction. Though the studies are without 
doubt of the utmost interest as allegories on more or 
less all characteristic features of modern society and on 
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certain basic issues of human existence, it is simply 
unwarranted to regard them as succeeding precisely at the 
point where Hegel needs them to stand not as allegory but 
as explicit truth (30). Those qualities of rational, 
empirical openness which Hegel identifies as the essence 
of what is valuable in philosophy must, in the end, be 
seen to be lacking in the Phenomenology, and certainly so 
in respect of the terms of necessarily compelling 
circularity which he seeks for proof of the Absolute. 
What in fact goes on throughout the book's remarkable 
combination of forms of argument is a most massive effort 
to continually force his basically empirical materials 
into the presumptive speculative mould in which they then 
play their part. Much more than forms of consciousness 
showing themselves to need to be understood within the 
framework of Hegelian Spirit, the reading of Hegel's 
work, at least after his death, has continually testified 
to the need to draw out what is valuable in his treatment 
of these forms from the encumbrance of that framework. 
We must note the indefensible elisions which this forcing 
introduces into the book, not because they could be 
removed, but because they could not. Hegel's 
dissatisfaction with the 1807 edition of the 
Phenomenology has already been mentioned. Presumably the 
revisions he began shortly before his death would have 
involved significant changes. (Though, interestingly 
enough, in that part of the 'Preface' which he did revise 
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he did not make other than trivial alterations (3 % _). 
This was, on the other hand, that part of the book 
written with most knowledge of where the argument was 
going). However, such an effort of revision is 
irrelevant to the point I am trying to make. The 
Phenomenology combines erudition, philosophic ability and 
substantive philosophic and social theoretical 
illumination, all of the highest degree, in a way that 
make it, in my opinion, the greatest work of modern human 
studies. Nevertheless, as an attempt to dominate its 
enormous material in a way that satisfies Hegel's 
theological claims, it is naive, breaking down at just 
about every point. This contradiction, which might be 
expanded to that between the speculative-objective 
demands of Hegel's theology and the empirical-subjective 
demands of his philosophic proof, the latter continually 
ridiculing the former, is stopped from splitting the work 
apart by a continous forcing that is an astonishing 
effort of dogmatic conviction and style. 
An important consequence of this contradiction in the 
Phenomenology is that the motive power of the movement 
described becomes impossible to understand coherently. I 
have mentioned that it is essential to the concept of 
Spirit that its externalisation be a commitment to open 
self-discovery. Equally the open character of the 
progression of forms of consciousness is of the essence 
of Phenomenological proof. Despite the depth of Hegel's 
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setting out of the ways in which forms of consciousness 
can be seen to be their own ground of development, it 
proves impossible for him to ultimately ward off the 
impression that the Phenomenological progression is 
teleologically directed. I do not mean this in the 
acceptable, indeed important, sense that new forms of 
consciousness may direct' themselves by learning from the 
past. I. mean that Hegel's representaton of forms of 
consciousness gives a direction to the movement which 
stands as an outer teleology, a direction outside of the 
movement itself. One should not make too much of this. 
There could hardly be a more determinedly 
anti-theological theocrasy than Hegel's, nor an account 
of consciousness that does more to make an 
unobjectionable sense of teleology available. However, 
in the end it is the impossibility of presenting God's 
externalisation of the world in ways which both do and do 
not convey his omniscience, and the consequent 
incomprehensibility of even Hegel's attempt to do so, 
that makes this shortcoming one we could very confidently 
expect to find (32). 
In his later writings, Hegel attempts, from the point of 
view of the System, to extol as a virtue just that 
ambiguity which we have seen in the Phenomenolooy. The 
empirical following of History's own movement is to 
reveal the process of the externalisation of Spirit (33), 
and Spirit's method of realising itself through the 
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alienated conduct of human beings is shown to be a work 
of absolute cunning - the ruse* of Reason (34). The 
essential Truth of the System is that in striving for 
their own goals, human beings actually act out the 
purposes of Spirit. 
It is not, of course, by any means impossible that (in 
alienated societies) the behaviour of men and women is 
influenced by social forces they do not comprehend. 
Adequate explanation of that behaviour reveals those 
influences and hence those forces. The recognition of 
this possibility of unacknowledged social determination 
is indeed, in my opinion, the most important achievement 
of modern society. This is not to say that we must 
accept Hegel's specific understanding of the issues 
involved, which explains them through the scheme of the 
externalisation of Spirit. This is surely a separable 
matter (3S). What is more, if we do not so separate the 
general possibility of the penetration of alienated 
consciousness from Hegel's specific construction of it, 
then when, as we must eventually do, we come to regard 
that construction as an ultimate failure, we stand 
threatened with losing the entire possibility of the 
critique of alienation. We must allow ourselves the hope 
of rebuilding the ground on which we can claim the 
epistemological privelege of penetrating alienated 
consciousness after seeing in Hegel why this task is 




HEGEL'S INVERSION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
Introduction 
Having set out the aims and method of Phenomenology, 
Hegel makes certain observations at the end of the 
'Introduction' which directly raise the idea of 
inversion, and it is to these that we must now turn (1). 
If we are to understand Marx's purported "inversion" of 
Hegel, a first task, one we can now address, is to see 
the way "inversion" figures in Hegel's own thought. 
Heg` s Requirement of an "Inversion" of our Knowledge of 
Experience 
The instructions Hegel has just given on how to follow 
the course of Experience contain, he now allows, a moment 
which does not seem to follow from what is ordinarily 
understood as experience, and thus, I should like to add, 
can only with difficulty be said to be directly derived 
from the study of experience. This moment is the 
transition from immediately undergoing experience to the 
comprehension of what Experience actually is. Let us 
take the course of any episode described as a determinate 
negation as it is actually experienced. It is understood 
as a change of some sort no doubt, and perhaps elements 
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of comprehension of the immanent criticism of existing 
positions are available to the participants. But it 
certainly is not understood as a point in the progressive 
realisation of the Absolute. This can come only 
afterwards, when we may look back upon and reflexively 
re-comprehend Experience with the privileged hindsight of 
knowledge of the realised Absolute. What we are dealing 
with, 'says Hegel, is an inversion of consciousness' 
normal perspective (2). 
We can recall Hegel's rejection of what he described as 
Schelling's asking of inadequate belief to stand upon its 
head, to invert itself when faced with its opposite in 
the Truth and thereby to rise to the Truth by assuming 
what that belief must regard as a quite unwarranted 
posture. Obviously, we must ask in what crucial way 
Hegel's Phenomenology is different to this. We are 
familiar with the claim of compelling circularity in 
Hegel's idea of Phenomenological proof, a circularity 
which will integrate any starting point into the scheme 
of the Absolute. Let us for the moment bracket our 
doubts about the power of this proof. In remarking here 
on the necessity of an inversion of perspective at the 
beginning of the Phenomenology, Hegel is, I suggest, 
trying to come to terms with the necessity of his taking 
a specific starting point from which all also follows. 
This is the point of view of the Absolute, a point of 
view which guides the treatment of each specific form of 
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consciousness subsequently discussed. As I have tried to 
point out, recognition of Hegel's comments being. informed 
by this viewpoint need not vitiate even his claims for 
the pesuppositionless nature of his studies, because the 
viewpoint can be dissolved within those studies. 
However, as I will now argue, examination of the very way 
in which Hegel takes up this viewpoint makes the 
Phenomenological effort impossible to coherently sustain. 
The Contribution of Hegel and his Audience to 
Phenomenology 
Hegel says that this inversion of consciousness' 
perspective on experience is something contributed by 
"us", by Hegel himself and his readers. He explains 
"our" ability to contribute this inversion in the 
following way. He claims that the entire progression of 
Spirit does not amount to nothing, it amounts, as the 
summation of determinate negations in the negation of the 
negation, to our knowledge of what Experience actually 
is. The . awareness. of 
this reveals patterns of 
consciousness as moments of Spirit, and in this awareness 
we have a deeper knowledge of Experience than those who 
initially made that Experience. We can, of course, agree 
with this, which is but a resume of Hegel's conception of 
Phenomenological proof, and allow that it can explain how 
an inversion in consciousness' perspective on Experience 
may come about. However, it is also necessary to say 
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that it cannot explain this in the way Hegel requires, 
for the chronology of the contribution to Phenomenology 
that is made when "we", as Hegel says, adopt this 
inverted perspective, is all wrong. We must look more 
closely at the position of the "we" who are able to make 
this contribution (3). 
Let me dispose of an ancilliary point first, Hegel 
imposes exacting requirements upon those who would follow 
his argument, requirements of, as has been seen, being 
prepared to follow a way of despair as the cost of 
adopting an open-minded stance. It is necessary to be 
dissatisfied, or at least not content, with one's present 
positions, and being ready to undergo the arduous task of 
reaching the Absolute through intellectual effort (4). 
(The extreme labour of reading the Phenomenology manages 
to even exaggerate this latter condition). In an 
interesting convergence with later phenomenology's 
fundamental requirement for breaking through the natural 
attitude, what Hegel firstly needs his readers to be is 
engaged in intellectual criticism of existing reality; 
that is to say, to be engaged in philosophy (5). 
If this condition is both recognised and allowed, it is 
still clearly an insufficient qualification for reaching 
the position of Hegel's "we". In my opinion, there 
remains an irremediable difficulty in ascertaining who it 
is that will be able to contribute to and who will 
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receive Phenomenological enlightenment. If, as it has 
centrally been argued, the Phenomenology is written for 
those whose beliefs constituted the earlier, inadequate 
conceptions, then there are surely major confusions 
involved. For the Phenomenology is written to 
demonstrate that the Truth is on the scene, and could be 
written only after this was so. Ordering the material in 
the light of knowledge of the Absolute is, precisely, 
"our" contribution. But to say this is to say that the 
progression outlined in the Phenomenology has been 
completed. The reflexive commentary and the 
enlightenment it is to bring becomes rather pointless if 
the possibility of making this commentary turns upon the 
Truth it is to reveal having already been realised. In 
so far as Hegel locates the possibility of this 
enlightenment in the complete identification of the 
Absolute and the form of its progessive realisation, then 
I contend that he makes the function of the Phenomenology 
either redundant or indefensible in the terms of the 
sought after Phenomenological proof. 
Now it might be thought that this conclusion is 
unacceptably harsh. The ready availability of a 
common-sense construction of Hegel's position would seem 
to make the contradiction in the Phenomenology at which I 
am aiming hard to identify. It could be said that Hegel 
is putting forward his account of the realisation of 
Spirit as an explanation of world History, and he is 
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seeking to win acceptance of the Truth by gaining 
acceptance of his explanation. Though I have rendered it 
in what to Hegel would be an extremely banal fashion, I 
think this is what he thought he was doing. However, 
this cannot be what he actually does. The strength of 
the Phenomenological proof is to lay in the complete 
identification of the Phenomenological account and the 
course of the development of Spirit. Philosophy may 
paint its "grey in grey" only when "a shape of life has 
grown old" (6), and the shape of Absolute Spirit is, 
amongst other things, consciousness in the shape of 
realised Absolute Knowledge, the shape which Hegel would 
have "us" both contribute to and find in the 
Phenomenology. There is difficulty in understanding 
exactly in what sense the Truth can, in Hegel's terms, be 
both on the scene and yet require actualisation. 
Hegel's Philosophy has what is perhaps its most important 
shortcoming at just this point. Hegel's statements of 
actualised rationality have to have an ambiguous form. 
For the reason I have just mentioned, one finds that they 
contain statements which both affirm the rational 
character of the world and also set out changes necessary 
for the actualisation of that rationality. As Hegel 
bases his arguments on the ultimate dogmatism of 
cognisance of the Absolute he must find realised 
rationality in the world, and yet the fact that 
realisation is incomplete is the rationale of the 
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Phenomenological effort. I do not mean to argue that 
there is no, as it were, middle ground possible here, of 
identifying the potential of rationalisation in the 
existent. My point is that for Hegel to put things this 
way is impossible because he continually draws upon 
achieved rationality as the Absolute justification of his 
Philosophy-. The consequence is of course that 
identifying rational potentials and ways of actualising 
them is, remarkable enough to have to say, the greatest 
lacuna in Hegel's thought. From one point of view it 
seems as if Hegel thought that as he set out the rational 
in thought this served to make the rational truly actual. 
This is so, but it is really only a partial acount of 
Hegel's weakness here, a weakness which emerges from the 
Absolute justification which he seeks for an attempt to 
move to the Absolute. Hegel's inversion of consciousness 
is an unacceptably abbreviated statement of what is in 
fact a task, both for him and for us. This task is the 
actualisation of the rational, a task we must approach, 
though he did not, in the knowledge that there is no 
available Absolute to justify our conduct. 
Responding to Hegel in the Light of Criticism of His 
Inversion of Consciousness 
With this conclusion we would seem to have come right 
round to the very beginning of Hegel's mature project. 
However, in doing so we have not arrived at the promised 
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conviction in the Absolute but at a rejection of the 
essential aims of that project. Instead of compelling 
belief by a wholly self-justifying argument, Hegel's 
Phenomenology is, I think, completely unsatisfactory. It 
is ridden with a contradiction between its theological 
ends and its philosophic means, and this contradiction is 
summed up in the very way Hegel himself adopts the 
perspective of an inverted consciousness which in the end 
he can only hortatively say he would have us also take 
up. 
Though coming to an essentially unfavourable conclusion 
about Hegel's project's ability to satisfy its own aims. 
I have meant to do so in a radically different way than 
has characterised recent marxist criticisms of Hegel. 
The interpretative paths through Hegel taken by Althusser 
and Colletti which lead them to try to separate Marx from 
him completely show a most interesting similarity. 
Though dealing with different aspects of Hegel's thought 
- Althusser with the teleological structure of the 
Dialectic, Colletti with its idealist formulation - they 
both insist on an extremely strong coherence in Hegel's 
work. They do this in order to successfully criticise 
what they characterise as the naive extant attempts to 
borrow from the Dialectic and develop it in a 
non-teleological, non-idealist fashion. We cannot 
dispute their conclusions about such naivete. However, 
beneath this ostensible criticism, they both introduce a 
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far stronger claim, and it is this claim that makes their 
positions ultimately unacceptable. This is the claim 
that any attempt to link Marx and Hegel must be naive. 
What they at first seem to be arguing, for example 
against Engels, is that his attempt to make this link is 
weak. But rather they are claiming that this is so as a 
result of anther argument, that any such an attempt must 
be weak. They give to Hegel's arguments such a degree of 
internal coherence that any such link becomes impossible. 
His thought is so monolithically consistent that one must 
take all or nothing from him (7). 
Now this is very dubious in a number of ways. Firstly, 
their choice of the alternatives they establish - to take 
nothing from Hegel - is hardly rationally defensible in 
their own terms. The internal consistency they find in 
Hegel is surely a strong ground for belief in any 
opinion. It would be so with regard to Hegel especially, 
for reasons with which we are familiar. What is more, 
this would be so particularly for Althusser, who adheres 
to a pure coherence criterion of truth. We know why they 
turn away from Hegel, but their own interpretations tend 
to remove the rational ground from what is thereby 
exposed as a political decision in the bad sense. 
Secondly, on general hermeneutic grounds into which I 
will not go here, the attribution of such a degree of 
consistency is quite simply illusory and off the point of 
any interpretation. 
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Thirdly, we must see that in this specific case there is 
indeed a profound fissure running through Hegel's thought 
which not only allows but demands a creative utilisation 
of elements of that thought if the enormous significance 
of Hegel for social theory and its development is to be 
recovered. As justification for saying this I can only 
refer the reader to what has gone before, and in summary 
of this say that recognising the contradictory 
composition of Hegel's thought is necessary both for 
understanding Hegel's work and, because that work is of 
the first philosophical importance, for the setting out 
of a principal resource for contemporary philosophy in 
full knowledge of the difficulty of utilising it. 
It is in this context that I would like now to turn to 
the work of Marx, and particularly to Capital. I make no 
secret of my belief that rather than having to distance 
himself from Hegel's thought in order to make his own 
work valuable, such is Hegel's stature that it is in the 
ways in which he might make Hegel's insights 
philosophically and scientifically corrigible that Marx's 
importance will lay. I want first to set out an account 
of what we can reconstruct as the philosophy of Marx's 
way of going about social scientific explanation. I want 
then to look at the major instance of the use of that 
philosophy in explanation, Capital. 
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MARX'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORICAL EXPLANATION 
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CHAPTER 8 
MARX'S MATERIALISM AND THE PHILSOPHY OF HISTORICAL 
EXPLANATION 
Introduction 
In the remainder of this work I want to turn to Marx, and 
particularly to an exposition of the arguments of 
Capital. I will reserve this exposition for Parts 4 and 
5. For the present, I should like to give an account of 
what we can identify as the broad social philosophy 
informing Capital. This will obviously be in a very 
strong sense a preliminary to the subsequent comments on 
Capital proper. It will also be, in almost as strong a 
sense, a continuation of our evaluation of the 
possibilities of separating the rational-philosophical 
from the speculative-theological elements in Hegel, for I 
will claim that the main influence upon Marx's social 
philosophy is his own intention to effect this 
separation. To put this the other way around, I look to 
Marx in order to gauge the extent to which he makes 
(social) scientifically corrigible the potentially 
invaluable resources that are to be found in Hegel. 
As has been widely enough lamented, Marx's social 
philosophy is directly available to us in what are really 
only fragments; and this places a particular premium upon 
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indirectly elucidating that philosophy from his longer 
polemics and from his substantive empirical work (1). 
However, whilst acknowledging this, I believe that it is 
possible to directly relate such an eludication to the 
text of those fragments, and I shall do so. More 
precisely, as Marx's social philosophy in its direct 
expressions is very largely articulated through a number 
of dualisms, I would like to draw these together and 
support them with other material where necessary. In so 
doing I intend to coherently link the ways in which Marx 
explicitly put forward his social philosophical thought. 
General and Specific Elements of Production 
Amongst these dualisms there is, to take this first, that 
between general and specific elements of production. 
This dualism emerges in that a specified mode of 
production can be seen to display some characteristics 
common to it and all other modes, some peculiar to a 
restricted number of modes, and further some peculiar to 
itself (2). The contrast of generality and specificity 
here has a modal logical tone which would be rather 
misleading. Marx's classification of phenomena according 
to this contrast is by no means carried out by simple 
factoral isolation, enumeration and distribution analysis 
after a mathematical model (3). Having an ultimately 
qualitative rather than quantiative basis, it is only 
partially constituted 6 
1) 
such operations. Such 
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operations have only a subsidiary role to play because 
the classification of phenomena as general or specific 
involves a great deal more than distribution analysis; it 
involves at least a substantial contribution to the 
explanation of the phenomena in question. 
There are of course no directly empirically available 
general elements of production; these are established by 
an abstraction from the peculiar features presented by 
specific modes of production which is guided by a 
comparative analysis of these modes. Such analysis 
indicates the generality of certain phenomena; but it is 
only when these are understood to be conditions of human 
existence as such, that is, to constitute a natural 
structure, that they can be taken to be general elements 
of production in Marx's sense. Isolation of these 
elements both provides some of the materials for, and 
requires the formulation of, what is most often called a 
philosophic anthropology of human existence. Marx 
clearly felt this necessity during the writing of 
Capital, and provided such an, as it were, existential 
analysis of the production of use-values in the first 
section of chapter seven of volume one. This is a 
section which, it is worth pointing out, is unique in the 
whole work by virtue of the general, philosophic form of 
expression which it maintained through two published 
versions (4). One must refer here to the more extensive 
existential analysis of production to be found in those 
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early writings which Marx very largely did not publish 
himself but upon which the discussion worked up in 
Capital unquestionably strongly draws (5). 
In the identification of general elements of production, 
Marx is trying to reveal a metabolism with the natural 
environment in human production and consumption which 
emerges from the natural character of human beings 
themselves (6). A commodity, for example, is a specific 
form of use-value, but it shares with the products of all 
other modes of production the character of being a 
use-value, an object of utility (7). Human beings must 
engage in material intercourse with their natural 
environment because they are themselves natural beings 
(8) whose stance towards that environment includes an 
element of need (9) to win from it their means of 
existence (10). Human beings cannot conjure their 
objects of utility from nothing, they must fashion them 
from the physical properties of natural objects (11). 
The materiality of these objects is given for human beings 
(12), and they must recognise the qualities of natural 
objects (13) as the precondition of work to actualise the 
potential utility of those objects for themselves by 
adapting those qualities to useful forms (14). The 
labour-process understood in this way, as human beings 
recognition of the properties of external nature and 
adaptation of these to satisfy their own fundamentally 
natural needs (15), is a summation and explanation of the 
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general elements of production found in all epochs (16). 
Obviously, phenomena found to be more specific cannot be 
explained along these lines- (17 )%the existential 
account of , 
the ontology of general elements of 
production, it is the very specificity of such phenomena 
that is itself the initial problem. In advance of 
explaining each such phenomenon, it is, to put the point 
paradoxically, the general existence of specificity that 
demands explanation. Marx's solution to this problem is 
given as the principal conclusion of his existential 
analysis. It is the natural characteristic of human 
beings which distinguishes them from other animals that 
they are able to self-consciously examine and conduct 
their lives, reflexively assessing earlier examinations 
and actions in the conscious formulation of intention, 
and are able to take a transformative rather than only 
passively adaptive stance towards nature as a consequence 
(18). - There is an emergent level of effective 
determination on the conduct of human life bound up in 
the exercise of these natural characteristics (19), for 
the self-conscious formulation of conduct gives human 
being a unique distance from immediate natural conditions 
by which they are enabled to exercise important 
influences which cannot be understood if reduced to those 
conditions (20). On one of Marx's more common usages, 
this level of determination, in which human beings are 
seen to be the ontological foundation of the specific 
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characters of themselves, is called "history" (21). 
Specific elements of production are to be accounted for 
as historical (22). This injunction initially is, it is 
important to stress and I therefore repeat, a general 
one. It must be established at the general, that is to 
say with Marx the natural, level, as an ontological 
structure identified by explanatory requirements (23). I 
think that, in outline of course, Marx, with Engels, 
attempted to do this in their criticisms of contemplative 
or mechanistic tendencies in earlier materialistic 
accounts of civil society (24), of the productive line in 
which their views are arguably the highest development 
(25). 
In sum, the dualism of general and specific elements of 
production can be seen to run into that of the natural 
and the historical. The former dualism is in fact an 
approximation to the latter, a way of coming to recognise 
the distinction between the natural and the historical by 
grasping one of its most. readily visible aspects. This 
aspect was continually emphasised by Engels and Marx as 
it is the crucial foundation of the plausibility of their 
politics. It is that whilst directly natural phenomena 
are conterminous with human existence, historical 
phenomena have been relatively unenduring, indeed, 
relatively ephermeral (26). 
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Social and Natural Conditions of Production 
The text in which Marx outlined the dualism of general 
and specific elements was an introduction which he 
drafted in 1857 to the planned political economic work of 
which the Grundrisse are the notebooks but of which was 
completed only the 1859 Critique. In this 1857 
introduction, some account of general elements was 
envisaged as the beginning of the planned political 
economy (27), and I think we have just seen why this 
should have occurred to Marx. But not only was this not 
given in the 1859 Critique, but the introduction was 
itself replaced by a new preface, these changes being 
partially explained by Marx's thinking it best to begin 
with the specific (28). And in turning to the 
explanation of particular specific elements of 
production, as Marx did himself of course to the 
capitalist mode of production, there is a profound change 
in focus. 
Marx insisted upon shifting consideration from the 
general character of human beings which has been our 
object so far, to specific human natures as modified in 
each epoch (29). The self-determination of human beings 
that is history may not be understood as a simple 
development of human nature in general, for that nature 
grounds a radical openness in self-consciousness, not the 
closure of fore-ordained lines of development. Bearing 
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this in mind, we can see that as it is of the essence of 
specific elements that they differ, the peculiarity of 
particular ones can hardly be explained by what is common 
to them all. "Self-consciousness" (or its near synonyms) 
are in themselves as little an explanation of particular 
phenomena in history as is "causality" in itself an 
explanation of phenomena in nature. Particular specific 
elements of production can be accounted for only by 
distinguishing between human nature in general and 
specific human natures, and recognising that though the 
latter have their ontological ground in the former, they 
are not deducible epiphenomena of it. Though Marx's 
existential analysis of human nature in general does 
underpin the attitude he takes to specific phenomena, and 
must do so to give the latter a sound foundation, there 
is undoubtedly a profound change of focus between the 
Paris Manuscripts and The German Ideology, in which 
Feuerbach becomes less important for Engels and Marx as 
thy move to study specific phenomena in a science of 
history (30). For such study, they centrally affirm in 
1845, cannot be derived from consideration of the general 
human essence (31). This is, and was developed by Marx 
at least as, -, itself an understanding of the character of 
that essence, but one that founds a break with 
essentialism. 
What is so far lacking is, of course, a statement of the 
conditions in which the now uncovered agency operates. 
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There are, Marx seems to indicate, two ways of making 
such a statement; either to undertake a complete history 
of production or to say, at the beginning of work of more 
limited intent, that one's concern is with only a 
specific mode of production (32). Marx undertook an 
instance of the latter as his life's principal work, but 
it has been seen that the isolation of such elements 
involves comparison, and Marx certainly carried out a 
number of researches into earlier modes of production 
(33). Not only were these researches used to make points 
of historical comparison between capitalism and earlier 
modes of production (34), but also to put forward the 
substantial account of primitive accumulation (35) and an 
outline of capitalism's location in a universal 
historiography (3'). Discounting the study of primitive 
accumulation since it is directly pertinent to captalism, 
the only other more than fragmentary work in this vein 
actually completed by Engels or Marx was, however, the 
former's Origin gin of the Family ... All shifts between 
specific human natures can in principle be explained in 
such a universal history as is envisaged here, and this 
if of course a way of describing the overall task of 
historiography. Though such an account of course aims at 
complete unity, this is a unity arrived at though the 
completeness of the projected history and not by a simple 
reduction to general human nature. 
What does the statement of the conditions of a specific 
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mode of production involve? Marx placed great importance 
on recognising that human beings may exert historical 
influences only within determining conditions bequeathed 
by the past (37). In specifying particular historical 
periods, Marx's tack was to refer to a set of social 
relations as the conditions of individuals' conduct which 
constitute the historically specific structure (38). 
Marx's existential analysis lead him to the conclusion 
that human beings are by nature social (39), though, as 
with any other aspect of their naturally given being, 
this is open to their historical mediation. Marx did not 
conceive of these social relations as "inter-personal 
relations" reducible to the individuals who make them up, 
much less to those individuals' consciousnesses or wills 
(40). He is not consistent in his use of "society" to 
cover both individuals and their social relations 
(41) or 
dust the latter 
(42), but in both usages the sense that 
social relations must be granted an ontological status 
irreducible to individuals is present. For though social 
relations do not have an empirical existence independent 
of their actualisation in individuals' conduct 
(for 
material manifestations of those relations, in statutes, 
forms of architecture, etc., are not the relations 
themselves), they are not explanatorily reducible to 
those individuals (43). Accounting for individuals' 
conduct leads to the necessity of reognising social 
determinations on will and action (44). Structures of 
social relations are posited by Marx as an ever pre-given 
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legacy of the past which are enabling resources for and 
constraints upon individual conduct (45). 
I have tried to show the way in which Marx depicts social 
relations as an emergent and in itself effective level of 
human nature. His explicit comments on social relations 
are typically made, however, in the context of an 
emphasis placed upon human relations with nature which 
Marx famously acknowledged to be the "guiding thread" of 
his historical studies (46). The peculiar materialism of 
this guiding thread, a materialism substantially defined 
in opposition to earlier materialisms, can make little 
sense unless one recognises the emergent level of history 
as integral to that materialism, and I am sure that it is 
right for the purposes of exegesis to present this level 
first. Nevertheless, against a background of human 
studies which Engels and Marx characterised as dominated 
by accounts which gave an explanatory primacy to forms of 
consciousness, Marx stressed an, as it were, materialist 
hypothesis in his historical explanations (47). I want 
now to look at the character of the materialism of Marx's 
guiding thread, and then to examine the way in which that 
materialism guided Marx in historical explanation. 
Though historically self-determined, human. beings' 
conduct remains bounded by the natural conditions in 
which it is exercised. There is a primary level of this 
determination, of the given biological character of the 
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human being and the given geological, climatic, etc., 
character of external nature (48). Marx, I believe, 
thought the input of these into historical explanations 
would be very limited, contributing only to the statement 
of the general conditions of productions which in an 
important sense precede historiography proper. All 
historical writing must begin with knowledge of such of 
these primary determinations as are relevant of course, 
but the actual history lies in the human conduct 
formulated with respect to, but not immediately set by, 
these determinations (49). 
However, these primary conditions do not exhaust the 
natural influences upon historical action. For Marx, the 
most important set of primary natural givens is that 
which imposes the very necessity of a human metabolism 
with nature, and in recognising this we move to a 
secondary level of natural conditions which is of 
continuous importance in history. I do not mean to again 
go over Marx's description of the labour process, but to 
draw out one of the implications of that description. 
Human beings must recognise the qualities of natural 
objects in order to utilise them for their own ends. 
Accordingly, the potentialities open to them by those 
qualities and their knowledge of those qualities 
constitute a determining, as it were secondary, natural 
influence upon their specific historical conduct (50). 
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Recognition of this secondary natural influence 
constitutes a materialist position, but in a peculiar 
sense. As human work within nature is expanded, nature 
itself is increasingly (51) humanised (52ý, increasingly 
subjected to humanly effected alterations (53). Human 
beings may expand their knowledge of nature, but they do 
not do so only theoretically. They do so practically, 
objectively; and in changing their relation to nature 
they change nature itself. The conditions of historical 
action are composed of a mutually mediated society and 
nature, in which natural structures influence what 
historical actions may be undertaken, and those actions 
form the resource of altered social practices and altered 
natural conditions upon which subsequent historical 
action is based (54). In this sense, in historical 
explanation Marx has in mind the merging of the 
intertwined development of natural science and social 
science, in one natural history of human beings and their 
world (55). 
This recognition of social and natural conditions is a 
position in historical explanation which follows rather 
directly from the realist epistemology which we have seen 
Marx take up in his philosophic anthropology of labour 
(56). Historical explanation cannot make direct 
reference to natural givens without negating its own 
specific objects. However, after recognising history as 
an emergent effective level involving its own social 
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conditions, accounts of events at this level cannot 
forget the materialist truth of realism, that the given 
character of nature exerts its influence on specific 
human conduct, even when human beings are engaged in 
transforming nature most radically. Against either of 
what Marx identified as non-historical materialist (57) 
or idealist (58) currents in historiography, his 
historical accounts are to stress the totality (59) of 
the conditions influencing the specific conduct of 
naturally located, historically effective human beings 
(60). 
Forces and Relations of Production 
This rendering of Marx's philosophy of historical 
explanation as involving primarily a regard for the 
totality of the conditions affecting historical action 
would seem to be inadequate to the way in which he 
undoubtedly places an emphasis on materialism in his 
formulations of the guiding thread of his studies. We 
should be clear on three points here. Firstly, as we 
have seen, Marx's materialism includes social 
determinations and thus has a far broader scope than what 
he calls mechanistic materialism. Secondly, we should 
not place too much weight on the construction of phrases 
such as "the materialist conception of history" or 
"historical materialism", for these 
phrases constitute Engels' interepretation of Marx's 
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outlook and their veracity must be put to the test. Marx 
himself wisely refrained from giving his guiding thread 
any definite name (61). And thirdly, as is evident even 
in 1859 (62), Marx's materialist emphasis partially 
follows from the often extremely unfairly polemical way 
(63) in which he and Engels distanced their view of 
historiography from young hegelian positions they had 
themselves earlier occupied by calling those positions 
deficient in that they were idealist (64). However, even 
after acknowledging these three points it remains that 
there is an issue of the greatest importance for the 
interpretation of Marx and the evaluation of his legacy 
bound up in the role of materialism in his guiding 
thread. This is an issue which, I will say, follows 
from, and is by no means in contradiction of, regarding 
Marx's view of historiography as initially drawing 
attention to the totality of determinations upon 
historical action. 
Let us consider one implication of Marx's description of 
material production as a social activity. To produce in 
a specific way entails a form of social organisation 
which enables that production to take place (65). 
Changing the methods of production will involve 
alterations in the social relations of production (66), 
and equally the possibilities of adopting new methods of 
production will be affected by the character of the 
prevailing social relations (67). The dualism here, 
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between the forces and relations of material production, 
is the main component of Marx's guiding thread. For 
through use of this dualism, accounts of modes of 
production are to be intimately tied to the historical 
changes in and between those modes. This is to be so 
much so, in fact, that it is to be impossible to give a 
statement of the character of a mode of production in 
terms other than those of its historical genesis and 
developmental tendencies (68). 
Marx thought that the major transitions between specific 
modes of production could be explained in the following 
way. At a certain stage in their development, the 
productive forces established in a mode of production 
would come into conflict with the social relations of 
production of that mode. Having earlier been developed 
more or less compatably with those social relations, the 
productive forces now find those relations to be a 
fetter. Hence a pressure to change those relations is 
built up, and a period of social revolutions begins (69). 
As Marx himself says (70), this framework for explaining 
shifts between modes of production is a dialectic of 
forces and relations of production. Very often, indeed 
typically in the interpretation of Marx's thought, the 
use of "dialectic" here has been merely a convenient way 
of holding to either of the sides of dualistic 
perspectives on social change - social 
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influence/technological determinism, individual 
action/social determinism, etc. - whenever seemed 
necessary (71). What I want to argue, however, is that 
this dialectic has a coherent sense (72), based on its 
being a rather direct borrowing from the structure of the 
Hegelian Phenomenological Dialectic (73). In essence, 
the forces of production are distinguishable from amongst 
the totality of determinations influencing the form of 
material production because these forces occupy the 
position of the object in human beings' continuous 
appraisals of the adequacy of their ability to work in 
nature. 
The forces of production are, in the first instance, 
tools and raw materials of whatever type (74). Behind 
this, however, the real force of production is the 
knowledge of. how to produce that lead to the fashioning 
of, and animates the objectifications of that knowledge 
in, tools and raw materials (75). Marx's analysis of the 
labour process quite rightly separates the labour 
expended in a specific act of production from the 
antecedent labour which provided the means of production 
employed in that specific act (76). But it remains that 
in the forces of production we are dealing with 
objectifications of human knowledge of nature, shaping 
nature to a form which aids in the. production of final 
use-values (77). Such knowledge can display a number of 
qualities which Marx takes as his warrant for introducing 
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themes of historical development and progress into his 
characterisation of modes of production. 
Marx typically writes of "stages in the development" of 
productive forces when referring to these forces (78). 
His ability to do so turns completely on whether or not 
in the assessment of human ability to work in nature 
there is a meaningful criterion by which we are able to 
really evaluate particular sets of forces of production. 
I think that Marx is right to hold that it is possible to 
speak of a higher or lower stage in the development of 
forces of production, gauged by the ability to effect 
transformations in nature and/or the ease with which 
these can be carried out. The actual use of this 
criterion to evaluate forces of production allows us to 
define a pattern in history, for not only can specific 
modes of production be located along a continuum of the 
power of their forces of production, but the actors 
within those modes evaluate their own relations with 
nature in this way. Against the criterion of the 
enabling powers of relations with nature, specific modes 
of production may be, and are by the actors within them, 
judged (79). It is this (80) which allows us to speak of 
human history rather than an unconnected set of 
relativistic episodes (81). 
What I am trying to show is that changes in forces of 
production are changes in consciousness. This may seem 
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an extraordinary thing to say, but Marx, in fact, closely 
identifies the state of the connection of the forces and 
relations of production and the overall attitudes of 
members of a society towards that society. It is when 
existing relations of production hamper the potential 
development of the productive forces that the members of 
a society may adopt a perspective essentially critical of 
that society (or of specific fundamental social 
relations) (82). 
Crucially, however, this is a practical consciousness 
established by the attempt to know the real qualities of 
nature and of the adequacy of a specific set of abilities 
to manipulate those qualities. This is a consciousness 
generated in activity regulated by the external 
objectivity of nature, and hence has a fixity which 
allows this consciousness itself to serve as the 
objective component of the general scheme of social 
change which Marx is trying to set out in the dialectic 
of forces and relations of production. 
Any set of productive forces has its ramifications in 
sets of social relations of production and equally any 
set of those relations will allow of only a certain type 
or area of productive forces to be developed. It may 
seem quite nonsensical to try and separate out productive 
forces and production relations (83), and it is certainly 
my opinion that attempts to distinguish them as distinct 
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structural sectors of a social formation have in the end 
amounted to nonsense (84). However, I think the 
distinction is both possible and valuable, because to 
dispense with it, or to so weaken it that it really loses 
its sense, flatly cuts out the base of understanding, and 
hence of properly utilising, Marx's ideas on social 
change (85). In any productive activity it is, I 
believe, quite possible to distinguish between the body 
of practical knowledge informing the activity and the 
consciousness of the social relations in which that 
activity takes place. It is open for us to distinquish 
between, for example, the employment of a certain 
production process and the social deployment of labour 
and labour based resources in that process. Of course, 
in employment the two cannot be separated - the latter 
simply describes the organisation of labour in which the 
former is at that time actualised, and why, in the light 
of this, we should want to make such a distinction is 
unclear. The reason can emerge only by discussion of 
Marx's ideas on alienation and class struggle, and will 
hopefully emerge when we turn to these issues. For the 
moment, however, I want to stress the mere possibility of 
this distinction, and this can, I submit, be allowed. 
From this distinction it follows that a determinate 
production process or set of processes can be seen as 
being facilitated or as being limited by a set of social 
reactions of production. A certain level of the 
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development of productive forces may be aided by or 
handicapped by those social relations. This level may be 
greater than was possible under other relations of 
production, and, if the shift to the newer relations was 
ultimately guided by assessments of the ability of those 
relations to foster the development of productive 
abilities, it will be. Developing a certain level of 
productive forces will inevitably posit an even higher 
level, as the limiting case of such development is an 
absolutely adequate knowledge of nature. There is, then, 
an immanent critique of existing productive forces bound 
up in every progressive development. This critique will 
extend to relations of production. Some extent of change 
in the level of productive forces will be able to be 
embraced within existing relations of production. That 
is to say, the fundamental character of those relations 
will be able to be still recognisable amidst the smaller 
changes that any change in the employment of productive 
forces must bring about. But, as I say, each such change 
posits others, and thus ultimately even the fundamental 
character of the given relations of production must be 
called into question. As the result of the new 
productive resources potentially available, and as the 
cumulative result of earlier smaller scale changes in the 
relations of production, the fundamental structure of 
those relations may come to be seen as exhausted of 
significiant productive potential. The judge of 
"significant" here is the potential which seems available 
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under other possible relations of production which could 
carry on the process of facilitating productive 
developments which is aready at work on, in fact 
undermining, the fundamental structure of the existing 
relations. 
The question of whether social relations or productive 
forces have a determining privilege in this scheme of 
social change is a misplaced one. There is no doubt that 
this scheme requires a recognition of the facts both that 
social relations determine the form and pace of the 
development of the productive forces and that those 
forces must exercise an influence on those relations. 
Productive forces are designated by Marx as the location 
of the overall direction of social development, but this 
is not because those forces exercise a more powerful 
determining influence but because they have the position 
of object in the overall consciousness of productive 
activity. Those forces are developed in relation to an 
external nature which human beings cannot alter, only 
transform according to its own structures. To develop 
productive forces thus requires social relations of 
production to accommodate productive forces whose power 
of production is objectively settled. What development 
of productive forces can take place is clearly determined 
by the relations of production; and, what is more, the 
speed of that development will be completely determined by 
the place given to such development in the overall social 
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system. Nevertheless, it is impossible for social 
relations to actually wrest a truly objective position in 
the development of material intercourse with nature from 
the productive forces as those forces are the seat of the 
knowledge of nature which is at issue. This structure of 
the consciousness of material production is the key to 
Marx's scheme of social change. 
Marx is trying, to describe what he imagines is the united 
process of the development of, as it were, material 
consciousness, that is the consciousness of the adequacy 
of forms of productive intercourse with nature and 
reflections on social systems or social practices 
informed by this consciousness. It is a scheme of 
immanent critique ordered through a layering in which 
knowledge of nature is the objective element of material 
consciousness upon which is then based a structure of the 
critique of social forms. This scheme involves a central 
element of determinate negation, and thus can embrace 
ideas of evolution, progress and of stages of 
development, in that it is always possible, though not 
necessary, for the evaluation of existing forces of 
production and existing relations of production to draw 
on past experience and set itself the aims of 
improvement. To draw attention to the power of social 
reflexivity to lead to improvements in human material 
powers is not be thereby lay it down as the absolutely 
necessary pattern of social development, and we shall see 
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that Marx goes on to identify otherºnfluences on that 
development which tend to contradict the pattern of 
reflexive assessment central to his guiding thread. 
Base and Superstructure 
The way in which I have set out the bounds of the 
sensible application of the dialetic of forces and 
relations of production has turned upon stressing the 
historical restrictions of those bounds. It clearly 
remains the case, however, that this applicability is 
both, to put it this way, intensively and extensively 
enormous. 
In saying that this applicability is intensively enormous 
I mean that even within its bounds only the most massive 
shifts between historical modes of production can really 
hope to be directly subsumed under Marx's guiding thread 
(86). Marx himself, I would say, made no stronger claim 
than this. However interesting and fruitfully provoking 
it may be, his scheme of ancient, asiatic, fuedal and 
capitalist modes of production is obviously cast at the 
most general level of historiography (87). That even 
this scheme is open to question (88) paradoxically shows 
the Marx's guiding thread is able to generate worthwhile 
issues at this most general level. 
If it is, in the first instance, only these wide-ranging 
173 
observations which the scheme of determinate negation of 
forms of material consciousness in Marx's dialectic can 
produce, this does not mean that all other history does 
not require this fundamental level of historiographical 
understanding. Obviously not all the details of the 
capitalist development of the labour process which Marx 
described in, say, his later journalism are required for 
the account of the production of relative surplus value 
in Capital, nor are such details by any means wholly 
explicable through such an account. This is in no sense 
a point which arises duetosome formal method of 
abstraction which Marx takes to his subject (89). It is 
rather merely an explanatory protocol arising from 
contemplation of the subject and the particular aims one 
has in addressing it. That the only overall 
methodological injunction involved here is fýJ't\ity to 
the empirical seems to me to be immediately obvious from 
the very tone -a tone expressive of years of ardous 
factual research carefully distinguished from a 
familiarity with "practical details which lie outside the 
sphere of the actual science of political economy" (90) - 
of those works which Marx thought made up his science 
(91). 
In considering the extensive dimension of the ground 
covered by Marx's guiding thread, I would argue that its 
bounds are set by the pre-history of mankind. If my 
representation of Marx's dialectic of forces and 
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relations of production has so far stressed its 
indebtedness to the structure of that of Hegel, I would 
now also like to claim that the field of the 
applicability of that dialetic is also set by Marx's 
adoption of strongly Hegelian themes. Though Marx's 
dialectic involves, as I have tried to argue, certain 
ontological commitments, it is not, I believe, itself 
intended to be an ontological analysis of social and/or 
material being (92). It is rather a scheme of social 
changes within definite historical limits; that is to 
say, limits of a historical and not a directly natural 
character. It is these limits which both give sense and 
plausibility to the structure of Marx's dialetic and to 
his raising it to the position of a guiding thread for 
historical study. 
Let us return to the idea of distinguishing forces from 
relations of production. Though, as I have attempted to 
show, it is conceivable to separate out two elements of 
the practical consciousness of productive activity to 
obtain this distinction, it might be wondered why we 
should do so. At first glance it would seem that the 
social relations of production could well be entailed by 
the simple adoption of a certain production process or, 
to put more or less the same thing the other way around, 
that certain production processes could be regarded as 
located within an overall distribution of labour in a 
given mode of production. What, I believe, Marx is 
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trying to do in drawing this distinction is to show that 
historically there has been a fundamental contradiction 
between human knowledge of nature and ability to 
transform it and human social organisatior. This 
contradiction lies in the very fact that relations of 
production have had a principle of ordering which is 
their own, which separates them from being informed by 
direct recognition of the requirements of the established 
level of the forces of production. On the basis of an 
inadequate apprehension of the character of natural 
properties in general, it has been historically 
impossible to generate a social organisation of 
production adequate to the development of productive 
forces. What Marx is driving at, I would say, is that 
the historical development of the relations of production 
has been in alienation from nature as a whole, and the 
increasing knowledge of nature furnished by the 
development of the productive forces has thus always 
either found only partial support from production 
relations or has actually found them to be a fetter. 
The characteristic which Marx regards as unifying the 
pre-history of humankind is that, though related of 
course, the forces and relations of production have 
distinct internal logics during this period which may 
mutually engender or contradict one another. I have 
discussed the internal logic of forces of production, and 
repeat that this is an "objective" logic set by the given 
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qualities of nature as human beings come to know them. 
Freed from other influences, social relations of 
production would be the direct consciousness of the 
requirements and potentialities of the forces of 
production subjected to ends determined in social 
awareness. Marx's claim - which I shall examine at 
length in a short while - is that it is precisely the 
absence ' of self-consciousness of material life that 
characterises all the social relations of production in 
pre-history. These relations have their own logic just 
because they are not developed in social 
self-consciousness of the organisation of labour. 
All these comments are, I think, the necessary 
preliminary to trying to make sense of a further famous 
dichotomy in which Marx expressed his philosophy of 
historical explanation. I mean the topographical 
metaphor of the economy (mode of production constituted 
of forces and relations of production) as base and of 
politics and ideology as superstructures. This dichotomy 
has proven quite as difficult to even understand - let 
alone utilise - as has the dialectic of forces and 
relations of production (93). The very same problems 
attend this dichotomy as we have seen attend the other. 
As manifestly political institutions arguably, and 
elements of consciousness certainly, partially constitute 
the material life of all societies together with any 
economic phenomena narrowly defined, there seems to be no 
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coherent principle for distinguishing between these areas 
and no real reason for wishing to do so. I think it will 
prove ultimately disappointing in terms of explanatory 
productivity and ultimately frustrating in- terms of 
theoretical coherence to regard the issue bound up in the 
dichotomy of base and superstructures as the description 
of the actual structure of a social formation. I do not 
say this, let me quickly add, because I want to flatly 
deny that there are no potentially recoverable 
explanatory resources bound up in the topographical 
metaphor, for it is merely fair to note that it has on 
numerous occasions been sensitively used to valuable 
effect in hands other than Marx's (94). However, I do 
want to argue that these resources are not in essence 
generated by an, as it were, morphology of social 
structure (analogous to Durkheim, Parsons, etc. ), and 
attempts to capture them through such an idea cannot be 
successful. Put the other way around, attempts to refine 
the topographical metaphor as if it turned on such a 
morphology are, in my opinion, bound to decay into merely 
conceptual ratiocination without any real object which is 
its justification (95). 
What I think is actually guiding Marx's recourse to the 
base and superstructure metaphor is his wish to address 
other perspectives on social theory from the point of 
view of his own materialism. Having in his materialism 
arrived at a specific understanding of history which 
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grants an explanatory privilege to grasping the pattern 
of material intercourse with nature, Marx, I believe, 
attempted to set out the ramifications of this 
understanding not so much for other sectors or 
institutions of society rigorously structurally 
demarcated from the economic but for other approaches to 
social issues. When Marx says: "It is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on 
the contrary, their social being that determines their 
consciousness", he is clearly challenging a form of 
explanation and not segregating sectors of social life. 
That Marx wrote these words in the preface to his first 
published attempt to come to terms with an economy which 
he insisted was reproduced through the alienated 
consciousness of those labouring under it means that to 
read them as contributing to such a segregation would be, 
I suggest, absurd. Now, I believe that we can see that 
saying that it is through the pattern of social life, in 
which material life has the influential position we have 
described, that forms of consciousness are developed is 
to say something significantly different from the 
reverse. (Though the polemical point has rather lost its 
force through its subsequent general acceptance). 
Furthermore, depending upon how much value we find in 
Marx's claims for his materialism, we might think the 
difference important, for if the central claim that this 
materialism describes the fundamental dynamic of social 
development is accepted, then we have some apparatus for 
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explaining forms of consciousness. Whether we are 
dealing with something important here really turns on 
whether we accept Marx's hierarchy of explanatory 
privelege, in which material life certainly is the basis 
of historical accounts, or whether we do not. However, 
recognising this does not commit us to an attempt to 
strictly demarcate (a basal structural level of) economy 
from (a superstructural level of) consciousness, and I do 
not see how any ultimately coherent support for such an 
effort can be derived from attempting explanations along 
the line of Marx's guiding thread. 
In one particular sense, this attitude towards the 
explanations of consciousness has a special importance 
for Marx. This sense is the development of critical 
consciousness, of critical attitudes towards existing 
social arrangements. We have seen how the dialectic of 
forces and relations of production describes a pattern of 
determinate negations of forms of material consciousness. 
The overall cast of common attitudes towards given social 
arrangements turns, Marx says, on whether those 
arrangements facilitate or hinder the development of the 
forces of production, an essentially critical attitude 
being generated when the forces and relations of 
production stand in contradiction. On the basis of this 
fundamentally critical attitude, the ramifications of 
criticism can be explored in other spheres of existence 
and from other points of view of social inquiry than the 
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material (96). Something important is being said here, 
and I would put it like this: that the ultimate 
determinant of the possibilities of critical 
consciousness are determined in pre-history by the level 
of the material accomplishments of society, for the forms 
of socio-political life and of thought in pre-history are 
based on forms of material life that are-alienated and 
out of conscious control. In my opinion, none of this 
can be made any clearer by being expressed though a 
strict language of base and superstructure. 
Why Marx should make clear his reversal of the 
explanatory background of consciousness and material life 
against a background of Hegelian philosophy is obvious. 
That Marx should also designate the political and legal 
as superstructures in a similar way is, I suggest, almost 
equally easy to understand. There is no great precision 
of institutional demarcation involved here - Marx runs 
together legal and political practices in a way which 
would seem frustratingly careless were he to be thought 
to be attempting such demarcation. However, that 
understanding given forms of legal and political 
institutions and assessing the' possibilities for legal 
and political reconstruction turn upon grasping the 
peculiar determinations of a specific level of material 
life is obviously an interesting idea. To say this 
involves a much wider idea of social theory than narrow 
description, an idea which embraces the effect of social 
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understanding on political organisation and on value 
judgements on extant beliefs. Such was undoubtedly the 
idea of social theory which Marx held, and which locates 
his work within properly classical social theory (97). 
When interpreted in the fashion I suggest, the base and 
superstructure metaphor does not commit us to any 
pre-ordained position on the relation of all political 
and ideological issues to material life. Just as the 
explanatory power of the dichotomy of forces and 
relations of production neither possibly could nor needs 
to embrace all details of material life, so the 
explanatory claims bound up in the topographical metaphor 
need not extend to all details of social life to be an 
interesting and valuable claim. It is only on the 
mistaken understanding that this is so that saving 
degrees of autonomy from the economy need to be invented 
as terminological - if nothing else - devices for dealing 
with those instances where the distinguishing of base 
from superstructure patently leaves an infinite number of 
political and ideological phenomena with no economic 
explanation. 
Of course, as I have mentioned, if Marx's materialism is 
to be our guide in historical explanation, then the 
ultimate, or indeed, basal explanation of all historical 
events must have recourse to the form of material life. 
What we can say of political or ideological forms merely 
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by referring to the overall form of material life is, in 
itself, of the most general character. It is, however, 
well worth saying. In the pre-history of alienated forms 
of production, socio-political arrangements and social 
consciousness will also be alienated, for reasons to 
which I shall turn in a moment. An in itself equally 
general observation, though leading to historical 
specification, is that the particular form of alienated 
material life will overall determine the particular 
character of the politics and consciousness of the 
society of which it is the mode of production. That is 
to say, in the last instance the character of a society 
is given by the development of the dynamic of material 
life (98). 
It is only to put the obverse of the points I_have been 
making to note that it is only when material production 
has progressed to the point where a non-alienated 
intercourse with nature may take place that non-alienated 
forms of political life and consciousness might be 
practically projected. AT-%AI 3. ý\, % A\\ take up the reasons 
for this in a short while. For (Marx himself this 
contemporary lesson of his materialism was the main fruit 
of its insights into history, and we shall see, his 
account of capitalism articulates exactly this double 
insight into past alienation and the possibility of the 
end of pre-history. 
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Class and Classless Societies 
In the 1888 English edition of the Communist Manifesto, 
Engels qualified the famous slogan that "The history of 
all hitherto existing society is the history of class 
struggles" with a note to the effect that this applied 
only to written history (99). In the early 1880s Marx 
began studies in the ethnology of pre-class societies, 
and though he did not work these up himself (100), they 
were given some expression in Engels 1884 Origin of the 
Family (101). The qualification of the famous words of 
1847 represents a deepening of the elusive sense of these 
words in the light of the strides forward in ethnology 
made between 1847 and 1888 which Engels and Marx were 
trying to assimilate within their broad outline of 
history. I will try to set out the meaning of the at 
first glance absurd idea that all history is the history 
of class struggles by approaching the ideas of 1847 
equipped with the hindsight of their later qualification. 
I hope thereby to show the role of the important 
dichotomy of class and classless societies in Marx's 
guiding thread of historical understanding. 
Given the conception of communism as classless society 
(to which I will return), the position of Engels and Marx 
in the early 1880s seems to have been to contrast class 
societies to two forms of classless society - the 
post-class form of communism and the pre-class form of 
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primitive communism. Primitive communism is 
distinguished by the common property holding by family 
units within tribes of more or less sufficient means of 
production for subsistence production. Engels and Marx 
clearly have in mind here - at a certain depth of 
ethnological sophistication - the "early and rude state 
of society" of "natural man" common to the historical 
imagination of the contributors to the classic beginnings 
of social thought (102). They certainly share the main 
concern of that thought to contrast such early society to 
civilisation, and to explain the latter's origin in the 
former. 
Engels' and Marx's thought on this fundamental problem 
seems to turn on linking the production of surplus with 
the division of labour and private property, though the 
link is by no means clearly established (103). 
The limitations of subsistence production begin to be 
broken down with the realisation of a potential increase 
in productivity innate in the almost immediately natural 
division of labour within the family. The normal 
production goal of the family as an economic unit is 
self-sufficiency within a rather narrow time horizon. 
The failure to provide against inevitable breakdowns in 
production by building up a hoard through surplus 
production will eventually certainly lead to the most 
fundamental deprivation. The commitment to the 
185 
production of surplus by each family member working long 
enough to actualise a greater amount of the potential 
productive power of the familial division of labour in 
order to build up a surplus against more difficult times 
is, then, the first step in human beings emerging from 
the subservience to nature which they must endure unless 
they develop their powers of conscious fore-thought. 
With the formation of hoards, a system of rather simple 
exchange between families may develop, allowing the 
extension of each family's range of goods. There may be 
established a common hoard, which both requires and 
allows the release of certain members of the tribe from 
direct productive activity, permitting the extension of 
certain common tribal functions. Bound up in such 
developments is the emergence of social ranking, for we 
have the growth of social life but inevitably not based 
on general social perspectives but on the, as it were, 
extraneous association of hitherto distinct units. 
The accumulation of a certain surplus within the family 
unit allows the possibility of employing outside labour 
resources, extending the division of labour and thereby 
increasing surplus. The first such resources were 
provided by the captives of tribal war, that is to say by 
enslavement. 
From the very outset, then, the development of the 
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potential for surplus production and the extension of the 
social life is characterised by being based on the 
fundamental economic principle of the control of the 
means of production resting with the ownership of private 
property by units within the society. The 
differentiation of a class of owners of the means of 
production. and those whose labour is directed by them, 
and within the class of owners ranking essentially based 
on the size of holding, mark the final elements of the 
process by which we can see primitive communism 
dissolving into private property owning civilisation 
(104). 
I do not want to attempt to elaborate this rudimentary 
ethnography of the distinction between pre-class and 
class societies (105). Rather I wish, as I said at the 
outset, to look at what this ethnographic deepening of 
Engels' and Marx's thought can tell us about the core 
ideas of their earlier formulations, and for this purpose 
I think we have discussed enough of their later 
elaborations. We have to come to terms with the essence 
of the idea that all history is the history of class 
struggles, and I want to say that this is in fact an 
important idea expressing a substantial historical truth 
in the materialist fashion Engels and Marx sought. 
Human development from the position of familial-tribal 
subsistence production fundamentally involves the 
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production of surplus through realisation of the 
productive powers -of an initially familial division of 
labour. This surplus can serve as the basis of the 
employment of outside labour. This is to say, this 
surplus is the basis of the relative concentration of the 
means of production in a restricted number of hands and 
thus the creation of private property. The nexus of 
surplus - division of labour - private property is then, 
of course, the basis of the further production of 
surplus. 
The essential feature of this outline of the basis of 
social improvement is its recognition of the necessity of 
private property (106). It was not possible to move from 
general subsistence production to general command of 
material intercourse with nature by whole societies. The 
resources which make such general command plausible 
simply were not available. This plausibility had to be 
established by a gradual extension of knowledge and 
command of nature through a material life based on 
production units which segment the entire society; that 
is to say, private property. The nexus of surplus - 
division of labour - private property leaves the last as 
the necessary result (and not the cause) of the only 
possible way in which the increase of productive powers 
expressed in the first could be accomplished. 
Private property certainly represents the alienation of 
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those who do not own the means of production from their 
own material life (107). It is a principle giving effect 
to that aspect of the division of labour which. Marx felt 
constituted the essence of alienation - the division of 
manual and mental labour (108). The direction of the use 
of the means of production is fundamentally a function of 
the ownership of private property. This is so not so 
much in that ownership and control are identical, but 
that the framework of control options must embody respect 
for the particular form of private property as this 
social form is understood as the form of means of 
production as such. The other side of this position is 
that those who labour under designated positions in the 
division of labour are quite disenfranchised from the 
control of their own material life. Private property and 
the division of labour hence articulate two aspects of 
the alienation of labour - the former in respect of the 
product of labour which becomes private property and the 
latter in respect of the labour process which is under 
class based direction (109). This, let me repeat, is a 
necessary alienation. Private property does not create 
the shortcomings of the alienated labour process but 
stems from them, though of course once established it 
reproduces that alienation (110). The forces of human 
material productivity could not be improved on any basis 
other than of successive forms of private property. It 
is this alienated pre-history that is the field of 
application of the dialectic of forces and relations of 
189 
production. 
For we are now in a position to clearly grasp the inner 
logic of the social relations of production that sets 
them apart from, and in varying relationship to, the 
forces of production. This logic is class struggle based 
on various forms of private property. 
We have seen that Engels and Marx clearly intend to link 
the production of surplus as an essential indicator of 
the productive powers of labour to the division of 
labour. The division of labour can, initially, be 
carried out only through the disposition of sectors of 
the means of production as private properties. Though 
the owners and controllers of these individual properties 
will certainly lack an overall perspective on the 
material life of their society, the identification of 
their social position will involve recognising their 
mutual standing as a class, and their mutual distance 
from those who do not own the means of production. This 
is not fundamentally a matter of the description of 
ostensible stratification but rather an attempt to 
identify the central pivot of the character of a society 
by drawing attention to the specific. social form of its 
alienated political structures and the location of these 
structures within a particular form of alienated material 
life. The (infinite) potential classification of various 
sectors of society by, for example, types of revenue 
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received (111) can be of value in this scheme only in so 
far as it contributes to knowledge of this - for Marx - 
crucial element of historical explanation. To put this 
the other way round, the social classification which 
Marx's guiding thread can directly generate may well be 
empirically limited. However, an empirically adequate 
picture must necessarily rest on this broad outline. 
The conduct of political life under these class divisions 
cannot but be alienated. Those who do not own the means 
of production are immediately disenfranchised. Those who 
do own them - and here we come to the nub of the 
dichotomy of forces and relations of production - are 
always eventually faced with the contradiction between 
expanding productive forces and maintaining the 
arrangement of material life that supports their own 
class position. Expansion of production beyond the 
limits of the requirements of the unproductive 
consumption of the owners and controllers of the means of 
production will always ultimately call into question that 
ownership and control (112). The class of owners is 
itself alienated - its very class position dictates an 
attitude towards other classes and ultimately to social 
improvement which can only be described as a reactionary 
commitment to a partial position unable to rise to 
general social perspectives. This is in an important 
sense a moral criticism, and we must also recognise that 
it is to some extent a moralistic criticism in that it 
191 
would be pious to expect the owners of the means of 
production to relinquish the power which confirms their 
privilege in circumstances where that privilege seems to 
be the discrimination of God or nature amongst men. By 
contrast, the class position of those who do not own the 
means of production would seem to be more open to 
embracing change, for those in this positon find only the 
confirmation of their own relative material and political 
deprivation in existing social arrangements, and may well 
therefore have a progressive interest in potential social 
improvement. 
Marx's overall scheme of explanation will refer the 
actual disposition of social classes to the degree of 
criticism of existing social relations of production 
which the productive forces are positing, for this is 
the, as it were, objective resource for taking up social 
criticism. Nevertheless, the sense in which Marx's 
guiding thread requires history to be the history of 
class struggle is that in alienated societies the 
. actualisation of social change in order to accommodate 
improvements in the forces of production must go through 
the mediation of struggle within class divided social 
relations of production. It is this struggle the 
proximate location of the social dynamic which Marx more 
fundamentally explains in terms of the dialectic of 
forces and relations of production. I think it is fair 
to claim that in this way Marx's guiding thread contains, 
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in a principled fashion, a moment of crucial mediation of 
the consequences of the contradiction of forces and 
relations of production (113). 
It is, I think, Engels' and Marx's claim that when we 
look at the institutions of the governance of class 
societies - the state as they typically put it - we will 
find that they represent the class divided character of 
these societies. These institutions will typically 
embrace a system of right which guarantees the existing 
disposition of property, and will politically govern the 
society in accordance with this system and the policy 
imperatives it dictates. It is the social fragmentation 
implied by private property as the fundamental economic 
unit that makes the existence of socially separate 
institutions concerned with maintaining the society as a 
whole necessary - this cannot be a function of the common 
society as this commonality does not actually exist. The 
very existence of separate state institutions marks, 
then, the alienation of the society, and the class biased 
conduct of those institutions is a subordinate aspect of 
that alienation. 
Progressive social movements will, given this account of 
the state, involve a challenge to the existing pattern of 
state power. We may expect to find that in the attempt 
to guarantee the given social relations of production the 
state is itself pushed into internal political 
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contradiction. In so far as it must guarantee the social 
relations of production in which the forces of production 
have been developed to the extent where they criticise 
the fundamental structures of the existing mode of 
production, the state has to contain both the progressive 
and the reactionary forces whose antagonism builds up 
with the development of a mode of production. It is the 
struggle over the direction of the resolution or 
containment of this contradiction that we may term the 
political struggle of materially based classes, our 
heuristic emphasis shifting from the disposition of 
material life to explicit problems of governance and 
political participation. 
As I have mentioned, Engels and Marx envisaged a second 
form of classless society - post-class or communist 
society. Capitalism represents the potential for the and 
of human pre-history in that it makes plausible the 
construction, through a rather ill-defined transitory 
period of socialism, of communist society. The only 
political characterisation of communist society worth 
making is that it will be genuinely mass democratic. To 
now specify th. e institutions of such a society and the 
actions taken through them is an absurd contradiction of 
the freedom which that society is to embody, and Marx 
displayed a principled understanding of this point in his 
typical refusal to describe communist society (114). The 
freedom sought here is not freedom to do a certain sort 
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of act but to rationally decide to do any sort of act at 
all. What we should be told, and what indeed we must be 
told, is how communist society is to facilitate this open 
freedom, how it is to allow this rationality. 
In accord with his materialism, Marx's fundamental 
statements on this point are of the reorganisation of 
production. Given what we have seen of Marx's attitude 
to the division of labour, it would seem that the 
overcoming of alienation would require the abolition of 
the division of labour. It has often been argued that 
Marx would seem to have at one time thought this a 
plausible goal (115). I think it is certainly the case 
that this attitude to the division of labour is most 
dubious - indeed it is rather hard to see quite what Marx 
could mean by it. It is not perhaps worth the effort of 
trying to press on to a clear understanding both because 
the accuracy of attributing this position to Marx's early 
thought is suspect and because he certainly did not hold 
to it later. In some of his later writing Marx 
unequivocally and explicitly concedes that the securing 
of material existence is a realm of necessity, and 
presumably this means that the requirements of division 
of labour for efficient production must also be 
considered as necessary. The realm of freedom is to be 
secured by extending free-time as far as possible (116). 
This idea does not turn on the quality of the activity 
undertaken in either necessary or free labour time. 
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Material activity cannot be play, but free activity can 
certainly be very hard work (117). The issue is that the 
former is objectively directed by natural need; the 
latter is self-directed towards as Marx puts it, "the 
development of human powers as an end in itself". 
What is more, the question of the relative size of 
necessary and free labour times is, in my opinion, 
important but quite secondary to the main issue in the 
overcoming of the alienation of material life. 
This issue is rather the achievement of the subordination 
of that life to social self-consciousness. What we are 
dealing with here is an end to the confusions of the 
natural and the social which obscure a socially 
self-, consciousness disposition of labour by the 
subjection of material life to conscious social planning. 
It is only in this socially conscious position that 
rational decisions to expand output, or to hold output 
steady and increase free time, etc., can be possible. In 
my later account of Marx's analysis of the capitalist 
made of production, I will try to show why Marx thought 
this achievement conceivable with the development of that 
mode. For the moment, I want to see what we can say 
about political life in communist society that would be 
necessary for this social self-consciousness. 
Firstly, of course, it is clear that all obstructions to 
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taking the general perspectives necessary for knowledge 
of the interests of the whole society must be removed. 
In other words, all partial class influences on the 
conduct of material life must be abolished. The 
rationality of the determination of social policies can 
lie only in that they are genuinely democratically 
formulated, for the only adequate form of genuinely 
non-alienated political life is a mass democracy which 
fully expresses the control by the whole society of its 
own destiny. 
What of the fate of the state in this idea of communism? 
If we take the state to be the alienated form of 
political life, then we can boldly state that the truth 
of the state is democracy (118). But what of the 
alienated form after its truth is grasped? There can be 
no doubt that institutions of governmental policy are an 
absolute necessity for any form of civilised life. 
However, it is a mistake - logically simple but socially 
extremely difficult to detect - to run together 
administration and oppression. If we recognise the state 
as the form of political life of class society, we must 
then posit the absence of the state from communist 
society when the administration of things is not 
conflated with the dominance of people (119). To put 
this another way, the very existence of separate 
institutions over and above the rest of society must end 
when the institutions of government are an integral part 
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of the social whole (120). 
Science and Ideology 
It is obvious that Marx's guiding thread is constituted 
of a complicated set of statements. One particular 
complication is that it involves statements at two 
ontologically discrete levels, but that the character of 
the guiding thread substantially turns on running these 
together. Marx in effect distinguishes the level of 
given nature from history, and then puts forward 
propositions about history which stress the influence 
exercised by humanly mediated natural determinations. 
Nature in fact figures twice in Marx's materialism. The 
significance of recognising this in attempts to 
understand Marx's guiding thread can hardly be 
overstated. For whereas the way in which nature first 
figures can be discussed in the most general terms, the 
way in which it figures secondly - in the dichotomies of 
forces and relations of production, base and 
superstructure and class and classless societies - can be 
discussed only after the specific historical bounds of 
that discussion are made clear. The uses of nature at 
this second level are intelligible only when their 
location within the human pre-history of alienation is 
recognised. Outside of this context, and especially when 
posited at the same level of generality as the first use 
of nature, these employments of nature in Marx's guiding 
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thread are unintelligible. It is in claiming to make 
clear these essential bounds of alienation and of the 
ways of discussing it that Marx's guiding thread takes up 
the position- of claiming an epistemological privilege 
through a dichotomy of science and ideology. 
The way in which Marx sets about identifying beliefs as 
ideological or scientific is coloured by the general 
attitude towards consciousness which we have seen in his 
guiding thread. By this attitude I mean his emphasis on 
the location of phenomena within the totality of social 
determinations (121) ordered by his materialism (122). 
The implications of this attitude for the overall 
explanation of the character of forms of consciousness 
are clear. The possibilities for understanding elements 
of human existence are set by the resources available for 
such understanding at any particular historical time 
(123). Attempts to specify the method of determination 
of consciousness which is involved here, that is to say 
to specify what explanatory power this attitude to 
consciousness does precisely possess, have proven 
extremely difficult (124). Though Marx himself 
acknowledged this difficulty upon occasion (125), its 
theoretical solution would seem to have held little 
interest for him. We have already seen that, even 
rudimentarily expressed, his attitude to consciousness 
embodies important specific explanatory claims, and Marx 
seems to have been content to work out more precise 
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formulations in specific empirical circumstances 
connected with a particular study. 
If we take Marx's idea of "ideology" to mean the above 
stress on the immersion of forms of consciousness in 
patterns of life, then clearly this ideology involves no 
sense of epistemological privilege (126). To relate the 
character of a belief to its social background when one 
is centrally claiming that all such characters are 
determined in such a relation obviously, of itself, does 
not involve denigration of any particular belief. Even 
beliefs accredited as true must be related to the social 
conditions of possession of a true belief. However, to 
take this epistemological neutrality as characteristic of 
Marx's main or most useful sense of ideology is a 
mistake, a mistake necessarily represented in the 
stretching of the texts which such a view requires (127). 
For the very intelligibility of Marx's overall use of 
ideology turns, I believe, upon recognising the specific 
historical bounds within which he uses it, bounds which 
immediately imbue that use with a sense of the discussion 
of issues related to a particular claim of 
epistemological privilege. 
We have seen Marx's guiding thread sketch out a view of 
history which fundamentally turns on the explanation of 
social alienation from the point of view where humankind 
has set itself the task of abolishing that alienation. 
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The proximate locus of alienation, though crucially for 
Marx not the fundamental basis of it, is consciousness. 
In a very important way, the central issue of Marx's 
guiding thread is the explanation of alienated 
consciousness. It is social life alienated from its own 
true character, and hence moving through a material 
dialectic of forces and relations of production which can 
operate only in so far as it is not subject to conscious 
social determination. The identifying characteristic of 
pre-history is, then, in the first instance the existence 
of alienated consciousness (128). 
A sense of ideology undoubtedly present in Marx's 
writings uses the term to describe this overall form of 
alienated belief. This sense is typically established 
through a contrast with "science" as the penetration of 
alienated beliefs and the establishment of 
self-consciousness. The effect of alienation is present 
in the disjunction between the phenomenal appearances of 
the social world in the normal consciousness and the true 
character, or essence, of that world (129). It is not 
that these appearances are ephemeral illusions, it is 
that they do not grasp the social production of the 
world. Alienation is certainly present at the level of 
essence, for it is only because the essential truth of 
human social power is inadequately actualised that 
appearances which obfuscate that power can exist. 
Science, in this sense of a contrast to this ideology, is 
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necessary because social life is alienated. If everyday 
conceptions actually expressed the true character of 
social life, then science as the penetration of alienated 
phenomenal appearances would be superfluous. But it is 
not (130). 
This implies that two characteristics are to be found 
integral to the scientific attitude. Firstly, that 
attitude is immanently critical. Its aim is the 
displacement of the dominant understandings of social 
life, because in pre-history these understandings are 
alienated and therefore inadequate. Secondly, though not 
such a direct implication, a politically critical 
attitude to given social institutions follows from such 
science, for as the explanation of alienated 
consciousness does not reside in consciousness but in 
alienated social life, the conquest of alienation cannot 
be a work of pure science (131). Rather science's 
enlightening conclusions can be actualised when employed 
to material effect (132). It is not that science serves 
pre-determined political conclusions but that political 
action is the corollary of science, given that the effort 
of scientific understanding is made with an awareness of 
social responsibility and is not regarded as merely an 
academic, in the bad sense, exercise. Science must draw 
its resources from given social practices. It must also, 
for the reasons we have just discussed, hope to carry its 
conclusion¬ through to practical interventions in the 
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social (133) if the emancipatory logic of these 
conclusions is to be actualised (134). Science which 
rested at the level of theory would be pointless, for the 
full achievement of the goals of science must go further, 
must go on, in fact, to the abolition of the idea of 
theoretical science as a self-sufficient enterprise 
(135). 
This all, of course, immediately raises the issue of the 
distinguishing of science from ideology, but not, it is 
essential to appreciate, as an internally philosophical 
one for Marx, but as a historical one. From what we have 
seen of Marx's attitude to consciousness, it is clear 
that, as I have mentioned, science as much as ideology is 
a product of social location. That is to say, both 
science and ideology are "ideologies" in the first sense 
of Marx's use of this term which we have discussed. It 
is essential to ask how, on this basis, Marx felt able to 
state a claim to the possession of scientific knowledge 
in the sense of knowledge epistemologically superior to 
ideology. In a few words, he identified the potential 
for social self consciousness as a product of the 
develoment of the capitalist mode of production, and he 
identified the social actualisation of this potential as 
socialism moving into communism. The assessment of this 
claim is the task of the next part of this work. For 
now, it is apposite to bracket the question of the 
plausibility of Marx's claims to possession of scientific 
203 
knowledge, and to examine how these claims work to set up 
the distinction of science and ideology. Given what we 
have seen of the method of Hegel's Phenomenological 
proof, what needs to be said in exegesis of this part of 
Marx's work can be said quite briefly. 
The first and fundamental characteristic of these claims 
by Marx is that they are based on belief in their own 
empirical adequacy. Marx. tries to explain the character 
of material life of bourgeois society, and it is the 
character of his subject, empirically ascertained, which 
he claims leads him to the labour theory of value as a 
statement of capitalist economic principle (136). Marx 
has to argue that the typical bourgeois attitude to 
material life, which involves economic ideas which are 
opposed to the labour theory, is mistaken, is in fact a 
form of alienated belief which he calls commodity 
fetishism. For Marx, the establishment of the 
plausibility of his argument and in particular of its 
superiority to commodity fetishism is a matter of 
establishing his argument's explanatory power and that 
that power is far greater than that of commodity 
fetishism. Marx accordingly is at great pains to claim 
that superiority against the academic expression of 
commodity fetishism in what he calls vulgar political 
economy (137). There is a further dimension to this 
process for Marx. Commodity fetishism is the everyday 
understanding of material life in bourgeois society, that 
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is to say, it is an integral element of that society and 
not a mere spurious mistake. It is the consciousness 
engendered by the capitalist form of economy. The full 
extent of Marx's claim to be in possession of a superior 
understanding that that of commodity fetishism is 
expressed in his eventual claim to explain commodity 
fetishism better than it can explain itself. This power 
of reflexively expanding our knowledge takes us into the 
second element of Marx's method of distinguishing science 
and ideology which I want to discuss. 
The scientific penetration of alienation which Marx 
believes is possible in bourgeois conditions allows of 
the reflexive reassessment of all alienated history, both 
in bourgeois society, as I have just mentioned, and in 
all epochs prior to the bourgeois one, about which I 
should like to now say a few words. From the position of 
social self-consciousness represented by the scientific 
apprehension of the truth of bourgeois social structure, 
a reflexive re-comprehension of pre-history as such, that 
is as the historical work of human beings but of human 
beings alienated from knowledge of their own historical 
powers, is possible. It is not that the past is found to 
be identical to bourgeois society, but that the 
uncovering of the historical ontology of bourgeois 
society can illuminate the different historical 
circumstances of earlier societies. It is the riddle of 
history that is essentially solved (138). 
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As I have mentioned, the assessment of the adequacy of 
these claims of Marx's will be attempted in the following 
parts of this work. For the present I merely want to 
myself claim that what I have said is an accurate 
presentation of the method by which Marx intended to 
demarcate science from ideology. The idea of empirically 
claiming an end of pre-history analogous in its 
historico-empistemological privilege to the and of 
history in Hegel is, I am sure, clearly present here. 
What is most remarkable about the idea of critique which 
informs Marx's way of distinguishing science and ideology 
is the degree of necessary sympathy with the beliefs 
identified as ideological. Ideological beliefs are the 
antecedents of science, and this is to say that they must 
contain the potentials that make the science possible. 
Any practical claim to be able to make any sort of 
productive development must have roots in conditions 
which, after the development is accomplished, will be 
commonly held to be inadequate (139). The issue is to 
locate the potentials in the inadequate state of affairs, 
not to bluntly counterpose a better state to the given 
(140), for this would make the aim of productive 
development uptopian. This applies as much to the 
critique of ideology as the political critique of the 
given social world of which it is part. 
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Marx is dealing in an importantly Hegelian way with a 
problem he identifies in a- rather less importantly - 
Hegelian fashion. This is the problem of the inversion 
of the true character of an alienated world in 
ideological consciousness, and the necessary re-inverting 
of these beliefs through science (and more generally 
through political action). There is no point in 
insisting upon the letter of the metaphor of inversion or 
of trying to generate any sort of precise (even if 
defective) mechanism of distinguishing science and 
ideology from this metaphor (141). But what the presence 
of the locution of inversion and its synonyms - from the 
mention of the camera obscure, in The German Ideology 
(142) to the allusions in Capital to the common 
understanding (143) and vulgar political economy (144) 
having reversed the true character of the capitalist 
economy in their understandinýsof it - does testify to, I 
believe, is that Marx was thinking these problems through 
in a way intimately related to Hegel. 
This locution expresses an overall intellectual debt 
which Marx's attitude to history owes to Hegel. We are 
not faced with a question of the borrowing of certain 
discrete ideas when we turn to Marx's relation to Hegel. 
It is misleading to ask whether Marx used dialectic, or 
recognised alienation, etc., in his work, for this 
implies that these are self-contained notions which Marx 
could either incorporate in his work or not. What we 
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have to recognise is that Marx's guiding thread is 
situated within an intellectual field whose boundaries 
were set by Hegel. To even attempt to speak of the 
application of certain of the ideas of Marx's guiding 
thread outside that intellectual field - to move the 
dialectic forces and relations of production outside of 
the context of the alienated material life of pe-history, 
for example - is to reduce those ideas to absurdity. 
More than this, the way in which Marx approaches 
historical developments draws upon an idea of progressive 
critique that again is so essentially Hegelian that we 
are talking about the Hegelian background to the basic 
character of Marx's thought. The key, I have tried to 
argue, to understanding Marx's guiding thread is to see 
it as a restatement of the entire form of Hegel's 
Phenomenological Dialectic. We have already seen why 
such a restatement was necessary. When Marx takes on the 
broad task of inverting the given, his improvements - if 
any - upon Hegel turn upon the extent to which he is able 
to base his science in that given. For Marx, the given 
is the capitalist mode of production and the bourgeois 
society and forms of thought which are based an that 








USE-VALUE AND- EXCHANGE-VALUE IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE 
COMMODITY 
Introduction: Use-value and Exchange-value 
In Marx's presentation of his political economy of 
capitalism, the first dichotomy into which the commodity 
is shown to resolve itself is that of use-value and 
exchange-value (1). First, let me say that from what we 
have seen of Marx's philosophy of historical explanation, 
what is at issue in this dichotomy is the analytic 
separation of the natural or material content of a good 
that is its use-value from the social form of the 
production of that good as a commodity with 
exchange-value. On this basis, Marx will argue that in 
order to explain exchange-value it is necessary to make 
reference not only to, the natural properties of 
commodities but to those properties as grasped through a 
historically specific social organisation of production 
(capitalism). This involves a criticism of bourgeois 
political economy as a form of alienated consciousness in 
which social powers are obscured by being conflated with 
naturally given qualities (2). I shall argue that Capital 
is essentially an elaborated discussion of those themes 
which I have identified in his general philosophy of 
historical explanation. In saying this, I wish to stress 
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that such an elaboration is a condition of the adequacy 
of the account and of the understanding to which it can 
give rise. The issue really is whether Capital's 
description of modern society can render its derived 
Hegelian concerns in a way which can carry social 
scientifically informed conviction beyond the point where 
the Phenomenology of Spirit cannot do so. To put this 
another way, can Marx's "guiding thread" as actualised in 
Capital push the criticism of alienation beyond Hegelian 
limits? 
I shall order my account of Capital around the dichotomy 
of use-value and exchange-value not only because this is 
clearly central to the analysis of commodity, but also 
because, as I will claim, it is the pivot of the overall 
account of capitalism. My case will be that this 
dichotomy is the nexus of the connection between the 
character o, Marx's political economyo^aoo his philosophy 
of social explanation. This is so because the dichotomy 
of use-value and exchange-value is the capitalistic form 
of the dichotomy of forces and relations of production. 
The Commodity 
Marx's argument for this separation of the material 
content and the social form of a good is given through 
his analysis of the commodity in his statement of the 
first positions of the labour theory of value. Let us 
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begin, then, with Marx's beginning, the commodity. 
Adapting, as he so often does, one of Hegel's famous 
observations. Marx allows that selecting a point at 
which to begin any science is difficult (3), and tells us 
that in his science the commodity is chosen as the 
economic cell form of bourgeois society (4). Leaving 
aside the rather sweeping analogy with the entire history 
of western science by which Marx arrives at this 
metaphor, we are, I think, led quite directly to the 
reasons for his choice of beginning by this hint. Though 
we can now see from the Paris Manuscripts and the 
Grundrisse that Marx did not begin his own investigations 
in this way, he was surely justified in believing that 
this presentation of those investigations has as its 
beginning the simplest element of contemporary economic 
life as it appears (5). Two senses of "simple" are 
played upon here. The commodity does at every moment in 
the vast majority of transactions present itelf as the 
unit of economic life, and this is a simple, easily 
recognisable beginning. But, as it is to be argued 
throughout Capital, it possesses this character only 
because it is simple in that it is the unit (the cell, we 
might agree bearing the biology of Marx's time in mind) 
of bourgeois wealth (6). To look at everyday economic 
transactions would reveal a great number of possible 
common determinations: the use of money, the motivation 
of utility, etc. Furthermore, the commodity can itself 
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be analytically broken down - Marx himself proceeds to do 
this. However, it is the commodity that is the end point 
of any heuristic abstraction or simplification which 
would preserve in their unity the specific 
characteristics which identify the capitalist mode of 
production (7). The commodity is, in a phrase, the 
fundamental element of generalised commodity production 
and is, therefore, the proper place to begin an 
explanation of capitalism W. Marx's choice of 
beginning is, then, one which is intended to direct our 
attention to the fundamental unit of capitalism as a 
specific mode of production (9). 
This is a beginning which can be justified only by the 
explanatory power of what follows from it, for the 
indentification of capitalism as a particular mode of 
production obviously must underpin, after being shown to 
be demonstrable from3the singling out of the commodity as 
the fundamental element of a specific form of production. 
It is our grasp of this specific form that will enable us 
to understand the peculiar characteristics of a 
historical type of production. This would not be 
possible if we took an element to be found in all 
economic transactions, say the element of utility, as our 
starting point in explaining specific transactions. 
Indeed, a counterpoint between the two sense of 
simplicity we have discussed here, between the 
commonplace character of the commodity as it appears and 
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the peculiarity which is uncovered in it as it is shown 
to be the element of specifically bourgeois wealth, is a 
persistent ordering theme of the three volumes of 
Capital, as Marx sets about explaining the forrier 
simplicity by means of the latter (10). 
Marx's tack* of selecting the commodity as his starting 
place is one about which we should be clear. He is 
trying to establish a real social structure, of 
specific c&lly capitalist social relations of production, 
as necessary for the explanation of the features of a 
specific set of economic transactions. The structure is 
posited through explanatory requirements which it is to 
subsequently satisfy. Marx undoubtedly has a certain 
realist confidence in the erectenCe of this structure as 
an actually existing determining influence on empýr'c. al 
human conduct which he will pit against alternative, 
including the most common, understandings of that conduct 
which tend to deny the influence, or indeed existence, of 
that structure. 
Reaular Exchange and Generalised Commodity Production 
The use-value and exchange-value of a commodity are 
distinguished by Marx under the dualisms of quality and 
quantity and substance and magnitude. The particular 
use-value of a commodity rests in the peculiar qualities 
which it possesses by virtue of its intrinsic natural 
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properties. Though, as we have seen, Marx was well 
enough aware that such properties may constitute a 
use-value only though being recognised as useful, he 
emphasises the intrinsic character of the use-value (11) 
by, in line with classic philosophic usage, denoting this 
quality as the commodity's substance. Equally in line 
with this usage is the problem which arises immediately 
upon turning to the exchange of these substances. It is 
precisely the qualitative differences between use-values 
that is the reason for the exchange of commodities, but 
how might the exchange of different qualities be 
proportionally regulated when those qualities constitute 
different, incommensurable substances? 
Certainly when first taken up in this way, any such 
exchange would seem to be, purely arbitrary -in this 
respect; the quite accidental exchange of various 
proportions of commodities which may turn on any number 
of reasons, such as we can both easily imagine and 
recall, specific to the given exchange and not involving 
any proportional regulation at all (12). 
Indeed, as the purposefully comic examples of exchange 
given in the 1859 Critique (13) indicate, and as Marx 
observes in so many words in Capital (14), the idea that 
such regular exchange could take place, according the 
commodity an inseparable exchange-value, seems absurd. 
Nevertheless, Marx proceeds to investigate how it is that 
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such regulation can take place, taking it from the outset 
of both this section of Capital and the latter, more 
detailed discussion of the elementary or accidental form 
of value, that exchange-value expresses some regulated 
commensurability (15). On what grounds did he do this? 
These grounds are by no means readily apparent. Marx's 
overt argument for taking this course is that two 
different qualities can be exchanged only after they have 
been reduced to quantitative differences of the same 
unit, that is to say, after they have been rendered 
commensurable. He gave in direct support of this logical 
case analogies drawn from geometry (16), physics 
(17) and 
chemistry (18). But we can readily see that the whole 
argument which Marx formulates itself presumes the 
proportional regulation of exchange, and being an inquiry 
into how it can take place can hardly prove that it does. 
It is not correct, however, to imply that Marx provides 
no argument which is pertinent to his taking of this 
course. The brief comments on Bailey which are found at 
points within the section on the elementary form, to the 
effect that he paid insufficient attention to the very 
form of value because he exclusively focused only upon 
the quantitative aspects, seems very promising, but these 
comments were only written up fragments of Theories of 
Surplus Value and any longer discussion was therefore 
denied to Capital's readers before Kautsky. We can, of 
course, turn to the manuscript, where we are lead to the 
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quite long section in which Bailey's particular 
contribution to the disintegration of the Ricardian 
school is considered (19). From this, together with the 
discussion of the anonymous Observations on Certain 
Verbal Disputes etc. (20), which Marx thought Bailey 
closely followed on these points (21), we can see the 
whole writing up of the presentation of capitalist 
exchange according to inseparable exchange-value as it 
began. 
Bailey's polemic against the entire Ricardian attempt to 
determine a measure of value took the form (22) of an 
accusation that there were really only an infinite number 
of accidental equations of the relative value of various 
commodities, and that therefore a theory of value such as 
that aimed at by Ricardo illegitimately attempted to 
render absolute that which was purely relative. The 
cause of this scholastic illusion on the part of Ricardo 
was a misunderstanding of money's role as a universal 
mediator of exchange. That money could play this part 
did not mean, as Bailey alleged Ricardo took it to mean, 
that it was an absolute, invariant measure of value, for 
it could and did vary infinitely in value. It could 
nevertheless be a universal mediator, as its variations 
did not of course effect the relative magnitudes of 
commodity values expressed in it as these would vary 
uniformly. Money thus in fact expressed the essential 
relativity of value (23). 
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Marx recognised that Bailey had in this way cast a 
valuable light on the manner in which money could 
function as a measure of value, and he evidently drew to 
some degree upon this (24) when reaching his own 
conclusion that money must have a variable value (25). 
But as Marx's ability to incorporate this within the 
labour theory of value testifies, Bailey's disposal of 
the idea of an invariant measure hardly secures the 
position that value was thereby only relative. Drop the 
requirement that value be invariant 
(and Ricardo's 
commitment to this is by no means as clear cut as Bailey 
assumes (26)), and the argument against an "absolute" 
value formally falls. This cannot, I think, be shown 
more clearly than it was by Marx himself in criticism of 
the use of such an argument by Broadhurst, who would seem 
to have been taken as an exemplar in Capital only because 
of the economy of his formulations as he is not discussed 
elsewhere in Marx's economic writings and as he obviously 
was not the first to state the case. I therefore quote; 
firstly, the passage from Broadhurst: 
Once admit that A falls, because B, with which it is 
exchanged, rises, while no less labour is bestowed 
in the meantime on A, and your general principle of 
value falls to' the ground... If (Ricardo) allowed 
that when A rises in value relative to B, B falls in 
value relatively to A. he cut away the ground on 
which he rested his grand proposition, that the 
value of a commodity is ever determined by the 
labour embodied in it; for if a change in the cost 
of A alters not only its own relation to 8, for 
which it is exchanged, but also the value of B 
relatively to that of A, though no change has taken 
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place in the quantity of labour needed to produce B. 
then not only the doctrine falls to the ground which 
asserts that the quantity of labour bestowed on an 
article regulates its value, but also that which 
affirms that the cost of an article regulates its 
value. (27); 
and, secondly, Marx's comment on this: 
Mr. Broadhurst might just as well say: consider the 
fractions 10/20,10/50 10/100, etc. The number 10 
remains, unchanged, and yet its proportional 
magnitude, its magnitude in relation to the numbers 
20,50,10 continually diminishes. Therefore, the 
great principle that the magnitude of a whole 
number, such as 10, is "regulated" by the number of 
times the number 1 is contained in it falls to the 
ground. (28). 
The exposure of such an error in itself if of much less 
significance than noting the step in the direction of 
vulgar economics which allows it. Bailey's writings of 
the 1820s were part of a polemical attack against the 
Ricardian theory of value's inability to square with 
certain immediately available characteristics of the 
capitalist economy such as the equalisation of the rate. 
of profit, and it was spurred on by Richardo's frank but 
nonetheless increasingly disingenous admission of 
exceptions to his theory 
(29). Clearly Bailey's efforts, 
and those of others at the time, were aimed not a 
developing Ricardo but at doing away with the core of his 
work, dismissing as a scholastic invention the very basis 
of any investigation of regular exchange. Bailey's 
political economy was to end with relative exchanges of 
commodities, the values entering those relative exchanges 
accordingly being regarded as naturally given properties 
(30). This result was used by Marx in Capital to 
illustrate the nadir of the fetishistic confusion of the 
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natural and social (31). 
Obviously an explanation of exchange-value, given Marx's 
establishment of the necessity of social explanation, 
must go further at precisely the point where Bailey 
breaks off and would have Ricardo break off (32). Time 
and again Marx insists that the point is to examine how 
regular proportional exchange can take place, and that 
there must be a qualitative equalisation of different 
use-values into commensurable quantities for it to do so. 
The argument worked up in Capital, even down to a version 
of the analogies with geometry and physics 
(33), is given 
many times in this section of the Theories, and Marx had 
little difficulty in formally refuting the logic of 
Bailey's attempt to relativise value. But the acceptance 
of the plausibility of Marx's particular explanatory tack 
and the formal arguments for this, cannot be secured 
without explication of why that tack is necessary 
(and 
possible, as we shall see later), and why it allows 
convincing formal arguments to be marshalled to its aid. 
However, the display of the conviction that Bailey is 
fundamentally diminishing political economy's explanatory 
power, which emerges far more clearly from the Theories 
than from Capital, gives us all the lead we need in this 
respect. 
In arguing about what is necessary for exchange to take 
place, Marx is not giving a second-order rationalisation 
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of exchange, but an, as it were, first person account of 
what goes on in the capitalist mode of production. We 
can conceive rationales of certain acts of exchange which 
are certainly specific to those acts, and recognising 
this would seem to cut out the power of Marx's argument 
to ground the necessity of undertaking his projected 
explanation. But he is directly drawing our attention to 
an actual process of reduction to qualitatively equalised 
units and quantitative commensuration of the magnitudes 
of these units that does, as a matter of fact, take 
place, allowing the generalised exchange of innumerable 
use-values in regular, definite proportions that is the 
principal characteristic of bourgeois economic life (34). 
He is, in a phrase, trying to describe the real social 
structure of capitalist exchange (35). This becomes 
rather more clear in later passages of Capital (36), 
where Marx describes the 
actual historical development of 
the specific form of proportionally regular exchange 
which he wants to investigate (37). This interpretation 
of Marx's taking regular exchange as given is directly 
confirmed by certain passages of the Grundrisse and the 
Theories (38) and it is also supported by following up 
the textual links between such passages and Marx's 
writings of the early 1840s. This reveals that Marx 
initially took up these themes in an ethical evaluation 
of capitalist universal exchange as constituting the 
universal venality of bourgeois soiety (39). It is a 
requirement of the explanation of capitalist production 
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that justifies Marx's criticism of Bailey for neglecting 
the qualitative aspects of exchange (40). 
The Common Denominator of Exchange 
As we have seen, Marx gives a number of logical arguments 
and natural scientific analogies in order to demonstrate 
that for proportionally regulated exchange to take place 
there must be a reduction of the qualitatively different 
objects to be exchanged to commensurable quantities of 
the same unit. Though these devices cannot, as Marx 
seems to think they can, establish proportional 
regulation as essential for exchange, once we accept 
exchange in this sense as taking place they do show, and 
Marx wants them to do this as well, that some 
quantitatively mensurable common denominator is necessary 
(41). 
Such a conclusion can claim realist support as it is 
arrived at by the use of formalised argument to deepen 
given experience, in this case of capitalist exchange. 
Everyone knows, as Marx later says, that distinct from 
their various shapes as use-values, commodities have such 
a quantitatively mensurable denominator - money (42). 
Let us note here only the force of the observation of the 
denominator; to consider money itself at this point is to 
run rather ahead in the argument. 
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Use-value and the Common Denominator of Exch_ e 
In turning to the examination of this denominator, Marx's 
first conclusion is that it cannot inhere in commodities' 
use-values. Two related arguments to this effect may be 
found in Capital. Firstly, as it is the qualitative 
differences between use-values that motivate their 
exchange, this aspect of the commodity does not have the 
essential uniformity which allows of their quantitative 
comparison - one bed is equal to two chairs is an absurd 
statement (43). This again is a formal explication of 
the experience of capitalist commodity exchange, making 
clear what goes on in the typical obliteration of the 
qualitative differences of use-values when commodities 
are assessed in respect of exchange-value; when £ 100 
worth of anything is equivalent to £100 worth of anything 
else (44). 
From this, argument we reach a second. If we bring two 
different use-values together, though we may well express 
their worth in relative amounts of each other, this 
cannot be done by actually equating them themselves, but 
only through the mediation of a third quality, one which 
is common to, but distinguishable from both. Thus one 
bed can equal two chairs because both constitute the same 
amount of their denominator. The thing to note in this 
context is that the denominator cannot be the actual 
object of the exchange but must be a third quality (45) 
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Now, for some purposes this denominator can, as Marx's 
analogies infer, refer to the natural characteristics of 
the commodity which go to make up its use-value. A bed 
and a chair can be equated in terms of mass, volume, 
analysis of composite materials, etc. But it is the 
unique configuration of an object's properties that makes 
it desirable as a specific use-value, and thus resolution 
into these properties, though perfectly possible, cannot 
lead to the common denominator we are seeking for as a 
regulator of exchange. 
The aim of this argument is to criticise the direct 
attribution of exchange-value to the intrinsic qualities 
of natural objects, so that a commodity seems naturally 
endowed with a certain worth. We will take this up in 
detail later. At thts point I would like to mention that 
it is the making of such an attribution in the earliest 
formulations of marginalism, (apart from Gossen of 
course) that draws Marx's only comments on this then 
nascent current of economic thought. In the 1859 
Critique he briefly observes, and in the first edition of 
Capital he repeats, that the sorts of information that 
are gathered in attempts to relate worth directly to 
natural properties belongs only in commercial catalogues 
(46), and not, by implication, in political economy. 
Against such blunt attempts to derive value from inner 
worth, Marx's arguments show that what attempts to 
explain exchange-value as a natural property rest upon is 
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not acceptable as such a residuum. Explanation of 
exchange-value calls for some further account of how the 
purported equation of different qualities can take place. 
To put this another way; it is no explanation of 
exchange-value to tautologically ascribe it to an 
intrinsic worth of the commodity when not only has 
natural science never revealed exchange-value in a 
natural object (47), but when even if it did so it would 
remain to be understood how judgments of worth based upon 
it can be made in a proportionally regular fashion. It 
is even less of an explanation when in fact such 
judgments seem quite impossible on the basis claimed. 
How can one bed equal two chairs? 
Marx so far concludes that such an equality cannot inhere 
in the natural properties of commodities as it is 
impossible to see how a proportionally regular equation 
of them is to be constructed out of these properties. 
The thrust of such direct attributions of worth to 
natural properties is to remove the distinction between 
use-value and exchange-value, but I believe that Marx has 
successfully demonstrated that explanation of the latter 
calls, at least at an initial stage, for their analytic 
separation (48). 
Labour and Value 
If then, continues Marx, we disregard use-values, only 
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one property is left common to all commodities - that of 
being the products of labour. Once we have abstracted 
from use-value, all commodities tell us is that they are 
congealed quantities of human labour. It is as units of 
this social substance that they have value, the common 
denominator of their exchange (49). We have reached the 
first expressions of the labour theory of value. I 
should like to leave aside for the moment the description 
of "human labour" by which Marx tries to show how this is 
to play the part of the quantitative denominator which we 
are seeking and consider the very plausibility of the 
basic idea of the labour theory of value as so far 
expressed. 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to note a shift in the 
subjects of our discussion. Labour is put forward as the 
constitutent of value and value as the basis of 
proportionally regulated exchange. Though the entire 
argument so far would lead one to expect that value is 
directly related to price, Marx, although not 
sufficiently clearly, leaves the character of this 
relation quite open and in fact he will argue that it 
cannot be one of direct proportion. Recalling the 
earlier argument that the common denominator cannot be 
either of the objects to be exchanged but must be a third 
quality, we can see how Marx leaves a space for his later 
distinction. An exchange-value, strictly speaking, is a 
relational term expressing, the proportional exchange of 
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two or more objects. One bed is equal to two chairs is 
an exchange-value. But this is only the form of the 
expression of the denominator which sets the 
proportionality and mediates the exchange. What is 
actually going on in the equation of the bed and the 
chairs is the 'recognition that these things may be 
mediated by a common denominator, which is value. This 
is all one can say so far. It would be wrong to move 
immediately on to saying that a bed has twice as much 
value as a chair because this would presume that 
exchange-value is a direct expression of value, and we do 
not yet know whether or not this is so. Exchange-value 
is then, to be quite precise, the form of expression of 
value (50), which form will be subjected to detailed 
investigation later in Capital. The commodity is now 
shown to be analytically resolvable into a dichotomy of 
use-value and value, not use-value and exchange-value, 
and in the development of this third term of "value" Marx 
gives a name to the real social structure at which he is 
driving in his comments on Bailey. As Marx says, 
initially treating exchange-value and value as equivalent 
could do no harm so long as we are aware of the problem 
of the value-form, and doing so did give us a certain 
purchase on the immediately accessible characteristics of 
the commodity from which we could begin (51). At the 
moment we must be sure in our grasp of value as that 
component of the commodity other than its use-value; as 
that component which is the ground of exchange; and as 
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that component which represents the labour expended in 
realising the use-value of the commodity. 
What we have of course to immediately ask is whether this 
presentation, stated generally in order that we might 
avoid qualifications which could as yet only obscure the 
main point, is correct? There are at first glance some 
anomalous cases which run counter to the constellation of 
the concepts of commodity, use-value, exchange-value, 
value and labour which Marx has now presented (52), and 
in explanation of those concepts he takes up such cases 
(53). 
A thing can be a use-value and be a product of labour 
without being a commodity. We have, I trust, already 
dealt sufficiently with the identification of capitalism 
as generalised commodity production to see that this case 
is not really an anomaly but directly follows from and 
strongly supports the depiction of capitalism as a 
specific mode of the general production of use-values. 
However, a number of further points of importance follow 
from this case and these will be discussed in a moment. 
Rather of the same theorectical consequence as this first 
case is a second, which arises when a commodity is a 
product of labour but has no value as the commodity 
produced has no use-value and thus cannot be exchanged. 
Again this case can be easily seen to fit in with what 





to pose problem for that dichotomy, though 
interesting corollaries remain to be 
Amongst the anomalous cases which Marx sets out, the one 
we are about to discuss is distinguished from the other 
two in that it by no means easily falls into place in 
Marx's analysis of the commodity (54). A thing, Marx 
observes, can be a use-value without being a value. This 
is a rather imprecise way of putting the case, for if we 
quite properly regard value as the representation of 
labour in commodity production, then this anomaly merely 
restates the first which we have discussed, where labour 
is present in a form other than value in a different mode 
of production. But as is made quite clear by a brief 
look at the list of things which Marx considers to fall 
under this case, a list including air and natural 
meadows, this case is one of the possession of value by 
objects which are not the products of labour. 
Even with this made clear, there are still difficulties 
in seeing what is meant by Marx. Considering the two 
examples of air and natural meadows which have been 
mentioned, it would seem that including both in the same 
list is to ignore important distinctions. Air, let us 
allow, has never appeared as a commodity, and thus 
regarding it as a use-value presents no difficulty for 
the labour theory of value. Indeed we might say that air 
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is a use-value but not a commodity because it has no 
value. This would however by very rash, because natural 
meadows, which may also have a use-value not produced by 
labour, do of course appear as commodities. I have given 
a reference to Marx's noting of this problem in 1859, and 
in fact he had before this set out the essentials of its 
solution (55), a solution which he had drafted in 
expanded form in volume three before this list in volume 
one which, we are discussing went to press (56). We can 
be sure, then, that we are not dealing with some terrible 
slip (57); and, bearing in mind the earlier distinction 
between value and exchange-value, it is possible to look 
forward to Marx's thoughts on rent and such matters 
without being convinced beforehand that they are 
casuistic. Indeed it transpires that Marx has, in fact, 
chosen his words rather carefully in this particular 
respect. He does not deny that natural meadows may have 
an exchange-value, rather he denies that they have a 
value, and he believes that rent is based upon and 
determined by the basic structure of value in commodity 
production though the meadows themselves have no value. 
We must then suspend our judgment until we have 
considered his account of the distance beween value and 
its expression in exchange-value, of which the theory of 
rent is an important part. However, some general 
comments on the character of this distance are in order 
at this point, for we are not pursuing the knowledge, 
uninteresting in itself, that exchange of use-values 
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unmediated by labour is reconcilable with the labour 
theory of value, but rather Marx's claim that we need 
this theory in order to explain even these exchanges. 
Natural meadows have use-value; they also can be 
commodities. Now, there can be nothing in their 
use-value that makes the meadows necessarily commodities, 
for that use-value can be realised without the meadow 
entering economic life as a commodity at all. We need one 
further account of why the potential to be commodities 
which the meadows' use-value affords them is realised. 
This way of putting the issue here sets out one 
explanatory aim of the labour theory of value (58), the 
aim which concerns us here. 
Let us take a rather simple model of commodity production 
(59). Goods are produced and are to be exchanged. They 
have no use-value for their producers, who wish to 
realise their exchange-value in order to purchase other 
goods which do have a use-value for themselves. Such 
producers produce independently, or rather individually, 
for they require each other for the full satisfaction of 
their needs. In the production of commodities for 
exchange, deliberate regulation of this social 
interchange- is typically absent. Individual decisions 
about what to produce and what to exchange in what 
proportion for what other goods can only be arrived at in 
the market place. That is to say, after the act of 
individual production. Such decisions are obviously made 
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with reference to the use-values of the commodities, but 
we must note that investigation of this reference is 
theoretically subsequent to recognising that these 
decisions are situated at a distinct ontological level of 
the social relations of the division of labour (60). We 
can recall Marx introducing this labour theory of value 
by saying that if we abstract from their use-values, 
commodities are congealed labour, and that it is as units 
of this social substance that they have value. This 
formulation immediately runs together private labour and 
social exchange in a way which in retrospect reveals that 
we are dealing with the set of social relations which 
govern even the individually undertaken labours of 
commodity production. That is to say, we are dealing 
with the social relations which form the division of 
labour in commodity production, social relations which 
posit seemingly independent individual producers. In so 
far as these relations are mediated through the value 
which appears intrinsic to the commodity when the 
commodity is brought to the market place and the exchange 
of commodities takes place, then value is the social 
component of the commodity. 
I have mentioned that it is rather stretching a point to 
say that a commodity's use-value is inherent in it. 
However, so long as we remain aware that the specific 
relation between a commodity's natural properties and its 
use-value is a product of use, this way of speaking 
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provides a useful contrast with which to address value. 
For looked at in this way, use-value is distinguished 
from value in that it has ontological foundations 
directly in the natural properties of the commodity which 
are quite absent from the social relation of production 
which make that use-value present itself as a commodity. 
The difference is not so much that labour is present in 
value. This is a misleading way of putting the point, as 
we can see from noting that labour is usually present in 
use-values as well. It is that labour is the object of 
the social relation of value, whereas utility is the 
object of use-value. If it is human relations with 
nature that are described by use-value, it is the social 
relations of production which govern those relations 
with nature that are described by value. The distances 
between natural properties, use-value and and the social 
relation of value are opened up by the separation of 
use-value and value. Examination of these distances can, 
as they must, now follow. But any such examination will 
necessarily be inadequate if it does not start from the 
knowledge that what are at issue are the social relations 
of the direction of labour. Moving from positions where 
we (necessarily of course) begin with the phenomenal 
appearance that value is a natural property of 
commodities, we must first show that labour is the 
principle of the social direction of labour in 
capitalism. When accomplished this task becomes the 
preliminary to the explanation of why labour is socially 
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directed through the mystified form of value, which is 
the real crux of the identification of capitalism as 
generalised commodity production, 
I would like to sum up what I have just said about value. 
Value emerges as a mystified principle of the social 
direction of labour, which principle remains to be 
investigated. It is basically only a presumption, then, 
to imagine that value is the directly proportional 
measure of labour. Such a presumption has no relation to 
actually understanding what value is as a given social 
structure. Marx continually urged this point against the 
utopian socialism of especially Proudhon, which sets its 
desired measure of labour against what, because they do 
not conform to this ideal standard, are the defective 
measures of capitalistic value (61). Marx continually 
stresses that what he is dealing with is value as it is 
actually present for empiricial investigation (62), 
dealing with understandings and assessments of value as 
they have become, as a matter of fact, cemented by custom 
(63). Value might be a perfectly irrational measure of 
labour, or it might measure it with complete precision. 
We do not yet know. Though we have to come to some 
opinion about the validity of value's representation of 
labour in order to understand that representation, what 
we must not thereby do is simply give a moralistic 
pronouncement based on that opinion without understanding 
why that representation has actually become socially 
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dominant. However, I must say that Marx continually 
allows some determinations of the relation of value and 
labour which belong to this latter part of the 
investigation to enter into his presentation at far too 
early a stage, giving the erroneous impression that he 
himself conceived of value as some precise measure of 
labour by the use of which he will recalculate 
capitalistic assessments of labour's just economic 
desserts (64) in precisely the way he regarded as 
utopian. 
Bearing the substance of Marx's idea of value in mind, we 
can now see our anomalous cases in another light. Marx 
can, we recall, allow that something may be a product of 
labour but not have a value because it cannot be 
exchanged. This obviously could not be so if he regarded 
value as his own measure of labour, for then an input of 
labour would constitute value irrespective of other 
conditions. But equally obviously Marx can allow this 
denial of value to some labour if we take value as the 
given principle of the social direction of labour under 
generalised commodity production, a principle which is 
quite prepared to negate any amount of labour if that 
labour's product has no use-value which will lead to its 
exchange. This is to say in fact that the labour's 
product has no socially endorsed use-value. It is the 
production of goods not merely for the use of someone 
other than the producer but for exchange understood as 
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this oblique general social direction of individual 
producers that distinguishes commodity production. 
Natural meadows can of course be said to have a use-value 
which is in no way the product of labour. But if we 
regard value as the principle of the social direction of 
labour under commodity production and not as a substance 
composed of labour, then the possibility that the 
utilisation of the use-value of the meadows should come 
under that principle, irrespective of that use-value's 
not initially being a product of labour, clearly emerges 
as one it is important to pursue. For we see that this 
case certainly falls under what we are trying to 
understand; the direction of labour. Natural meadows may 
have an exchange-value because their, as it were, 
original use-value can be ultimately utilised only 
through labour, and that labour is organised through the 
structure of value. Air, by contrast, has not been 
regulated by value or any other form of economic 
organisaton because its utilisation in breathing defies 
the mediation of labour. Or, more specifically with 
regard to capitalism, defies subordination to the 
position where it is utilisable only through such 
mediation, that is to say, being rendered private 
property (65). Air is a gift of nature as much as 
natural meadows, and yet its economic position is 
significantly quite different (66). If it should be 
quibbled that in some special cases air is rendered 
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subject to commodity production, then this quibble, which 
certainly turns on the provision of air through the 
mediation of labour, surely reinforces the belief we have 
reached that with value we are dealing with an 
ontological structure of the social which must be 
distinguished from the given natural, which we must allow 
an effective place in the determination of specific form 
of human relations with nature (67). 
Abstract Labour 
In claiming that when we disregard the use-values of 
commodities only the common property of being the 
products of social labour remains, Marx observes that our 
view of the commodity has radically altered. Its 
sensuous characteristics and the use-value which is based 
upon these are removed; it remains only as a product of 
labour. Having grasped this dual character of the 
commodity itself, we are able to recognise that the 
labour involved in its production must also have a dual 
character, a new side to which character has now also 
emerged. For labour is no longer to us a specific act or 
type of work. If the sensuous characters of commodities 
no longer interest us, then neither do the particular 
types of work - tailoring, spinning, metalwork, etc., - 
which realise those characters as use-values. As opposed 
to these, as it were, concrete labours, what Marx is now 
trying to drive at is the idea of abstract labour (68). 
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If we abstract from the characters of concrete labours, 
we are left with just the simple fact of the expenditure 
of human effort. Marx's argument certainly makes it seem 
that he conceives of arriving at abstract labour through 
some reduction of different labours to a common index of 
biological energy expanded or some such physiological 
quanta. Now, such a reduction from tailoring to amounts 
of energy is impossible, as has often enough been pointed 
out in criticism of the idea of abstract labour (69). 
However, not only does such a reduction speak of the kind 
of materialism which Marx thought mechanical, thereby 
contradicting the way Marx posits conscious intention as 
integral to the labour process, but Marx himself is in 
fact here affirming this impossibility. As there can be 
no reduction of qualitatively different use-values to a 
common denominator, there cannot be such a reduction of 
the labour which produced those use-values. And even were 
such a reduction possible, the resulting physiological 
quanta would remain in the realm of the natural, and we 
know that the common quality of the commodity which we 
seek is social. 
Indeed, the peculiarity of the dual character of labour 
lies in the necessity of concrete labours being 
different, for their products must have different 
use-values in order to exchange (70). We are in fact 
dealing with the social interdependence of specialised 
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individual labours that is the division of labour (which 
is of course a condition of commodity production 
although, as Marx tells us (71), the converse does not 
thereby follow). The abstract side of labour's dual 
character is the mechanism of social or mutual command of 
labours in commodity production; the analogue in 
wage-labour of value in the commodity. 
If commodity exchange is in essence proportionally 
regular, as value is determined by the amount of 
capitalism's resources of productive labour needed to 
realise the use-values of particular commodities, it 
follows that the social side of the dual character of 
labour must equally render labour quantitatively 
calculable. This is the specific quality of abstract 
labour. In it all types of labour and all-degrees of 
skill displayed in labour are reduced to the exercise of 
a general labour capacity or labour power, whose measure 
is duration in time. 
Marx immediately tries to leave no doubt as to what he 
means by abstract labour by saying that if the value of 
. 
he commodity is determined by the quantity of labour 
needed for its production, then it would seem that the 
less able the worker who produced it the more valuable 
would be the commodity, as that commodity would then take 
a longer time to make. This is not so, however, because 
we are dealing with socially necessary labour-time, that 
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is, "the labour-time required to produce any use-value 
under the conditions of production normal for a given 
society and with the average degree of skill and 
intensity of labour prevalent in that society" (72). In 
bourgeois society this average is rigorously enforced. 
The law of commodity production is that anybody whose 
productive activity chronically falls beneath the average 
may not be able, due to competition, to valorise his 
product as a value proportionate to the time he or she 
spent on it. And in developed capitalist production this 
necessity is felt by wage-labourers through factory 
discipline (73) in what Marx called the real subsumption 
of labour to capitalist production (74). By the same 
social token, the degree of productivity in use-value 
terms of this average or simple labour will vary with 
changes in productive resources. Or, put another way, 
what counts as simple labour at one point may well be 
below average after a rise in the general level of 
productivity. 
The dichotomy of concrete and abstract labours is by no 
means an ideal way of describing the social direction of 
labour at which Marx is trying to drive with this 
dichotomy. In this respect a better, and seemingly more 
natural, dualism might well be that of individual and 
social labours (75). But we must be careful not to 
extinguish an important shade of meaning in abstract 
labour, for by this term Marx means not only social 
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labour, common to all modes of production, but the 
specifically capitalist form of social labour. This 
specific form is abstract in the sense of being based on 
a quantitative abstraction from qualitative forms of 
labour, and the confusions this no doubt puts in the way 
of grasping the sociality of labour follows from the 
capitalist form of social labour. If, as I would say is 
the case, the social character of abstract labour emerges 
more clearly in the 1859 Critique because of the direct 
social locutions Marx uses there, this is because in 
Capital's various editions the term becomes increasingly 
intimately bound up with the statement of specifically 
capitalist conditions. (I do not, let me repeat, deny 
that nonetheless Marx's way of presenting his idea is 
unsatisfactory, and I will turn to this in the next 
chapter). 
Though we have arrived at abstract labour as the social 
denominator of individual productive effort which allows 
of their mutual command through exchange, this is not to 
say that we have discovered some easily realisable 
socialist truth of capitalism. Capitalism certainly does 
rest on an essential sociality which it denies, and the 
significance of knowing this is impossible to exaggerate. 
But it does this-by resting on a sociality which denies 
itself. Formulating the labour theory does not socialise 
capitalism, because ultimately the sociality it reveals 
is one which obstructs the conscious grasp of its own 
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existence (76). In abstract labour what is missing is 
precisely the recognition of the fundamental equality of 
all labours, as exercises of human power, which would 
stress their mutually interdependent, social character 
and would allow of their common, conscious, planned 
direction. Such conscious regulation recognises all 
labours as instances of an essential human activity, 
conterminous with human life, mediating human existence 
in nature. Any conceivable conscious economic planning 
requires the recognition of human equality as a minimum 
condition. If it takes one day to build a wall, and two 
days to make a coat, then planning must take note of this 
of course, and such recognition involves some commitment 
to being able to place both labours under the plan. But 
in abstract labour we have the quantitative equalisation 
or equation of labours, which is something quite 
different, a perverted form of equality. We say that a 
coat is worth twice as much as a wall. But this is 
absurd. It is in itself meaningless and really 
comprehensible only through a distanced commentary. Such 
expressions are, however, the only bourgeois way of 
grasping the social equality of labours. 
This may seem a nice point; but rather it is of the very 
greatest importance. The difference of worth and planned 
allocation of labour emerges most clearly when we 
consider that plans could embrace criteria of production 
- say organisation of labour to maximise enjoyment of 
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that labour or to minimise environmental damage - which 
are externalities when judged by their worth. And here 
we come to what is peculiarly capitalist about abstract 
labour as a specific form of social labour. Abstract 
labour is the abstraction of concrete labours down to a 
unit expenditure of effort. It may be retorted that 
there is no way of doing this, and indeed there is no 
defensible way. But it is, as Marx says, an abstraction 
that is performed every day in capitalist society (77). 
It is a suppression of the concrete individualities of 
labours and skills in performing labours (78) in order to 
make them available to a production that is interested in 
their contributions to quantitative value only (79), the 
measure of that quantity being time (80). With the 
commodity being assessed in this way, so is the labour 
which makes it up. Abstract labour is not labour shown 
to be mutually social, but rather labour reduced to 
quantitative units. Value is the necessary quantitative 
measure of the proportional exchange that is the social 
bond of bourgeois society. Labour which constitutes 
value can be socially relevant for production only in so 
far as it can be reduced to quantitative value 
components. This reduction is a real process 
conterminous with capitalist production, though of 
differing significance at different periods of 
capitalism's development. It is a process often called 
de-skilling, a name which captures the abstraction in 
abstract labour most neatly (81). This abstraction is at 
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the root of the instrumentality of working class 
attitudes to labour (82). As such', abstract labour is a 
very substantial political-economic fleshing out of 
Marx's early characterisation of capitalist wage-labour 
as an alienation of the quintessential human activity of 
conscious, productive work (83). 
If we have found labour to be the content of value, we 
must be clear that it is not the labour of individuals 
who overtly unite their efforts but abstract labour that 
leads to value; the labour which is given as wage-labour. 
In uncovering abstract labour, we uncover the ground of 
value. It is not a form of labour which makes clear the 
social ground of the individual giving of labour, but 
rather socially unites individual labours in a mystified 
way, by reducing them one-sidedly to their duration in 
time (84). This reduction is to the quantitative, 
mechanical side of labour, and this militates against the 
development of other sides. Paradoxically, then, 
abstract labour's suppression of its social dimension has 
the direct result of extinguishing individual 
satisfaction in the giving of labour. 
Value and Its Expression in Exchange-value in the 
Criticism of Fetishism 
So far my account of the first chapter of Capital has 
basically moved from the immediately available 
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characteristics of the commodity to the labour theory of 
value, following I trust the development of Marx's own 
argument in the first two sections of the chapter. A 
quite crucial element of this argument is that Marx 
intends it to refute what he identifies as the 
fetishistic ideology through which the commodity's 
characteristics are normally understood. Let us now turn 
to this part of his case. 
The Value-form 
Marx sets out from the simple, isolated or accidental 
form of value (85), in which the single statement x 
commodity A is worth y commodity B describes the 
principle of the exchange of two goods. What we have 
here is a description of the historically earliest and 
thereby equally the most intrinsically simple form of 
exchange, in which isolated acts of exchange take place 
in a context of basically non-exchange (though with 
various sizes of subsistence unit) economies (86). These 
exchanges will be almost accidental initially, but with 
increasing volume of exchange a proportional regulation 
develops in custom which cuts against this accidental 
quality and begins to develop all the essential 
characteristics of value. For the proportions are, with 
development of the volume of exchange and of competition, 
fixed not by traditional assessments of merit in the work 
or its just price but by evaluations of necessary 
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labour-time established through what, in increasingly a 
context of competitive selling, the commodity will 
realise in exchange (87). 
The simple form automatically passes into a distinct form 
with expansion of the volume of exchange. This is the 
total or expanded form (88), in which a whole series of 
goods find. commodity expression in equivalents of each 
other. Thus x commodity A is worth y commodity B, z 
commodity C, etc. Instead of being brought into relation 
with one commodity in an isolated act of exchange, each 
commodity is known to be in proportional relation to a 
large number of others, these relative valuations being 
established through a large volume of exchange. The 
possibility of this attests, as we have seen, to the real 
existence of some denominator of the social exchange of 
these naturally distinct goods, and with the existence of 
the expanded form of value we have reached the position 
where value is the medium of a large amount of economic 
activity. The bringing of commodities to market -in 
enough volume to form this expanded idea of a good's 
worth testifies to value's supplanting traditional 
organisations of labour (89). 
This expanded form clearly does not meet the requirements 
of generalised exchange, and it has itself passed into a 
further form with the development of this level of 
exchange, the general form (90). In the expanded form, 
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no commodity can really be said totiave a clear, definite 
exchange-value, for that value is given in a virtually 
infinite and ever-changing set of relative expressions. 
General exchange on this basis is impossible, -for the 
form speaks of production that is still linked to 
specific acts of barter, though increasingly barter 
conducted according to calculations of value, and not to 
the mere possibility of exchange as such, to exchange 
with anything. In the general form, one commodity is 
singled out as the general equivalent, and all other 
commodities have a quantitative value relative to the 
general equivalent. From the point of view of social 
relations of production, any commodity could of course 
stand as this general equivalent. In pre-capitalist 
modes of production, the development of a large volume of 
exchange may lead to the singling out of the commodity in 
most general demand as the general equivalent. Here 
again we see that it is basically the resolution of the 
demands of barter with a. developipg volume of exchange 
that orders the development. Another form of development 
from the general form is possible, however, the 
money-form (91), and this form is essential for (though 
not of course unique to) capitalism. For in the money 
form, it is not the common utility of the general 
equivalent commodity that is its most important property. 
It is rather, we might say, its lack of direct utility 
(92). For the commodity functions as the repository of 
exchangeability as such. It is set apart from all other 
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commodities by virtue of being the general equivalent. 
It is the mark of the well developed possibility of 
exchange, for possession of money does not itself afford 
any utility (or very little) to the owner. Rather, 
through possession of money the owner has a special 
command on all other commodities. The money form can be 
distinguished from the general form as such because of 
the clear representation in the former of exchangeability 
as such in a well developed commodity economy. The 
precious metals have conquered the position of money in 
bourgeois societies, and amongst the reasons why this is 
so are their ability, because they are so difficult to 
come by, to encompass a great social value in relatively 
little bulk; their ability as metals to be divided into 
precise quantitative units by weight; and their ability 
to be made into a form which will facilitate circulation 
(93). 
The most important thing to understand about Marx's 
discussion of the value-form is the great distance he 
means to travel in moving from value to price. We can 
see from the Grundrisse that he arrived at his most 
sophisticated views on the fetishistic character of money 
in a critical dialogue with what he thought were utopian 
attempts to make money directly represent labour-time 
(94), as part of what we have already discussed as his 
general attitude to Proudhonism. The large time spent on 
this in the Grundrisse is written up only briefly in the 
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1859 Critique (95) and appears merely as footnotes in 
Capital (96). The fruits of this contraction are that 
the heart of the issue of the difference between price 
and value is available in very brief form in Capital. 
Why money does not directly represent labour-time, Marx 
says in the last of his footnotes on the point, "comes 
down simply to the question why, on the basis of 
commodity production, the products of labour must take 
the form of commodities". For money, or any medium of 
circulation, to directly represent labour-time, labour 
itself must be undertaken through a general social plan. 
In such a plan, a certain amount of labour-time might 
well be directly credited to whoever performed it by its 
meriting a certain amount of medium of circulation. For 
the labour is socially credited as deserving the reward 
of that amount of the medium before the labour is carried 
out. Such social recognition is precisely what is absent 
from commodity production, and money is a development of 
commodity production. As we have seen, labour in 
commodity production is invested in a commodity for sale, 
and that labour is socially credited only through the 
sale of the commodity. It is not the labour which is the 
subject of sale, it is the commodity. We know that the 
very possibility of proportional exchange involves 
recognition of labour-time, and that it is the social 
bringing together of individual labours invested in 
commodities that is the real issue in an economy of 
general division of labour and commodity production. 
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Nevertheless, these social relations are established only 
through the exchange of commodities. It is commodity 
exchange that is the object of this exercise, not the 
direct representation of labour-time. 
It follows from this that there is the possibility of 
quantitative divergence between value and price bound up 
in the very existence of a developed money form (97). Of 
course, a commodity may not be bought because it has no 
use-value, and therefore the labour in it is not socially 
rewarded at all, but let us leave this aside and consider 
the following. Two people produce the same desired 
use-value. It may take the first one day and the second 
two. If price directly measured exchange-value, the 
latter product would exchange for twice the former 
product. But of course such an exchange is not what 
would take place. The former person would be able to 
sell his or her product and expand his or her production 
if he or she so wished., whilst the latter typically would 
be unable to sell his or her product at all. It may be 
thought that price is therefore an imperfect measuring 
device. But rather we should not regard the equitable 
planning, measure and reward of labour as leading to the 
development of money price, but rather see the exchange 
of commodities as the peculiar basi$of general money. 
When the issue is the buying and selling of commodities, 
and when the production of commodities will be open to 
continuous competition in methods, money's' diversions 
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from value are an absolute necessity. In capitalism, 
competition will constantly alter the rewards for 
different labours according to the changing of the 
socially necessary conditions of production that is 
endemic to the search for surplus value. Indeed, Marx 
thought that competition between capitals for commodity 
sales realising the highest possible profit would always, 
as it were, redistribute surplus value. Because greater 
amounts of capital would be attracted to areas of higher 
surplus value, commodities would more or less never sell 
at their value under capitalism but at a production price 
set by the effect of supply and demand on the profit of 
different branches of production (98). 
To regard Marx's labour theory of value as a direct 
quantitative account of price is, then, a mistake. Not 
only is money fetishistic in that it allows of the 
understanding of social relations only through a 
mystifying material form, making all commodities and 
especially money itself seem to have an intrinsic natural 
value, but also money is necessarily not a direct 
quantitative measure of labour-time, giving a real 
distance between price and value. The foremost results 
of social scientific analysis of the capitalist mode of 
production reveals the recognition of value, however, 
both to qualitatively describe the real social structure 
of that production, and then quantitatively to orient the 
account of price to an influential starting point which 
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we can consider supply and demand as modifying (99). Of 
course the political economy of capitalism must be able 
to explain price, and perhaps even, given enough boundary 
data, specific prices (100). However, the ability to 
calculate price in itself, without extension backwards 
into the understanding of the specific relations of 
production, can make virtually no contribution to 
political economy (101). With such extension, the 
thereby modified calculations can obviously be of the 
greatest service in rendering a complete account of the 
capitalist mode of production (102). 
We can mention one further point at which a distance 
between value and price can be seen. Money is a command 
of social labour through its ability to be exchanged for 
all other commodities. It takes this position through a 
process which is predicated upon value. Once having 
gained the social pre-eminence of being the general 
equivalent (103), however, money can of course be used to 
buy things which do not have a value, and, to put this 
the other way around, things which do not have a value 
can have a price. For those who sell the thing without a 
value will thereby gain a command over almost all other 
products through possession of money. What is involved 
here is merely the impinging on other social relations of 
the economic relation at the heart of the capitalist 
production. 
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The rent or purchase of land from land owners whose 
private property in that land is of pre-capitalist origin 
is the most economically, in the narrow sense, important 
such case. The very structure of Marx's explanation of 
rent shows his overall conception of value most clearly. 
He makes it explicit that he is investigating the 
particular capitalist influences upon the rent paid to 
non-capitalists, and not any other form of land charges 
(though some extension into other forms are, and could 
further, I think, be made) (104). Marx certainly 
believed that the explanation of this rent required the 
labour theory of value. He accounted for it as being 
paid out of the super profits available to investment in 
agriculture due to the typically relatively low organic 
composition of agricultural capital. The volume of rent 
is clearly delimited by the size of the deduction from 
super profits which is possible before agricultural 
profit to the capitalist declines below that which would 
be available from industrial investment (105). Such an 
account of the source of rent obviously does require the 
labour theory, and as such is to describe the 
incorporation of pre-capitalist land-holding into the 
developing value economy. 
Perhaps a more generally socially significant social 
consequence of the dominance of money over other than 
value relations is the possibility of purchasing human 
qualities, such as conscience, honour, etc. These might 
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even come to have a fixed price through custom. With 
this observation, we have returned to a central theme of 
Marx's early works - the universal venality of money. 
This is now an ethical condemnation backed by an 
unparalleled understanding of the capitalist economy that 
makes this venality not only possible but to be expected. 
If, under planning, some unit of circulation was provided 
which was directly representative of judgments of 
labour-time, in its inability to ground these 
consequences of money in other than terms which would 
overtly condemn the planning authority, this unit would 
be money only by the most forced stretching of the term 
(106). 
The fundamental conclusion of Marx's analysis of the 
commodity is that capitalist production engenders a 
pervasive social alienation represented in the ideology 
of fetishism. The reworking of Hegelian themes within a 
new context is, I submit, quite clear, and may stand by 
itself as it emerged in the foregoing discussion. We 
must now consider, however, how Marx sets about 




MARX AND MARGINALISE AS THE SUCCESSORS OF CLASSICAL 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Introduction 
Having followed Marx's account of fetishism, I want in 
this chapter to ask upon what basis. he claimed to 
penetrate this necessary concomitant of capitalist 
production. If we can regard Marx as having to re-work 
Hegel's idea of alienation in order to use it in his 
political economy of capitalism, we can now see that on 
this fundamental point he must rather more radically 
depart from Hegel. For the truth which Hegel drew upon 
to penetrate the alienation of Spirit-is, I have argued, 
and Marx certainly believed, indefensibly grounded. If 
Marx is to succeed in making his account of modern 
alienation plausible, he must furnish it with a much 
firmer ground. I want to look at whether we can regard 
him as having done so. 
The most obvious, but nevertheless the best, way to do 
this is to explore the ways in which Capital's arguments 
for the labour theory actually work as a critique of 
classical political economy. This critique, as we have 
seen, is Marx's dialogue with the body of bourgeois 
thought through which he developed - having to start with 
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this thought but hoping to change it - his socialist 
account of the capitalist mode of production. 
I shall also examine, in what I hope will be an 
illuminating comparisons the ways in which the classicals 
have been represented in the subsequent rejection of the 
labour theory in neo-classical marginalist economics. 
Marx and the Formulation of the Labour Theory in 
Classical Political Economy 
There is a difficult manoeuvre at the heart of Marx's 
critique of classical political economy which I want 
carefully to describe. This manoeuvre involves, firstly, 
separating out the historically specific elements from 
the general elements of capitalist production, and 
showing how bourgeois political economy commits serious 
mistakes in failing to do this. Secondly, just as 
importantly but far less widely recognised, Marx has to 
show how the scientific resources for his critique of 
political economy are generated by capitalist conditions. 
For scientific illumination as well as ideological 
fetishism can both only spring from the given social 
life. 
Let us consider the first part of this manoeuvre by 
examining in detail one of Marx's criticisms of Ricardo. 
I have in mind that place in On Protection to Agriculture 
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in which Ricardo contrasts the economics which will hold 
"as long as society is constituted as it now is" to that 
which might apply to "Mr. Owen's parallelograms" (1). 
Marx regarded this passage as testimony to the poverty of 
Ricardo's imagination of society other than as presently 
constituted. Indeed, when Ricardo, himself, with 
reference to Smith's "early and rude state of society" in 
mind, illustrates his analysis of the magnitude of value 
by descriptions of the economic conduct of primitive 
hunters and fishermen (2), one finds, as Marx says in the 
1859 Critique (3), that these primitives calculate the 
value of their tools and labours as if "in accordance 
with the annuity tables in use on the London Stock 
Exchange in 1817". Other than Owen's parallelograms, 
Marx concludes, bourgeois society is the only society 
Ricardo seems to have been able to countenance. That 
Ricardo could not even conceive of non-capitalist forms 
of economic calculation and organisation has the direct 
consequence that in his political economy the form of 
value is nowhere examined. Value is regarded as the 
principle of economic life, and therefore neither 
requiring nor indeed permitting social investigation (4). 
Even Ricardo, Marx says in Capital recalling this passage 
of the 1859 Critique, has his Robinson Crusoe stories 
(5). 
All this is, of course, very familiar. However, the 
status of Marx's opinion of Ricardo's idea of value 
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contains, I submit, a number of more complex shades. 
There is, to begin with this, the way in which Marx 
insists on the quantitative power of Ricardo's analysis. 
In the footnote of Capital just quoted, Marx says "even 
Ricardo" because it was of course his opinion that though 
the explanatory power of Ricardo's writings is bounded by 
the limitations of historical imagination that identify 
bourgeois political economy, those writings were the 
highest achievement of that body of thought. Ricardo's 
work was the culmination of the productive lines of 
classical political economy because of both - related 
points - its firm commitment to labour as the content 
of value and the quality of its analysis of the 
magnitude of value (6). Of course, Marx had to recognise 
the inadequacies of Ricardo's analysis. In the period 
between Ricardo's death and the writing of the Paris 
manuscripts exposure of these inadequacies had, as I have 
mentioned, almost buried the basic labour theory (8). 
That Marx himself moved from an initial rejection of the 
labour theory to his eventual characterisation of the 
disintegration of the Ricardian school as a large 
regressive step into vulgar economics (9) was possible 
only because he spent an enormous - but unfinished - 
effort on completing Ricardo's reconciliation of the 
influence on price of differing organic compositions of 
capital and of competition with the labour theory (10). 
Now, we can hardly say that these considerations on price 
are external to the labour theory as they are crucial to 
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the determination of cost price (11) and, therefore, to 
the adequacy to the theory as such. However, I would say 
that Marx added nothing to Ricardo's determination of the 
magnitude of value itself, value rather than price. 
Marx mentions Ricardo's Robinsonade because, as political 
economists are so fond of these stories, he wants to give 
one of them himself (12). We are shown Marx's Robinson 
organising his economic life in a way which is intended 
to make clear the basic labour theory of value, even to 
the least penetrating economist. As anyone who compares 
the relevant pages of Capital and of The Principles will 
see, there is no difference in method between the 
calculations of Ricardo's primitives and Marx's Robinson. 
The basic assessments of value according to, in a phrase, 
the rarity of the use-value and therefore the amount of 
labour needed to actualise it in so far as possible the 
desired quantities, or in a word, scarcity, remain the 
same. What I believe Marx thought he was doing here was 
simply taking over the evaluations of the expenditure of 
labour, the various forms reduced to a common 
denominator, which he found in the tradition which he 
identified as classical political economy, certainly as 
he considered it to culminate in Ricardo (13). At least 
with respect to Ricardo, we can understand this taking 
over quite literally. Marx merely on occasion repeats 
some of the basic evaluations for his own purposes (14). 
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One should stress the obvious, direct intellectual debt 
here. Marx thought that in classical political economy, 
in its examination of the determination of the values of 
different durations and intensities of labour for example 
(15), there were the most refined reflective 
contributions to the fixing of values through competitive 
commodity production that was of the essence of the 
development of capitalist relations of production. All 
the principal works of at least English classical 
political economy display something of the essentially 
pragmatic tone which emerges so clearly from The Wealth 
of Nations. ons : Even Ricardo's Principles was written up 
from a polemic against the corn laws, and this shows 
throughout the book. In the directness of his borrowings 
in respect of the labour theory of value from, as he knew 
well enough (16), cynically bourgeois works, we can see 
that Marx learned the principles of his political economy 
in a most important sense from capitalism. 
Capitalism, then, provides an historically unique 
resource for understanding. But in adequately grasping 
that resource as, precisely, historically unique, it is 
implied that one moves from using the resource only 
quantitatively to using it qualitatively. In Capital, 
Marx comments on Aristotle's inability to develop a 
theory of value. Though Marx himself draws upon an 
insistence to be found in Aristotle that exchange 
requires equalisation of the goods to be exchanged (this 
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is discussed in Appendix 17), he moves on to giving an 
explanation of why Aristotle was himself unable to 
explain this equalisation. Marx's argument is 
essentially this (17): the key to the solution of the 
commensurability of different use-values lies in their 
being common expenditures of human labour and therefore 
subject to social equalisation (whether in value or in 
other ways). However, the slave labour of ancient 
society involved an ideology of the essential inequality 
of people and their labours which prevented such a 
theoretical insight. It is only, Marx says, after the 
event of the social equalisation of labour powers that 
the theoretical comprehension of the content of value is 
possible, a resource obviously denied to Artistotle. Of 
course Aristotle could not explain value as an 
overarching social structure when it did not exist (or 
perhaps, though I doubt whether it is correct to say 
this, when it existed only in vestigial form). More than 
this, however, Marx is trying to refer to a facility for 
the understanding of general production provided by 
value, or more precisely by abstract labour. Classical, 
political economy expresses the quantitative elements of 
value quite clearly in its labour theory. However, on 
this basis, because it is possible to clearly set out the 
quantitative side, it must also be possible to develop 
the qualitative side of value. The former may be 
accomplished only when the latter is possible, for the 
carrying out of the latter - even without full 
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consciousness of what one is doing (18) - is a condition 
of the former. It must be possible to equalise labours 
in order to quantitatively assess them. The assessment 
can, then, be pushed on to explication of the 
equalisation. 
Production for exchange-value accumulation is 
fetishistic, but in subjecting nature and all traditional 
practices to the demands of even a fetishised expansion 
of productive powers, capitalism makes essential human 
material intercourse its object (19). By disruption of 
all traditional impediments to the most 
technical-rational disposition of productive forces (20), 
that is to say, human labour-power, capitalism constructs 
for the first time the potential for social 
self-consciousness of the organisation of that 
intercourse. Co-operation is itself the fundamental 
productive resource (21). A mode of production whose 
historically unprecedented social spirit is the judgment 
of all human effort in terms of its production of value, 
and which is prepared to direct and redirect that effort 
according to those terms, lays the foundation of the 
comprehension, that not only is labour the substance of 
value, but that the fundamental issue of economic life is 
the social organisation of labour. 
In recognising this potential for understanding, we must 
immediately add, as is immediately added by capitalism 
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itself, the limitations on this potential. It remains a 
long way from seeing labour as the content of value to 
actually grasping what value is in its historical 
specifics. It makes all the difference in the world that 
Marx's Robinson, who is unique amongst the pantheon of 
heroes of such economic fables in that he emphasises 
rather than extinguishes the period features of Defoe's 
character (22), could at least plausibly and without 
anachronism conceive of calculating according to annuity 
tables. What is really at issue here is Marx's 
insistence on clearly situating bourgeois knowledge with 
reference to its past, present and future. We have seen 
how describing value in terms of the bourgeois present, 
which is its ground, is central to Marx's criticism of 
fetishism, and from this position we can set about 
relating value to the past and the future without 
committing anachronistic category mistakes. 
With respect to the future, there are of course 
fetishitic influences just as intrinsic to capitalism as 
are enlightening ones, and one crucial strand of Marx's 
conception of socialism is altering the balance between 
these. That the possibility of enlightenment be bound up 
in capitalism is essential to Marx for two reasons. One, 
obviously, is that without this possibility socialist 
aspirations would be utopian (23), for those aspirations 
would have no ground in the present, which is of course 
the only possible resource for their development. This 
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point, I think, can, be stated more strongly. The very 
possibility of conceiving of socialism can arise only 
when the conditions for that effort of imagination are 
present. Socialism, in other words, must be a task 
mankind can solve from the position of the bourgeois 
world as a condition of the formulation of the project of 
socialism. This is to put the point rather too 
dogmatically. Marx must continually show by the adequacy 
of his socialist account of capitalism that socialism is 
on mankind's agenda, or his notion of socialism fallsinto 
utopianism. On the other hand, however, the adequacy of 
that account will tend to justify the socialist goal. 
Socialism is depicted as the realisation of capitalism's 
potential for social self-consciousness against the 
restrictions on this realisation equally bound upint s 
mode of production, a depiction made perhaps most clear 
in Marx's insistence upon realising the liberatory 
potentials of large-scale industry against its appalling 
capitalist consequences which he did so much to document 
(24). 
All epochs are distinguished by their historical 
features, features irreducible beyond a social to a 
directly natural ontology. What is absolutely unique 
about capitalism is that it creates the potentials for 
the socially self-conscious recognition of this, the 
promise bound up in its being the end of mankind's 
prehistory. The unique feature of socialism is to be its 
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actualisation of capitalism's promise of general 
self-consciousness of social self-determination. This 
future potential can also be used to illuminate the past. 
Once we have grasped the limits of bourgeois knowledge 
and have thereby broken its typically ahistorical 
perspective, that knowledge can be applied to earlier 
societies. 
For clearly the uncovering of the social organisation of 
labour is, if it is truly the key to understanding 
economic life, going to prove most informative about 
earlier epochs. Marx's opinion, it is quite clear, was 
that a reflexive application of bourgeois knowledge to 
earlier societies allows us a clearer comprehension than 
was available to those who lived in them (25). With the 
advantage of hindsight and a distance from the prevalent 
ideologies of modes of production alienated from 
consciousness of social organisation, Marx envisages a 
privileged dialogue with the past. Of course, some 
problems of hermeneutic understanding remain; but I think 
we can allow this and yet still recognise the privilege 
of reflexive re-comprehension at which Marx is trying to 
drive. 
Marx's main concern in setting out this re-comprehension 
is to distance it from the platitudes which result unless 
the historical character of bourgeois knowledge is kept 
in view; even when, and this is the vital point, that 
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knowledge is of general elements of production. If the 
understanding of value leads to the recognition of the 
social organisation of production that is a general 
element of production, this is not to say that in all 
epochs this organisation takes the form of value (26). 
In my opinion this is the heart of the difficulties 
surrounding Marx's treatment of value. 
Let us look at an example of this application of 
bourgeois knowledge to the past in detail; the use of the 
distinction of productive and unproductive labour in 
Smith (27) in this way by Marx. There is no doubt that 
Marx drew on this distinction in reaching his conclusion 
about the general requirement of a degree (itself 
historically variable) of necessary labour in all modes 
of production, above which surplus labour time might be 
available for various purposes (28). But he equally 
recognised that the narrow idea of productive as opposed 
to unproductive labour itself has an intrinsically and 
ineradicably bourgeois meaning. What was in question in 
this dichotomy was not the production of use-values but 
the production of surplus value (29). Now, productive 
and unproductive labour is that form of the distinction 
of necessary and surplus labour time which Marx is able 
to use to gain knowledge of the general distinction, but 
it is not the general distinction itself. It has 
specific characteristics and Marx, indeed, argues that it 
is a contradictory expression of the general distinction. 
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Accordingly, Marx heaps scorn upon the bourgeois conceit 
of the likes of Senior who took exception to the 
distasteful consequences of Smith's admittedly cynical 
evaluations of productive and unproductive labour. 
Against the cynicism of judging everything from the 
bourgeois standpoint of the production of surplus value 
it is spurious of Senior to argue that even the lawgiver 
of the Hebrews . would 
be an unproductive labourer 
according to Smith (30). Senior is certainly more 
arrogantly bourgeois than Smith, for he wishes to hold on 
to bourgeois judgments and to extinquish the bourgeois 
limits of their applicability which permeate every word 
of Smith's economic and social studies. As Marx 
observes, Senior would hardly get the grateful response 
he expects were he able to acquaint Moses with the honour 
of being a labourer, even a productive one (31). 
Equally the idea that productive labour should receive in 
full its product under socialism makes the provision of 
social services in that society impossible (32). We 
might add that it makes very difficult to see how 
socialist justice can begin to be extended to women. 
This idea that productive labour should receive its 
product is a socialist conclusion which, as with the 
comparable bourgeois ones, follows from the plethora of 
category mistakes in the use of historically specific 
terms. That labour is productive of surplus value is by 
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no means directly connected to the ethical character of 
the labour and judging the latter by the former is 
unacceptable (33). A great deal of rather worthless 
casuistry intended to make plausible Marx's seemingly 
arbitrary distinction between the moral worth of various 
employments could have been saved if this arbitrariness 
had been recognised not as his but as capitalism's (34). 
And really, that Marx strains to distinguish ways in 
which the exclusive pursuit of surplus value can 
contradict optimum use-value productions should alert us 
to his true position. 
I would like to make a general statement of what I 
understand Marx's position an the use of bourgeois 
knowledge to understand earlier modes of production to 
be. The key point is that value is a unique form of the 
social organisation of labour, one that marks the end of 
the pre-history of mankind, in that it offers the 
possibility of social self-consciousness of that 
organisation. The question might well then be to 
investigate that organisation in earler epochs. It is, 
however, at best pointless to attempt to work out value 
calculations for the economic conduct of those epochs. 
This is not because value is itself still a 
mys - tcc tory form of economic organsation. Even 
planning cannot be retrospectively applied. These forms 
of economic principle are simply irrelevant to those 
pre-capitalist epochs, though they indicate the existence 
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of some economic principle in them. Attempts to impose 
value on those epochs because value is thought the only 
comprehensible principle of economic organisation has the 
immediate effect of making the economies of those epochs 
incomprehensible because the first thing that emerges 
about them is that they were irrational. It is this 
issue in historical understanding that informs Marx's 
insistence upon the inner rationality of mercantilism (at 
a time of burgeoning trade and merchant capital but of 
limited, pre-industrial production of wealth) against the 
scornful dismissals of it in bourgeois political economy 
ultimately pointing to free trade (35). We might add 
that the regarding of pre-capitalist economics as 
irrational is a necessary consequence of the application 
of more or less value criteria to them in the foremost 
sociological underpinning of neo-classical marginalism - 
the later writings of Max Weber (36). The very 
universality claimed for the categories of marginalist 
understanding (37) implies explanatory sterility. 
In all, then, in moving from the grasp of labour as the 
quantitative content of value, which I would say he 
thought he inherited in its fundamentals in a more or 
less adequate form, to regarding value as the 
capitalistic form of the social organisation of labour, 
Marx makes an enormous step. This step involves 
important enough refinements of the qualitative 
connotations of even the key concepts of classical 
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political economy. The making clear of the two-fold 
character of wage-labour was, for example, a development 
of an idea traceable to at least Steuart (38). But Marx 
is able to insist upon a substantial originality in his 
own relatively clear, because informed by a comprehension 
of the distinction of general use-value and specific 
exchange-value productions denied to classical political 
economy (39), formulations of this two-fold character 
(40). 
What Marx fundamentally draws from value is, I would say, 
this. Basic calculations of utility, scarcity, demand, 
supply, etc. - however one wants to put it - are made in 
any mode of production. Marx describes this as general 
use-value production, metabolism with nature, etc., and I 
would say his terms are less likely to carry unwanted 
historically specific connotations. But the point 
remains that the same subject is to be found in Marx as 
marginalist thought now makes the whole business of 
economics. This subject is the general production of 
use-values in those material relations. with nature that 
are conterminous with human existence (41). But what is 
valuable to say about those relations for historical 
purposes is, in the first instance, very limited. For 
people enter into those relations only, Marx argues 
centrally to the formulation of his guiding thread, 
within a further set of social relations, and this 
further set of relations exercises a determination on the 
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form of production which is irreducible to any initial 
set of basically naturally given conditions of human 
life. Hence there is no point in directly applying one 
specific form of calculation to all epochs. The distance 
between even utility in a mode of production which 
subjugates all of nature to the fetishised pursuit of the 
seeming intrinsic profitability of things and the 
analogical considerations of utility in all modes of 
production is vast - for one thing it is the proper 
subject of the whole of political economy. The first 
task preparatory to studying these relations with nature 
as socially modified is to distinguish general and 
specific elements of production. The labour theory of 
value is not so much a quantification of value in amounts 
of labour as recognition of the social ontology of a mode 
of production in which such quantification is made the 
essence of the age (42). 
Confusion arises, let me repeat, because we have to 
understand a general characteristic of human life through 
the particular specific form in which the general is made 
a subject open to clear understanding. Marx tries to 
both make clear the specific location of value, in the 
capitalist mode of production, and also, as part of 
identifying what is historically unique about value, show 
that value has furnished the opportunity of 
self-consciously understanding the social organisation 
that is a general element of production. Given all of 
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this one can understand the difficult, oblique fashion in 
which Marx goes about identifying value as a mode of the 
organisation of labour. The crux of this understanding 
turns on relating his seeming concern with quantitative 
reduction to its intellectual background in the 
bourgeois computation of the magnitude of value. It 
would appear that despite his efforts to make clear what 
we now have as volume one, chapter one, Marx never 
succeeded in properly distancing his own social analysis 
from the historically naive magnitude of value analyses 
from which it was developed. It is significant that the 
most directly clear statements of Marx's own positions 
are to be found at points in the Grundrisse, 1859 
Critique and Wages, Price and Profit. In fully working 
through his position, to some degree in the Critique but 
especially in the second edition of Capital, Marx was 
unable to secure a proper position in which his, as it 
were, first person statements of what goes on in the 
capitalist mode of production would be understood as 
historically specific. When Ricardo writes: "If a 
commodity were in no way useful ... it would be destitute 
of exchange-value... " and Marx puts: "If the thing is 
useless, so is the labour contained in it... " (43), the 
historical contextualisation through which Marx intends 
to give full sense to Ricardo's descriptions does not 
emerge, and Marx slips into locutions derived from what 
he himself insists was only magnitude analysis. 
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In this circumstance, the very radicalness of Marx's 
critique of the value-form is, in my opinion, all that is 
needed to push the first part of Capital into an 
incomprehensibility that yields only to a most determined 
interpretive effort. To focus, as a final example, on 
abstract labour. What Marx means to say is that the 
general equalisation of all labour-powers allows 
penetration of the mutual sociality of the organisation 
of labour that is general economic life. This insight 
into the fundamental equality of all human effort is 
gained from a mode of production in which all labours are 
quantitatively equated. But in the form of quantitative 
equation, the penetrative resources are limited. This is 
so because, amongst other reasons, this form of 
equalisation is itself absurd. To repeat a point already 
made, from the perspective of conceivable economic 
planning it is one thing to say that a particular 
use-value takes so long to produce and that that act of 
production requires a certain prior investment of effort 
in order to secure the requisite materials, tools and 
productive skills. It is quite another to say, at the 
furthest limits of bourgeois comprehension, that a 
commodity has a price related to so much labour expended 
in its production. If the first is the rational 
comprehension of economic activity manifest in its 
consciously planned organisation, the latter is a 
mystification so absurd as to be literally meaningless. 
It takes a distanced commentary to understand the in 
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itself senseless equation of labour with quantities of 
money. The way in which Marx's own presentation is 
dominated by forms of thought which effect the very 
transformation of quality into quantity which he wants to 
criticise is one of the elements that has quite blunted 
the general comprehension of his work. 
We must, then, register some shortcomings when evaluating 
Marx's immanent critique of classical political economy. 
From a dialogue with this body of thought Marx hopes to 
generate a socialist account of the character of 
capitalism. The possibility of doing so is in a very 
important sense the crucial test of his socialist 
understanding. Without having yet turned to the way in 
which Marx conceived of the mechanisms of socialism's 
determinate negation of capitalism, we can see that there 
are weaknesses in his attempt to generate socialism as 
the truth of capitalism. 
Nevertheless, these weaknesses are not, in my opinion, 
essentially destructive of Marx's project - indeed I 
would say they are of a character which speaks of an 
essential strength. If my remarks on Marx's critique of 
classical political economy are allowed, it emerges that 
this critique's shortcomings are bound up in the way it 
fails to gain sufficient distance from the forms of 
expression of bourgeois thought. However, this does mean 
that it has a ground in that thought and is not a 
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speculative construction&on. 4Ii, its 
an unjustified, and therefore 
point of view presumptive, posit 
I would characterise Capital, as 
inadequately developed critique 
and bourgeois thought. 
objects of critique, 64ude. ý 
from an epistemological 
ion. This is in fact how 
an essentially sound but 
of capitalist conditions 
Let us make no mistake, the inadequacies to which I refer 
are of great significance, as we shall see when we turn 
to Marx's account of the development of socialism. 
However, these are, if I may put it this way, forward 
looking shortcomings not backward looking ones. By this 
I mean that whatever weaknesses we may find in Marx's 
prognoses for socialist development, at least his 
position, in which socialism is placed upon the human 
agenda, has its ground. By comparison, Hegel is able to 
claim a substantially complete evolutionary scheme for 
Spirit, in which all philosophies are fully evaluated for 
their truth, but can do so only on grounds which rest 
their completeness on a dogmatism. The issue really is 
that whereas Hegel feels able to privilege himself to 
comment on a completed movement of Spirit, Marx must 
claim a depth of knowedge open in principle to us all, 
even {o&Lc. bourgeois thought he criticises, because ý%e :s 
describing a movement in process of which we are all 
(still, we must say) part. The latter claim is, I 
believe, in principle, more defensible. 
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We must hold it open, of course, whether MarA specific 
claim is sound. Applying Hegel's idea of reflexive 
proof, only the adequacy of Marx's account of capitalism 
and of bourgeois economic thought can justify his 
socialist understanding. Preparatory to turning to this 
question in the next part of this work, I want to argue 
in the rest of this chapter that Marx's critique can gain 
strength from its ability to inform us of the character 
of bourgeois economic thought. I will say something more 
about Smith and Ricardo, but I also want 
anachronistically to show how Marx's thought is able to 
embrace even marginalist developments in economics. 
Maroinalism and the Interpretation of Smith 
If my account of Marx's relation to classical political 
economy's fundamental treatments of value is correct, 
then this only underlines the most obvious lesson of the 
history of economic thought after the publication of 
volume one of Capital: that Marx relies far too heavily 
on his opinion that Ricardo especially had essentially 
won the basic positions of the labour theory of value. 
We have, as I have mentioned, only sketchy comments - all 
more or less contemptuous - by Marx on the origins of 
marginalism in German national economy. But when the 
initial dissemination of Capital's arguments had to 
battle against an increasingly intellectually dominant 
marginalism, a crucial point of the interpretation of the 
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history of political economy up to Ricardo was at issue. 
As Jevons put it in 1879: "When at length a true system 
of economics comes to be established, it will be seen 
that that able but wrong-headed man, David Ricardo, 
shunted the car of economic science on to a wrong line" 
(44). The intellectual history' in which this was 
definitively argued was provided by Schumpeter (45). The 
picture of lines of intellectual development here is - as 
always - somewhat confused by the way that some 
contributions are claimed by both of the alternative 
interpretations. Ricardo's analysis of differential rent 
is, for instance, a veritable blue-print for the very 
notion of marginal returns, and when coupled with an 
appreciation of the intensive as well as the extensive 
margin has entered very directly into accounts of 
diminishing returns on investment in land (46). Leaving 
such cases aside, I would like to look in detail at the 
issue of social scientific substance bound up in the 
marginalist interpretation of classical political 
economy, or at least of Smith and Ricardo, as a 
counterpoint to what I have said about Marx's efforts at 
such an interpretation. 
Though for marginalism the shunting of economic science 
on to a wrong line was the work of Ricardo, the points at 
which this was done were located in Smith, and it is with 
Smith that we must start. Let me say in advance that the 
vital question for the marginalist reading of Smith is, I 
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believe, the possibility of describing the theory of 
value in The Wealth of Nations as a circular movement, 
from an initial rejection of the consideration of utility 
to an eventual framing of the central parts of that 
theory through just such consideration. 
Before turning to prices, Smith takes up a common theme 
in contemporaneous broadly political economic literature 
by noting the distinction of use- and exchange-values. 
He contrasts the high amount of the former and the low 
amount of the latter in the case of water, and the 
reverse situation in the case of diamonds (47). If this 
is a paradox, Smith shows no interest in solving it; he 
invokes it to make clear that he is interested in The 
Wealth of Nations with exchange-value or price alone. 
There are, however, two senses of price for Smith. Price 
as a measure of labour inputs into the production of a 
commodity he calls real price. Price as a measure of the 
labour, not the fruits of labour it must be stressed, 
that may be commanded by the exchange of a commodity he 
calls nominal price (48). In early societies, what 
labour was expended in the production of a commod%ty will 
be matched by the amount of labour able to be commanded 
by the commodity's exchange. For at the more or less 
uniform level of productivity which is implied by general 
subsistence production, there can be no grounds on which 
a certain labour input could expect to command more than 
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an equivalent amount of (similarly productive) labour 
(49). In improved, commercial societies, there is a 
difference between real and nominal price, typically that 
the latter is larger. This is because, consequent upon 
the vast increase of specialised productive powers by 
means of the division of labour (50), the cost of 
production of a commodity is far less to those engaged in 
that production than is its worth to those who are not so 
engaged and who would therefore find that particular 
commodity so much harder to make (51). Smith is 
perfectly well aware that the accumulation of stock 
necessary for the division of labour is a matter of 
private property able to charge a revenue (52). Nominal 
price is therefore composed of the revenues of labour 
(wages), stock (profit) and land (rent), the latter two 
being paid from the excess of nominal over real price 
(53). It is this excess that is the fund for 
accumulation and expanded production (54). 
Smith's distinction between early and commercial 
societies clearly involves the impossibility of value in 
the latter being determined by labour inputs. This is 
warrant enough for broadly marginalist developments from 
Smith, which have taken two lines. Firstly, having found 
nominal price to consist of wages, profit and rent, Smith 
proceeds to reverse this and to construct nominal price 
as the sum of the natural prices of each of these three 
when independently determined (55). This cumulative 
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mutual determination may be seen as a rudimentary 
equilibrium theory foreshadowing the younger Wairas (56). 
Secondly, a general utility theory analogy to regarding 
nominal price as what a commodity is worth established by 
what will be given for it in exchange presents itself 
(57). Taking up this latter tack, it becomes natural to 
suggest that if Smith had been acquainted with a workable 
marginalist apparatus, he would have been able to 
recognise the way his ideas of value in commercial 
societies had worked around to a position where it was 
the solution of utility/value paradoxes such as the 
water/diamond one he mentions that was the issue, not the 
attempt to exclude value in use from political economy 
(58). 
Though these ways of taking up Smith have a ground, and 
to that extent perhaps represent valid applied readings 
of his work, they are hermeneutically weak. The 
interpretation they put forward involves emphasising part 
of Smith's work which is thought valuable and imputing a 
rejection of the rest which is regretted. The rejection 
is clearly that of the interpreters - eager to quash the 
labour theory at its main source in favour of a militant 
marginalism - rather than that of the interpreted. As I 
say, this sort of eclectic borrowing sometimes has its 
place, but in this case the sacrificing of fidelity to 
Smith in order to justify later positions means that one 
falls beneath some very valuable ideas which would emerge 
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if we try to understand his work as a whole, rather than 
as anachronistically fractured by subsequent divisions in 
the history of economic thought. 
How in detail does Smith himself account for the 
difference between real and nominal price? If we take 
his solution to be that the former is composed only of 
labour inputs and the latter of the sum of wages, profit 
and rent, then this is certainly very weak as an 
explanation of the difference. The natural prices of 
labour and means of production by which Smith assesses 
wages, profit and rent is arrived at merely as their 
average price as opposed to their market prices, which 
vary according to competition (59). Natural price is 
thereby no explanation of why these three revenues should 
enter into nominal price. In respect of wages, Smith of 
course has such an explanation in the basic labour input 
theory of value. His explanation of why profit and rent 
enter into nominal price is very different, not turning 
on production but upon the exacting of those revenues by 
those who want to reap where they have not sown and are 
able to do so. Profit and rent are merely the 
monopolistic charges able to be imposed after the 
appropriation of stock. and land (60). Those who have 
private property in stock or land must be paid something 
for their use or they would not allow them to enter into 
production. This payment must be in proportion to the 
amount of their possessions allowed to be utilised in 
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production as there would be no incentive to put larger 
resources into productive employment (61). 
If Smith's account of why the three revenues enter into 
nominal price embraces two types of explanation, then we 
must add that these two types are by no means compatible. 
His comments on profit and rent involve rather too 
radical an idea of exploitation for them to be accepted, 
for its reliance on flat parasitism cannot explain how 
the excess of nominal over real price is produced in line 
with the way the labour input theory explains real price. 
Smith is in fact confusing exploitation in the most 
vulgar sense and production rather badly. In his 
description of the economic life of early societies, 
Smith is not really referring only to direct labour 
inputs into real price, despite his own opinion that he 
is doing so. No doubt even his hunters had to reckon the 
value of their kill not only by the time spent in the 
chase but also by the time spent in the making of their 
weapons, though Smith's picture of them glosses over 
this. What actually emerges from Smith's contrast of 
early and commercial societies is not that in the former 
value was determined purely by direct labour, but rather 
that in these societies the means of production were 
individually but generally owned. Smith shows production 
taking place using materials available to everyone (62). 
So the difference between real and nominal price is not 
one of the factors entering into the production of a 
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commodity which it seems at first, because in early 
societies Smith is including means of production as a 
labour input. Making this inclusion so quickly as not to 
see what he is doing, Smith draws the wrong conclusion 
from his historical contrast. It is the alienation of 
labour from the means of production as the latter are 
appropriated as private property which is really 
illuminated by Smith's contrast. But the economic 
consistency of Smith's thought is disturbed by the way in 
which Smith himself understands this illumination. It is 
not, as Smith thinks, that the labour theory of value 
must be thought to have ceased to operate in commercial 
societies, but rather that we must recognise its 
operation in the provision of labour-dated means of 
production in early societies. This is a paradigmatic 
instance of where the labour theory turns on showing the 
productive place of (constant) capital, and not on its 
condemnation as a parasitic form of exploitation. (I 
would add here that Smith carries this immersion of means 
of production in immediate labour right through his work. 
In his path-breaking analysis of capital reproduction, 
Smith always resolves price into merely the forms of 
revenue. That is to say, he always fails to consider the 
reproduction of constant capital (63)). 
However confused, there is the strongest theoretical 
interest in Smith's concept of nominal price, a 
theoretical interest which amply displays the strength of 
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the social philosophical milieu in which that concept was 
formulated. Let us ask what is left of Smith's idea of 
the fund for accumulation in commercial societies,. which 
we have seen him locate in profit and rent, after the 
above critique of his confusion of ownership and role in 
production? The excess of nominal over real price would 
seem to be the very work of exchange, as we have to 
account for the production of the excess of labour 
commanded in exchange over labour input when the two 
components which take up the excess of nominal over real 
price are presented by Smith not as themselves productive 
but as only revenue charges. This is in a strong sense 
what Smith believed. Not that he conceived of surplus as 
a product of exchange itself - Smith is rather beyond 
mercantilism in what are thereby the most interesting 
parts of his work. Surplus is certainly something added 
in production - "the value'which the workmen add to the 
materials" as he puts it (64). However, his whole 
account of commercial societies, aptly named by him, 
turns on making exchange the paramount productive force. 
Given the division of labour, a great deal more wealth of 
use-values is of course produced. The division of labour 
implies the renunciation by more or less everyone of the 
possibility of subsistence production. Irrespective of 
the appropriation of stock and rent, specialisation 
destroys this possibility. The absolute pre-condit'on for 
the division of labour is for Smith the exchange economy 
(65). In this sense, exchange is itself the productive 
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power of commercial society, which is a most interesting 
position to take up. 
From the vantage point of commercial society, Smith puts 
the essence of this position in a way which is not 
immediately clear. Labour, he says, is the real measure 
of exchangeable value (66). He means here commendable 
labour, not labour input. It is not only the unnecessary 
duplication of the meaning of some of his crucial terms 
which makes his point difficult. When describing nominal 
price, he says that it is measured by the amount of 
labour which exchange can command. Now this might seem 
to be the same as saying the amount of the fruits of 
labour which exchange can command. These two ways of 
speaking do amount to the same thing, quantitatively 
speaking. Indeed the latter might be the better narrowly 
economic way of putting it, for it describes the fact tht 
some of profit and rent must go to luxury consumption. 
But what Smith has foremost in his mind is hortatively 
describing the mechanisms of accummulation, the essence 
of his pragmatic concern with the wealth of nations. He 
minimises, indeed staunchly criticises, luxury 
consumption, more as a policy recommendation than as a 
theoretical choice, insisting that this is the way to 
make the best use of the possible fund for accummulation 
(67). But, in what is no doubt an instance of the 
advocacy of progessive social development deepening 
social self-comprehension, there is a most valuable 
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explanatory benefit which flows from the way Smith 
speaks. For Smith is able to focus in his account of 
accummulation on commercial societies on the relations of 
commandable labours rather than " on relations between 
people and goods. Not only is the organisation of labour 
through general exchange made the key to understanding 
commercial societies, but furthermore accummulation is 
shown to be an issue of the command of new labour by 
those who gain the revenues of profit and rent. The, as 
it were, qualitative sociological thrust of Smith's 
notion of commendable labour is towards making clear the 
specific social relations of production in commercial 
societies, and how these ground an historically 
unprecedented productivity. We should remember that in 
Smith's pin factory no new technology but merely the 
division of labour is the cause of the vast increase in 
pin production (68). And we can add that it was factory 
organisation that called for the employment of 
increasingly large-scale machinery and not the other way 
round. 
Much of the sociological content of The Wealth of Nations 
is to be found common to the other outstanding works of 
the Scottish Enlightenment's accounts of civil society. 
No doubt the peculiar elevation granted to Smith's book 
in large part follows from the way in which it captured 
the spirit of, and therefore had much of direct practical 
interest to say to, the rising industrial bourgeoisie. 
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Indeed Smith's book is unique within this extremely 
productive tradition in social thought in the way it 
unreservedly falls into political economy, though Smith 
was in fact following Hutchisons's example in focusing 
upon economic questions. We must say, then, that the 
exchange relation of the various types of specialised 
labours in the division of labour and their command for 
the purposes of capital accummulation is put forward in 
The Wealth of Nations together with the first reasonably 
clear grasp of the capitalist social equalisation of 
labour at the heart of political economy. However, this 
unity of social philosophy and economics is very 
precarious in Smith, and in fact his qualitative account 
of capitalist social relations of production is put 
forward in a way which militates against the development 
of such an account into compatible quantitative accounts 
of value through the labour theory. Smith's confusion 
over the factors entering into production and the 
economic significance of their private ownership ensure 
this. Let us try, then, to give an overall evaluation of 
Smith's description of commercial society. 
It is clear that in terms of exchangeable value Smith is 
unable to give any account of the production of the 
excess of nominal over real price. What he seems to do 
is take the undoubted increase in wealth, in amount of 
commodities for use, in commercial societies as 
immediately an exchange-value category. Smith's 
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essential set of problems is to come to terms with the 
historically unique expansion of the production of 
use-values in the historically unique social relations of 
commercial society which, as Smith clearly saw, operate 
through exchange-value. What is absolutely necessary 
here is a proper ordering of the relation of historically 
specific exchange-value production, general use-value 
production and their relation in a specific form of 
use-value production organised through exchange-value. 
But of course this is precisely what we may expect to be 
absent from the ahistorical perspectives of what remains 
in the end a bourgeois vision, and Smith's attempt to 
contextualise capitalist economic forms is in the end a 
failure. One example, on a fundamental point, will 
suffice. The reason given for the development of the 
social form of commercial society is a purported natural 
instinct of exchange (69), a pitifully weak fetishisation 
by comparison to the social theoretical importance of 
Smith himself and his intellectual background in the most 
substantial source of the very idea of social theory. 
Smith's errors in comparative value calculations for 
early and commercial societies are, then, of the greatest 
importance, for they are the nexus of the shortcomings of 
his attempt to describe the social relations of 
developing capitalist production and their historic 
significance. 
Smith affords some warrant for marginalist developments 
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because he is fundamentally concerned to describe new 
criteria of economic life which inform capitalism, and 
these criteria essentially are those of the allocation of 
labour according to scarcity and demand under competitive 
pressures which are now central to marginalism. For 
Smith, this is an important point, but one which can be 
dealt with briefly, for what is the real task, running 
together the practical need to criticise pre-capitalist 
relations and the theoretical task to grasp the character 
of capitalist ones, is to come to terms with the new 
social form which has brought about these novel types of 
economic conduct. This is the significance of the labour 
theory of value. The theory does not dispute the new 
criteria, but provides the context of those criteria as a 
new form of the economic organisation of labour. The 
point remains, however, that Smith develops the 
fundamental social theoretical content of the labour 
theory in a way which obstructed its adequate narrowly 
economic, quantitative development. Let us now turn to 
the way Ricardo sought to remedy this. 
Ricardo's Corrections of Smith 
Ricardo's Principles were of course written in the 
closest relation to Smith's thought in The Wealth of 
Nations. He draws upon the labour theory of value in The 
Wealth of Nations in the very first section of his book, 
and more than this we can see that this is no mechanical 
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borrowing, but that Ricardo deserves to be regarded as 
the principal carrier of Smith's description of 
specifically capitalist economics. Ricardo's very first 
words invoke Smith's distinction between use- and 
exchange-values, and he adds a most interesting 
qualification. Richardo goes on to say that, given that 
they have a use-value, commodities derive exchange-value 
from one of two sources; either from scarcity or from the 
amount of labour required to obtain them. This seems 
like two ways of saying the same thing, but in fact by 
"scarcity" Ricardo means something more like 
"uniqueness", referring to such goods as oil paintings by 
Rembrandt, the value of which is economically quite 
arbitrary. As these goods are not reproducible and are 
therefore not open to determination of value through 
competitive production, their value boils down to what it 
is possible to get for them, though given enough 
potential customers a competition of merely buyers may 
make their price subject to convention. Without forcing 
Ricardo's meaning, I think we can say that he is here 
detailing an instance of the impinging of money on the 
sale of other than true commodities. For in making this 
quibble, Ricardo is displaying a keen grasp of the 
economic conditions which do enforce value. Leaving 
aside more or less unique goods, Ricardo means by 
commodities only those which "can be increased in 
quantity by human industry, and on the production of 
which competition operates without restraint" (70). This 
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means, of course, a developed capitalist economy of 
generalised exchange and competition. From the outset, 
then, Ricardo has his eye fixed firmly on production in 
bourgeois society and properly identifies exchange-value 
as value fixed by production within these conditions. We 
must add, however, that though he clearly has a sound 
idea of the features of capitalism as a specfic set of 
relations of production, we cannot expect Ricardo to 
fimly grasp the historical bounds of those relations. 
It is the genuine taking up of Smith's standpoint of 
social observation coupled with a concern to remedy his 
errors in delimiting the applicability of the labour 
theory of value to capitalist institutions that give the 
essential shape to Ricardo's book. (Or rather, gives the 
shape to the first six chapters in which he puts forward 
this theory of value, the theory merely being amplified 
or applied in the later chapters). Ricardo, as I have 
mentioned, straight away takes the labour theory from 
Smith (71), exposes (amongst other shortcomings) (72) the 
errors in Smith's restriction of its applicability to 
early societies (73), and then takes the main economic 
institutions of the developed capitalist economy one by 
one and tries to show that they do not contradict, but 
are subject to, the labour theory of value (74). Ricardo 
essentially argues the mistake in Smith's inclusion of 
means of production in direct labour in early societies 
which I have - following Ricardo - described. He then 
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shows FtiºI% capitalist institutions based on private 
property may charge revenues other than, or indeed 
antagonistic to, wages, their ability to do so is based 
in their entrance into the production process as 
labour-dated means of production. , 
Whatever weaknesses 
are left in Ricardo's quantitative determination of 
price, it is clear that he here provides the coherent 
foundation of bringing burgeois economic life within a 
single reference to a set of capitalist social relations 
of production. 
Why Ricardo should set out the Principles in this way as 
a contribution to a political economic science dominated 
by Smith is obvious, and the approach does, as I say, 
serve to extend Smith's legacy of the labour theory most 
directly. However, that Ricardo felt able to present his 
work in this way, in which capitalist institutions are 
taken as given and then reconciled with the labour 
theory, shows the historical explanatory limitations of 
his whole concept of political economy. One need not 
agree with Marx that one should begin with the commodity 
in order to fully explain value and from this capitalist 
production in order to see that Ricardo begins very 
substantially with what his political economy should end. 
In Ricardo, then, we have the paradox of the possibility 
of bringing bourgeois institutions into a single set of 
relations of production, coupled with a complete lack of 
penetration of the historicality of these relations. Let 
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us look at this paradox more closely. 
Ricardo attempts to improve the coherence of political 
economy's rigorous handling of the distinction of use- and 
exchange-values. Ricardo understands perfectly well that 
improvements in setting the forces of nature at work can 
wonderfully increase riches, but not only does nature 
create no use-value but also improved use-value 
production will typically lower exchangeable value per 
good (75). Ricardo makes this point against Say (76), 
defending the importance of Smith's distinction of value 
in use and exchangeable value. But, as his having to add 
these passages in order to address himself to Say here 
makes us aware, Ricardo could hardly be thought to be 
holding to a clear line from Smith. Rather Ricardo is 
trying to clear up the confusions of Smith's running 
together of the use- and exchange-value components in his 
characterisation of commercial society, and he does this 
by expunging use-value considerations completely. 
Ricardo includes chapter twenty in the third edition as 
an expansion and defence of the essential position taken 
up in the first paragraphs of the book. Its purpose is 
to make quite clear that the best way to move on from 
Smith is to restrict oneself to exchange-value. In 
claiming this he makes substantially the arguments later 
given by Marx for the necessity for some common 
denominator of exchange in order for exchange to take 
place, and makes labour that denominator. This is a 
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rather pure form of the labour theory, for it is achieved 
by expunging the use-value considerations on capitalism 
to be found in Smith in order to leave (on in the end 
inconclusive quantitative grounds it must be said) labour 
organised through exchange-value as the sole determinant 
of value. 
Of course, in Ricardo these social phenomena become so 
extended beyond their proper historical context that they 
become almost natural in their generality. What I want 
to point out is that this extinguishing of historical 
location is linked to the loss of consideration however 
confused, of use-value. For use-value production is the 
context of all social relations of production. To some 
extent what we are dealing with here is the clear 
formulation of the general production of use-values, and 
undoubtedly some of Ricardo's fetishisations of 
capitalist forms could not have taken place with a more 
clear grasp of this. But the fundamental issue is that 
capitalism is not just a specific mode of production, 
production just as a noun or as a disposition of labour, 
but a mode of production of use-values as process of 
human metabolism with nature. Comparative studies of 
forms of production may be rather simple catalogues of 
differing forms set out in relativistic juxtaposition. 
This is all that comparative study can amount to without 
some common thread by which the mutual evaluation that is 
the essence of real comparison can take place. For Smith 
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this is use-value production, and by employing this 
criterion the contrast of early and commercial societies 
is brought out in a historically significant fashion. 
Abstraction from use-value to the point where the 
naturalistic context of all social forms is lost is to 
destroy the context in which those forms take their 
shape. There is an interpenetration of the natural and 
the social in the very identification of the latter, as 
looking at any attempt to come to terms with the specific 
characteristics of capitalism, which must involve 
reference to its historically unique capacity to dominate 
nature, would show. 
Use-value and the Criticism of Capitalist Production 
In Smith and Ricardo there is a substantially correct 
description of the specifically capitalist relations of 
production, though a grasp paradoxically characterised by 
an inadequate appreciation of the historical bounds of 
those relations. What is more, the extension of the 
unified description of Ricardo is accompanied by a loss 
of Smith's greatest contribution to the recognition of 
those bounds, his attempt to come to terms with the 
specific use-value consequences of capitalist production. 
In Ricardo, only the social relations of production are 
examined, in the terms of the labour theory of value 
describing exchange-value. The labour involved here is a 
mysteriously spiritual labour, divorced from its material 
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location and considered only for its disposition. By 
contrast, labour in its relation to nature and the 
natural disposition of materials is the very object of 
utility theory. b9$t, }e ý4, thV%VA\S t-. aa-', ý, kmcs w\,. ats specifically 
capitalist for here, let me repeat, the specific social 
relations that have made human relations with 
nature Ue- ýo"ýý. +ýý1 dopX are lost to view. I want to say that 
what Marx attempted to do in Capital was to draw upon the 
social and natural elements in the identification of 
capitalism by Smith, re-uniting them in a way which 
overcomes Smith's shortcomings. If he celebrates 
Ricardo's refinement of the description of specifically 
capitalist relations, we must also recognise the 
positive, if partial, advances on the development of the 
other side of Smith's thought in marginalism. Saying 
this involves me in taking up two positions: one on the 
attitude one should take towards utility theory on the 
basis of a fundamental acceptance of Marx's critique of 
bourgeois economics (77), and another on the character of 
Marx's own political economy. 
An antagonistic attitude to neo-classical marginalism on 
the part of those who wish to defend Marx tends in fact 
to undermine an important prop of Marx's position. For 
Marx is ultimately trying to say that in value capitalism 
begins, in however difficultly convoluted a way, to make 
the key to rational, social self-consciousness of 
economic organisation available. What we must add is 
that utility theory is the bourgeois statement of these 
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rational potentials. It self-consciously wishes to draw 
on just those observations on value being related to 
scarcity, that is to say to the. amount of labour required 
to actualise a use-value in as far as possible the 
required amounts, that Marx finds in Smith and Ricardo 
(78). 
Some errors often displayed in marxist attitudes to 
utility theory must be cleared up. For one thing, 
utility theory can by no means be considered to directly 
fall under Marx's criticisms of fetishism. 
Neo-classicism is neither content with surface 
appearances, for it always wants to operate an 
explanatory regress to utility (79), nor does it consider 
utility to be an intrinsic property of a good, for it 
always emphasises that utility emerges in human relations 
to nature (80). I think that, in fact, the reference to 
utility takes over substantially the grasp of the 
principles of rational organisation of labour which Marx 
considers capitalism to have made available (81). Of 
course, the tendency of marginalist thought is precisely 
to forget the specific social relations which have made 
this rational comprehension available. This both makes 
the marginalist reading of the classicals on even these 
points seem very forced (82), but more than this it makes 
marginalism collapse into a purported general psychology 
of rational economic behaviour (83). Although in fact we 
must acknowledge that some insight into rational 
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use-value is given, this is in terms which allow little or 
no purchase on specific economic conditions. In 
particular, this knowledge quite subdues the power of 
marginalism to give an account of present day forms of 
the contradiction of rational use-value production by 
exchange-value. 
But even here we must not be too hasty. In especially 
welfare economics marginalism pushes rational use-value 
economics through to what is in fact a criticism of 
capitalist product ion - albeit a criticism which emerges 
only after one looks at the distance between the 
prescriptions for rational utility and employment (84) 
and the actual capitalist economy. In Keynes this 
distance is of course made an object. If, as is clear, 
Keynes' ideas o f economic reform are bounded by 
restricted ideas of the possiblities of social justice 
(85), nevertheless this reform would be a socialisation 
of the capitalist economy, adjusting exchange-value's 
departures from optimum use-value production, though 
conceived only in terms of the extent of the employment 
of economic resou rces rather than the directions of that 
employment (86). What, I am sure, is fundamentally 
operating here is the use-value criticism of 
exchange-value, in however muted a form. The overall 
socialist response to the recent rejection of broadly 
Keynesian economic planning by the capitalist economies 
has been rather disingenuous, now regretting the 
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disappearance of a system which has more or less suffered 
nothing other than calumnydtsocialist hands until 
regression from it cuts back the socialisation of the 
economy. Of course, broadly marxist political economy' 
can show how limited Keynesianism is and how nevertheless 
it is insupportable for the capitalist organisation of 
production. But this did not have to be a destructive 
statement of the bourgeois limitations of Keynes, but 
could have been one of the socialist directions which 
must be taken even to secure his limited gains and not 
lose them. This is more a question of the generosity 
with which one examines social theories than any 
fundamental change in the evaluation of those theories 
(87). However, the consequences which could flow from 
this are, in my opinion, invaluable. 
If my argument is accepted it is clear that a broadly 
marxist intellectual history of marginalism needs to be 
re-written. This, however, is only the second such task 
which this argument puts on the agenda. For if use-value 
consideration in neo-classical marginalism at least 
presents a muted form of the criticism of exchange-value, 
I want to argue that Marx himself criticised capitalism 
in essentially this way, contrasting the use-value 
potentialities of capitalist production with 
exchange-value restrictions on that potentiality. The 
crucial point is that whereas the play of use- and 
exchange-value components of the description of 
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capitalism in Smith is confused, Marx is, with his much 
firmer grip of the general and specific elements of 
production, able to make this play coherent. For Marx, 
there is the distinction of general use-value production 
and historically specific exchange-value production, and 
then a consideration of the form of use-value production 
undertaken in those particular relations of production. 
The key to this is, as I hope is beginning to emerge, 
that Marx's account of capitalism is set out in accord 
with his separation of the natural and the social coupled 
with a subsequent materialist account of social change. 
I will argue this fully in the next chapter, when I deal 
with the account of capitalist development in Capital. 
Preparatory to this, I want to conclude this discussion 
of Marx's utilisation of the resources of classical 
political economy by discussing his ideas on the role of 
use-value in political economy and in Smith and Ricardo's 
explanations of the tendency of the rate of profit to 
fall. 
Smith and Ricardo on the Tendency of the Rate of Profit 
to Fall 
Smith quite forthrightly declared that there is a 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall proportionate to 
the degree of improvement of commercial society (88); his 
grounds being the following. Accumulation of course 
means a growing stock (89), and the greater possibilities 
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for the productive utilisation of that stock presented by 
the expanding market that is of the essence of a society 
undergoing improvement leads to an increasing proportion 
of profit and rent revenues being productively rather 
than unproductively consumed (90). However, there is a 
point, Smith says it in so many words, when it becomes 
increasingly difficult to convert-this growing proportion 
seeking productive employment of an in any case 
increasing stock into new productive stock (91). Being 
able to export a surplus produced when the home market 
for a product is satiated is given by Smith as an 
important function of foreign trade - "Without such 
exportation a part of the productive labour of the 
country must cease, and the value of its annual product 
diminish" (92). The volume of the carrying trade is 
hence a reliable indicator of the wealth of improved 
societies (93). Beyond this point, however, Smith seems 
to envisage a general difficulty in finding new outlets 
for the productive investment of revenue. In this 
situation, competition between revenues to secure their 
own productive investment must force down the rate of 
profit. Each revenue is forced by competition to pay 
more for its inputs and charge less for its outputs when 
productively utilised in order to be so utilised. In 
particular continuously expanding demand for productive 
labour must push up wages at the expense of profits (94). 
Smith does not clearly identify the cause of either the 
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partial or general overproduction to which he refers. If 
the interpretation of Smith's distinguishing of early and 
commercial societies which I have given above is correct, 
then what at first glance seems a direct implication by 
Smith of the satiation of consumption requirements for 
use-values in specific and general markets would seem to 
be borne out as the correct reading of the basic reason 
for the rate of profit to fall. We should not be 
surprised, then, when Smith's foretelling of England's 
future in Holland's present lends direct textual support 
for this reading. In Holland, approaching near to the 
state of "a country which had acquired its full 
complement of riches, where in every particular branch of 
business there was the greatest quantity of stock that 
could be employed in it", the rate of profit was so small 
that only those who owned a great volume of stock could 
live on profit and interest, and more and more owners 
were having to superintend their own productive workers 
(95). The unprecedented ability of improved commercial 
societies to furnish riches is to run into contradiction 
with the satiation of use-value consumption, the 
development of which contradiction is manifested in a 
declining rate of profit returned upon productively 
invested stock. 
Ricardo would, I think, have regarded this last sentence 
as a fair summary of Smith's ideas on the fall of the 
rate of profit, but he treats it as an indefensible slip 
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rather than as a line of thought which has a ground in 
Smith's basic theory. Ricardo makes short work of the 
slip, and because of the shortcomings of Smith's 
treatment of use-value, of the whole idea as well in The 
Wealth of Nations. 
If the problem is of overproduction of specific goods, 
then, Ricardo says, nobody has shown better than Smith 
that capital will flow from a sated branch of production 
where the rate of profit will be declining into a branch 
where profits are higher. Smith's specific examples were 
of Britain's production of more corn, woollen goods and 
hardware than the home market could absorb, and the 
consequent need to export these products. One would 
think, Ricardo observes, that Britain was under some 
compulsion to produce those particular goods. Even if 
export outlets dried up, the capital could be shifted to 
other branches of production (96). 
When turning to general overproduction and decline in the 
general rate of profit, Ricardo's opinion of Smith's 
conclusions is no less critical, but the issue is a 
little clouded. For Ricardo himself held that there was 
a tend e ncy for the general rate of profit to fall with 
progressive accumulation, but he attributed this to the 
restraint of non-capitalist factors of accumulation, not 
to a development intrinsic of accumulation through the 
capitalist production of use-values itself. A few words 
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firstly, then, on why Ricardo himself thought that the 
rate of profit would decline. 
Though Ricardo was well aware of increases in profits 
deriving from the development of labour productivity with 
the improvement of society (97), he identified an 
increased demand for labour with such improvement, as of 
course he was historically warranted to do in the midst 
of primitive accumulation. This demand for labour 
translates into demand for the necessaries which wages 
purchase (98), most importantly for foodstuffs - Ricardo 
focuses upon corn (99). Ricardo of course knew of 
historical improvements in agricultural productivity 
(100), but he regarded these as being exceptional 
occurrences with little prospect for continuous future 
development (101). There is a historical warrant for 
this too in the great discrepancies between the degree of 
real subsumption to capital in Ricardo's time of 
agricultural as opposed to industrial production, 
discrepancies which has been only reduced and by no means 
removed at present. For Ricardo, this intensive margin 
of increases in agricultural productivity was of little 
significance. beside the extensive margin of bringing more 
land into production (102). In what he felt was an acute 
contrast to the virtually limitless capitalist expansion 
of the production of industrial goods (103), Ricardo saw 
corn production being pushed onto decreasingly fertile 
land, and thus corn rising in value because more labour 
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would be required to produce a given amount. The 
consequence of this is that differential rent must rise 
with increased agricultural production. 
I must here give a brief account of what Ricardo 
understood by differential rent. Ricardo accounted for 
all rent as a charge on the super profits accruing to 
agricultural production on relatively fertile land as 
total demand for corn pushes agriculture onto less 
fertile land. Prices must allow profitable production on 
this poorer land, but of course such a level of prices 
provides great profits for production on the better land, 
which land can thus charge differential rent (104). 
In these conditions of rising demand for corn, to 
maintain even a minimum standard of living (105) 
labourers would have to be paid an increasingly large 
money wage, even if the corn wage which, corn being a 
large component of necessary consumption, basically set 
the money wage (106) remained stationary or even declined 
(107). As Ricardo treated wages and profits as directly 
competitive shares of revenue (108), then this would 
imply a tendency for profit to decline (109), or, more 
precisely, for rent to absorb profit (110). If initially 
the expansion of capital's revenue would exceed the rate 
of increase of money wage because of the relative 
under-utilisation of the better land (111), this could 
only be so for a limited period which the pressure of 
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accumulation must eventually end. Ultimately corn 
production would be pushed on to such poor land that the 
tendency of profits to decline would predominate as the 
rate of growth in money wages overcame the rate of growth 
of capital's revenues (112). Then return to capital 
investment would be so low that no such investment would 
take place (113). This would. be a position in which - 
Ricardo's armageddon - the country's whole produce would, 
after paying wages, be in the hands of the land-owners. 
This argument clearly contains a number of errors which 
basically turn on Ricardo's underestimation of capital's 
ability to increase agricultural productivity, but it is 
not really to these that I should like to turn but rather 
to the overall direction of Ricardo's argument. At one 
point Ricardo seems to be saying that in a situation when 
all the world's possible land was brought under corn 
production, then progress would be halted by a law of 
nature (114). This is nonsense which exposes the limits 
of Ricardo's historical imagination rather starkly, for 
that land can charge a rent to capitalist production has 
everything to do with forms of land ownership and nothing 
to do with the volume of agricultural land. Ricardo's 
vision is much more acute in the short term, as opposed 
to this fanciful speculation at the limits of bourgeois 
thought. The whole thrust of Ricardo's argument up to 
the end of chapter six is against the corn laws in 
particular and the landed interest in general - showing 
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the Principles origin in the earlier polemic against 
those laws. A small but fertile country, Ricardo tells 
us, "particularly if it freely permits the importation of 
food, may accumulate a large stock of capital without any 
great diminution in the rate of profits, or any great 
increase in the rent of land" (115). Ricardo's overall 
position is confused by a typical fetishisation of 
private property, which he seems he could not abandon 
even when it would serve him to do so, but its thrust is 
clear. Ricardo can see no internal bounds to capital 
accummulation, but rather accounts for any such bounds in 
the survival of pre-capitalist fetters on capitalist 
production. Ricardo, to return to the main line of our 
own interest, explicitly argues against there being any 
such internal limits (116), and does so against Smith. 
The attempt to dignify the claim that general 
overproduction in a capitalist economy is impossible with 
the title of a law is identified with the name of Say. 
However, Say's law of markets is characteristically 
Ricardian, and is so not merely because the formulation 
of the law owes at least as much to the elder mill as to 
Say himself (117). For this law sets out what is quite 
characteristically Ricardo's fundamentally optimistic 
attitude to capital accummulation. It is true that as it 
is given by Say and mill themselves the law is either a 
flat tautology, cancelling out the distance between 
production and valorisation by means of a particular 
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definition of sale and purchase, or a failure to 
distinguish between simple commodity production with 
use-value production almost immediately in mind and 
developed capitalist production for exchange-value 
accumulation. We should not expect to find this sort of 
thing in Ricardo. When Ricardo approvingly refers to Say 
he does so - quite in line with the way he generously 
reads the best into his sources - in a fashion which 
brings out the point of substance in the law. As Ricardo 
renders it, Say's law has the form of a proposition that 
any amount of capital may be productively employed in an 
economy, because the only limit to demand is production 
(118). There is no limit to what might be demanded 
should it be produced, for having sated oneself of a 
certain product there is always something else which one 
may wish to have (119). If nature has limited the 
possible amount of food one may consume (in terms of the 
value inputs into a given satisfaction of food 
requirement this has undergone a vast expansion since 
Smith's and Ricardo's day), there remain an infinite 
amount of the conveniences and ornaments of life which 
would be in demand once productive resources had been 
turned to furnishing these (120). 
Ricardo takes this distinction of food and the 
conveniences and ornaments of life from a passage in 
which Smith argued there were natural limits to the 
former but not the latter (121). As with overproduction 
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of particular goods, Ricardo's tack in dealing with 
general overproduction is to turn Smith's own arguments 
against themselves. This form of polemic is often 
spectacularly successful, but as with all such successes 
it is so only by virtue of being hermeneutically weak. 
The inconsistencies revealed serve the purpose of he or 
she who reveals them only if they stand as flat 
inconsistencies which can be explained as, precisely, 
inconsistent. That is to say, the production of the 
inconsistency cannot be related to the overall text in 
which it occurs, whereas such inconsistencies always 
represent inadequacies in the overall character of that 
text. 
Ricardo is here pushing the consideration of the ultimate 
consumption of use-values right out of the analysis of 
the capitalist economy, and finds his warrant for this in 
Smith's inconsistency in undertaking such consideration. 
"It follows", says Ricardo, "from these admissions" by 
Smith against his own position, "that there is no limit 
to demand" (122). That we can conceive of infinite 
demand for luxuries or at least refinements, Ricardo is 
arguing, means that there is no reason for Smith to think 
capital can ever satiate its markets, and thus ultimate 
use-value consumption is irrelevant in determining the 
course of capitalist production. In a sense - the sense 
that makes much of an impossible rigour against the 
productiveness of the ambiguities that subsequent reading 
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must reveal in any- text - Ricardo is of course right. 
Inadequately developed in the terms of the confused 
mixing up of the specific influences on use-value 
production of exchange-value production, this 
consideration of use-value consumption in Smith is 
certainly inconsistent. As Ricardo himself attributes an 
exemplary degree of rigour to Smith's distinction of 
value in use and exchange (123), Smith's departures from 
this seem to be just lapses. Ricardo's general 
elimination of consideration of use-value here in fact 
rules out, as I hope we can now clearly see, a 
substantial point in the very understanding of the social 
form of capitalism. I think that a dialogue aimed at 
expanding our knowledge of Smith's thought (beyond his 
self-comprehension) rather than outlawing part of that 
thought, just the opposite to that part outlawed by 
marginalism, will raise points of great substance. 
Marx's Evaluation of Smith and-Ricardo on the Tendency of 
the Rate of Profit to Fall 
These points are, I believe, raised by Marx in the 
discussion of these parts of Smith and Ricardo through 
which he arrived at much of the economic detailing of his 
broad conception of the limitations of capitalism as a 
historical mode of production. Let us begin to follow 
Marx's discussion by turning to the passage in the 
Grundrisse in which Marx notes that Smith's conception of 
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the falling rate of profit is characterised by the 
excessive amount of theoretical work which is to be 
carried out by competition (124). Smith evidently means 
competition to be the mechanism not only of the levelling 
of the rates of profit accruing to different production 
sectors but also of the lowering of the general rate of 
profit. The actual competitive mechanism is the same in 
both cases, but acceptance of the former, with its 
background substantiation in Smith's account of transfers 
of capital to their most profitable employment, does not 
imply acceptance of the latter, as Smith seems to think 
(125). Without some auxilliary theoretical statements 
about the finitude of potential accumulation the latter 
case cannot be regarded as substantiated, and we have 
seen Ricardo demonstrate that Smith does not provide 
this. Ricardo, of course, uses competition to achieve a 
general rate of profit (126), but insists, against Smith, 
that competition cannot lower the general rate of profit 
(127); and Marx, who also equalises profit rates through 
competition (128), as always recognises Ricardo's 
superior consistency (129). However, what for Ricardo 
are merely slips by Smith are taken rather more seriously 
by Marx, who claims that at issue in the competitive 
lowering of the general rate of profit, and in the 
development of external trade to overcome satiation of 
the internal market (130), is some comprehension of 
overproduction as a limit to capitalist accumulation. 
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For it is Marx's opinion, I think, that in the very 
consistency of Ricardo's corrections of Smith, in the 
very purity of the labour theory in Ricardo, something - 
a" productive theoretical resource - is lost. When 
Ricardo pushes consideration of the consumption of 
use-values out of the formulation of the tendency of the 
rate of profit to fall and depicts a completely 
production lead demand which poses no internal limit to 
capital accumulation, we can hardly say, in initial 
response, that by such consistency in the distinction of 
use- and exchange-valuse we have come any closer to 
crucial features oftc capitalist economy. Against the 
requirement of explaining what legitimately may be 
provisionally regarded as crises at least grounded in 
conditions of overproduction (or its broad synonyms), 
Ricardo's attitude, perhaps with a degree of hindsight 
available to Marx (131), appears as a restriction on 
understanding. Maintaining such an attitude would appear 
to owe mM, ý, to a pious wish that there were no such 
crises, and to a consequent effort not to explain these 
episodes but rather to explain them away (132). 
Marx recognises that by comparison to the obfuscatory 
character of Say's law in mill and in Say himself (133), 
Ricardo's formulation of the idea does at least make the 
point at issue relatively clear. The question of the 
unlimited potential for capital accumulation is at least 
brought into focus rather than being completely conjured 
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away. It is true to say, however, that though Marx spent 
some time on learning from Ricardo's formulation, his 
opinion of Ricardo's attitude towards questioning the 
potential for capital accumulation was that it was very 
weak - "Could there be" Marx asks, "a more childish 
argument? " (134). There is of course something to be 
said for Ricardo's taking ultimate consumption tobe 
infinite (that is to say, limited only by the volume of 
production), and therefore irrelevant to economics. It 
has proven possible in bourgeois society to identify 
virtually all human values with consumption as an end in 
itself, and if this identification is accepted, as it was 
by Ricardo and has been by more or less all bourgeois 
economics, then consumption can have no limit placed upon 
it even in the imagination. Marx of course violently 
disagreed with this taking of all human goals to be 
consumption needs, the diminution of necessary labour 
time being a far more important goal for him than 
unlimited increases in consumption. But even so he 
accepts that there has never been and nor could there be 
(in other, perhaps, than the very long term future) 
overproduction in terms of what Marx himself calls 
"absolute needs" (135). He did not-employ this term in 
order to absolutise the needs in question, but to stress 
that their existence pushes outside the bounds of the 
capitalist mode of production in which they arise. But 
this is to step rather ahead in our argument, and I will 
reserve my attempt to make that sense of exteriority 
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clear., For the present 
these periods which 
overproduction Marx did 
absolute needs had been 
over-fulfilled. But wh 
overproduction to do with 
it is enough to say that even in 
he regards as being ones of 
not for a moment think that 
even nearly satisfied, much less 
at, Marx goes on to ask, has 
absolute needs? (136). 
That Ricardo's position is impossible to maintain is 
easily seen. Judging by the criteria of absolute needs, 
even the relative overproduction of certain goods, which 
is both an obvious phenomenal characteristic of 
capitalism and theoretically essential for Ricardo's 
account of profit (137), could never have taken place. 
The competitive forcing down of profits in a particular 
branch of production could not be attributed to the 
absolute satiation of demand for that product, certainly 
not in the vast majority of cases (138). Leaving this 
aside, and moving to the crucial point, in capitalism 
needs are effective, that is to say have a social command 
over production, only when backed by money. The creation 
of absolute needs might well be directly connected to 
bourgeois standards, but they remain outside of 
capitalism because needs not supported by money might as 
well not exist in so far as they are typically recognised 
by that mode of production (139). Marx spent a great 
deal of the time in which he learned his political 
economy describing the capitalist historical form of the 
distinction of production and consumption (140), against 
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the attempt to simply elide the gap between production 
and the valorisation of surplus value connected with 
Say's law. If we recognise this gap, the question which 
Ricardo tries to answer definitely in the negative in his 
formulation of the idea behind Say's law, is whether 
consumption can, under capitalism, furnish adequate 
demand for continously expanding production (141). 
Marx's opinion is that this is not so, and further that 
this is intimately bound up with a tendency of the rate 
of profit to fall. I intend to set out Marx's ground for 
this opinion at length in the next part of this work as I 
believe it can easily be expanded to cover all of Marx's 
account of capitalism, but for the present I would like 
to sum up these remarks, as it were preliminary to my 
discussion of this account, by making explicit what is 
involved in Marx's being able to offer any opinion on 
this whatsoever. 
I do not think that it is an adequate interpretation of 
the attitude Marx is taking towards Ricardo to say that 
Marx insists on the historically specific forms not only 
of production but of consumption, and that Smith is to be 
congratulated for having, however unclearly, anticipated 
such an insistence. For this is to dodge the real issue, 
of why consumption must be considered, and this pushes 
one into an artificial construction of Marx's relation to 
Smith. Smith has tried to deal with a whole set of 
issues relating to the very identification of the 
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character of modernity - the issues with which we can 
identify the very beginnings of social science - which 
are suppressed by the economist Ricardo as a consequence 
of the way he makes the labour theory a coherent measure 
of the magnitude of value. Marx tries to take over this 
coherence, drawing on Ricardo's relatively clear 
description of the specific structure of value, but then 
also to return with this to revive Smith's social issues 
in a more clear way. 
For the crux of Marx's argument against Ricardo is not, 
in the first instance, a historical one. Clearly, when 
consumption plays a determining role in a mode of 
production, it can do so only in a historically specific 
form. However, that consumption has such a role is a 
natural given, a necessity with which no conceivable 
historical mode of production can dispense. What is 
essentially the shortcoming of Ricardo's attitude to 
overproduction is that it considers production in 
isolation from consumption (142). It is true that 
Ricardo gives some account of the character of 
consumption, but the effect of his account is to make 
consumption irrelevant to his political economy. 
Production becomes, to all intents and purposes, an end 
in itself, for it is not understood as the furnishing of 
use-values to satisfy consumption demands but as merely 
production for exchange-value, that is to say, limitless 
production. It would seem that Ricardo is saying 
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something like the infinite possibilities of demand are 
the, as it were, vacuum in which infinite capital 
accumulation could take place, other things being equal. 
He denies use-value consumption any theoretical space in 
the analysis of capitalism. Marx insists that such a 
theoretical status is unacceptable. Though production 
and consumption are subject to historical determination, 
the fact of their intimate relation is not, and the study 
of historical forms of that, relation must begin by 
registering its ahistorical influence. 
This is not a case where use-value components of 
explanation can be thought to have been added to 
exchange-value components, because here we have no ground 
for ever doing other than analytically separating those 
components. Though their analytical separation is vital, 
this must not disrupt, in fact it must deepen, our grasp 
of their real unity. We must grasp the implications of 
our dealing with a specific form of general material 
intercourse with nature, that is to say with properties 
that have a general basis but owe their specific 
character to their historical form. Nevertheless, the 
development of that historical form is in conjunction 
with nature; it is a product of a specific form of work 
on nature. We are dealing in fact, with an 
inter-penetration of the natural and social components of 
explanation, fusing them into one history, because the 
very understanding of the particular consequences of the 
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capitalist mode of production for the ahistorical 
production and consumption of use-values directly enters 
into the description of the social form itself. 
Marx begins Capital by reference to "The wealth of 
societies in which the capitalist mode of production 
prevails". Against the background of the use of "wealth" 
or sometimes "riches" as opposed to "value" in classical 
political economy, there can be no doubt that Marx is 
referring to the wealth of use-values in those societies, 
though he then goes on to say that that wealth "appears 
as an 'immense collection of commodities'" (143). The 
very description of capitalism involves historical 
locutions which can be made only through comparisons with 
other modes in respect of their wealth, though the 
identifications of any specific modes of production at 
all obviously requires historical abstraction to the 
isolation of those modes in the first instance. 
Really, any approach to Capital other than u ., o, \ 1,, rcl 
so; C. \ interpretation might expect this. For after 
noting Marx's insistence upon historical specificity as a 
vital canon of -social explanation, then it is time to 
recall the equally important, perhaps more important for 
Marx himself, other canon bound up in Marx's 
materialism . As I have tried to show, for Marx, though 
it is both possible and necessary to distinguish the 
ontologies of history and nature, not only are historical 
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events not thereby granted a complete independence from 
nature, but very important elements of the explanation of 
those events emerges only by taking into account the 
natural context in which they take place. What is more, 
I think we are now in a position to precisely identify 
the way in which Marx conceives of this in respect of the 
capitalist mode, of production. The distinction between 
productive forces and social relations of production 
which Marx thinks common to all _ alienated modes of 
production has its capitalist form in the distinction of 
use- and exchange-values. Capitalism poses potentials of 
use-value production, in the organisation of labour 
through exchange-value, which are historically 
unprecedented. It also actualises these potentials to an 
unprecedented degree - in recognising this amongst the 
horror of primitive accumulation and the production of 
absolute surplus value Marx shows a remarkable depth of 
historical imagination. However, on the pattern of the 
scheme of determinate negation through immanent critique 
of the social relations of production ordered by 
productive powers, Marx also tries to argue that 
capitalism posits socialism. I will, in the next 
chapter, turn to his account of the limits of capitalism, 
which I hope to show can be properly understood only on 
the basis of the dialectic of use- and exchange-values. 
Both Ricardo's response to Smith and the marginalist' 
interpretation of this are distinguished by 
3 . 
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tendentiousness. An interpretative deficiency is 
manifest from the very- outset in the way they both 
celebrate Smith's inconsistency in order to discard parts 
of his work and emphasise others. However, the 
substantial point is that crucial issues are lost to both 
attitudes to Smith in the way they seek to be 
improvements upon him. Marx's position, I would say, 
would be that both of these responses to Smith are 
progressive developments, though I do not doubt that in 
terms of explaining capitalism he would maintain that 
Ricardo's is the far more valuable contribution. In 
Smith a jumble of general and specific determinations 
flows from the inability to maintain his distinction of 
use- and exchange-values, but in this jumble issues which 
must involve the inter-penetration of both of these 
distinguished values is present, and is lost when sorted 
out by, in their differing fashions, Ricardo and 
marginalism. Marx's attitude (144) is strong in that it 
recognises in Ricardo the establishment of the specific 
historical structure of the captalistic organisation of 
labour that is described - in an unrivalled fashion - by 
the labour theory of value. He goes on to insert this, 
in a rather more clear way than Ricardo himself (though 
hardly in a fashion beyond improvement), between the 
given empirical and nature in his account of capitalism, 
manifestly as a criticism of commodity fetishism. He 
does not thereby go so far as to deny a theoretical role 
in political economy to the relation between people and 
320 
nature that is the object of marginalism. Some confusion 
arises here because Marx is, I think, far more critical 
of the commodity fetishist depiction of relations between 
people and things than he could have been of a 
marginalism in which the refinements involved in the 
concepts of utility and scarcity as opposed to the 
concept of inherent value were made clear. For it is the 
distance between the social relations of capitalism and 
the possible relations between people and nature fostered 
under capitalism that, I think, Marx identifies as the 
contradiction of that mode of production that posits 
socialism. This is the progressive element of 
marginalism set in an enlightening historical context 
more or less absent from marginalism itself; and as such 
is a deepening of this bourgeois criticism of capitalist 
limits on economic activity. Let us now look at how Marx 
set out his account of capitalist development in detail. 
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PART 




MARX'S ACCOUNT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM 
Introduction 
I want now to set out the main lines of Marx's account of 
the capitalist mode of production, intending to deepen 
our understanding of that account by showing how it 
articulates the dialectical positing of a higher social 
form in the existing which I have tried to show is 
central to Marx's philosophy of historical explanation. 
I will specifically argue that socialism is posited 
within capitalism as a set of potentialities created by, 
and also necessary measures in order to deal with, the 
burgeoning forces of use-value production when these, 
inevitably, push beyond the social relations of 
production of exchange-value and capital. A chronic 
tendency towards overproduction in the capitalist economy 
which becomes acutely manifest in increasingly profound 
crises is the signal to the capitalist mode of production 
that it both contains potentialities which it cannot 
realise and that the pressures of this containment are 
bound to accumulate. 
I hope, of course, to show how my interpretation of 
Marx's attitude of Hegel can help us to understand Marx's 
substantive work. More than this, however, I want to 
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continue to ask how far that work manages to successfully 
carry on Hegel's legacy and allows Marx to give an 
account of socialism that substantially and theoretically 
solves Marx's and Hegel's, as it were, joint proposals of 
the overcoming of alienation in modern society. 
Simple Reproduction 
Marx's account of the limits to capital accumulation has 
a two-stage form, discussing the problems of simple and 
then of expanded reproduction, and we shall consider 
these in turn. 
In part three of volume two of Capital, Marx takes up 
again the concepts of total (C), constant (c) and 
variable (v) capitals and of surplus value (s) which he 
used to describe the structure of capitalist production 
in volume one, and employs them in the context of the 
examination of circulation given earlier in volume two to 
ask two questions of the capitalist economy. Firstly, 
what are the conditions of commodity exchange which would 
allow a given level of commodity reproduction - simple 
reproduction - to take place? Secondly, what such 
conditions would be needed to allow this production to 
continue and to generate capital accumulation, that is, 
would allow expanded reproduction to take place? 
The ground for Marx's approaching reproduction in this 
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zwo stage rasnion turn on its theoretical isolation of 
growth. It is important to see that this is a 
theoretical fiction in a particularly strong sense. 
Leaving aside accumulation is to leave aside the very 
goal of capitalist economic effort. Furthermore, 
isolating growth involves supposing that the conditions 
of production remain constant when capitalism typically 
revolutionises them (1). (On this last point, it will be 
seen that even simple reproduction, in value terms, of 
constant capital must call forth accumulation in other 
spheres of the economy because of the increased 
productivity of new machinery over old, even though the 
former may be entirely charged as depreciation on the 
latter (2)). Marx, of course, insisted on these two 
characteristics of capitalism as much as anyone. 
nuwever, LL uerzainly is necessary to grasp the 
conditions of simple reproduction in order to assess the 
potential for growth in the whole economy, because any 
level of expanded reproduction is a surplus over simple 
reproduction. What is more, analysis of the requisite of 
simple reproduction in capitalism can allow us to ask 
whether there is the possibility not only of stagnation 
in the capitalist economy - no accumulation and therefore 
no expansion of repoduction - but also of defective 
simple reproduction? (3). That is to say, we can examine 
the strength of the capitalist process of reproduction as 
such. 
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Marx divides the capitalist economy into two departments, 
i producing means of production, and ii producing means 
of consumption, giving the following model: 
department i ci + vi + si = C. 
department ii c11 + vii + s11 = iii (4ý. 
Of course almost any number of departments could be 
depicted. Marx had himself worked with a four department 
model in the Grundrisse (5), and as he deepens his 
discussion of the two department model in volume two we 
are given the materials, such as the distinction between 
necessary and luxury consumption, for a schema detailing 
many more departments (6). A two department model, 
however, constitutes all the theoretical apparatus needed 
to focus on the fundamental sociological problems of 
reproduction. A general element of all modes of 
production is that their production is directed at the 
satisfaction of the consumption needs of the people 
within them and is also directed at the provision of the 
means of production with which new production can take 
place. It is the ability of capitalism to satisfy this 
requisite that Marx's two department model of simple 
reproduction is able to put to the test. 
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The conditions for commodity exchange in and between 
departments for simple reproduction are: 
C=C 1 11 1 
vi + si + vii + sii - C.. (7). 
To reach these equilibrium conditions, constant capital 
reproduction charges must equal the product of department 
i and revenues to the labour force and capitalists 
(ignoring other claimants upon surplus value), that is 
wages and profits, must equal the product of department 
ii (all profits being unproductively consumed as there is 
no accumulation). These conditions can be determined by 
the most simple mathematics; mathematics that could get 
only increasingly complicated due to the multiplication 
of data and not really intrinsically more complex as one 
enlarged the number of departments in the reproduction 
model. A similarly complicated picture to the one 
presented by such value calculation would emerge were one 
to attempt, following particularly Leontiev, to chart the 
material inputs and outputs of decreasingly abstract 
departmental schemas. But when we turn to the 
investigation of the means by which equilibrium would 
actually have to be reached in the capitalist economy, 
the picture is not merely complicated, but is 
convolutedly complex as simple reproduction is shown to 
have to be realised through a number of economic 
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mechanisms which are by-no means in economic harmony. 
As I am interested not so much in detailing these 
mechanisms themselves but in the overall character of 
the reproduction process they constitute, I will make 
only a few observations. Though conducted in terms of 
exchange-values in the capitalist economy, reproduction 
in that or any other economy is a question of the 
distribution of use-values. The difficulties inherent in 
this are not really adequately described by conceiving of 
the capitalist circulation process as a dual flow of 
exchange- and use-values (8). There is only one flow, 
and in it the imperative distribution of use-values can 
be achieved only through the exchange of exchange-values 
(9). We should note further that in circulation 
conducted in terms of exchange, -values, even value 
equilibrium cannot be the object of bourgeois calculation 
(10). It is in the spaces between values and 
exchange-values that the rushed destruction of capital 
that attends the pursuit of surplus profits by productive 
innovation takes place (11). Much less than even this 
can the division of the production process into c, v and 
s as reproductive sectors be made a conscious object, for 
these sectors are perceived through forms of revenue, 
forms which obscure the sectors' real productive roles 
(12). 
One could go on, but I would like to merely add to these 
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obstructions to simple reproduction which we must note 
when considering the nature of capital as a whole some 
mention of the obstructions which emerge when we consider 
that the whole capital is necessarily made up of 
individual capitals. These capitals typically not only 
lack an overall view of the economy, but conduct 
themselves in ways which, in their competition between 
each other, certainly need not even embrance their dim 
perception of the general economic interest and may well 
be antithetic to this (13). 
Even from this brief list of factors, the conclusion to 
which recognition of the separation of use- and 
exchange-values must lead, when that separation is 
understood not as a sundering but a mediation, is that 
the possibility of defective valorisation embodied in 
this real separation is not an isolable malfunction of 
the capitalist economy but a disproportionality endemic 
to it (14). This disproportion can be the ground of 
crises through the multiplier effect of a sufficiently 
large initial dislocation in the allocation of resources 
(15). In its characteristically unplanned outcomes (16), 
capitalist circulation, if not perhaps chaotic as there 
are certainly determinate influences at work in it (17), 
has as its first and foremost law that it is conducted as 
if it were chaotic. That the law of the capitalist 
economy is chance (18) was one of the first conclusions 
Marx, following Engels, reached in his political economic 
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studies (19), and in volume two we have the full 
development of this central idea. 
This link between Marx's earlier and later writings 
illustrates what I think is the main characteristic of 
Marx's account of the mechanisms of simple reproduction 
in capitalism. This is that these mechanisms engender a 
more or less complete lack of social self-consciousness 
in the conduct of economic life. At the end of the 
process of capitalist circulation, very little indeed can 
be seen of the social organisation of labour that is at 
the heart of the process. True enough, even the most 
disparate phenomena of capitalist reproduction are to be 
explained through the labour theory of value, but this is 
not to say that those phenomena easily or clearly 
represent the essential organisation of labour. In a 
sense, the science of political economy arises in order 
to penetrate exactly the alienation which capitalist 
economic mechanisms must create (20), robbing the members 
of bourgeois society of social self-consciousness of 
their economic life. The economic phenomena of the 
capitalist made of production are the material 
foundations of alienated social consciousness, and when 
crises of disproportionality arise they are very strongly 
grounded in a lack of social self-consciousness. 
Expanded Reproduction 
We have seen that the conditions of commodity exchange in 
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and between the departments for simple reproduction are: 
Ci f Cii Ci ýCi + Vi f Siý 
vi + si + vii + s.. - Cii (cii + vii + sii). 11 
If we eliminate those commodity exchanges which are to 
take place within departments, that is, ci will partially 
valorise Ci and vii + sii will partially valorise iii' 
then we are left with the following condition of exchange 
between the departments for simple reproduction: 
v. +si=c. (21). i ii 
By reducing to this condition I do not of course mean to 
imply that the other exchanges will take place 
unproblematically. But this reduction facilitates a 
change of focus from problems of the very carrying out of 
reproduction at all in a capitalist economy to some 
structural contradictions which that economy presents to 
such a state. How this is so will, I hope, emerge. 
Before turning to this we must look at how expanded 
reproduction modifies this condition of exchange between 
departments, for we have now to consider accumulation. 
I will give some account of aspects of capitalist 
reproduction at pertinent moments in what follows. At 
this point we need only consider that what distinguishes 
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expanded from simple reproduction is that, in the former, 
part of s is reinvested in the next production cycle, 
augmenting the capital which enters that cycle with the 
aim of producing more s which can itself then be a fund 
for further expansion (22). 
Of course all investment for expanded reproduction in 
this model is, as it were, a saving by capitalists out of 
the possible fund for luxury consumption. The very 
expansion of the capital invested involved here means, 
however, that after a certain point both luxury 
consumption and investment can expand. It is this 
position I will consider. We must then divide up s for 
any capital according to where it will enter into the 
next cycle of production. If we let sl be a sum which 
would maintain luxury consumption at its previous level, 
s2 be a sum which is used to increase that consumption, 
s3 be aa sum used to increase c in the next production 
cycle, and s4 be a sum used to increase v in that coming 
cycle, then we can state the following conditions of 
exchange in and between departments for the, as it were, 
dynamic equilibrium of expanded reproduction: 
ci + s31 + c11 + s3ii = C. (ci + vi + sli + s2i + s3i + s4i) 
v1 + s4i + sli + s2i + vii +s4 ii + slii + s2.11 
Cii (Cii + vii + slic + s211 + s3ii + s4ii). 
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Again we may reduce these conditions to the requirement 
of exchange between the departments: 
vi + s4i + sli + s2i - cii + s3 ii. 
This condition is obviously very similar to that for 
simple reproduction, and indeed will simplify further 
when we remember that vi + sli = cii, as this is the 
component of simple reproduction that must be 
accomplished even in: expanded reproduction, and that 
therefore: 
s4. + s2i = s3 ii, 
The multiple obstructions and detours through which 
simple reproduction must be mediated can and do enter 
into contradiction with these exchange conditions, 
requiring us to regard instances of disproportionality 
here and in the consideration of simple reproduction as 
actualisations of chronic latent contradictions. 
However, a rather stronger notion of contradiction, of 
contradiction necessarily arising from the very working 
of the system, is also displayed by the capitalist 
economies as an obstruction to expanded reproduction. 
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Consideration of the dynamic equilibrium conditions of 
exchange between the departments which we have just 
discussed is a good place to begin. in the description of 
this contradiction. Marx argues overall in Capital, I 
think, that there is a chronic tendency for cii + s311 to 
rise in value at a greater rate than vi + s4i + sli + s2i. 
If this is so there will be a tendency for a specific 
disproportion in the economy, of failure to valorise 
cii + s311 which for capitalist production will mean a 
breakdown in expanded reproduction (23). This is of 
course an instance of disproportionality in a sense. 
However, as I have aleady intimated, we are not really 
dealing here with the shortcomings of the very matching 
of commodity flows in the capitalist economy, but with a 
specific structural tendency to obstruct expanded 
reproduction. We are dealing, in fact, with the 
particular disproportionality which I shall follow Marx's 
most common - though not completely consistent - usage in 
calling overproduction. 
The Organic Composition of Capital 
From our discussion of the the way the nature of capital 
posits an infinite urge to accumulate, we can go on to 
say of the production cycle examined in expanded 
reproduction that it is undertaken in order to furnish 
the greatest possible amount of s (24). Two importantly 
distinct ways of doing this are open to the capitalist. 
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One is to increase the mass of s by absolutely increasing 
v. This is the extraction of absolute surplus value that 
is the very essence of the establishment of developed 
capitalist production, a process of the increase of the 
number of wage-labourers (25) and of the amount of time 
they each spend in wage-labour (26). More important once 
production has been, as Marx puts it, really rather than 
only formally subsumed under the capitalist mode (27), is 
increase of s not through the mass of v but of the rate 
at which v produces s (28). This is the production of 
relative surplus value by increase of the rate of surplus 
value 2 (29). Let us look at how relative surplus value 
may be produced. 
If we assume that (the number of wage-labourers and) the 
length of the working day is fixed and the possibilities 
of increasing absolute surplus value are thus exhausted, 
it remains possible to increase s by increasing the part 
of the working day in which s is produced. This increase 
in surplus labour-time means of course a decrease in 
necessary labour-time (30), that is, a decline in the 
value of labour-power. It is the reduction in the value 
of labour-power that is the mechanism of the production 
of relative surplus value. The value of labour-power is 
of course governed by the value of the consumption 
necessary for the reproduction of the labour force (31). 
Therefore relative surplus value is produced by increases 
in the use-value productivity of the labour-time spent on 
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the commodities which go to necessary consumption. We 
have here Marx's formulation of Smith's insight into the 
unprecedented use-value productive capacity of 
capitalism. Marx 'does not place any reliance on Smith's 
unacceptable delimitation of the possible capacity of 
want, however. Marx does, it is true, see this 
unprecedented increase of use-value productivity as 
burdened by limits, but these are located in the value 
consequences of the technical changes required to furnish 
relative surplus value. 
This massive impulse which capitalism gives to the 
improvement of the productitivity of labour is obeyed 
basically by alterations in the composition of capital 
itself. The natural character of the labour process, in 
which use-values are produced by transforming raw 
material with the aid of tools (32), means that increases 
in use-value productivity are gained by increases in the 
amount of raw material which a given amount of labour can 
transform, which implies an increase in the, as it were, 
mechanical assistance offered by the tool. This is a 
shift in the technical composition of the labour process; 
a relative increase in the means of production over 
living labour. All such natural considerations on the 
production of use-values are in themselves quite 
immaterial to the capitalist, except in so far as they 
are the technical requisite of reduction in the value of 
labour-power. But alterations in technical composition 
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of course alter the value composition of capital, though 
of course the two are by no means the same thing (33). 
There are a number of ways of assessing the value 
composition of capital, but the way which has proven most 
fruitful focuses on the amount of c in the sum of c and 
v, that is c+v, which 
is usually designated by q in 
discussions of this issue. 
On a cursory look at this issue, it would seem that the 
pursuit of relative surplus value must raise q, for the 
technical composition of capital is altered in favour of 
c by this pursuit. This conclusion directly follows, 
however, only given that the level of technique remains 
constant, so that the values of c and v per unit do not 
change, only their absolute amounts are increased, let us 
say, by differing degrees. But the very point of the 
effort is, we recall, precisely to increase the level of 
technique and so reduce the value of v. Part and parcel 
of reduction in the value of labour-power will 
undoubtedly eventually be a reduction in the value of the 
means of production. The value of c could, then, fall as 
much if not more than v in the effort to produce relative 
surplus value, leaving net alterations in value 
composition quite indeterminate as to overall direction 
in changes in q even when we can say that the technical 
composition of the labour process will change in favour 
of the amount of means of production (34). 
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Marx was of course quite well aware that reductions in 
the value of c per unit will follow from attempts to 
reduce the value of v (35). But he did not seem to 
regard this as disturbing an unproblematic, virtually 
tautological, proportionality in the changes in q brought 
about by alterations in technical composition (36). In 
volume three, as part of his formulation of the law of 
the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, he implies 
that there is a basic, tendency for q to rise which is 
only, as it were antecedently, slowed by reduction in the 
value of c per unit (37). But if we are unable to really 
say anything about the directions of change in q, this 
listing of reduction in the value of c as a counteracting 
force to a basic tendency would be a wholly unwarranted 
way of speaking (38). 
I have so far spoken of the value and not the organic 
composition of capital as I think the essential requisite 
of understanding Marx's attitude to reductions in the 
value of c per unit as they affect q is to distinquish 
between organic and value composition. In his scripts of 
around 1863 Marx seems to identify organic compositon 
with technical, not value, composition (39), and a close 
reading of the passage in volume one where technical, 
value and organic compositons are defined shows that 
organic composition is value composition "as it is 
determined by and mirrors the changes in technical 
composition" (40). Of themselves such narrow 
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philological issues are of little theoretical interest, 
but the distance between value and organic compositions 
which these passages indicate does prove of theoretical 
substance. This distance does ground Marx's way of 
presenting reductions in the value of c per unit as a 
counteracting force to overall increases in q, and this 
plays an important role in, to return to our starting 
point, the explanation of the pursuit of relative surplus 
value. 
At time T the pursuit by capital C of increased relative 
surplus value by increase of its technical composition 
will in fact take the form of a, to all intents and 
purposes, direct increase in its value composition. 
Though there may well have taken place a change in 
productivity that will eventually lower the value of c 
per unit, at time T this change will not have taken 
place. Even if capital C produces a means of production 
only remotely related to the production of the objects of 
necessary consumption this will be so. For the value of 
c per unit is the social value, and at time T this 
remains as it was before the change in the technical 
composition of C. In the distance between the working 
through of the consequences of the recomposition of C, C 
will, by its unequalled rate of relative surplus value, 
be able to win surplus profit over the general rate and 
may well be able to increase its market by cutting the 
price per unit'of its product. The competitors of C will 
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have to recompose their own capitals to compete with C, 
and this will of course generally lower the value of c 
and v as the increase of productivity and the rate of 
relative surplus value becomes generalised. Marx uses 
this very explanation to account for the general rise in 
relative surplus value by the actions of individual 
capitals (41). I think taking organic composition as the 
direct value recomposition (that is, based on old values) 
of C due to its technical recomposition at T is a 
requisite of assessing both the short-term behaviour of C 
and C's effect on the economy and the long-term changes 
in the rate of exploitation due to the real process 
described as relative surplus value production. 
Certainly the effects on q of organic composition and of 
the net value composition after reductions in c and v per 
unit consequent upon the multiplier effect of the 
technical recomposition of C would seem to be open to 
quantification (42). 
Let us turn to the long-term considerations which arise 
here. The organic composition of a capital will, then, 
always represent a rise in q. However, this is not to 
say, to turn to this more important point, that 
successive organic compositions will tend towards ever 
increasing values of q, for of course in assessing the 
overall change in value composition over successive 
episodes of organic composition we have to take into 
account the revaluing of c that will take place between 
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those episodes. But with further consideration it does 
become necessary to say that successive organic 
compositions will increase the overall value of q. 
At time T the technical recomposition of capital C will 
give it an organic composition in which value of q has 
increased, that is, in Cc will be larger and v 
relatively smaller than before the technical changes. 
Let us allow that the multiplier effect of this 
alteration as it reflects on the settled new value 
composition of C at time T' can be only to lower the 
value of v even further if it has any effect in this 
area. But what of the value of c? Eventually the value 
of c per unit will certainly be lowered, the speed of 
this consequence depending on the location in the economy 
of C's product. -However, I think we can say that 
whatever this location, the reduction in the value of c 
per unit will ultimately be lower than the reduction in 
v. Let us recall that the value of v is the value of the 
objects of necessary consumption. (Together with luxury 
consumption about which more later but which for now I 
will discount) v represents, then, the end point, to put 
it this way, of the economy, consumption. Now, technical 
recomposition of even the most insular sphere of 
production of department i, producing means of production 
which make parts of new means of production let us say, 
must ultimately depend on reduction in the value of v, 
because the ultimate valorisation of the investment in 
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even these recompositions remote from detartment ii must 
come from the sale of objects of ultimate consumption. 
New investment in any sphere of production must 
ult mately be funded in the capitalist economy by gains 
in some capital's market for the production of objects of 
consumption. Lacking this ultimate valorisation, no 
investment made with the aim of producing valorisable 
surplus-value will take place. Obviously, for certain 
capitals, investment in c is so remote from the 
production of wage-goods that it seems as if there was no 
relation here, but this speaks of the limitations of an 
individual capital's grasp of the total economy more than 
of the true state of affairs (43). The competitive 
accumulation impulse must eventually work towards 
reduction in v in order to fund any development in the 
productivity of c. (Though, of course, given other 
principles of economic organisation, increases in 
consumption need not be the pre-requisite of investment 
in the productivity of the furnishing of means of 
production. Investment in this area could be undertaken, 
let us say, simply to reduce, as an end in itself, 
necessary labour-time in these industries). I would say, 
then, that c will be reduced in value per unit at a lower 
rate than v, because the former can. typically be 
undertaken only in order to do the latter. Successive 
organic compositions will, therefore, take place on the 
basis of value compositions in which earlier organic 
compositions had had the effect of raising q (44). 
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The Law of the Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall 
The tendency of q to rise with, but typically at a 
greater rate than (45), capital accumulation was of the 
greatest interest to Marx, because he gave it a central 
role in his account of the law of the tendency of the 
rate of profit to fall (46), a law, there can be no 
doubt, he thought of the utmost importance in the 
analysis of the historical location of capitalism (47). 
I will for the moment exclude other variables and simply 
set out Marx's way of linking rising organic composition 
and falling profit rate, and then discuss the strength of 
this link in the light of the reintroduction of those 
variables. In this mode of presentation I am following 
Marx's own way of presenting "the law itself" followed by 
"counteracting forces", and as the real issue is whether 
in the light of the counteracting forces the law itself 
can be said to describe a real tendency this way of 
proceeding obviously has its shortcomings. I am no doubt 
betraying my eventual conclusion in the very way I set 
about the task of examining this law - it is because I do 
feel the basic law to be valid and that grasping it is a 
pre-requisite to correctly understanding its 
counteracting forces as such that I take over this two 
part way of formulating the law. 
The basic point is simple enough - indeed a 
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(mathematical) tautology (48). Seeking relative surplus 
value is a contradictory goal, and therefore developed 
capital accumulation is a contradictory process, for the 
relative decline in v at which the capitalist aims must 
relatively reduce the source from which s is produced, 
for of course c does not produce s (49). Let us 
calculate on the basis not of the rate of surplus value, 
s 
v' but in the terms with which the capitalist is concerned 
(indeed even cognisant of) the rate of profit, p, that 
s 
is, surplus over total capital advanced: -+v (50). It 
is evident that there is a fundamental proportionality of 
the rate of profit and the rate of surplus value 
determined by the amount of v in the sum of c and v such 
that p: v=v: c+v (51). We can see therefore that 
the capitalist is faced with a relative reduction in that 
part of the total capital which can produce a surplus. 
Holding other infuences constant, it is obvious that an 
increasing q must lower the rate of profit, a tendency 
which will be more manifest with increasing accumulation. 
One important difference, of which Marx himself made a 
great deal (52), between this theory of the falling rate 
of profit and that of Ricardo is that Marx is by no means 
committed to the direct opposition of profits and wages 
which forms the basis of Ricardo's thinking. In Marx's 
terms, Ricardo does not ever deal with profit. In 
calculating on the basis of only variable capital and 
surplus he deals only with surplus value, and not with 
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surplus against total capital advanced, that is, with 
constant capital as well. Marx's introduction of c frees 
the theory of the falling rate of profit from having to 
rely on direct deductions from profit, the essential 
shortcoming of Ricardo's formulation (53). This is of 
the greatest significance, for capital accumulation will 
involve pressures to increase c, v, s and C. Marx was 
able to set out the relationship of the rate of profit to 
the rate of surplus value in the light of changes in 
isolated aspects of production treated as variables (54). 
Accumulation will give definite positive directions to 
the absolute growth of these variables, and by 
considering these we can assess the specific effect of 
the accumulation process on the rate of profit. I should 
-say in advance, however, that I do not intend to deal 
with all the factors treated by Marx as countervailing 
farces, much less with all the other possible influences 
on the rate of profit of which one could conceive. 
Rather I mean to treat of only those which enter into the 
issue not because of some possible empirical conjuncture 
of factors, but because they are directly related to the 
basic structure and must therefore be part of any 
theoretical statement of the law of the tendency of the 
rate of profit to fall. Allowing what I have said about 
q, there remains the behaviour of 
2 
and of the absolute 
growth of C. 
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The Rate of Exploitation 
t 
On the first page of the chapter on 'The Law Itself', 
Marx illustrates the law of the tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall by a table in which v, s and hence 
v 
are 
the same for five capitals but c is increasingly large, 
and shows that p thus decreases over the five capitals 
(55). It has therefore seemed to some commentators on 
Marx's formulation of the law that that formulation 
presupposes a constant rate of 
2 (56). Presupposing 
this, the law would certainly be proven once one had 
established that q must rise, but of course to do this is 
wholly unwarranted as increases in q are the very means 
of increasing 
ý. Marx's subsequent listing of "the more 
intense exploitations of labour" as the first of his 
counteracting forces (57) 'would thus seem quite 
disingenous. In the absence of further argument we have 
every right to think that counteracting force might quite 
annul or even reverse, indeed deny existence, to the law 
itself. 
As a matter of fact, it is only this juxtaposition of the 
first page or so of chapter thirteen and the first few 
pages of chapter fourteen of volume three that provides 
textual evidence for this attribution to Marx of a 
holding constant of s. Not only is it rather 
implausible to imagine that Marx forgot that he had laid 
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the basis for part three of volume three in part four of 
volume one, but it is made explicit enough in the rest of 
chapter thirteen and elsehwere (58) that Marx thought of 
s 
the law as covering the rising values of - which could be 
expected with accumulation. What is more, it is possible. 
to construct the table in which Marx gives S as a 
V S 
constant with quite steeply rising values of -V and still 
show p falling (59). Of course, these values are all 
quite arbitrary, and were one to give even higher values 
of ý then p could be shown as stable or even rising. 
What we have to do, again in the absence of firm 
empirically derived figures, is try to theoretically 
assess what is the likely relation of q and ý with the 
progress of accumulation. Marx did actually consider 
this at some length in the Grundrisse, and reading the 
relevant pages would seem to be - judging by the history 
of the understanding of Marx on this point -a 
pre-requisite of evaluating the fragments on this issue 
in Capital. 
The fundamental point is that, as Marx puts it when 
introducing the importance of the rate of surplus value 
in determining its absolute mass in volume one, "there 
are limits, which cannot be overcome, " to the 
compensation for a relative decline in v by a rise in s-. 
As long as necessary labour has any positive value, the 
amount of* surplus labour must be less than 24 hours in a 
day (60), and of course the working day is shortened by 
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political action beneath this absolute maximum (61). 
Marx seems in Capital to have thought this sufficient. 
In volume three he briefly repeats that there are 
definite limits to the degree to which rising ! can 
compensate for a relatively declining v, and gives the 
illustration that "two workers working for twelve hours a 
day could not supply the same surplus-value as twenty 
four workers each working two hours", even if the former 
were able to live on air and hence scarcely needed to 
work at all for themselves" (62). The present progress 
of automation allows of interesting speculations on the 
basis of what would happen as capital encounters these 
limiting cases (63). But of course, it was not these 
cases which Marx had in mind as he attempted to relate 
these limits to the actual character of the capital of 
his time. For even us now, for whom total automation 
still remains just speculation, it remains to be 
regretted that Marx did not make as clear in Capital the 
relation of these limits to the actual working of the law 
of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall as he did 
in the Grundrisse. 
In the Grundrisse Marx outlines, through some rather 
weakly worked out examples in fact, what must 
mathematically follow from the statement of the above 
limits, once one had secured, and this is all implied in 
allowing a rising value of q, the real significance of 
those limits. Although this is not necessary, let us 
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follow Marx's numerical examples, though making necessary 
corrections. Let us take necessary labour time as half 
the working day. Let us further assume that labour 
productivity doubles. Necessary labour time is therefore 
now only one quarter of the working day. However, though 
the productive force has doubled, surplus labour time and 
surplus value have grown by only one quarter. "If the 
productive force is quadrupled, then the original 
relation (between necessary and surplus labour) becomes 
one eighth and the value grows by only one eighth". To 
I 
go even further: "If necessary labour were I, 000 (of the 
working day) and the productive force tripled then it 
(necessary labour) would fall to only 3,000' or surplus 
labour would have increased by only3,000 "" What these 
examples illustrate is that the surplus value of capital 
cannot increase as does the multiplier of the productive 
force, and that the disparity here will increase with 
every previous raising of the level of productivity. The 
pursuit of relative surplus value must involve 
diminishing returns in the terms of the improvement of 
2 
gained by a raising of q, and this pursuit must become 
increasingly difficult with every succeeding effort (64). 
It is this development of the need to recompose 
ever-larger capitals, in which c must be growing far 
faster than v, in order to gain ever smaller improvements 
s 
in - as capital accumulation progesses that Marx begins 
toque i&e-IVA{tlaw of the tendency of the rate of profit to 
fall. 
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In order to avoid confusion, it is important to bear in 
mind that these statements of a relation do not tell us 
anything about the absolute amounts of c, v and s 
involved in any C (65). Marx is speaking of total 
capital, capital in general, and the outlook for 
individual capitals of varying absolute sizes can be very 
diff-erent within this overall picture. I will begin to 
talk about the absolute dimensions of capital in the next 
section. Before going on to this, however, I would like 
to complete these remarks on the relation of 
S to q by 
offering some explanation of how "more intense 
exploitation of labour" can actually feature entirely as 
a counteracting force to the tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall. What Marx has in mind here are in fact 
s 
methods of raising v- which do not involve a rise in q. 
This in fact means the intensification of labour, which 
at one level is just the exceptional case of sweating, 
and at another level means changes in the general value 
of labour power, which simply sets new base lines for the 
developments we are discussing. He feels able to set 
this out as a counteracting factor because the usual 
method of raising 
1 is, precisely, to raise q, and these 
other methods which do not raise q are exceptional. They 
certainly would counteract the basic tendency of the rate 
of profit to fall because they raise 1 without the usual 
consequence of this, a further increase in q, following 
(66), but their relatively exceptional character allows 
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them to be treated as a secondary consideration. 
The Industrial Reserve Army 
I intend now to turn to a factor which in a sense does 
not have a place in a discussion of the rate of profit as 
it does not directly affect that rate. However, I 
consider this factor, the possibility of absolute growth 
in Co indispensable to setting out the context in which 
the tendency of the rate of profit to fall works. In 
other words, I would say that the consideration of this 
factor by "underconsumption theories" which give 
alternative accounts of crisis to that of the law of the 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall is a mistake, for 
these two main lines of the explanation of capitalist 
crises are mutally complementary, indeed are mutually 
constitutive (67). 
A rise in q would have no detrimental effect on the 
absolute mass of profit, though the profit rate would 
fall, if the accumulation of C took place at such a pace 
that the absolute growth or restricted absolute decline 
of v produces, at the increasing rates of 
29 
a mass of s 
that counterbalances the influence of the relative growth 
of c on the profit rate (68). A capital will of course 
seek always to employ as much v (and c) as possible (69), 
and in fact for larger capitals this mass of v has served 
very well as the base of continued accumulation (710), 
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giving these capitals a great advantage over small 
capitals (71). Though in the absence of firm statistics 
about increases in q one can really only guess, we might 
straight away suspect that the rates of growth in C 
required for this compensatory effect are, after a 
certain point has been reached in concentration and 
centralisation, fanciful. However, we can get rather 
closer to an examination of this possibility by focusing 
upon what must certainly be part of it, and which is 
something we might initially imagine to be part of 
accumulation as such, a tendency to full employment. 
An obvious consequence of increasing accumulation would 
be a growing demand for labour-power. For Ricardo, as we 
might expect from his conception of the relation of wages 
to profits, this was a serious obstacle to capitalist 
progress. But if he saw nature eventually posing 
difficulties for such progress by the recalcitrance of 
agricultural production, nature fortunately came to the 
rescue in this instance. The doctrine of population 
identified with Malthus' name (72) has a central place in 
classical political economy largely through that body of 
thought's reliance upon the doctrine for the restriction 
of wages to a level commensurate with capital 
accumulation, a reliance from which Ricardo was not 
exempt. The argument runs basically thus: as 
accumulation progresses the demand for labour will rise 
and wages will increase. This will be an increase in 
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real as well as money wages. In this position, the 
market price of labour being above its natural price will 
represent an improvement in the labourers' conditions. 
Profits will by this very token be restricted and an 
obstacle to further accumulation will have arisen. 
However, the rise in the labourers' conditions will 
eventually be reflected in an increased labouring 
population, due to this population's peculiar tendency to 
(geometrically) expand to the maximum possible given a 
certain level of provision, which will redress the 
balance of supply and demand for labour even at the new 
level of accumulation. This reduces wages to their 
natural level or even, by a reaction, for some time below 
that level (73). 
Marx's analysis of capitalism clearly required some 
similar tailoring of the price of labour-power to the 
needs of accumulaton, but this solution given by Ricardo 
was anathema to him and is undoubtedly that part of The 
Principles from which Marx gained the least. Looking at 
the tone of Marx's writings on this issue, it seem that 
Marx's ability to see the cyncicism of Smith and Ricardo 
in a light which set it off to best effect quite left him 
in the case of Malthus' population theory (74). However 
I would certainly place great weight on Marx's own 
account of why this was so. 
Marx unambiguously placed Malthus' general political 
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economy (75) in the category of a vulgar economic 
regression from Ricardo, and he saw the population theory 
not as wedded to the progressive capitalist interests of 
the time when the bourgeoisie played a historically 
revolu. tionary role, but as a reactionary response to 
capitalism's contradictions as it establishes its 
historical limits (76). The spectacle of a cleric urging 
the rich to unproductive consumption in order to maintain 
in the face of its contradictions an economic system 
whose imposition of narrow necessity on the labouring 
population was nonetheless to be brutally enforced was no 
doubt somewhat hard to bear to a humanitarian who saw in 
those contradictions the possibility of the end of all 
domination by necessity (77). However, our judgment 
must, as Marx would surely have said, turn on our 
evaluation of the theory of population as a scientific 
theory. If we can say that Malthus had a brutal (by our 
standards) disposition and Marx an (overall) generous 
one, whether Malthus was a cyncial reactionary or Marx a 
utopian idealist turn on whether the theory of population 
is true. 
On this point, Marx's scholarly contempt was profound, 
exposing through his enormous acquaintance with the 
political economic and related literature such a degree 
of intellectual indebtedness on Malthus' part that Marx 
thought him a plagiarist (78). The basic line of Marx's 
substantive criticism runs as follows. Malthus's 
354 
geometrical reproduction law is, because it sets out to 
describe a natural difference between human and other 
animal reproduction, not a human law but a natural one. 
The theoretical formulation of this law is very shaky 
(79), but this shakiness is a necessary result of what is 
an attempt to subordinate all the particular historical 
forms of the influences on human population which have 
obtained to one supra-historical formulation. There are 
no doubt real determinations on population growth in all 
historical epochs, but they are certainly set by 
modifications on the natural basis of population that 
must be historically, as they cannot be naturally, 
explained (80). In the case of population under 
capitalism, Marx has no doubt that Malthus has seen a 
real phenomenon of this mode of production - surplus 
population (81). In his theory of relative surplus 
population or the industrial reserve army, Marx gives an 
account of this phenomenon quite parallel to that of 
Malthus (82), but an alternative historical account. 
Let us consider again the impetus to wage rises given by 
capitalists' competition for labour-power during a period 
of expansion. Given the expanded scale of reproduction 
with accumulation it would seem certain, Marx allows, 
that the demand for labour-power would eventually exceed 
customary supply, and wages thus rise (83). During this 
period of the formal subsumption of production to the 
capitalist mode the basic solution to this was expansion 
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of the number of wage-labourers. Though Marx mentions 
this in Capital (84), it is Wage-Labour and Capital (to 
which Marx refers in the passage in Capital) that is the 
foremost explanation of this process which Marx gives, 
and an assessment of the arguments of this published 
speech should bear strongly in mind this context, the 
speech being given in 1847. In developed capitalist 
production in which, let us say, the possibility of 
recruiting wage-labour from non-capitalist sectors of the 
economy is exhausted, Marx thought the capitalist economy 
would restrict wage rises to a level compatible with 
accumulation. 
The basic reason for this is that the purchase of 
labour-power is conditional upon the capitalist's being 
able to produce a valorisable surplus-value with that 
labour-power (85). Assuming a rise in wages which makes 
v dearer for C, one of two cases might obtain. The price 
of v may continue to rise because this rise does not 
interfere with the progress of accumulation. Though the 
increasing cost of v may be a deduction from possible 
profits, if it is the side effect of continuing 
accumulation, the desired effects of that accumulation 
might easily outweigh this unwanted one. What we are 
essentially dealing with here is the mass of profit 
accruing to large capitals compensating them for declines 
in rates of profit. The second possible case is that the 
wage rise does interfere with accumulation. To the 
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extent that it does so, the profit incentive for 
accumulation will be lessened and accumulation will slow 
down. But in slowing down, the cause of the wage rise, 
the disproportion between the demands of expanding 
capital and the labour force, will tend to disappear. 
The price of labour will again fall to a level 
corresponding to capital's requirements for 
self-valorisation, whether this level is the same as or 
lower or higher than before. 
For Marx it is this characteristic of the accumulation 
process to remove the very obstacles it temporarily 
creates that explains the cyclical character of 
capitalist accumulation, or to put this the other way 
around, capitalist crises. It is not, as the population 
theory has it, fluctuations in population that affect 
accumulation, but rather the reverse which is the case 
(86). Marx not only was quick enough to observe that the 
real crises he had seen were describing a cycle of far 
too short a period to be linked to generational 
population shifts, but also that the range of capitalist 
responses to these difficulties were by no means limited 
to passively waiting for population growth, but embraced 
actively changing the pattern of accumulation (87). 
Fundamentally, however, what he stressed in his 
foundation for an explanation of the cyclical character 
of capitalist accumulation is that such a movement was 
historically impossible before the estalishment of the 
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developed capitalist economy. The possibility of 
bringing great productive resources to bear in a short 
time is the requisite of an equally rapid contraction. 
This is quite unimaginable without the development of the 
economic mobility that is the essence of 
ever-accumulating capital and ever fluid wage-labour 
(88). The, as it were, reflected consequences of* 
accumulation for the labour force cannot have a directly 
natural cause. They are inconceivable without a specific 
historical structure of production - capitalism. 
The relinquishment of the population theory in later 
economic explanations of the industrial cycle has 
resulted (disregarding the biological criticisms) from 
the evidence of the persistence of that cycle in a 
capitalism socialised to the point where the clear 
correlation of labour force changes and economic growth 
can by no means be linked to the mortality rates of the 
entire working class. Marx grasped this point the other 
way around. Were capital to wait until, to speak 
bluntly, enough workers had starved to death to make 
accumulation profitable again, capital might find that 
its dominance of the production process had been wrested 
from it by those who wanted to work in order to live even 
when they could not work in order to make a profit (89). 
It might be thought that this foundation for a theory of 
crises can allow of only a very limted degree of 
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accumulation before any further capital expansion would 
necessarily run into labour shortage. However, this is 
not to take into account those consequences of 
accumulation which free it from a direct tie to the 
labour force. Leaving aside the consequence of 
concentration and centralisation that they would allow 
expanding capitals to absorb the labour forces of now 
liquidated other capitals, what I am speaking about is of 
course the accumulative spur to productivity. Accepting 
s 
a rising value of q and a rising rate of - as bound up in 
accumulation, there will be, Marx says, the tendency for 
relative surplus population, or an industrial reserve 
army to be built up with capitalist progress (90). 
Although aware that the English and Welsh birthrate was 
steadily falling (91) (a phenonemon we can now say is 
common to all the advanced bourgeois societies), Marx 
evidently thought that such was the rate of rise in 
organic composition and exploitation that the production 
of the industrial reserve army would continue. In this 
Marx followed Ricardo's change of mind over the 
possibility of labourers who were "set free" from one 
branch of production never having an opportunity to be 
re-employed in another branch - the compensation theory 
as it was called (92). Instead of this constant smooth 
redeployment, the aftermath of each capitalist boom and 
slump would be a recomposed capital in which q was higher 
and the relative surplus population greater. This 
population serves as an industrial reserve army, the 
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especially fluid labour resources that are needed to 
undertake the great new venture of the boom and which by 
their expansion of the available labour force at these 
times lower the pressures for wage rises. Marx 
distinguishes three forms of existence of the relative 
surplus population - the floating, the latent and the 
stagnant - depending on their place in the industrial 
reserve army determined by the distance from taking up 
employment (93), but this need not concern us here. 
What is fundamentally different between Marx's idea of 
relative surplus production and Ricardo's eventual 
rejection of the compensation theory is that whereas the 
latter is, as it were, an adjunct to a doctrine of wages 
and relies on an avowedly biological theorem extrinsic to 
political economy, the former is an integrated whole. 
The ground of Marx's tying of wages to the requirements 
of accumulation and of the formation of relative surplus 
population to the progress of capital accumulation is his 
basic characterisation of the capitalist mode of 
production. We are dealing here with the relation of 
paid to unpaid wage-labour as it develops in the mode of 
production predicated upon wage-labour (94). When in a 
boom period the unpaid labour extracted from the 
labourers would require too much paid labour in order to 
be reconverted into capital, that paid labour will be 
curtailed to a degree which re-establishes the dominance 
of unpaid labour. Equally when the reconversion of 
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unpaid labour into capital with ever increasing amounts 
of c relative' to v takes place, the consequence is that 
paid labour will again be curtailed to the best situation 
for the unpaid labour (95). In the industrial reserve 
army, Marx's critique of the alienation consequent upon 
capitalist production reaches its most developed point. 
When the products of labour have been given such a form 
that living labour is subordinated to them, and not the 
other way around (96), then and only then is it possible 
that the development of productive power will be carried 
out in order to augment the size of the productive forces 
as an end in itself and not, for example, to diminish 
necessary labour. The ultimate result of the vast 
expansion of productivity through capital accumulation is 
not that necessary labour is reduced for all, but that 
some population beomes relatively surplus. And every 
working day can only increase this domination of the 
fetishised products of men and women's work over their 
living labours (97). 
Unlimited Production A. Restricted Consumption 
The competitive raising of wages is not the only, indeed 
it is not the most fundamental, obstacle to an absolute 
growth of production that would provide for large 
individual capitals a mass of s that would always 
compensate for relatively low values of v and p (until 
the limiting case of complete automation would have to be 
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taken into consideration). A truly basic difficulty in 
the way of this possibility arises with the establishment 
of the capitalist form of the relation of production and 
consumption itself. 
Let us again consider the position of capital C as it 
seeks to accumulate. There can be no mistake about the 
strength of the intention here - the aim is an infinite, 
because purely quantitative, growth. Recognition of this 
consequence of the very nature of capital does not only 
tell us a great deal about the absurd fetishism of 
capitalist production as such, it is also of the first 
importance in understanding specific acts of capitalist 
planning. When C expects to expand, it will typically do 
so with unlimited ambition. C's aim is not to satisfy a 
certain need for a use-value to a required degree. It 
cannot with any reliability know of such needs, for we 
are specifically not dealing here with the pre-planned 
allocation of resources, and in any case such knowledge 
is not what is most important to it. If C can expand its 
market for a relatively frivolous use-value it will do 
so, even if this is at the expense of the existing volume 
of consumption of another capital's relatively essential 
use-value. C will attempt to expand its market as far as 
possible, and under the pressures of competition so must 
C's rivals. The form of capitalist growth is, then, to 
seek the infinite expansion of each individual capital. 
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If it could, capital C would all at once produce an 
infinite surplus value (98). But of course we are 
dealing here with a form of general productive 
intercourse with nature, and though C's aims may be 
posited in the terms of only quantitative value, it may 
realise those aims only through the production of 
specific commodities with specific use-values. These 
commodities must be valorised if they are to serve the 
purpses of C's accumulation (99). With the vast increase 
in productivity that characterises capitalism, very soon 
indeed in the history of that mode of production this 
means an expansion of consumption (100). Extrinsically, 
Marx thought the construction of a world market for goods 
as much part of the dynamic establishment of capital's 
domination as the creation of general wage-labour (101). 
Intrinsically, Marx took the historical expansion of 
needs through the creation of the means by which those 
needs may be realistically conceived, to be a most 
important part of capital's unprecendented civilising 
influence (102). Such expansions of consumption must 
ultimately be of wage-goods or luxury goods, for as I 
have mentioned in another context, investment in, and we 
can now say consumption of, the means of production is 
limited in the capitalist economy by the final sale of 
consumption goods. 
There are definite limits, however, to consumption under 
capitalism, limits which contrast rather starkly with the 
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ideology of infinite want which accompanies the 
capitalist form of efforts to expand production. I will 
assume that luxury consumption by capitalists and 
necessary consumption by- wage-labourers are the only 
forms of consumption, and that the fund for accumulation 
is a deduction from the possible fund for luxury 
consumption. 
The in some respects characteristic capitalist attitude 
to luxury consumption has, as is well enough known, been 
as abstemious one (103), an attitude representing a time 
when individual capital formation did in fact 
substantially depend on the personal savings of a 
capitalist. Of course, to treat this as an act of 
abstinence by the capitalist which is paid for by 
profits, the capitalist's wage for renunciation (104), is 
apologetic nonsense. But if the source of profits in 
this idea is fictitious, the abstemiousness which the 
idea. rationalises was not. The temptation to invoke such 
a useful defence of the very existence of capitalists 
prolonged the abstinence theory's life beyond the years 
in which it retained its phenomenal referent in initial 
capital formation, and the defence was still used when 
capitals were yielding volumes of s such that luxury 
consumption and the fund for accumulation could both 
increase spectacularly. This shift in the behaviour of 
capitalists from that described in Weber's 'The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism' to that of 
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Veblen's The Theory of the Leisure Class (the latter in 
fact written before the former) was enough for Marx to 
dismiss the abstinence theory (165). Certainly, without 
the greatest widening of the sense of "abstinence", the 
fact that large capitalists after a certain point in the 
history of capital formation did not consume all 
surplus-value is hardly abstinence, and absolutely not to 
be compared with the sacrifice of labour as described by 
Smith, which comparison Senior intended. Such is the 
volume of s that really the whole language of "savings" 
was virtually redundant for large capitalists when Marx 
wrote - virtually unlimited consumption could accompany 
accumulation. In so far as luxury consumption can still 
adversely affect a specific capital's expansion by 
depleting the necessary fund for accumulation, we can say 
that for any continuing capital, the use of s for luxury 
consumption will be fitted (hardly, I repeat, curtailed) 
to allow of accumulation at a competitive level (106). 
Part of Marx's scorn for the abstinence theory stemmed 
from his displeasure at the lack of consistency of 
capitalists' rejection of abstinence - except in the very 
widest possible sense - for themselves when coupled with 
their enthusiastic advocacy of the salutory effects of 
privation on the industry of wage-labourers, a privation 
which they, the capitalists, enforce in a sort of 
vicarious abstinence (107). As it is obviously the case 
that wage rises are a deduction from possible profits 
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(108), the typical capitalistic. attitude to wages must be 
one of minimisation. I say must be, because wages are a 
cost open to competitive reduction at least as much as 
the price of any element of constant capital (109). 
Fundamentally, wages will be driven down to the minimum 
by capital because from the point of view of capitalist 
production the livelihood of the majority of the 
population is a cost (110). This is not, I think, to say 
that the progress of capital accumulation will involve 
the driving of wages down to an absolute minimum. The 
attribution to Marx of a "theory of immiseration", by 
which is meant the progressive reduction of wages to the 
lowest physiological point compatible with the 
reproduction of labour-power (111), is very dubious 
indeed. Not only did Marx emphatically reject this idea 
in his replies to Weston (112) and to Lassalle's "iron 
law of wages" (113), and make the struggle for wage 
increases an integral part of his political ideas (114), 
but he also thought that the determination of wages, 
though requiring knowledge on the value of labour-power 
based on the cost of worker's reproduction, could not be 
found trough a physiological minimum alone (115). 
However, there are no doubt some passages in Marx which 
can be marshalled in support of an immiseration reading, 
and what is really at issue in this reading, as in all 
such problematic interpretations, is the elucidation of 
the broad context, in this case theoretical context, 
which is the background against which the full meaning of 
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isolated passages can emerge. I would like therefore not 
to turn so much to Marx's explicit comments on wages, 
principally in 'Wage-labour and Capital', 'Wages, Price 
and Profit' and volume one of Capital, but to draw on 
what I have already said about Marx's overall analysis of 
capital in order to put forward the context of these 
comments. (A more internal examination of the 
immiseration thesis will be put forward in a little while 
and in the next chapter). 
In a period of significant expansion fundamentally due to 
an increase in relative surplus value gained by the 
organic recomposition of an influential amount of total 
capital, wages may rise due to competition for 
labour-power. When the new level of productivity is 
generalised if not before, the value of labour-power will 
have fallen. As a result of these compound movements, 
wages will have risen above the value of labour-power. 
In the slump, wages will tend to fall. One can imagine a 
number of possibilities here, but let us first assume 
that money wages return to their original level. Of 
course in this case though the money wage has not 
changed, the real wage has risen. Ko, depending on the 
reduction in necessary labour-time that has occurred in 
the raising of relative surplus value, money wages might 
fall and yet real wages rise (116). In both of these 
case, there will have been a rise in profit, surplus 
value having risen- and the money wage not having 
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increased. The money wage can increase and profit still 
rise either if, because of increased productivity, the 
number of workers falls to such an extent that wage per 
worker will not increase v for the capital, or if v rises 
but at a level which still yields a larger profit to 
capital out of the increased surplus value. Here there 
is a maximum level to which wages can rise. It is the 
level at which accumulation is profitable, and thus the 
settling of the market value of labour-power after a boom 
will, we see, also set the new value of labour-power 
(117). 
There are obviously common themes in all of these 
possible outcomes of alterations in wages with periods of 
capital accumulation. Marx, however, left it open as to 
which specific outcomes would follow. This was because 
although we can say that capital will seek to reduce 
wages to the minimum possible, what this minimum is is 
fixed by an indeterminate "historical and moral element" 
(118). This element is that of the "traditional standard 
of life" which enters a social moment into what is the 
accepted livelihood of the working population which is 
not really connected to any physiological minimum. Or at 
least, efforts to determine this livelihood by reference 
to a physiological minimum are negations of the 
civilising achievements bound up in the exercise of 
historical and moral considerations on the setting of 
wages. For Marx, what exactly wages would be as a result 
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struggle between capital and labour in any period (119). 
This element of indeterminacy is obviously explanatorily 
regrettable in so far as it seems to be theoretical and 
not merely an empirical indeterminacy, and the 
predominant. developments of this issue in marxist 
writings have made the situation worse by celebrating 
"class struggle" as a variable which can be used to make 
the basic ideas fit any situation. I will return to this 
below, when I hope to go some way to remedying the 
theoretical indeterminacy at least. For the present, 
however, I think it is sufficient to note the limits 
within which wage rises may vary within a period of 
capital accumulation and to say that this by no means 
precludes, in fact it may lead us to expect, real wage 
rises with accumulation. 
In view of this, is there, we might ask, any fruitful way 
in which Marx's linking of wages to the progress of 
accumulation might be described as a theory of 
immiseration? There are, I think, two such ways, the 
first rather dubious and of secondary interest, the 
second very strongly supported by and indeed of the 
greatest importance to Marx's analysis of capitalism. 
Firstly, this analysis as it stands in Capital must 
postulate, and does so in so many words, that 
accompanying the rise in relative surplus value that 
allows of real wage increases will be a growth of the 
3.6 9 
relative surplus population, and these people will 
participate less than the working population in the 
general increase in wealth. This argument, though there 
is something in st, cannot really be stretched very far, 
not perhaps far enough to be linked to an idea of 
immiseration. In so far as the floating and latent 
sections of the relative surplus population make up an 
industrial reserve army which is periodically taken into 
employment, then to that degree they will share with the 
more permanent working population the beneifts of any 
wage rises. But what is more, these sections of the 
relative surplus population together with the stagnant 
section might be expected to reap the benefits of the 
political action by which the working population seeks 
increases in real wages, in the form of the social 
security benefits that have been an important aim of 
working class politics. Of course, the real poverty of 
these people will remain, but the idea of absolute 
immiseration is inappropriate here because poverty is a 
relative (though not thereby somehow worthless or 
meaningless) term. 
It is this theme of the relativity of the terms we are 
necessarily using here that brings us to the second sense 
in which Marx's ideas on wages might be a theory of 
immiseration. Wage rises are, we have seen, 
fundamentally the working class' share in the proceeds of 
the general growth of wealth that is accumulation. This 
being so, the amount of wages cannot tell us everything 
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about them - there is the further consideration of the 
relative size of this share in the general enrichment. 
It is very easy indeed to conceive of values of the 
increase in relative surplus value that will confer to 
the capitalist a relatively greater share of the increase 
in social wealth than accrues to the working population 
even with a wage increase (120). This can be interpreted 
in material terms as a vast improvement in the 
livelihoods of capitalists which the relatively tiny 
improvement in the working class' living standards very 
poorly emulates. But I do not think this is principally 
what Marx had in mind in this idea of relative wages. 
This was really the working class' production by its 
labours of the social power of capital that grows ever 
more relatively strong with accumulation. Many of Marx's 
comments on wages, including his criticisms of Weston, 
show that he did not identify struggle over wages with 
the pursuit of narrow material gain (121), confirming the 
impression one receives from his earliest critiques of 
wage-labour. It is this theme, of the self-production of 
an alien power that is, I think, the central one here. 
This is certainly the only sense of immiseration that can 
fairly be said to emerge from the most common place at 
which the theory of immiseration is located - chapter 32 
of volume one on 'The Historical Tendency of Capitalist 
Accumulation' (122). 
It is the collision of strategies of the expansion of 
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production which can know no internal limit and of 
expansions in consumption which are either so small as to 
be almost irrelevant to the system or are only grudgingly 
. uon from that system that Marx regarded as further 
developing the possibility of crises in the capitalist 
economy (123). 
I have mentioned earlier that Marx saw this possibility, 
at the most abstract level, as contained in breakdowns in 
the circulation circuit of capital - money - enlarged 
capital, and we can now see that a dislocation between 
the production of surplus value and its valorisation for 
the purpose of further accumulation is subject not merely 
to chronic disproportionality but to acute contradiction 
due to the capitalist forms of production and 
consumption. I will sketch out a form of the 
actualisation of this possibility in crises in the next 
section, but for now I would like to return to the scheme 
of expanded reproduction in order to detail the position 
we have now reached. 
Recalling our statement of the condition of exchange 
between departments for achieving the dynamic equilibrium 
of expanded reproduction, that is vi + s4. + 
sli + s21 = c1 + s311 we can pinpoint the contradiction 
we have found in the capitalist economy. Given rising 
organic compositions and the inability of capital to 
offset, through various compensations, the tendency which 
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these give to the rate of profit to fall, we will find 
this tendency manifested in a growing difficulty of the 
valorisation of the accumulating constant capital of 
department ii by the relatively slowly growing variable 
capital and surplus value of department ii. This means, 
in essence, an unsaleable mass of consumer goods (124). 
We can see two reasons for this. 
Firstly, the rates of expansion displayed by the two 
departmental sectors are different, so that s4i + 
s2i # s3 ii.. For s4i will relatively fall as a result 
of increases in q, and s2i will also relatively decline 
as s3i takes an increasingly dominant share of si. By 
contrast, s3ii will participate in the general relative 
rise of c in the entire production process. (The 
relationship between ci and cii , and particularly 
between s3i and s3ii , need not detain us here, but of 
course determining this will be of great value in the 
further setting out of the relations contained in the 
scheme of expanded reproduction). 
Secondly, however, the growth of cii is incremental in a 
way which the growth of vi + s11 + s2i is not. These 
revenues, I have assumed, make up the consumption fund 
(any departure from this assumption can only strengthen 
the case I am about to make). They may grow, but being 
consumed in any production cycle, each cycle can contain 
only a specific revenue sum. However co given simple 
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reproduction, will always enter into the cycle with an 
existing value, and the reproduction of that value is the 
starting point of accumulation. And after a period of 
accumulation, it is the reproduction of the now increased 
value of c that is the new starting point of further 
accumulation (125). I am not speaking here of the fact 
that fixed capital will typically yield only part of its 
value to each turnover period of capital (126). I am 
referring to the reproduction of already existing 
constant capital values that is the starting point of 
accumulation. This is a crucial issue. 
I have argued that Smith was forced to conclude that the 
labour theory of value did not hold in commercial 
societies because his idea of the labour involved was 
defective. He included the costs of the generally 
individually owned means of production in the revenue 
accruing to labour in early societies. When noting that 
the means of production in commercial societies were the 
property of a restricted number of owners, he drew the 
erroneous conclusion that labour no longer accounted for 
the price of commodities. What happens is his analyses 
of reproduction is that constant capital in capitalist 
societies disappears, and I have noted that Marx tried to 
remedy this in his own analysis of reproduction. It is 
not, however, the narrowly quantitative matters that 
concern us here, but the descripion of the form of 
reproduction under capitalism. In making any new value, 
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the worker, by the very nature of the labour process' 
utilisation of tools and raw materials, must embody in 
that new value the value. of these means of production. 
The production of surplus value is a question of the 
workers being able to produce goods of more value in a 
working period than he or she requires to support him or 
herself over that period. But in the production of these 
goods, the value of the utilised means of production is 
also transferred (127). For capital, the labour process 
will accomplish the reproduction of the existing value of 
the means of production in the same moment as new values 
are created. The size of capital is thus increased with 
every cycle of accumulation. By its labour, the working 
class in the capitalist form of productive relations with 
nature produces historically relatively vast forces of 
production. But under this form, those forces are an 
alien power which stands against its producers. Beyond a 
certain extent of development, Marx is however arguing, 
the continued production of this power will involve 
increasingly severe disruptions in productive relations 
with nature whilst they remain subsumed to the capitalist 
form. Let us now turn to Marx's detailing of these 
disruptions. 
Overproduction - Crises - Breakdown 
We are now able, I trust, to sum up Marx's analysis of 
capital through the crucial concept of overproduction. 
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The way I would like to do this is to directly address 
some passages in his economic writings which at once seem 
replete with very important material but which have been 
very resistent to interpretation. 
The first of these passages is the following immediately 
striking (128) section of the Grundrisse in which Marx is 
discussing the inherent limits of capital: 
.. there is a limit, not inherent to production 
generally, but to production founded on capital... 
It is enough here to demonstrate that capital 
contains a particular restriction of production - 
which contradicts its general tendency to drive 
beyond every barrier of production - in order to 
have uncovered the foundation of overproduction, the 
fundamental contradiction of developed capital... 
The inherent limits have to coincide with the nature 
of capital, with the essential character of its very 
concept. These necessary limits are: 
1. Necessary labour as limit to the exchange value 
of living labour capacity or of the wages of the 
industrial population; 
2. Surplus value as limit on surplus labour time; 
and, in regard to relative surplus labour time, as 
barrier to the development of the forces of 
production; 
3. What is the same, the transformation into money, 
exchange value as such, as limit of production; or 
exchange founded on value, or value founded on 
exchange, as limit of production. This is: 
4. Again, the same as restriction of the production 
of uusse_ values by exchange value; or that real wealth 
has to take on a specific form distinct from itself, 
a form not absolutely identical with it, in order to 
become an object of production at all. Hence 
overproduction: i. e. the sudden recall of all these 
necessary moments of production founded on 
capital ... 
(129). 
It is, I am sure, correct to read this passage as the 
initial outline of what we have discussed in its more 
developed form - Marx's characterisation of capitalism as 
subject to chronic, incremental crises of overproduction. 
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Firstly, then, necessary labour is, if not the limit of 
the exchange value of living labour capacity, at least a 
constant 'limitation placed upon that value. We have seen 
that from the point of view of production, capital 
regards living labour as a cost, as indeed follows from 
labour-power's position as a commodity like any other. 
Wages will therefore be restricted as far as possible to 
the minimum set by necessary labour. Rises in real wages 
can typically be achieved only through political action 
to expand the historical and moral content of the minimum 
standard of the reproduction of labour-power. 
Secondly, surplus value is the limit placed by capital on 
the amount of surplus labour time that will be worked. 
For capital will withdraw from production if it cannot 
valorise the surplus value produced by surplus labour. 
In so far as the main impetus to the development of the 
forces of production under capitalism is the pursuit of 
relative surplus value by the reduction of necessary 
labour time, the condition of valorising surplus value 
must stand as a potential barrier to such development. 
Thirdly, the possibility of the transformation of capital 
into money, the possibil ity of the valorisation of 
surplus value, will limit production if it is subject to 
difficulties. There is a double transformation here, of 
capital into money by the transformation of the 
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use-values produced by capital into the exchange-value 
which is capital's aim. This latter transformation is 
ultimately dependent upon the volume of final 
consumption, and within this on the volume of the 
consumption of wage-goods. That is to say, the demands 
of valorisation predicated upon increases in the value of 
necessary consumption will contradict the essential 
thrust of capitalist production which is to drive this 
value down relative to constant capital costs. 
Fourthly, we are thus fundamentally presented with the 
restriction of the production of use-values by the form 
of exchange-value. I want to expand this thesis greatly 
in the next chapter, but we can say now that the form of 
production in which exchange-value, that is to say 
commodity production, is generalised, capitalism, will 
eventually posit the continuation of its own form - of 
value and surplus value - as a barrier to the expanded 
production of use-values. 
Hence overproduction; because at certain points in the 
progress of accumulation the continued expansion of 
production founded upon this contradictory -. 
basis will 
experience the effects of those contradictions in the 
breakdown of the accumulation process. The distance 
between capital and money will widen so far as to be a 
breach, and this breach will be materially represented in 
an unsaleable mass of consumer goods, which mass will- 
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have an, as it were, reverse multiplier effect on even 
sectors of the economy producing means of production. Of 
course, this is not absolute over-production, but it is 
certainly overproduction on the basis of capital. The 
term "over-production" might be replaced by, for example, 
under-consumption or over-accumulation, the- latter of 
which perhaps does more to show the specifically 
capitalist nature of these episodes. But on reflection 
over-production brings out this historical peculiarity of 
these episodes more fully in my opinion. Capitalist 
crises are historically unique in that they result from 
superabundance and not from scarcity (though the latter 
type can occur exceptionally); and in having this form 
they declare that human beings have only to consciously 
dominate their own social life in order to end their 
domination by nature. 
The second rather difficult passage which I would like to 
try and explain is to be found in chapter fifteen of 
volume three, the third chapter on the law of the 
tendency of the rate. of profit to fall entitled 
'Exposition of the Law's Internal Contradictions'. This 
chapter is really the conclusion of Capital as Marx left 
it - what follows in volume three are substantially 
addenda to the theory of industrial capital (financial 
capital and rent) and sociological sketching out of the 
character of capitalist production (revenues and 
classes). In this chapter Marx draws his depiction of 
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the immanent contradictions of capitalist production 
together in order to explain their most obvious 
manifestation - crises. Having begun to explain his idea 
that the capital accumulation process contains a 
contradiction, Marx continues:. 
To express this contradiction in the most general 
terms, it consists in the fact that the capitalist 
mode of production tends towards an absolute 
development of the productive forces irrespective of 
value and surplus value considerations, and even 
irrespective of the social relations within which 
capitalist production takes place; while on the 
other hand its purpose is to maintain the existing 
capital value and to valorise it to the utmost 
extent possible... The methods through which it 
attains this end involve a decline in the profit 
rate, the devaluation of the existing capital and 
the development of the productive forces of labour 
at the cost of the productive forces already 
developed. The periodical devaluation of the 
existing capital, which is a means, immanent to the 
capitalist mode of production, for delaying the fall 
in the profit rate and accelerating the accumulation 
of capital value by the formation. of new capital, 
disturbs the given conditions in which the 
circulation and reproduction process of capital 
takes place, and is therefore accompanied by sudden 
stoppages and crises in the production process (130). 
Let us consider this passage in some detail. 
Capital must, Marx is I believe saying, drive beyond all 
barriers to production and is able to posit only the 
absolute development of the productive forces. Though 
it does this as a result of the competitive enforcement 
of its own intrinsic nature, capital will find that this 
development will eventually contradict its nature. 
Nevertheless, capital will continue to pursue this 
development even when it threatens capitalist social 
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relations of production - value and surplus value - 
because each individual capital must do so even at the 
expense of the interest of capital as a whole. The 
specific acts through which the development of the 
productive forces is brought about are cycles of 
individual capitals' expansion involving the production 
of surplus value, its valorisation, and its subsequent 
use as a fund for accumulation. The paramount method of 
the production of surplus value for developed capitalism 
is the production of relative surplus value, but this is 
the very process by which capital is brought into 
conflict with the future expansion of the productive 
forces. For in creating relative surplus value, capital 
also creates a tendency of the rate of profit to fall and 
a restricted (by comparison to the growth of the 
productive forces) market in which that tendency will be 
actualised in crises. 
Crises are in fact periodical devaluations of capital 
which allow of the cyclical reproduction of the 
contradiction laden process. After a significant organic 
recomposition of capital, a certain amount of capital 
will be producing at above the hitherto existing socially 
average level of productivity. The volume of output will 
probably expand because the recomposed capital will 
attempt to enlarge its market at the expense of its 
competitors and those competitors will not have altered 
their behaviours as they are not as yet aware of the 
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challenge. Given the finitude of markets which the 
capitalist distribution of income effects, any 
improvement in productivity of real significance will 
eventually result in unsaleable stocks of consumer goods. 
The degree to which this will follow, and to which this 
glut will effect the whole economy, will of course depend 
on numerous factors, but I hope that I have shown that no 
distinction in principle can be drawn between 
over-production of specific goods and general 
over-production. If this is so it requires only certain 
assumptions about the size and range of the increase in 
productivity in order to generate a model of general 
crisis. I do not think these assumptions are capable of 
theoretical elaboration; they are too embedded in 
specific empirical conjunctures. However, it is 
consonant -with the massive disproportion Marx clearly 
believes develops in capital between the growth of the 
productive forces and the growth of consumption to 
postulate that after a certain point in the accumulation 
of capital further accumulation must tend towards 
production of general crises. That point is determined 
by capital's pushing of productivity up to the level 
where the value of labour power can absorb wage goods 
output. From this point the system is chronically prone 
to crisis. 
Faced with the impossibility of selling all of their 
commodities, certainly at their prices of production, 
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capitals will compete with one another for market shares. 
Marx here, we can see, provides some account of the 
conditions in which competition will lower the rate of 
profit, effectively reversing the thrust of Smith's 
explanation (131). This competition will reduce the 
value of commodities towards levels compatible with the 
new level of productivity. Of course this will amount to 
the devaluation of commodities produced by the older 
methods, commodities which now perhaps simply cannot be 
sold or can be sold only below their price of production 
or below even their cost price. All forms of future 
undertaking calculated on the basis of the old values are 
thereby thrown into confusion as promissory notes on 
production in various forms are also devalued. (It is 
well to note that in so far as the credit apparatus both 
speeds up the introduction of major new means of 
production and prolongs the time at which capitals using 
old methods may continue production, then this apparatus 
will deepen the extent of the eventual devaluation). 
Ultimately the devaluation of capital will be added to by 
the liquidation of capitals which are unable to succeed 
in the competitive struggle over the now far too small 
market (or are unable to speculate, hoard, etc., and thus 
survive in this way - as good as any other to the capital 
itself). The assets of these capitals will either simply 
cease to enter production, or will be radically devalued 
by being offered to other capitals'at well below their 
value, their market price in the depressed conditions 
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being abnormally low. Even many of the capitals which 
survive will have to undergo a stagnation if not a 
devaluation of their capital, because they will be unable 
to invest all of it in production, and thus will not be 
expanded during this period. 
Such crises certainly Involve some physical destruction 
of means of production and the physical waste of 
potential labour-power which cannot be productively 
utilised. But what is of the essence is the destruction 
of capital values, of which physical waste of capital is 
just a material expression. For crisis is in fact 
healthy (though such words slip into absurdity through 
their use in this connection) for the capitalist economy. 
Over-production is probably halted by the gross 
stagnation of the economy in the trough of the crisis, by 
both variable and constant capital being withdrawn from 
(by those capitalists who can invest elsewhere) or pushed 
out of (the capital which is driven out of business) 
production. However a fundamental disproportion between 
the amount of capital invested in production and the 
market for the product remains, and any start up of 
production would simply bring this to crisis point again. 
Or rather, whilst this disproportion remained there would 
be no start up. This is why the forcible destruction of 
capital values is healthy for the economy. By nullifying 
a certain amount of capital, the market becomes somewhat 
unconstricted, and the effect for surviving capitals is 
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rather as if some entirely new market has been opened. 
For this fundamental reason, as well as because in the 
crisis the costs of expanding production are abnormally 
low, the crisis can expect to end. It produces its own 
conditions for ending when it has proceeded so far with 
the destruction of existing capitals that it produces 
viable markets for the remaining capitals. To this basic 
point, the lowering of capital costs (both variable and 
constant) is a subordinate point. Crises of 
over-production tell us that capital needs no help to 
assault production, only to be released from its own 
fetters. 
Crises are the expression of the capitalist economy's 
inability to smoothly cope with increases in productivity 
of anything like the size and range which it continually 
seeks. The dynamic equilibrium of our model of expanded 
reproduction can be only a statement of the conditions 
deviation from which will produce the crises 
characteristic of the real economy. For instead of the 
assimilation of the levels of productivity being a smooth 
process, it is rather an abrupt switch from the old to 
the new. If we reflect on what we already know of the 
nature of capitalism as generalised commodity production 
then we can see why this is so. 
New levels of productivity are at first the guarded 
province of only some capitals. They will typically use 
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these new levels in order to enlarge their market. In 
the capitalist form of restricted consumption this is 
tantamount to saying that they will use the new levels to 
provoke a crisis; for other capitals they intend, but 
beyond a certain size of change the reverse multiplier 
effect of their behaviour must reflect on them though to 
a much lesser extent than on others. Finding their 
commodities unsaleable at their prices of production, 
their capital devalued, and perhaps being driven into 
liquidation, is the way the market informs capitals with 
older methods of production that they are now wasting 
labour - the social average level of productivity has 
risen above their level of technique. The social 
judgment on their production is made clear to these 
capitals in the way in which the social relations of 
capitalist production must be made clear, after the event 
of production when they try to valorise their surplus 
value. Hence the appalling waste of the market system - 
waste which simply would not arise if the introduction of 
new methods were planned for the whole economy 
beforehand. Consciousness of what is going on is 
specifically what is absent from the capitalist economy. 
Though this is so, even this general statement of the 
causes of crises cannot, let me emphasise, be thought to 
describe merely a type of disproportionality. There are 
specific features of the nature of capital which 
necessarily work in contradictory directions which bring 
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about the realisation of the anarchy of capitalist 
production in crises as well as in other ways. It is in 
the nature of individual capitals to seek virtually 
infinite expansion of their own means of production, to 
seek to valorise their surplus value and to enter into 
production only if they feel they will gain what they 
seek, to increase the value composition of capital, and 
to restrict the market to the point where the alteration 
in the level of productivity will provoke a crisis. 
Hence I have felt it possible to give the above outline 
of the structural reasons for crises - this would be 
impossible if crises were simply the outcomes of 
specifically arbitrary behaviour. 
The third and final passage from Marx's economics on 
which I would like to comment is the following, again 
from the Grundrisse, again in which Marx is discussing 
capital's contradictions: 
These contradictions, of course, lead to explosions, 
crises, in which momentary suspension of all labour 
and annihilation of a great part of capital 
violently lead back to the point where it is enabled to go on fully employing its productive powers 
without committing suicide. Yet, these regularly 
recurring catastrophes lead to their repetition on a higher scale, and finally to its violent overthrow (132). 
This passage contains two distinct propositions, the 
first of which follows directly from what we have already 
seen of Marx's account of capitalism. This is that 
crises are not only merely temporary solutions to 
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capital's contradictions, they in fact leave the 
situation worse than before. The devaluation of existing 
capitals will, in its destructively wasteful fashion, be 
the harbingar of renewed accumulation. And that 
accumulation will take place with the same intent, for 
capital can set no limit to its own purely quantitative 
growth, but in a situation where accumulation faces a 
more difficult prospect. For now the productive forces 
have been increased, and the lower rate of profit on 
larger investments and the increased relative paucity of 
consumption which this increase entails sets even greater 
obstacles to further accumulation. We have gone over 
this before, and I have thought it necessary only to put 
the point into its proper place here. It leads, of 
course, to what Marx has in mind in the second of the 
propositions of the above passage; the eventual violent 
overthrow of captalism. Ths is so large a topic that, 
after noting how it comes at the end of Marx's analysis I 
propose to leave it for treatment separately in the 
remainder of this work. 
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CHAPTER 12 
THE CONTRADICTIONS USE-VALUE/EXCHANGE-VALUE AND 
CAPITALISM/SOCIALISM IN MARX'S DESCRIPTION OF CAPITALISM 
Introduction 
In this chapter I want to draw out the central 
historiographical ideas in Marx's account of the 
development of capitalism. This chapter is, in effect, a 
summary of my argument about Marx so far. I am sure that 
Marx's own statement of the guiding thread of his studies 
is the indispensable key to Capital, but Marx has 
substantially left us the task of properly grasping the 
meaning of that statement so that we may use that key. 
Therefore I have felt it necessary to set out that 
meaning at length - which is as much a task of reading 
Hegel as of reading Marx - prior to discussing Capital. 
My aim now is to, as it were, reverse the direction of 
the foregoing study of (Hegel and) Marx, summing up the 
interpretative results of that study by explicitly 
discussing the way Capital articulates the -themes of 
Marx's guiding thread. 
Capital as Alienation 
The first and foremost characteristic of Marx's 
description of capitalism is that it is a description of 
389 
a state of social alienation. Marx discusses forms of 
alienated consciousness - principally commodity fetishism 
and elements of vulgar and classical political economy. 
But more than this, his discussion of these forms reapers 
to the alienating character of the fundamental social 
relations of material life. Commodity fetishism arises 
because the production of commodities is specifically an 
unplanned activity. It is the way in which social 
relations are obscurely represented in the material 
bodies of goods that creates fetishism (1). Marx goes on 
to extend his initial explanation of the form of material 
life that leads to the fetishism of money into an account 
of capital (2). That account shows capital to be the 
product of labour certainly, but a product which takes on 
a life of its own, to the extent that the aim of the 
economy is the augmentation of capital rather than the 
welfare of people, because the process of production 
which creates capital is not under the conscious control 
of the producers. In detailing an economy which is 
dominated by the increase of the means of production as 
an end in itself, which treats human beings only as 
instruments to carry out this end, and can even lead to 
the creation of a surplus population when certain people 
are unable to be used as such instruments, Marx is 
detailing an economy whose principal features are the 
d; sýýu«wý.. ýs of the alienation of social powers (3). In an 
initial sense, capital is merely a form of means of 
production; but it is capital in that it is the form of 
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means of production which directs the economy for its own 
growth (4). 
Use-value and Exchange-value as Forces and Relations of 
Production 
Standing as a form of alienated material life,. capitalism 
is subject to the dialectic of forces and relations of 
production. Marx's stated aim is to describe the laws of 
motion of the capitalist mode of production (5), and the 
dynamic of this motion is the capitalist form of the 
dialectic of forces and relations of production, which is 
the changing relation of use-value and exchange-value. 
The material productivity of capitalism - its ability to 
produce objects of utility with a given expenditure of 
labour - is represented by use-value productivity. The 
specifically capitalist relations of production under 
which this use-value productivity is developed are the 
relations of generalised exchange-value. 
Marx's overall account of the relation of use- and 
exchange-values follows the scheme outlined in the 1859 
Preface most directly. The-re is a stress on the way in 
which the imperatives of exchange-value accumulation 
initially facilitated - indeed facilitated in an 
historically uniquely powerful fashion (6) - the 
development of human powers of furnishing use-values (7). 
However, it is the continuation of production along these 
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lines that eventually brings use-value and exchange-value 
into contradiction, in the sense that, from initially 
furthering the development of the forces of use-value 
production, the social relations of exchange-value 
production eventually increasingly stand as a fetter upon 
such development (8). This change in the relation of 
use- and exchange-values, a change in the relation 
between the development of the forces of production and 
capitalist economic relations, is the result of the inner 
motion of capitalism - it is capitalism's own immanent 
critique (9). 
The most palpable expressions of this critique are crises 
(10). However, the more fundamental expression, present 
in and underlying the crises, is the chronic tendency 
toward overproduction and economic stagnation in 
established capitalism (11). The result of the pincer 
grip of relative restrictions upon consumption and 
declining profit rates (12) spells out the fundamental 
obsolesence of capitalism's social relations of 
production once they have developed in the forces of 
production the weapons of their own criticism (13). 
In capitalist terms, it is the growing contradiction 
between use-value productivity (as this is necessarily 
reflected in calculations of exchange-value) and 
exchange-value (and capital as the principle of economic 
organisation which aims at the infinite accumulation of 
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exchange-values) that constitutes the dialectical 
critique of given economic relations. Marx was certainly 
at pains to separate the historically specific economic 
relations of capitalism from the general, natural pursuit 
of utility - and hence use- and exchange-values are 
initially distinguished. BUt use-value does not thereby 
fall from Marx's political economy. Indeed, use-value 
production as given historically specific forms in 
relation to exchange-value but nevertheless retaining a 
natural objectivity is central to that political economy. 
The way in which exchange-value production increasingly 
fails to live up to its objective measure in use-value 
eventually calls the whole identification of production 
with commodity production into question. Without at all 
stretching the point, we can say that fundamentally 
Capital describes the changing position of use-value 
production within the unfolding capitalist mode of 
production (14). It is just this criterion that 
historically contextualises the account of 
exchange-value. 
Bourgeoisie and Proletariat: Bourgeois Society and Its 
Class Divisions 
As an alienated form of material life, capitalism begets 
a class divided society. Marx famously characterised 
bourgeois society as being progressively polarised into 






former are identifed by their ownership of the means of 
production and the latter by their having to labour with 
those means which stand against them as the private 
property of others. This is to say that these two main 
classes are formed by the essential characteristic of 
capitalist economic life - concentrated private ownership 
of capital and its antithesis in the existence of mass 
wage-labour (16). 
Some qualifications of this picture of bourgeois society 
is obviously necessary to push this basic two class 
schema on towards phenomenal empirical adequacy, and this 
can in many cases be readily admitted to this schema 
(17). Let us briefly mention some of these cases. Marx 
identified landowners as another major class of bourgeois 
society (18), but a class whose existence as such was not 
generated by the capitalist mode of production but by the 
persistence of feudal tenure of land in bourgeois society 
(19). He also recognised subdivisions of capital into, 
for example, those sectors that are not actually 
concerned with industrial production but operate only 
within the sphere of circulation, that is to say, finance 
capital (20). Equally, Marx distinguishes continuously 
employed proletatians from the members of the three 
strata of the industrial reserve army (21), and these in 
turn from the lumpenproletariat (22). Lastly, let us 
mention the petty-bourgeoisie, who are continously being 
stripped of their ownership of a small capital by the 
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competitive struggles leading to centralisation (23). 
Other refinements - such as public sector employment - 
which may well be thought necessary cannot be so readily 
admitted into Marx's basically two-class description of 
bourgeois social structure, and I will mention these in 
the conclusion of this work. For the present we must 
note that Marx's concentration an the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat follows from the central place which private 
property has in his guiding thread. He places an 
emphasis upon these two classes because that emphasis 
serves his aims of historical explanation. This emphasis 
must be explanatorily defensible in terms of what it 
reveals of capitalism, and, as I have just mentioned, I 
will turn to this in concluding. But we must note that 
there is a specific explanatory strategy involved in 
Marx's class schema, and not some purely quantitative 
division of society into theoretically arbitrary 
stratification models (24). Bearing this in mind, let us 
look at the class positions of the bourgeoisie and 
proletari. at as these are generated by the developing 
capitalist economy. 
The existence of the bourgeoisie as a class obviously 
turns on the persistence of capital as such. The 
economic imperatives of production for exchange-value 
accumulation are subjectively adhered to by the 
bourgeoisie (25), and indeed are fetishistically 
conflated by them with the given nature of material life 
as such (26). As this form of life does constitute the 
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existence of the bourgeoisie as a privileged class, it 
typically is a source of subjective satisfaction to the 
members of that class (27). However, there should be no 
mistaking the essential alienation of the bourgeoisie 
under capitalism. Lacking self-consciousness of the 
character of social life, the bourgeoisie is just as much 
subject to the domination of estranged social 
institutions as is the proletariat (28). The capitalist 
may bear the power of capital and money in his or her 
person (29), but he or she can do so only so long as he 
or she serves the accumulation of capital (30) and 
observes the rules of capital which are made known in the 
distorted, coercive form of competition (31). Perhaps in 
one important sense this is no real coercion, as the 
bourgeoisie identify with the maxims of competition which 
they must observe, regarding them as inexorable standards 
and regarding success judged by these standards as 
confirming the justice of their own privilege. In this 
lack of a critical distance towards even the condition of 
their own alienation, the bourgeoisie are, in a sense, 
more alienated than the proletariat (32). 
As capitalist economic relations enter into contradiction 
with the development of the forces of production, there 
is the inevitable corollary that the bourgeoisie come to 
stand in a reactionary position towards that development. 
The distance between the contradiction of forces and 
relations of production and the actual degree to which 
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the latter are called into question is constructed by the 
adherence of the bourgeoisie to those relations. This is 
not really a question of self-interest, for the 
bourgeoisie understand the true character of their 
position at least as poorly as the proletariat, but 
rather of an inability to gain any distance from given 
social relations in which any stance other than adherence 
would be possible. If the contradiction of forces and 
relations of production is to be overcome, then it is 
necessary to overcome the fundamental resistance of the 
bourgeoisie to progressive. change (33). 
Before turning to the proletariat, we must note that 
there are trends central to capitalist development which 
must weaken the reactionary position of the bourgeoisie 
in class struggle (34). Let me initially deal with one 
point. The centralisation of capital will lead to the 
bourgeoisie, always of course a minority, becoming 
relatively very small indeed, thereby making the solution 
of many practical problems in the abolition of their 
class position easily envisageable as a social task (35). 
Of course, whether these problems could ever be posed is 
the crucial question, but there again the development of 
the capitalist mode of production would seem to undermine 
the class power of the bourgeoisie. 
The bourgeoisie - in the fundamental position of capital 
owners - also begins to cease to have an economic 
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function, for, with the massive scale and complexity of 
concentrated and centralised capitals, individual, 
idiosyncratic, personal direction of business becomes 
quite impossible and the functions of management and the 
ownership of capital become split (36). Of course, one 
person can embrace both positions, but in doing so he or 
she is recognisably filling two distinct positions and 
not one (the latter) which entails another (the former). 
The economic rationalisation of the priv; leges accruing 
to ownership thereby becomes increasingly difficult (37), 
but far more important is the real obsolescence of 
private ownership which is developed here. The massive 
enlargement of the scale of capitalist production - both 
of individual capitals and in their interconnection as 
capital as a whole - requires massively expanded horizons 
in the production process. It is increasingly a 
generalised power of production - of co-operation in the 
production process and in the stages of preparation for 
that particular production process - that is seen to be 
the real force of production. Against this, production 
directed for what seems to be the profit of individuals 
is a laughable anachronism (38). Production is no longer 
production which can meaningfully be said to be under the 
control of individuals. It is rather, in effect, 
production on a generalised social scale, and this is 
demonstrated in the fantastic implausibility of any 
individual's efforts to direct it to his or her own will 
in ways which seem, precisely, bizarrely idiosyncratic. 
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For Marx, the apogee of this development was the joint 
stock company, a form even of the ownership of capital 
which is based on the admission that treating the means 
of production, even allowing that these are capital, as 
the property of individuals is farcical (39). 
The fundamental theme of the reasoning behind Marx's idea 
that the proletariat will put the class impetus behind 
the development of socialism which will overcome 
bourgeois resistance to such a development is that the 
members of the proletariat can essentially improve their 
conditions of life only by a general criticism of 
capitalism. Marx describes the conditions of the 
proletariat as miserable (40), and the process of their 
immiseration is so intrinsic to the subordinate position 
of that* class that it can be overcome only by the 
abolition of that sub ordination. But as it is the 
direct result of the most central social characteristics 
of the entire bourgeois society, this subordination can 
be abolished only with the abolition of that society 
(41). 
As I have mentioned in the 
the proper meaning of this 
been as vexed a problem in 
any other issue. This is 
Marx's way of using this 
ways, and it is certainly t 
previous chapter, ascertaining 
process of "immiseration" has 
the interpretation of Marx as 
no doubt substantially due to 
term in a number of different 
D be regretted that he did not 
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coordinate these ways. However, it is clear that the 
inconsistencies here have often been gleefully siezed 
upon as parts of readings directed at denigration rather 
than interpretation, and, as I have implied, I think a 
more fairly sympathetic reading can find some rather 
valuable sense of immiseration. To correlate these 
senses one must recognise two different axes on which 
they turn, and let us recapitulate and expand on these. 
The first of these axes is that Marx had some ideas about 
the early stages of capitalism which do not necessarily 
have to apply to the established capitalist mode of 
production. Marx would certainly seem to have believed 
that the conditions of the initially assembling urban 
proletariat were inferior to those which had prevailed in 
the earlier peasant lifestyle. The production of free 
wage-labour was accompanined by an absolute decline in 
the standard of living of those compelled to populate the 
towns and work in factories (42). Whether this was so or 
not is a question it is difficult to even pose properly, 
much less to answer, and has generated much impassioned 
debate (43). I do not propose to say anything further 
upon it - Marx's view is surely at least credible but 
this would not repay discussion here as the whole issue 
clearly related to primitive accumulation and I would 
like to discuss the proletariat within established 
capitalism. 
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In turning to this, we come across the second axis on 
which Marx's various views on immiseration turn, for I 
think some discussion of Marx's views on the condition of 
the proletariat under established capitalism will show 
that an early moral criticism of the wretchedness of 
those conditions is scientifically deepended to a large - 
if not in the and adequate - degree by being placed 
within an economic account of the determination of the 
living standards of the proletariat as wage-labour. 
The theme of absolute immiseration which is to be found 
in Marx's comments on the initially forming proletariat 
is, it has been argued (44), present in Marx's ideas 
about what would happen to the living standards of the 
proletariat in the course of the development of 
capitalism. Were this Marx's view, then clearly he is 
incorrect, and in a most serious way; but I rather doubt 
whether we are able to simply dismiss Marx's thought in 
this area as an unfounded and worthless prediction (45). 
Marx certainly does argue that the economic tendency of 
capitalism is to push wages down to the minimum, for of 
course wages are treated as a cost. This is hardly to 
say that the minimum must absolutely decline or that the 
tendency for wages to be pushed to this level must have 
effect. I have already allowed that perhaps it is 
possible to produce isolated quotations from Marx which 
seem to show this, but by this sort of method of 
interpretation anything is possible. On the basis of an 
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overall look at Marx's ideas on wages, such as I have 
attempted below, it is obvious that the central 
theoretical trend of those ideas is that they are much 
more flexible than Ricardo's. Not only are they far more 
precise about the changes in wages during the industrial 
cycle, but, due to Marx's distinguishing of surplus value 
and profit, they can very easily allow for a continuing 
rise in the standard of wages. 
What Marx does in detail say here is that the value of 
labour-power will fall, and that treating this as the 
minimum (though obviously it features in competition as 
the average), money wages will tend to be pushed towards 
it by certain competitive pressures generated by 
developing capitalism. 
That the value of' labour-power will fall is obviously 
absolutely central to Marx's account of capitalism, for 
this is the mechanism of the production of surplus value. 
But what does this mean in terms of living standards? 
Unless wages fall in proportion to the fall in the value 
of labour-power, this fall will in fact mean a rise in 
real wages and living standards. Let us, however, leave 
consideration of the size of money wages aside for a 
moment, however, u. \1 o, \ A\, e interesting idea of 
immiseration bound up within the fall in the value of 
labour-power itself, -\ý, e idea of relative immiseration. 
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The decline in the value of labour-power is part of the 
enormous growth in the productive power of labour under 
capitalism. But this historical achievement has a 
paradoxical form for labour itself. The value of 
labour-power falls, but this is not meant as a resource 
for labour but as a resource for capital, for though 
necessary labour declines, the capitalist will want to 
use this decline to increase surplus labour. To the 
extent that the decline in necessary labour is used to 
produce surplus value, the result will be that the 
expanded production of capital itself will take place. 
At more or less any conceivable ratio of necessary and 
surplus labour under capitalism, the labour of the 
proletariat will lead to a relatively far greater 
production of capital than of fruits for labour itself 
(46). Moreover, at virtually any conceivable volume of 
luxury consumption in established capitalism, this will 
involve a far greater accumulation of real wealth by the 
bourgeoisie than the proletariat (47). A conviction that 
the very act of labour under capitalism produces the 
subordination of labour to an ever deeper extent which 
Marx held from 1844 (48) is thus extended to an 
explanation of relative immiseration and its generation 
of a proletarian attitude critical of capitalism in the 
development of his economics (49). This sense of 
relative immiseration does not turn, let me repeat, on 
the absolute size of wages (50) - it is an idea of a 
relation and only thus is adequate to a real social 
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relation (51). 
Having seen that Marx is committed to predicting a fall 
in the value of labour-power, and that this involves an 
idea of relative immiseration, let us return to the other 
part of what Marx would have to say were this idea to be 
extended on into any sort of absolute immiseration - that 
a fall in money wages proportional to the fall in the 
value of labour-power would overall (i. e. ignoring 
fluctuations in the industrial cycle) have to take place. 
Marx undoubtedly did think an economic tendency for this 
to happen did exist in capitalism (52). This tendency is 
fundamentally composed of the effects on wages of the 
growth of the industrial reserve army, for this growth 
will increase the competitive advantage of capital as a 
whole over wage-labour as a whole in the determination of 
wages (53). Two types of absolute immiseration can 
conceivably result from this tendency. One relates to 
the fate of chronic pauperism which awaits the stagnant 
element of the growing relative surplus population (54). 
This shades - through the other forms of existence of the 
relative surplus population - into the second conceivable 
type of absolute immiseration. This is a general pushing 
down of the money wages of even those in full time work 
to the declining value of labour-power (55). 
This is indeed Marx's statement of the economic laws of 
motion of capitalism in this area, but it is not his 
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entire statement on the issue. He locates at precisely 
this point the main impetus of proletarian class 
struggle, and this struggle specifically moves beyond 
those laws, positing their abolition. Faced with 
economic pressures on their money wages, Marx did not 
counsel acceptance of economic inevitability but class 
based politico-economic resistance of those pressures. 
This is the entire theme of the polemic against Weston in 
Wages, Price and Profit (56). To be sure, Marx does not 
say that such actions can consistently hope to counter 
the economic tendencies of capital, but they can succeed 
in gradually positing the abolition of those-tend encies. 
The area of this proletarian class struggle is that of 
what Marx calls the historical and moral element in the 
determination in the value of labour-power. The economic 
tendency of capitalism is to treat labour-power as a 
commodity and therefore ultimately to determine wages by 
determining the value of labour-power as a commodity 
(57). However, labour-power is a unique commodity in 
that the object of valuation is itself an active subject, 
labour itself. Here we have the nub of the alienating 
pressures of, capital, that human labour be reduced to a 
commodity, to variable capital, and here Marx locates, in 
the struggle over wage levels, the fundamental class 
impetus to the rejection of that reduction. Abstract 
labour is to be challenged in that there is always an 
element in the settling of the value of labour-power 
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which resists strict economic calculation (58). This is 
a social element furnished by the power of human beings - 
even wage-labourers - to reflect on their situation and 
to (to various degrees) consciously alter that situation. 
This is an historical and social element in that the 
power of the proletariat to realise a creative increase 
in the standards of their life turns, of course, upon 
social resources such as the traditional standard of life 
and therefore of legitimate expectation (59). 
The historical and moral element in the determination of 
the value of labour-power may be relatively large or 
small (60). During a period of boom the proletariat may 
increase it (61) and conversely during slumps the 
bourgeoisie will contract it. This of course is a matter 
of the differing competitive situations in the labour 
market produced by the cyclical character of 
accumulation. But, overall, Marx the .,. c'} the economic 
tendencies of capitalism - essentially the growth of the 
industrial reserve army - would, as I have mentioned, 
increasingly favour the bourgeoisie. The point is, 
however, that the logic of the proletariat's situation 
must push them into critique not of a particular 
competitive situation but into critique of this sort of 
economic determination of living standards at all. The 
varying extent of the historical and moral element is, 
precisely, itself an historical issue. The economic 
tendency of capitalism is to extinguish it altogether. 
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Resistance of this tendency, if it is to be coherent, 
cannot quibble about the economics, for the economics are 
internally correct. It must reject such economics. 
Defence of the historical moral element is ultimately 
criticism of the alienation of the capitalist economic 
calculation of the value of labour-power at all, and of 
the fundamental treating of labour as a commodity on 
which such calculation is based. 
It is sometimes argued that Marx did not allow of the 
possibility of conceiving of a purely physical minimum 
standard of consumption which would allow of continued 
bare existence but no more (62). The evidence for this 
is constituted of two main points. Firstly, there is a 
general observations that Marx's materialism so 
inextricably intertwines - historical and natural 
influences that his conceiving of an ahistorical, 
physical standard of human existence was impossible. 
Secondly, it is noted that Marx was specifically scathing 
in his criticisms of explicit attempts to formulate such 
a physical minimum, not only by such as Malthus but even 
by the leading socialist Lassalle. I would say that the 
first point is unarguably correct and that consistently 
Marx would have to rule out the possibility of coherently 
imagining a purely physically detemined minimum standard 
of existence. Many of his statements on the value of 
labour power can easily be read as supporting this (63). 
But to say this is rather to miss the real issue here. 
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Capital certainly is seeking to push wages down to a 
purportedly physically ascertained limit, and Marx notes 
a number of attempts to fix this limit (64). That 
capital is hereby pursuing a goal which is simply 
impossible given the historical character of human beings 
should neither surprise us nor prevent us from 
recognising the real economic force pushing wages down to 
this limit in capitalism. It is pious sentimentality to 
wish to reject this sort of fixing of living standards 
given the existence of wage-labour (65); only the 
abolition of wage-labour will abolish this standard which 
is intrinsic to it. And it is at this point That Marx 
disagrees with Lassalle. This disagreement arises not 
because Lassalle argues that there is a pressure towards 
physically minimum wages, but that his argument follows 
the population theory in incorrectly identifying this 
force as an "iron" natural law and not an economic 
product of capitalism (66). There is certainly a very 
real issue bound up in the idea of conceiving of a 
physically minimum standard of living, and that this idea 
is internally absurd because it stems from the alienated 
position of labour in capitalism does not detract from 
the reality of the issue whilst capitalism continues. 
Marx's hope would seem to have been that initial 
struggles over pressures to reduce money wages - which 
are simply part of the competitive determination of wages 
and the value of labour-power (67) - would lead, as 
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proletarian awareness of the fundamental reasons for 
these obvious pressures develops, into explicit struggles 
over the preservation and extension of the civilising 
presence of the historical element of the determination 
of the value of labour-power and hence into rejection of 
determining living standards by the value. of 
labour-power. Whilst proletarian action focuses only on 
money wage levels it restricts itelf to surface phenomena 
(68). 
. The only plausible goal of a conscious proletarian 
struggle (69) over wage levels can be the very abolition 
of wage-labour, the abolition of the proletarian class 
position itself (70). In this way Marx tries to locate 
proletarian class struggle over wage levels and, 
relatedly, over non-wage (welfare) provisions for the 
relative surplus populaton within a scheme of the 
fundamental economic laws of capital and a class-based 
movement to abolish those laws. I presume that it cannot 
be argued in favour of interpreting Marx as holding to a 
thesis of inevitable absolute immiseration that he 
thought this struggle would inevitably be resolved 
against the proletariat. From what we have seen it is 
clear that rejection of this inevitability is in a very 
important way the central theme of Marx's life work. 
By saying this I do not mean to completely disparage the 
attribution to Marx of an idea of inevitable absolute 
immiseration, for a profound difficulty in the 
understanding of Marx is certainly brought up by it. Let 
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us recapitulate on the way Marx's account of capitalism 
articulates the themes of his guiding thead. There is a 
contradiction of forces and relations of production 
described in the contradiction of use- and 
exchange-values, and there is a class struggle described 
in the conflict of bourgeoisie and proletariat. I think 
it has emerged that Marx has extreme difficulty - so 
extreme in fact that he does not properly see the problem 
himself - of running these two elements of his account of 
capitalist development together. His statement of the 
laws of motion of capitalism posits the historical 
obsolescence of exchange-value internally to those laws, 
and carries a very strong explanatory power in doing so. 
But his statement of the proletarian struggle over wages 
does not have this form. This struggle is initially 
internal to capitalism as is it explained as part of a 
necessary competition arising from the very positing of 
labour as a commodity. But the laws of motion as Marx 
describes them do posit absolute immiseration as the 
general law of capitalist accumulation. Marx obviously 
had faith in the proletariat's ability to overcome this 
law, but this is a rejection of the law, not its internal 
working out. His account of the proletariat's class 
struggle explicitly eschews the internal consistency with 
which he describes the obsolescence of exchange-value. 
Now, we have seen that Marx in a principled and 
defensible way sets class struggle at a distance from the 
contradiction of the relations of production. However, 
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there can be no doubt that he does virtually nothing to 
essentially relate the two, and bring proletarian class 
struggle within his explanatory framework, when he 
describes them in their capitalist form. 
Perhaps the fundamental difficulty in ascribing to Marx a 
belief in inevitable asbolute immiseration lies in the 
obstacles which this places in the way of seeing how a 
proletariat subjected to this process could rise to the 
position of assuming class dominance. Absolute 
immiseration might explain discontent, but a class 
reduced to universal wrtechedness could hardly be 
conceived of as the realisers of the potential for 
universal wealth posited by capitalism. Such 
wretchedness could hardly be the background of a 
conscious critique of existing conditions and the 
positing of the revolutionary development of those' 
conditions into socialism. Apart from through the 
influence of previously bourgeois people who have been 
proletarianised (71) or of those bourgeois who grasp the 
historical position of the proletariat and support it 
(72), it is difficult to see how socialist aspirations 
could be generated amidst such a wretched mass. But for 
Marx these were certainly marginal influences on what he 
thought should be the essentially self-emancipatory 
struggle of the proletariat (73). It is not enough to 
show why the proletariat should posit socialism as a 
class goal; Marx must show how they are able to do so, 
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and for that 
class would 
capitalism. 
ability to be imported from outside that 
simply flatly contradict his analysis of 
The normal class based competition over wages leads to 
the proletariat uniting to improve their bargaining 
position as a whole (74). For Marx, the real fruit of 
these associations was not the victories in wage 
competition which they can on occasion bring but the way 
in which the lesson of such victories becomes ever 
clearer simply by virtue of the united struggle: that 
proletarian unity is a strength which reaches to the 
heart of modern production (75). To the extent that 
trades unions are the immediate product of capitalist 
wage struggles, trades union aims may tend to be 
restricted to the illusory goal of continuous success in 
such struggles (76). But the evidence of class based 
power furnished by the trades union experience is 
invaluable (77). The real issue here, an issue which can 
be resolved only by the closest study of the penetrations 
and limitations bound up in working class actions. (78), 
is the formation of a general critical attitude to 
capitalism and a general conception of the plausibility 
of socialism amongst the proletariat. 
One of Marx's ways of discussing this issue was to employ 
Kantian terminology in a distinction between a class 
"in-itself" and a class "for-itself" (79). The 
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proletariat as a class of human beings subject to a 
specific set of most significant social determinations of 
subordination and exploitation is identified in Marx's 
political economy of capitalism. We can, at an initial 
level, social scientifically defend the existence of this 
class if its existence is posited by explanatory 
requirements. But so far we are discussing only a class 
in-itself, for the very powerful reason that its 
existence may be recognised only in social science and 
may not be recognised by the members of the class 
themselves. It may be well argued that some shared 
consciousness, and perhaps even some consciousness of 
shared position, are necessary characteristics of any 
identifiable real social class, and I myself would accept 
this point. Marx, however, was not really interested in 
mapping out the consequences of proletarian class 
position for the culture of members of that class except 
in two respects. One was the basic ideology of 
fetishism, and the second, more peculiar to the 
proletariat, was the extent that that culture grasped the 
fundamental historical determinants of its own 
production. A culture which did involve such a grasp 
would constitute a proletarian class for-itself, a 
proletariat class-conscious in the very important sense 
that it recognised its own class existence and social 
position. 
Marx clearly thought that he had essentially set out the 
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genesis of the proletariat as a class in-itself in his 
political economy. From this position, he had then to go 
on to say that the proletariat had to develop 
self-conscicusness by bringing to active political 
fruition the latent strength of its class position (80). 
There is a serious difficulty here for Marx, one which is 
linked to the earlier difference between his depiction of 
the contradiction of use- and exchange-values and the 
development of class struggle. This is that the full 
development of his account of capitalism must include an 
explanation of the progressive elements of proletarian 
class consciousness. I can see no principled ground on 
which this can be denied. To talk of Capital as a purely 
economic work - as opposed to say The Class Struggles in 
France or The Eighteenth Brumaire which study political 
forms - is irrelevant here. There is surely a difference 
in focus between these works, but not one based on a 
rigid topographical metaphor but on the generality of the 
explanations attempted in the different works. Marx was 
ready enough to bring the general determinations of 
fetishism within Capital, and indeed he had to do so was 
Capital's account of capitalism to be adequate. But at 
this general level, it is equally necessary for Marx to 
provide an account of the generation of proletarian class 
consciousness as part of the generation of socialism; but 
no equivalent explanation of this is really put forward. 
What we are forced to recognise is an unacceptable 
theoretical indeterminateness in the area of proletarian 
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class struggle and the development of socialism out of 
capitalism. 
I want to discuss this indeterminateness in detail as the 
conclusion of this work. But for now I would like to 
acknowledge that as I have made this criticism so far, 
here and in the previous chapter, it is. rather 
ungenerous. There are some elements of Marx's 
explanation of capitalist development that do link the 
class position of the proletariat to the innermost 
development of the forces of production under capitalism. 
We have seen in our discussion of the guiding thread that 
Marx held an idea that the possiblities of taking a 
critical attitude towards a mode of production depends on 
how far the forces and relations of production developed 
in that mode were in contradiction. He makes some effort 
to utilise this idea in a capitalist form by making the 
developing contradiction of use- and exchange-values a 
basic resource for the proletarian adoption of a strategy 
of conscious class conflict. 
Co-operation is the fundamental relation of production in 
capitalism. It is the extensive division of labour 
throughout society in generalised commodity production 
and the intensive division of labour in the factory in 
the production of particular commodities (81) that allows 
of the massive development of the productive forces under 
capitalism (82). As all social forces are brought under 
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the requirements of production, and production is 
resolved into its component parts on which those forces 
can be concentrated, an ability to adopt the strategy of 
increasing productivity by enlarging the scale of the 
employment of means of production in detailed branches of 
production is present in capitalism in a sense in which 
it can be said to be more or less absent from previous 
modes of production (83). 
Of course, as it is developed within capitalism, 
co-operation has a capitalist form. This is most 
obviously so in the coercion exercised in the 
capitalistic supervision of the labour-process (84), but 
more essentially all the powers fostered by co-operation 
are alienated from the producers as they appear to be a 
quality, indeed a property, of the capital which brings 
workers together (85). However, all this cannot alter 
that co-operation is a specifically social production 
relation, for it is a relation that makes its sociality 
its object in that it is precisely by virtue of that 
sociality that co-operation fosters the development of 
productive forces. And this sociality expands as the 
scale of production in all its facets is increased as the 
means of pursing relative surplus value (86). Production 
is undertaken on what is increasingly a society-wide 
basis within an interdependent world economy, and that 
interdependence undercuts the atomism of commodity 
production. Accumulation on the basis of private 
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property in capital thus expands the self-consciously 
social dimension of production. 
It is this inner socialisation of capital that Marx tries 
to establish as the basis of the positive development of 
proletarian class consciousness (87). We have discussed 
how exchange-value is pushed into reactionary absurdity 
by the expanding powers of use-value production, and here 
we have, in the distanced dimension of class struggle, 
the principal ramification of this. This is the 
absurdity of private ownership - and of conducting 
economic life for the purpose of private accumulation, 
when the means of production have been developed by, and 
can only be employed by, the powers of social 
co-operation. As the bourgeoisie becomes productively 
redundant, so it falls to the proletariat to actualise 
that redundancy. The proper utilisation of the forces of 
production to fulfill relative and absolute material 
needs depends on the degree to which the socialisadon of 
the forces of production is pushed through, and the 
necessity of this process faces the proletariat as a 
resource and a task. 
Particular co-operative developments have an important 
role. They are, as we have seen when discussing the 
bourgeoisie, the actual proof of the redundancy of 
"' Clt C-\Ayl;, Their success can be only limited, however, 
for as they are particular they are open to localised 
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destructive efforts by the bourgeoisie and, more than 
this, are simply inadequate to the task of the 
socialisation of the entire economy which becomes every 
more pressing (88). It is the political organisation of 
the proletariat to wrest what is seen as the cmc, - -tort 
reactionary residue of bourgeois domination of production 
that socialisation makes a clear objective. 
Capitalism - Socialism - Communism: The Determinate 
Negation of the Given 
Marx's account of capitalism has, as we have seen, the 
form of a penetration to the inner dynamic of that mode 
production which is shown to be one which posits that 
mode's inner critique and breakdown. Though Marx's 
terminology on this issue is by no 'means always 
consistent, I think we can identify his idea of full 
actualised, non-alienated society as "communism" (89), 
and his idea of the social form which capitalism 
immediately posits as its own critique as "socialism" 
(go). Socialism is the 'initial stage in the 
actualisation of non-alienated society. It is a society 
in which the tendencies towards the supercession of 
alienation generated by capitalism are dominant (whereas 
in capitalism these tendencies are subordinate to 
alienating influences) but the alienating residues of 
capitalist forms are by no means overcome. When they are 
fully overcome, this is communism (91). 
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Let me stress that not all of Marx's uses of "socialism" 
and "communism" fit in with this rendering of their 
meaning, for the consistent use of these terms in this 
way certainly owes more to Lenin than Marx. The 
rendition is defensible only in terms of the overall fit 
with Marx's thought which it very arguably possesses, for 
even when Marx says "communism" in precisely the fashion 
that "socialism" should be used given the above 
distinction, the essential idea of stages in the movement 
from capitalism to completely non-alienated society 
remains (92). But allowing such a fit does not of course 
guarantee the coherence of the distinction, and its 
terminological niceness can have a real ground only if it 
describes a real issue. What does it mean to so attempt 
to demarcate capitalism, socialism and communism? Does 
this demarcation describe an actual issue? 
It would seem that there is an in principle defensible 
criterion for making this demarcation, which lies in 
specifying the balance of alienating the non-alienating 
social influences as this enters into consciousness and 
is given political effect in the area of class struggle. 
If Marx was to gauge the development of the contradiction 
of forces and relations of production in capitalism 
through assessment of the extent to which use-value 
contradicts exchange-value, then his attempt to assess 
the extent to which this fundamental contradiction calls 
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into question the capitalist mode of production, the 
extent to which mankind has actually consciously set 
itself the problem of creating non-alienated society, may 
be presented as the assessment of the politically 
effective projection of socialism. 
Of course it is possible to use socialism to describe a 
stage in the development of the contradiction of use- and 
exchange-values as such, a stage when the relations of 
production have become reactionary. But I think that 
initially we might say that this would be a pointless 
duplication of terminology. (I do not say that Marx was 
never guilty of this). More than this, however, the most 
important sense in which is it possible to gauge the way 
in which the contradiction of forces and relations of 
production -is proceeding under capitalism is precisely 
through the proletarian positing of socialism, for class 
conflict is, according to Marx, supposed to issue from, 
and actualise the liberatory potential of, this 
contradiction. In this sense, then, the contradiction 
capitalism-socialism serves as an accompaniment to the 
contradiction of use- and exchange-values, the former 
being the area in which the political ramifications of 
the latter are developed through the degree of formation 
of class self-consciousness in the proletariat. 
Marx accordingly stresses that socialism is the period of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat (93). The 
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proletariat siezes political power and uses this to push 
through the socialisation of capital against bourgeois 
resistance, in fact to negate the political powers of 
reaction of the bourgeoisie (94). Marx's idea was that 
this particular dictatorship would be qualititatively 
different to all preceding forms of political domination. 
The proletariat comprises the vast majority of people 
(95) and the forces of production it is trying to free 
from the restraints of capitalist relations are so 
intrinsically social that they demand general social 
control (96). The implications of this are that the 
proletarian dictatorship in fact posits the end of all 
classes. With the abolition of bourgeoisie, all class 
partiality will disappear as the proletariat subsumes all 
of society, that is to say, it abolishes itself as a 
class (97). When this merging of class and society is 
quite complete, this will be communism. 
The issue of the distance between socialism and communism 
has of course been a most important one in this century. 
I am quite sure, however, that this was no issue at all 
for Marx as he addressed the central thesis of Capital. 
The reasons for this are, firstly, the obvious temporal 
one. More than this, however, though developing from it, 
is the complete reversal of attitude which addressing the 
distance of socialism and communism implies by contrast 
to Marx's project in Capital. Socialism is the 
determinate negation of capitalism - its very 
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F lausibility turns on identifying the bases of socialN,. 
in capitalism and regarding those bases generously from 
the point of view of grasping their productive 
potentials. From the point of view of the would-be 
communist, socialism is not a statement of promise but a 
statement of limitation, for socialism is communism's 
past as capitalism is socialism's. The necessary 
presence of capitalist elements in socialism, necessary 
if socialism is to be developed at all, is a problem of 
unwelcome survivals for the communist, and the issue is 
the purging of these unwelcome residues. That anyone 
could claim to take up this communist point of view on 
other than dogmatic grounds seems to me to impossible, 
but I do not want to argue this here. I want only to 
stress that is obviously the antithesis of the way-Marx 
has to conceive of socialism in Capital. Marx could 
recognise, of course, that socialism is not communism, 
and*ythis when explaining socialism. But for Marx as he 
addresses the central problems faced in Capital the 
necessity is not to deride capitalism but to grasp its 
productive elements. This is essentially a productive 
rather than A destructive critical attitude, the attitude 
of immanent critique and celebration rather than 
denigraton of determinate negations. It is an attitude 
quite absent from purported communist readings of Marx 
(98). 
423 
Science and Ideology: The End of Political Economy 
With the above ideas we have come, I think, to what is 
properly the end-of Marx's thought on the capitalist m, de 
of production. It is an end in that it postulates the 
end of capitalism by attempting to postulate the 
beginning of socialism-communism. The truth of 
capitalism is revealed by moving on to its future, for 
that future penetrates the alienated present. Truth, 
Marx is arguing, is on the scene, is potential in 
capitalism, and socialism begins the process of its 
actualisation, the full realisation being communism. In 
saying this we are returned to the essential problem 
which I attempted to set out in my discussion of Hegel. 
How can a claim about truth such as Hegel's or Marx's be 
substantiated? I do not believe that it is open to doubt 
that the whole intellectual character of Marx's approach 
to capitalism was that of a dialectic very strongly 
influenced by Hegel's but the Hegelian Phenomenological 
Dialectic was, as we have seen, crucially flawed. Can 
Marx claim to have overcome this shortcoming? Two things 
must, I think, be said. 
Much of what I first wish to say is merely repetition of 
parts 2 and 4 of this work. . 
This concerns the 
defensibility of the dialogue with existing beliefs which 
Hegel and Marx had to carry out to develop their own 
ideas. I will only restate my earlier conclusions; that 
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upon examination the Phenomenology is brilliant but 
essentially indefensible whilst Capital is often weakly 
expressed but essentially correct. The reasons for this 
are, at this fist level, internal to these specific 
dialogues, to their peculiar chA cters, and I cannot with 
profit go over the earlier detailed discussions. I leave 
them and their conclusions to stand on their own. But if 
these conclusions are valid, then there must be some 
difference in the principles of critique put forward by 
Hegel and Marx, and it is to the clear elucidation of 
this difference that I should like to turn. It is this 
second level of addressing the problem of the difference 
of Hegel's and Marx's dialogues that can be undertaken by 
looking at the overall status of Marx's critique of 
political economy. 
Both Hegel and Marx display as probably the foremost 
characteristic of their writings an intense concern to 
situate those writings in their intellectual-historical 
context. The results of this are displayed most clearly 
in Hegel's histories of aesthetics, religion and 
philosophy and in Marx's uncompleted history of political 
economy (99). More than this, even a cursory reading of 
Hegel's and Marx's substantive works will reveal how 
intimately these works are related to their intellectual 
ancestors. Marx of course included the designation 
"Critique of Political Economy" in the title of his 
published economic works. If we are to identify a 
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difference between Hegel's and Marx's ideas of critique, 
it can hardly be at the initial level of awareness of 
intellectual context, for the quality of Marx's awareness 
is inferior to Hegel's, at least in an extensive if not 
in an intensive sense. Both awarenesses are also 
certainly characterised by a sense of their own privilege 
and of their potential for reflexive reconstruction or 
recomprehension of the truth of earlier thought which was 
but dimly grasped by that thought itself. But there is a 
difference of the qualities of the senses of privilege 
here, a difference of principle of critique. 
There is an essential dogmatism in Hegel's critique and 
an essential openness in Marx's. I have tried to show 
that Hegel's critique is indefensible in that it is 
ultimately an hermeneutic failure. It rests on a 
presumed acquaintance with the true which allows Hegel to 
recast earlier thought - and indeed by extension all of 
the world - in the pattern which fits the initial idea of 
the true. I have also tried to show that this is not the 
case with Marx, and that his critique of bourgeois 
economic thought displays a genuine relationship of 
learning. It is hermeneutically defensible, and if it 
claims a peculiar privilege, it does so because it sets 
up a corrigible - and that it is essentially corrigible 
is more important that that it is completely correct - 
understanding of earlier thought as alienated. In the 
conditions of alienation and consequent distorted 
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communication, the privilege Marx claims is not only 
defensible but, because it is defensible, it (or 
something like it) is necessary. This cannot be said of 
Hegel's idea of critique (100). - 
This is a crucial point to make for the final sense in 
which Marx's dialectic of critique is indebted to Hegel's 
is in claiming an, as it were, circular but 
non-tautological justification. Marx's account of 
history and especially of the history of capitalism has 
lead him to posit capitalism's abolition, a point of view 
obviously non-capitalist in a very important way, and is 
in fact a point of view which in this sense is often 
described as the point of view of the proletariat. 
Marx's given theoretical materials are those of bourgeois 
political economy, but his conclusions about capitalism 
disrupt that thought, developing from it a superior 
political economy (101). There is certainly a sense of 
the scientific critique of ideological views here. 
Hegel's Absolute Truth has a similar distance from 
alienated views and is just as much the abolition of the 
"truth" of such views. 
Both Hegel and Marx claim, however, to generate their 
necessary distance from materials furnished by the given, 
and it is in the possibility of doing so that the 
justification of their critiques - if any - must lie. I 
have claimed that Hegel fails to secure such 
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justification - his critique cannot in the end be said to 
be a determinate negation of the given but rather has the 
distance from the given that attends the presumption of 
the correctness of one's positions. I hope it is now 
clear that I do not think that this is true of Marx. 
Marx generates his socialist comprehension of capitalism 
from the critique of political economy. When we seek the 
epistemological justification of the comprehension we are 
circularly referred back to the critique. However, this 
is not a tautology but the fundamental circularity of all 
hermeneutics. That Marx's critique can be thought to be 
a species of this circularity - notwithstanding in this 
respect the peculiar criticism that it has to undertake 
as part of its subject being alienated conditions which 
distort all dialogue - is, I think, its fundamental 
intellectual justification. 
If all this is accepted, then Marx's account of 
capitalism must be recognised as the indispensable core 
of the social scientific understanding of modern society. 
We can be sure, however, that this intellectual 
justification is not the one that fundamentally mattered 
to Marx. The practical justification of his science lies 
in its informing political critique; and the 
effectiveness of political work to actualise socialism is 
the ultimate test of his thought. 
It is typical of commentaries on this point that the 
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relationship of science and political action here is left 
quite open. Marx has presented the science and the work 
now remains of actualising its conclusions. This is 
wholly unacceptable. The critique of bourgeois political 
economyhoobeen carried out, and yet the formation of 
proletarian political power can be left unspecified. But 
of course the latter is the mechanism of the full 
accomplishment of the former, and we cannot rest with an 
acceptance of theoretical indeterminacy, an indeterminacy 
whose disruptive effects within core sections of Marx's 
thought we have already noted. It is a comic irony that 
writings which make such a great deal of the unity of 
theory and practice happily accept disunity at precisely 
the point where the world is to be revolutionised (102). 
As I have said, it is exactly here that Marx seeks the 
final productive result of his account of capitalism, and 
there is no ground on which we can leave that result 
unspecified and yet accept the ultimate adequacy of the 
account. In so far as it treats of the economic 
characteristics of capital, this account would seem to be 
essentially correct, and yet though it moves towards the 
positing of the abolition of capital, it cannot properly 
specify the way in which this is to be done. Having 
raised this issue I am in the correct position to 
conclude this work. To draw together the themes of my 
discussion of Hegel and Marx into a final evaluation of 
Marx's attempt to rework Hegel I shall have to return to 






MARX'S REVISION OF HEGEL'S IDEA OF CRITIQUE BY INVERSION 
Introduction 
I now want to summarise my account of Marx's relation to 
Hegel, and my consequent evaluation of Marx's thought, 
through a final assessment of the heuristic value of the 
metaphor of inversion. I intend to: firstly, recap on my 
explication of the phenomenological method described in 
the 'Introduction' to the Phenomenology of Spirit; 
secondly, set out the resources and the difficulties 
which this method presented for Marx, and how 
successfully he dealt with these; and thirdly, show how, 
as I believe, the metaphor of "inversion" is a crucial 
interpretative key to this episode in the history of 
ideas and, more importantly, to the issues that episode 
poses for the contemporary tasks of the social sciences. 
The Phenomenological Dialectic 
Hegel's epistemology is dominated, as of course was that 
of all his contemporaries, by an awareness of the 
shortcomings of the first Critique, shortcomings which 
most obviously disrupt Kant's"thought at the point of the 
concept of the thing-in-itself. Though Hegel was by no 
means unique in disposing of this concept, he did so in a 
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uniquely productive fashion. In criticism of what he 
goes on to show to be an unsupportable presupposition of 
the radical dissociation of subject and object, Hegel 
unites these sundered moments of knowing by giving them a 
common ground in consciousness, by which he initially 
conveys a sense of the domain of cognition, that is, of 
all potential human experience. By doing this, he takes 
a distance from Kant's aims as they exemplify the 
classical epistemological project, and is able to show 
those aims to be self-defeating ones which themselves 
alienate our power to know. The identification of the 
basic problems of philosophy with foundationalism which 
has proven so absurdly destructive of the whole 
philQ5ophical enterprise is thereby broken, and 
epistemology freed for more valuable work. 
The essential work Hegel sets it is the construction of a 
rational awareness of the inadequacies of present beliefs 
by a scheme of progressive critique. This scheme is the 
dialectic of determinate negations, about which three 
characteristics are particularly important. The first is 
its sensitivity to any given belief. Hegel insists upon 
immersing critique in the phenomenological character of 
such belief, and thereby gaining access to one's audience 
by the empirically adequate fashion in which one 
addresses it. The second is the way movement from any 
such belief takes the form of developing the belief's 
productive potentials to the point where they exhaust the 
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core of that belief and call for a radical change of 
viewpoint. Hegel, in effect, "layers" determinate 
critique. A new, relatively subjective, line of 
development is contrasted to the wider, more entrenched, 
relatively objective framework of belief which generated 
that line. The- exhaustion of the ability of that 
framework to generate new and valuable subjective 
conjectures calls for a shift in even our most settled 
beliefs. This is a negation of given belief, but it is a 
determinate negation for it issues from the empirical 
character of that belief. Phenomenology is the pursuit 
of that character through to its eventual self-criticism. 
The third point I should like to mention follows from 
this determinateness. The dialectic of determinate 
negations is potentially progessive because it may 
incorporate awareness of earlier errors. 
It is in an awareness of the futility of foundationalism 
that the idea of determinate negation is itself based. 
Thus this very idea is itself an example of the 
application of the principle involved. This method is, 
then, given in a critique of a specific alienation, the 
alienation of our power to know by the classical 
epistemological project. But this method also addresses 
alienation as such more widely. Hegel treats of all 
history as the movement of self-estranged Spirit, and 
attempts to cast a reflexive illumination on that history 
from the position when, as he has it, the truth of Spirit 
433 
is on the scene and alienation is essentially overcome. 
The dialectic of determinate negations is to culminate in 
the negation of the overall negation of the 
self-awareness of Spirit that characterises all previous 
history. This is obviously a different idea of negation, 
but it is to be generated as a determinate negation. 
Rigorous phenomenological pursuit of present beliefs is 
to lead to an appreciation of the possibility and 
necessity of the totality of comprehension which emerges 
from seeing history as Spirit. 
Hegel's project is, in his own terms, the "inversion" of 
contemporary consciousness, for, in the widest sense, he 
feels that understandings which are marked by the 
alienation of Spirit present the opposite of correct 
comprehension of the essential character of History. 
However, this inversion cannot be considered to be 
successfully accomplished in the Phenomenology, in fact 
Hegel ends up asking his readers to effect an inversion 
in their perspectives themselves, as a requisite of then 
grasping the dialectical progression. The break in what 
should be the continous flow of determinate negation is 
marked by a number of unfounded elisions in the way Hegel 
sets out the Truth, perhaps the most important of which 
is that between two distinct notions of consciousness. 
Having secured knowability in consciousness, Hegel goes 
on to speak of this consciousness as more natural 
consciousness, and the phenomenology is carried on 
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through a Consciousness in which knowledge exhausts all 
being. His explanation of History as the externalisation 
of Spirit involves a conterminity of knowing and being 
which follows from the way Spirit's self-knowledge 
embraces, indeed constitutes, all phenomena. But the 
ideality which allows this explanation is not secured 
from within the phenomenological position constituted by 
the classical epistemological project. Though Hegel 
shows the idea of exteriority in that project to be an 
absurd one; he does not, as he seems to think, thereby 
immanently negate exteriority as such. At this point, 
the point where Hegel's own theocratic aims are to be 
realised, the Phenomenology breaks down, and the complex 
of positions that is to demonstrate the Absolute Truth - 
such as the end of History and the necessity this can 
give to Hegel's explanations - collapses. 
Marx's Philosophic AnthropoloQy 
Marx's relationship to these central issues in Hegel's 
thought is rather complicated, as we have seen; but of 
his essential intellectual indebtedness to many of them 
there can be no doubt. Initially we must note that Marx 
takes the unity of subject and object as a given and as 
no issue for his own work. Rather than thinking this 
unity through a rather ambiguous consciousness, Marx sets 
out a philosophic anthropology of knowing, in which that 
activity is grounded by placing human beings and their 
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objects within a common ontological - because common 
natural - domain. In this materialist anthropology, 
foundationalist epistemological problems are dissolved 
within an analysis of being-in-the-world that centres on 
the process of objectification by which human beings 
develop themselves through their labour within a natural 
objectivity. The Paris Manuscripts are the main location 
of this anthropology, and what is most obvious from their 
tone - which calls to mind much that is best in 
existential phenomenology - is that they are concerned 
with explicating, not establishing, being-in-the-world. 
That philosophy can undertake the former task and 
disregard the latter is simply accepted by Marx. That 
human beings can know the natural world is clearly 
essential to all Marx says on labour; but that they can 
do so is no real issue for him. 
Marx's procedure in the Paris manuscripts is to very 
substantially directly draw on his German theoretical 
resources in order to furnish a general groundwork for 
his already contemplated renewal of political economy's 
analysis of specificially capitalist institutions. This, 
I would say, is immediately revealed by the structure of 
Marx's account of alienated labour, where a fact of 
political economy is incomparably deepened by being 
re-interpreted through a general anthropology of labour 
(1). It is, of course, to Marx's credit that he felt 
this philosophic necessity; but this is not to say that 
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he himself contributed a great deal to the background 
anthropology. Marx presents an understanding of the 
formation of human character as the expressive result of 
conscious social action in the natural world. This is 
quite directly a radical humanisation of Hegel's 
depiction of the realisation of Absolute Spirit (2). The 
thrust of the humanisation is to emphasise the objective 
natural location of species (i. e. socially)-conscious 
human activity in a way which draws heavily on Feuerbach 
(3). An interesting parallel is provided by Godwin's 
Eng_ -a work which completed, almost fifty years 
before Marx failed to do so, a progamme rather like the 
one announced in the preface to the Paris Manuscripts. 
Godwin felt compelled to preface his studies of political 
institutions by a number of geneca\ philosophic 
anthropological arguments to the effect that "the 
characters of men originate in their external 
circumstances" in order to ground the very possibility of 
the improving aims set out in his book (4). Against the 
background of a dominant English - not Scottish - 
individualism in political theory (though, in fact, 
perhaps foremostly expressed by Hume), Godwin's first 
chapters necessarily have an overall polemical tone. The 
tone of the Paris manuscripts is of learning and 
assimilation on these background anthropological 
concerns. 
Rather less should be claimed, in my opinion, for the 
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originality of Marx's anthropology (5). Though there is 
a wide recognition of its overall Hegelian cast, this is 
typically coupled with a statement of the thorough 
reworking these Hegelian elements received at Marx's 
materialist hands. The reworking, however, is certainly 
more properly studied in Feuerbach, from whence it was 
certainly derived by Marx. The appreciation of the state 
of philosophy after Hegel (6), the placing of the 
critique of foundationalism in a materialist context (7), 
the description of the naturally located human species 
(8), and the critique of religious representations of 
human powers (9) are all better done in Feuerbach than in 
Marx, and are far more properly regarded as the latter's 
work. Marx's own criticisms of Feuerbach have done much 
to disguise this, and it is as well to see why. 
From' Philosophic Anthropology to Historiography 
In the intellectual autobiographical remarks which he 
included in the 1859 preface, Marx dates his theoretical 
concern with economic interests from late-1842, and 
certainly this concern dominates the Paris Manuscripts. 
The philosophic anthropology set out in these scripts is 
only background, though, as Marx is quite certain, 
essential background. This general level of addressing 
human problems recedes in Marx's work from this point. 
Having established a philosophic anthropology to his own 
satisfaction, and that satisfaction is determined by an 
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interest that in 1844 is already clearly primarily 
historiographical, Marx did not productively engage with 
issues at only this level again. The remarks on the 
general elements of the labour process in Capital are 
virtually repetitions of remarks made more than twenty 
years earlier. We can in this sense say that Marx's 
materialism is non-ontological (10), for although that 
materialism must incorporate ontological positions, there 
is an essential historical focus of the rest of Marx's 
thought in which nature and society are studied in their 
specific inter-relations. Instead of concern with the 
character of existence as such, Engels and Marx move in 
1842-5 exclusively into historical problems, a radical 
shift which. is most clcarly demonstrated in The German 
Ideology. (Engels' last works, of course, contain a 
retrospective attempt to give an ontology for the 
historical works). 
Perhaps the radicalness of the shift here goes some way 
to explaining the unfavourable tone of the comments on 
Feuerbach in The German Ideology (and by extension, to 
the left-Hegelian movement as a whole in this and other 
works). These comments are grossly unfair, but for Engels 
and Marx in 1845 Feuerbach's work was entirely exhausted 
of productive potentials. To the extent that Feuerbach's 
thought remained cast at a broad existential level - and 
the 1850s saw him merely extending the lessons of The 
Essence of Christianity to other religions, its utility 
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for addressing the social problems with which Engels and 
Marx were now concerned was virtually nil. In the period 
of The German Ideology Marx seems to think that failing 
to move on to address such problems was a dereliction of 
duty by Feuerbach (11), and perhaps this was so. 
Certainly the respective statures of Marx and Feuerbach 
testify to the former's taking up the more pressing 
issues. But really Feuerbach's existential anthropology 
does not require more than an abstract recognition of 
humankind's historical power for its own purposes, and it 
contains this; indeed this was taken over by Marx and 
used as the basis of his concrete historiography. 
There can be no doubt that Feuerbach thought that his 
work essentially turned on a re-inversion of the inverted 
representation of thought and being present in Hegel's 
philosophy (12), and in theology (13) and contemplative 
philosophy (14) generally. There can also be no doubt 
that Marx took this inversion over quite directly (15), 
as he himself makes clear (16). But, of course, the 
essential character of Hegel's and Marx's work - its 
historicality - is not really touched by this inversion. 
Feuerbach's inversion addresses only the most bare 
propositions of Hegel's philosophy - its textual object 
is the Logic, to which the Phenomenology is regarded as 
quite subordinate (17). Valuable work can be done at 
this basic level, but there is a whole dimension in 
Hegel's thought to which such work can never aspire. 
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Marx addresses Hegel at this historical dimension, and 
attempts a second inversion guided by by this first one 
of Feuerbach's. 
Is there a break in Marx's intellectual development here, 
in which he distances himself from a simple metaphor of 
inversion by developing a critique of Hegel far more 
sophisticated than Feuerbachs? One of Althusser's more 
plausible arguments has been to show how Feuerbach's 
materialism cannot begin to sustain Marx's programme of 
social inquiry, and to claim that therefore the inversion 
in Feuerbach cannot adequately describe Marx's relation 
to Hegel (18). All this is, I would say, true; but, of 
course, it is not enough to justify Althusser concluding 
that therefore there is no relation, just a discontinuity, 
between Hegel and Marx. Althusser, in fact, makes two 
false representations. He has to sever Marx from even 
Feuerbach's broad existential concerns, lest a relation 
to Hegel slip by in this way; and of course a complete 
anti-humanism is central to Aithusser's thought (19). 
This simply does not describe the way Marx draws on 
Feuerbach's inversion of Hegel. It is precisely through 
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a philosophic anthropology that Marx generates humanity's 
potential to create specific historical structures. 
Althusser also has to suppress the way in which Hegel's 
philosophy cannot be considered exhausted by a few bare 
formulae on the idealist construction of existence, but 
has a historical content of enormous intrinsic worth. 
Althusser has put forward a reading of Hegal's other 
works which reduces them to the Logic (20), andin this 
his work at least bothers to address an interpretative 
problem. Colletti also cannot afford to deal with Hegel 
at other than the barest levels of ontology; but he does 
not go on to consider whether this sort of treatment is 
adequate (21). My opinion on this issue is, I am sure, 
clear, and I will not bother restating it here. For what 
is obvious - and for exegetical purposes this is enough -' 
is that Marx did not share Althusser's and Colletti's 
opinion as to the essential uselessness of the dialectic 
in historiography, and he want on to address it at the 
level of history. 
Marx's Reworking of Historical Dialectic 
Marx's guiding thread clearly adopts the central themes 
of the Phenomenological Dialectic. 
(Leaving aside the 
particular substantive themes which Marx takes from the 
Phenomenology and dealing only with method) critique 
understood as immanent, determinate negation is at the 
core of the guiding thread, which works out a broadly 
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progressive development within states of social 
alienation. Marx grants a privilege to consideration of 
material life in accounts of alienated conditions. In so 
doing he is taking over Feuerbach's inversion, but 
re-locating it within a specific context of alienated 
conditions identified by historiograhical explanatory 
necessity rather than the general context of existence as 
such. Marx's dialectic of social change also has 
something of the subject-object structure of Hegelian 
Dialectic, but this is very substantially altered. The 
dialectic of forces and relations of production is within 
consciousness certainly, but this is a consciousness 
which possesses more than merely internal criteria for 
judging particular social forms, for it has an ultimate 
practical reference to the objective natural world. By 
extension, those other dualisms which constitute the rest 
of the guiding thread - base and superstructure, class 
and classless societies and science and. Ideology - 
mediate the influence of his ultimate materialism as we 
take up other ways of addressing other areas of social 
life in different projects of historical explanation. 
In a very important initial sense, then, Marx's guiding 
thread is an inversion of Phenomenological Dialectic. 
Whereas in Hegel the status of consciousness is vague, 
and this vagueness is exploited so that consciousness can 
embrace the entire dialectic, in Marx consciousness is 
situated in a social 'materialist context against a 
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materialist philosophical anthropological background. 
Marx's dialectic reworks in detail many of the historical 
themes of Hegelian Dialectic, and does so in a way 
informed by the direct Feuerbachian inversion of Hegel's 
philosophy at the barest existential levels. Marx's 
thought thus contains many more determinations than 
Feuerbachs, being sensible to a great range of specific 
historical issues that really have no integrated place 
(nor need they have) in Feuerbach's existential 
anthropology. But awareness of the real historical 
presence here of the intellectual event of the (as it 
were, double) inversion of Hegel does allow us to 
understated Marx's thought more clearly, and I would defend 
the use of the metaphor on this ground. Marx may 
'"coquette" with Hegelian terminology', but, as he 
himself says, this is a sign pointing to substantial 
intellectual indebtedness (22). The directness of the 
metaphor does rather conceal what is the real strength of 
both Hegel and Marx - the complex richness and consequent 
felicity of their explanations, which the 
one-dimensionality of describing these explanations as 
ideal or material cannot capture. However, the inversion 
can stand as a way of helping us comprehend the 
irreducible detail of this complex relationship. 
What is more, having used the metaphor is this (double) 
sense in an intellectual history, it perhaps is more 
important to recognise how the problem of inversion still 
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figure as a contemporary task. Let us turn to this now. 
Inversion and the Project of Critique of Alienation 
Both Hegel and Marx set themselves the project of 
inverting contemporaneous consciousness through critique 
of existing alienated conditions. Both establish their 
particular contributions - in epistemology and political 
economy - by critique of rival theories which shows these 
to be alienated. Both conceive of the given world as 
having as its core a mistaken self-understanding - or, to 
put it this way, an absence of self-understanding - which 
they are trying to correct. They themselves often 
describe this as the inversion of present understandings. 
Taking a lead from the common metaphor allows us to focus 
on the shared essential aims of Hegel's and Marx's 
project; and, as I have tried to show, it is these that 
are the key to Marx's work. 
More than this, however, the inversion metaphor should 
still be the object of investigation because such 
investigation can point out contemporary tasks. For what 
is most obvious about both Hegel's and Marx's projects of 
inversion is that they have not succeeded in the ways 
envisaged. Any properly self-critical appraisal of 
projects which fail to satisfy the criteria they pose 
must eventually turn its attention to the core framework 
of those projects - this is a principal lesson of 
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dialectic. But what, then, of the dialectic as it sets 
itself the task of "inversion". 
For Marx, of course, Hegel's thought in many ways 
exemplifies the consciousness that requires inversion. 
To use Hegel's method, Marx, as we have seen and as he 
himself put it, had to carry out a (double) inversion of 
that method. But let us turn our attention to a related 
but significantly different problem; how Hegel and Marx 
were able to hold themselves to be in a position to 
regard past and present consciousness as alienated. 
There is a common theme of the present holding the 
potential for the and of (pre-)history. I have argued 
that Hegel is unable to secure his claimed position 
beyond history in a rationally corrigible manner, and 
that consequently a number of the especially strong forms 
of proof to which he aspires - basically a circularity of 
necessarily compelling totality of explanation - 
collapse into dogmatism. I have also argued that, by 
contrast, Marx's stance is secured in an, in principle, 
defensible dialogue with the present. Marx can, then, be 
thought to have done much to bring the power of Hegel's 
critique of alienation within a rationally defensible 
domain, the domain of social science. But, as I have 
said, this, though certainly important to Marx, was 
subordinate to what he regarded as the real confirmation 
of his work - the proletarian establishment of socialism. 
If Hegel's project is a failure in terms of the 
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rationality to which it aspires, then Marx's has, surely, 
been overall a political one. I have tried to locate 
Hegel's failure within his work; but have been rather less 
explicit about Marx. In taking this up, we run into the 
crucial issues of "inversion". 
The peculiar degree of dogmatism which is ultimately 
displayed by Hegel's dialectic involves him in arguing 
that the essential framework for all future historical 
events is now settled. There can no longer be the 
radical changes central to the dialectic; all future 
developments can merely extend the margin of now 
basically determined history. Hegel here commits himself 
to a position which seems absurd, but which in fact 
follows quite easily from the way he conceives of 
alienation. Spirit embraces all of the world, and 
therefore so too does its alienation. Once Spirit 
recognises itself, it is the peculiar characteristic of 
this subject that all objectivity becomes thereby, in 
principle, known. Nothing really new can emerge, because 
when Spirit potentially knows itself, all is potentially 
known. 
Marx dramatically departs from this. Humanity can 
overcome alienation, and know the social world, but 
rather than all that is to be known being thereby 
essentially known, a whole new openness thereby emerges 
with reference to what self-conscious sociality can do. 
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For finite human beings,, the self-knowledge of the social 
world is capable of infinite deepending, not to speak of 
the social changes consequent upon deepening our ability 
to work in nature. What Marx does it to refuse to bring 
all being under the ambit of alienation, or, to put it 
this way, he refuses to identify the realm of potential 
objectification with the realm of present alienation 
(23). A vast domain of a still opaque world in which we 
can - in various senses - still work remains after 
alienation is overcome. In the end, though there can be 
no doubt that freedom is the central goal of Hegel's 
thought, a greater idea of radical transformative 
potential persists in Marx than does in Hegel. The 
freedom of self-consciously dirtcted objectification is 
the reward of the critique of alienation for the former; 
in the latter the distinction of alienation and 
objectification simply cannot obtain. Marx takes a 
position only at the end of pre-history, rather than 
Hegel's stance at the end of history. An omission is 
perhaps the best evidence of the stength of Marx's 
position here. In stark contrast to Hegel's sometimes 
bathetic identification of the rational state, Marx 
repeatedly refused (though there are, perhaps, some early 
exceptions) to specify communist institutions, for to do 
so would be to close off precisely the potentials for 
freedom which he sought to actualise by removing present 
restrictions upon them. Obviously, more can be said of 
socialism, indeed more must be said to make socialist 
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developments consciously acceptable. But in what Marx 
actually did say here, crucial shortcomings emerge. 
In what I have just said, it is implicit that there is a 
common idea of the negation of the negation of absence of 
self-consciousness, a common inversion of this absence 
into presence. But Hegel can rather strictly invert the 
given, for the given contains the pattern of the True, 
only the relationship of the True and the given is 
inverted. Marx gains strength from following the project 
of inversion so far, but he cannot carry that project 
through in this rather literal way. When Marx inverts 
the absence of self-consciousness, he can produce 
presence, but he cannot invert a presently given pattern, 
for the inversion of alienation as Marx presents it is to 
lead only into openness. Put in this way, this seems an 
extremely nice point, but the fact that Marx never 
realised the full implications of this openness has had 
major implications for his understanding of socialism and 
how the proletariat is to achieve it. This is to say, 
this issue has had major implications for the way in 
which Marx sought the final justification of his work. 
I have tried to show how the proletarian struggle for 
socialism remains very seriously theoretically 
indeterminate in terms of the thrust of Marx's account of 
capitalism. The main reason for this can now, I think, 
be set out. Marx can in Capital go so far as to describe 
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those economic laws of motion that internally disrupt 
capitalist production and create the productive 
potentials for socialism. He can even go so far as to 
give economic reasons for the proletariat's 
dissatifaction with capitalism and for its engaging in 
combinations and struggles against the bourgeoisie over 
wages. He cannot proceed with explicating the 
proletariat's struggle for socialism within a similar 
framework of economic law, for as the proletariat 
actually becomes class consious and actively takes up 
socialist aims, it is integral to the whole idea of 
emancipation that it does so as a conscious decision. 
This is what is specifically socialist about the 
proletariat - it is the first class which carries the 
banner of social self-consciousness. 
This is not to say that the proletariat's struggle cannot 
be brought under explanation, but the explanation needs 
to be of a completely historically novel form. It is the 
explanation fit for social actors who are increasingly 
aware of what they are doing. It cannot have the form 
which is needed to account for the actions of those 
labouring under alienation. The accounts of their own 
actions which members of the proletariat themselves put 
forward must become increasingly self-sufficient as 
explanations; but this can ever be the case for all 
earlier social actors. 
450 
Marx would certainly seem to have missed this important 
point. His programmatic expressions all indicate a 
tendency to explain socialism more or less along the 
lines of a necessity derived from his account of 
capitalism (24), with the consequence that when he turns 
to the political elements central to proletarian class 
struggle, this appears to be merely a manoeuvre to save 
his essentially economic explanations when they are no 
longer of great value. 
One reason for this shortcoming, commonly adduced (25) 
and no doubt correct, is the influence of the background 
intellectual climate of scientistic positivism against 
which Marx wrote. In his aim to, for example, give 
accounts of economic crises purely in the terms of 
self-sufficient mathematics (26), Marx gives ample 
testimony to the effects of this background. Of course, 
we must be careful over this point. Marx put forward 
explicit polemics against what he called mechanical 
materialism, and parts of his most directly economic 
theses contain polemics against the naturalism of, to 
take this example, Malthus' population theory. What is 
more,, by extension we can fairly say that appreciation of 
historical effectivity is central to Marx's work. 
Recognising all of this, a plausible attitude to take 
would be to regard what seem to be Marx's confusions of 
the natural and the social to be marginal to his work. I 
am sure that this is the best stance on this particular 
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issue, but to treat of Marx's difficulties in this area 
as turning on the distinction natural/social reflects, I 
think, more the preoccupations of later social science 
than Marx's own concerns. Answering objections about 
Marx's treatment of the ýaýural and the social does not 
answer the objection I am trying to raise about his 
conception of socialism, so I shall try to be more 
precise about his specific concerns. 
Z^ the Dialectics of Nature Engels tries to locate Wie. 
guiding thread against development in natural science in 
a peculiar . 'o subsuming the latter under a dialectic 
which was claimed to already have generated the former. 
The guiding thread is to be placed within something of a 
cosmological context by being located, along with 
contemporaneous science, within a purportedly dialectical 
scheme based on some of Hegel's comments on nature and 
logic. As we have nothing like a detailed statment by 
Marx on the point, we cannot say with any confidence how 
far along this line he would have gone with Engels. We 
have a number of direct statements which show his broad 
sympathy with a dialectics of nature (27), but, on the 
other hand, I personally find it difficult to believe 
that, should he have undertaken any such dialectics, Marx 
would not have registered internal difficulties with it 
that certainly escaped Engels. What I want to argue is 
that -such a project could appear plausible to Marx 
because he held an aspiration which rather cross cuts the 
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division of natural and social. He works with an idea 
that he can give an account of the development of 
socialism that follows essentially the same line as the 
account which he gives of capitalism; that is to say, he 
treats of socialism in the same law-like way in which he 
treats of capitalism. Now, if this is the case, it 
cannot matter that Marx's laws of capitalism are properly 
formulated with respect to recognising social 
determinants, for the determinants they properly describe 
are those of an alienated society, and socialism cannot 
be subsumed under any such laws (28). Non-alienated 
action is its own conscious law, and the dialectic cannot 
be extended to cover it. Marx does not seem to have come 
proQecly to terms with this particular implication of his 
guiding thread, with the result that the proletariat's 
class struggle is expressed either in terms that are not 
apposite or remain intractably vague. There can be no 
inversion of the capitalist present to reveal the 
socialist future, for it is not a given form but a 
radical openness which the actualisation of socialism 
posits, and not merely for an established socialism but 
increasingly in all stages of socialism's development. 
I do not feel, however-, that this is the right note on 
which to conclude. The task which I have, in effect, 
assigned to Marx is to posit the abolition of his own 
work; to contemplate the redundancy of Capital and 
incorporate that into its composition. This is an 
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onerous task indeed, one which it seems churlish to 
accuse Marx of not completing in an orderly fashion. Of 
course, disorder is to be avoided, and the indeterminacy 
of Marx's accounts of class struggle is unacceptable. 
But in addressing this problem, we must not underestimate 
the inner strength of Marx's position which is registered 
even in this weak area. 
Two broad responses to the political failure of Marx's 
science and to his writings on the class struggle where 
that failure seems particularly theoretically destructive 
have, I would say, been made. One is simply to regard 
later events as overtaking Marx's writings, which are 
thus regarded as obsolete (29). The other is to hold to 
the core of those writings, and try to defend them by 
introducing other variables to take into account the 
political failure of Marx's programme. An at least 
conceptual sophistication of the rigid base and 
superstructure metaphor to allow of a greater independent 
(or relatively autonomous) effectivity of the political 
level is one variant of this (30). Rather more valuable 
is that variant which takes cognisance of real social 
changes but claims that Marx's economic (31) or more 
general social theories (32) are still essentially 
applicable. One may see both of these broad responses 
ranged on either side of the debate over whether the 
post-war western world is post-capitalist (33). 
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The latter of these responses is clearly concerned to 
defend Marx, and one may suspect a dogmatism in the way 
it marginalises very significant social developments in 
order to do so. But if there is a dogmatism here, it is 
a very peculiar one, for it is one which willingly 
surrenders the most defensible elements of its central 
position in order to support the least defensible ones. 
The essentials of Marx's class analysis are not lost by 
admitting change; indeed it is only change that can in 
the and support that analysis. The defence of Marx has 
very often been taken up by those who forget this. They 
continually insist on the undoubted vestiges of narrow 
capitalist economic necessity which still thwart the 
socialising thrust of such changes. But it is in the 
socialist elements of the change that the future-lies, as 
does the spirit, but thereby not the letter, of Marx's 
thought. 
This is just the opposite error to taking social 
improvement to be a direct refutation, or rather, a 
rendering obsolete, of. Marx's work (34). His analysis 
does not posit such improvement as being won against 
capitalism but as an increasingly pressing potential 
within it. Of course, unless we clearly recognise the 
necessity of consciously politically working to actualise 
those potentials, sentiments such as the one I am 
expressing can lapse into quietism - instead of waiting 
for the inevitable movement of the proletariat to abolish 
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capitalism, we wait for capitalism to abolish itself. 
What happens here is that freedom is even more directly 
subsumed under the laws of alienated economics. 
Though Marx does not specify the peculiar quality of the 
true politics of self-consciousness, we must now do so. 
Taking this step allows us to view developments in the 
capitalist economy in a progressive, rather than a merely 
negative, light. Those developments within capitalism, 
such as planning, welfare state provision, the growth of 
a public sector of employment, etc., which are taken to 
be the mark of Capital's basic inadequacy, in fact, by 
their narrowing the area in which capitalism's narrow 
economic necessity can prevail, do much to confirm Marx's 
most important theses, which posit just such a narrowing. 
What Marx is insufficiently clear about is'the way that 
this does entail the increasing obsolescence of Capital, 
for we cannot invert its description of capitalist 
determinations to produce socialist ones. What presently 
faces us is the complete rejection of this idea of 
inversion and the comprehension of self-conscious 
politics which can politically utilise the resources for 
socialism that have been - though substantially 
unself-consciously - produced. 
The paradox here is that the socialising developments 
within the capitalist economy which confirm the essential 
thrust bf Marx's workao5o by making it increasingly 
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inapplicable, and especially in respect of proletarian 
action. This, however, is the essential openness which I 
have tried to argue must lie at the heart of an in 
principle corrigible treatment of alienation, and the 
correct point an which to end is to register this 
strength. Consider the implications of Strachey's 
argument (35) to the effect that capitalism's life has 
been extended by those changes wrought by the working 
class which have made that mode of production more 
tolerable. Strachey's case for democratic socialism is 
weakened by the way he puts this, for though he 
recognises that, of course, these changes are not 
illusory (35), he does not grasp the full potential of 
those changes, revealed by seeing that a capitalism that 
embraces them is to that extent no longer capitalism. 
These changes are the mechanism of the revolut%e4\. It is 
not to go against Marx but to go with him to insist on 
the overall socialising character of such developments in 
the capitalist economy. However, it is just to the 
extent that socialisation proceeds that the sway of 
alienated economic forces gives way to that of nascently 
socially self-conscious planning, and statements of 
progressive improvements and what should be done in 
response to these cannot be made in the old economic 
ways. Marx suggests that the issues in proletarian 
struggle are political ones, and this is -%o«trwc, for the 
politics involved are actually ones of conscious decision 
making, than Marx's own work can incorporate, for that 
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work seems tied to the explanation of alienated 
conditions. The consequence is that Marx either 
represents these politics in wrong, because basically 
economic, ways, or leaves them indeterminate. There is 
no longer any excuse for this. We must radically shift 
our focus from the realm of alienated necessity to that 
of self-conscious removal of the present restrictions on 
free development. We should no longer stand under the 
thrall of the metaphor of inversion, seeking to find 
socialism by inversion of alienated determinations, but 
recognise the limits of the applicability of the 
dialectic. For the real lesson of Marx's dialectic is 
that the supercession of economic law gives an entirely 
different set of determinations - those of self-conscious 





HISTORICAL REPETITIONS IN MARXISM'S SELF-COMPREHENSION 
The most disappointing - indeed I find it depressing - 
aspect of these attempts to recast marxism's intellectual 
ancestry is the prejudices of Althusser's and Colletti's 
knowledge of marxism's own intellectual history. Let us 
consider the following quotation from Labriola: 
A return to other philosophers is nowadays also 
suggested by some socialists. The one wants to 
return to Spinoza, that is, to a philosophy, in 
which the historical development cuts no figure. 
Another would be content with the mechanical 
materialism of the eighteenth century, that is, with 
a repudiation of any and all history. Still others 
think of reviving Kant. Does this also imply the 
revival of his insoluble antinomy between practical 
reason and theoretical reason? Does it mean a 
return to his fixed catgories and fixed faculties of 
the soul, of which Herbart seemed to have made short 
work? Does it include his categorical imperative, 
in which Schopenhauer had discovered the Christian 
commandments in the disguise of a metaphysical 
principle? Does it mean the theory of natural 
rights, which even the Pope does not care to uphold 
any more? Why don't they let the dead bury the 
dead? (1). 
To anyone conversant with Althusser and Colletti and the 
sort of response to them exemplified by Timpanaro, that 
Labriola wrote this in 1897 is startling. However, 
reflection on the ideas of, for example, Plekhanov (2), 
Dietzgen (3) and Adler (4) confirms the picture drawn by 
Labriola, and gives the turn taken by the most important 
debate in marxist theory over the last twenty years a 
rather hackneyed aspect. Althusser and Colletti are not, 
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of course, unaware of their predecessors, indeed for 
Althusser Plekhanov's thought is mechanistic (5), and for 
Colletti' Adler's is idealist (6). It is, I would say, a 
dogmatism which is the only way either of these authors 
can reconcile their hermenuetically indefensible attitude 
to Hegel with their claim to be laying bare Marx's own 
thought that prevents them from seeing their own 
shortcomings in earlier writings and learning from these. 
In Althusser this dogmatism is elevated to a principle. 
In Colletti it would seem to stem from the very 




HEGEL AND THE PARADOX OF SEEKING AFTER TRUTH 
It has been claimed (1) that at the outset of the 
'Introduction' to the Phenomenology the difference 
between Hegel and the classical epistemological project 
might be considered to lie in that Hegel takes the 
paradox of learning in the meno seriously 
(2). Socrates 
formulates the paradox thus: "... a man cannot try to 
discover either what he knows or what he does not 
know... He would not seek for what he knows, for since he 
knows it there is no need of the inquiry, nor what he 
does not know, for in that case he does not know what he 
is to look for'. Hegel is cd to have put forward a 
re ß to this in a particularly serious fashion and 
to 
have been able to make a uniquely positive response to 
it. This is not, I think, directly so. 
Hegel does not begin with blank ignorance and ask how 
would it be possible to move from that state and come to 
know? It is not only that, in fact, he criticises this 
blank beginning for its blankness, but that this claim 
about Hegel's position misses the way he links his 
criticism of classical epistemology to his conception of 
Absolute Spirit? He does not ask how is it possible to 
know, but rather he presumes what is to be known is fixed 
and, as he writes the Phenomenology, is known. To miss 
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this elision will seriously handicap the reader gaining 
any critical distance from Hegel's arguments in the 
Phenomenology. In searching for a Platonic root of 
Hegel's project as set out in the 'Introduction', it is 
far more accurate and helpful to draw attention to the 
tale of the guide to the beautiful itself in the 
Symposium (3), or to the metaphor of the philosopher in- 
the cave in the Republic (4), where the problem is the 
dissemination of truth. 
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APPENDIX 3 
BRADLEY AND MOORE ON THE IDEA OF A WHOLE 
Bradley's derivation of an idea of the absolute from 
Hegel centres on the following notion. Every element of 
experience is related to the others, and therefore the 
full truth of experience would be found only by grasping 
the character of the all-encompassing unity in which all 
of these elements stand. Such knowledge is, of course, 
unavailable to the finite human intellect (1). 
Criticism of this notion of, as Moore renders it, an 
"organic whole" was a central theme in the rejection of 
the Hegelian and other speculative-rationalist elements 
in late-nineteenth century British thought that was an 
essential part of the establishment of the ascendencancy 
of analytic philosophy. Wanting to address the ways in 
which the ethical value of a whole can be different from 
that of (the sum of) its parts, Moore had to clear away 
the absolutist meanings which philosophers "who profess 
to have derived great benefit from the writings of Hegel" 
had attached to the idea o f. a whole (2). There can be no 
doubt about the strength of Moore's criticisms of such 
virtually mystical renderings of Hegel's arguments as 
Bradley's. But in saying this I do not want to allow 
that these criticisms exhaust the original arguments. 
That British philosophy of this century has more or less 
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regarded this as being , so has been, in my opinion, a 
serious mistake. 
When Russell, for example, takes over Moore's criticism 
of the supposedly Hegelian whole (3) and goes on to say 
that he rejects the pure coherence criterion of truth 
which follows from Hegel's panlogistic holism, then an 
unfortunate situation quickly develops. As part of this 
rejection, Russell moves on to the position known as 
logical atomism which asserts that there are irreducible 
and self-contained units of experience as the foundations 
of knowing (4). 
Russell's position is indefensible in the light of the 
subsequent appreciation upon the. hermeneutic frameworks 
within which even scientific descriptions must be formed. 
We can add that it is a retrogression from the awareness 
of the fluidity of our knowledges under changing 
(including improving) frameworks of interpretation that 
can be clearly derived from Hegel's Phenomenology. I 
have mentioned below that the Phenomenology's first 
chapters contain a well-worked out criticism of logical 
atomism (if I may be allowed to. use this anachronism), 
and have also taken up both Hegel's idea of the whole and 
his outline of the method of the discovery of new 
knowledge at more apposite points. I wills%ot go into 
these again, but just say a few words about why the more 
plausible and productive lines in Hegel have been missed. 
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The fault, of course, is that of Bradley (and mcTaggart, 
Stirling, etc. ). His treatment of the absolute is of a 
far more Spinozist than Hegelian character, repeating the 
desirability, but also the impossibility of the human 
intellect grasping the relations of all things under the 
aspect of God's eternal and infinite view (5). We should 
of course, suspect any attribution of Hegel of an 
absolute beyond human understanding. As we have seen, it 
is over the necessity of philosophically winning 
conviction in the Truth that Hegel principally diverges 
from Spinoza. This conflation of Hegel and Spinoza is a 
principal feature of nineteenth century British studies 
of Hegel (except for his political philosophy) and of the 
twentieth century criticism of these. Certainly 
Russell's History of *Western Philosophy-contains major 
failings here, which would emerge, I am sure, from the 
briefest reading of its treatment of Hegel. 
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APPENDIX 4 
KEMP SMITH ON HUME 
I think that the central argument of Kemp Smith's book on 
Hume is a mistaken one, though I do not in saying this 
mean to deny that this remains perhaps the best 
commentary we have. Against what he identifies as the 
then dominant interpretation of Hume, established by 
Reid, Beattie and Stewart and carried on through to J. S. 
Mill and Green (1)p Kemp Smith argues that the idea of 
natural belief constitutes a positive teaching by Hume to 
which the scepticism is subordinate (2). I have 
mentioned that Hegel himself was well enough aware of 
this positive side to Hume, and Kemp Smith cites (3) a 
passage from Wallace's ProleQomena (4) in support of his 
argument. 
However, I am sure that Kemp Smith misses the point of 
Hegel's recognition that Hume allowed this positive side 
into his work, for Hegel is arguing that Hume had to do 
this in order for his work to be at all plausible, but 
that this has nothing to do with his philosop\ . It is 
true to say that Hume is able to ridicule absurdly 
rationalist claims about the world and elevate over these 
a respect for natural belief in a way with which we 
should now sympathise (5). But, I cannot see how he does 
this other than by claiming that all philosophes have 
kvi 
unsupportable pretensions, and I do not think Kemp Smith 
shows how he does so. The main point is that when all 
philosophies come to be criticised in this way, even the 
healthy scepticism which Hume seems to engender must 
lapse. Kemp Smith by the end of his book seems to 
restore, in defence of Hume, the very same natural 
beliefs with which he started. Of course at the and we' 
are no longer able to claim all sorts of philosophical 
justifications for those beliefs such as were initially 
claimed. But this is, in a really positive sense, not 
even interesting, because we have to go on adopting those 
beliefs just the same. Hegel does not accept this 
conclusion. He sees it as a serious shortcoming of 
philosphy that it is ineffectual, and sets himself to 
recast a philosophy of significance to all our beliefs, 
in which doubt is of value (6). 
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APPENDIX 5 
ANAMNESIS AND ITS RESOLUTION 
I have earlier argued that it is inaccurate to regard 
Hegel as having taken the Meno paradox of learning 
seriously. Having precisely formulated it, Socrates, of 
course, went on to locate the possibility of knowing in 
anamnesis (1). That a rejection of this mystical 
solution does not leave us floundering before the paradox 
is certainly, however, due to Hegelian arguments, or at 
least to arguments first formulated by Hegel (2). These 
arguments show that the paradox is insoluble because it 
is misleadingly formulated. 
For what is stultifying about the paradox is the complete 
lack of determinations in its depiction of knowing. How 
is it possible to learn? (or to know? etc. ) is the 
question. It is clearly impossible to learn; it is 
possible only to learn something. There must be a set of 
determinate cognitions as resources and aims of cognition 
if any such question is to really have a meaning. That 
is to say, there must enter into epistemological inquiry 
some statement of the conditions and requirements of 
actual cognition of a to-be-known. The unbridgeable gulf 
between radically separated cognition and the to-be-known 
is the product of the wholly artificial severing of these 
every mutual constitutive moments of the process of 
knowing by which the paradox is formulated at all. 
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APPENDIX 6 
POPPER AND THE REFUTATION OF SCEPTICISM 
The importance of the idea of determinate negation can, I 
think, be brought out by some comments on the discussion 
of Hegel in Popper's 'What is Dialectic? '. In the famous 
criticism of Hegel's broadly social philosophy which he 
wrote at about the same time, Popper, in virtually his 
first words about Hegel in The Open Society and Its 
Enemie_ gives his opinion that Hegel would have been a 
fit subject for psycho-analysis (1). (This seems 
particularly harsh as Popper seems to have substantially 
reached his unfavourable conclusions about that 
discipline at that time). In 'What is Dialectic? ' we are 
presented with what is presumably another aspect of 
Hegel's pathology - his notion of truth is utterly absurd 
(2). Now, although Popper's paper is as shot through 
with coarse -misrepresentation of Hegel as is his book 
(3), there is doubtless a very important sense in which 
Hegel's Absolute is absurd. But I will try to show that 
this sense is hardly akin to flat incomprehensibility but 
is rather that of the unsatisfactory resolution of some 
very real issues, to ignore which means that one falls 
beneath the level of Hegel's thought. 
Popper's own work provides, I think, a case in point. It 
is Popper's claim to have solved the problem of induction 
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in the philosophy of science, that is to say 
understanding . the movement from particular statements 
(of 
events) to general ones (of a law-like form) (4), by 
adopting what he called a deductive system (5). In this 
system the issues are the criteria of the falsification 
or refutation of theories in science understood as the 
continuous replacement of theories (6). Typically Humean 
scepticism based on objections to the possibility of 
induction are thereby rendered immaterial as science is 
to proceed without recourse to that operation (7). Now, 
as Popper himself says (8), his basic shift in the focus 
of the philosophy of science did not really involve nor 
require a notion of truth. We can agree with him that 
the displacement of scientific theories by others does 
not of itself necessarily imply a movement, intended or 
actual, towards truth. However, when we invoke a general 
philosophy of science based on agnoticism on this point, 
then "science" can retain few of its nobler connotations 
of the valuable provision of knowledge, and becomes 
merely an academic, in the bad sense, enterprise. Popper 
gives an analogy between his envisaged process of 
continuous criticism and a game (9), and I would say that 
this is uncomfortably true. For all its overt polemic 
against inductivism, indeed probably because of this, 
Popper's philosophy of science is readily assimilable to 
the basic problematic of Humean philosophy of science, 
and as such stands, despite Popper's quibbles, as the 
twentieth century rationalisation of technical rational 
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science's eschewing of all social goals but its own (10) 
practical (11) ones. 
Popper has frequently characterised science as a process 
of progressive discovery (12), and the inconsistency of 
such a characterisation, involving as it does some idea 
of truth, speaks of his reluctance to grasp the rigorous 
conclusion of his own philosophy (13). Relatively 
recently he has openly admitted both his earlier 
inconsistencies and the absence of a motivational 
rationale for a science without truth, and has tried to 
set both right by involving in his work some idea of 
truth having a necessary regulatory function in 
scientific development (14). His aim is to be able to 
describe his philosophy as setting out the process by 
which we may actually learn from our mistakes (15). 
Though in my opinion this is a valuable direction for 
Popper to take, it is instructive to see why he is unable 
to establish any real regulation of criticism of truth. 
There is obviously going to be a forcedness about such a 
saving development in Popper's representation of science, 
for if this representation could be formulated without 
use of a notion of truth, then the later inclusion of 
some such notion to save the representation from certain 
criticisms is not the actual involvement of truth in the 
core formulation. This is the crucial point. Popper's 
tack when faced with scepticism about induction was not 
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to refute that scepticism (16) but rather to accept it, 
give up the aim of verification, and set criteria for 
falsifying theories (17). On this basis, to recognise 
that truth is needed even as a motive for falsification 
and therefore to include it in such a role does not allow 
Popper to claim, as he does (18), that his description of 
science is now of an approach to truth. Having failed to 
reject an inductivist understanding of truth, truth, for 
Popper's philosophy, remains above human authority (19). 
Despite Popper's use of some picturesque metaphors which 
conceal this (20), he cannot come to terms with Hegel's 
criticisms of the idea of being in possession of 
approximations of truth when what is properly true is 
unreachable. Perhaps the clearest indication of this is 
that Popper's idea of the way in which we might speak 
about truth, which he purports to derive from Tarski, is 
an attempt to make this possible through discussion about 
the form of liguistic statements and their implication of 
correspondence to facts (21). That is to say, it is 
hopelessly trivial in respect of, indeed eschews 
consideration of, understanding how we may claim to know 
real states of affairs. 
Now, I think Popper falls beneath Hegel's demonstration 
of the possibility of knowing through critique of those 
epistemological positions which terminate in unrelievable 
scepticism. Indeed, there arises a rather peculiar 
situation in Popper's understanding of Hegel. I would 
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say that the closest Popper comes in all of his writings 
on the topic to a representation of Hegel's views that is 
not wildly inaccurate is in the first section of 'What is 
Dialectic? ' - section two is at the same level as 
Popper's claim that the dialectic of lordship and bondage 
is a defence of slavery. This happy coincidence with 
respect of the critical features of the dialectic is not, 
unfortunately for Popper, repeated in its positive 
aspects. 
What is best about Popper's own work in respect of 
establishing a philosophy of science against scepticist 
philosophy is presaged, indeed rather better done, in 
Hegel. I cannot leave this without a few words about 
Lakatos. Lakatos thanks Popper for help in breaking from 
Hegel (22), and yet Lakatos' extensions of Popper are, I 
would say, basically correct in so far as they repeat 
Hegel's directions of thought. I do not mean by this to 
refer to the strong Hegelian cast of some of Lakatos' 
ideas, of which the rational reconstruction of 
intellectual disciplines is the oustanding example (23). 
I mean that when, having pushed Popper's work to its 
sceptical conclusion, Lakatos makes a plea for a whiff of 
inductivism (24), the way he does this directly recalls 
the positive side of determinate negation. Having 
immersed ourselves in science and presumed science's 
ability to know, Popper's philosophy, Lakatos argues, 
gives us many valuable reflections on how to judge the 
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value of now criticised theories. Of course, it is quite 
unprincipled to ask for a whiff of inductivism within 
Popper's philosophy, which is founded in the rejection of 
just such a possibility. In fact Lakatos does not really 
want the return of inductivism but of the sort of 
confidence in truth to which it aspired. Despite 
Lakatos' lame attempt to close the distance between 
wishing for something and achieving it (25), it would 
seem that we have no recourse other than to return to 
Hegel for a sound basis on which to rest the achievements 
of twentieth century philosophy of science. 
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APPENDIX 1 
RUSSELL'S REFUTION OF HEGELIAN NECESSITY 
Though it is perhaps the principal characteristic of 
McTaggart's entire work of interpretation that it gives 
to formalised logic a crucial role which it simply did 
not have in Hegel's philosophy, one is lead by the 
speculative aspirations of Hegel's concept of necessity 
to think of him. In saying this I no doubt go some way 
to making clear my opinion that with these aspirations we 
are faced by one of the aspects of Hegel's thought that 
it has proven difficult to discuss in other than the 
condescending tone in which are recalled ideas now 
remembered only for the quaint charm of their absurdity. 
Simply the effort which mcTaggart's expositions must have 
cost is ample testimony to his belief in the worth of his 
subject. But even when it was still possible to write a 
three hundred page study of Hegelian cosmology, Hegel's 
claims for the totality of his philosophy had to be 
rejected (1). It is Hegel's position, I believe, to have 
set himself theological aims which closely link him to 
pre-englightenment speculative philosophies, but to have 
attempted to realise these using critically rational 
apparatuses which ultimately ridicule the very idea of 
such aims. In the case of Hegel's effort to generate a 
strong sense of necessity by philosophical and especially 
phenomenological comprehension this is certainly so. 
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There is no defensible sense, for diluting the strength 
of the requirement of necessity destroys the power of the 
intended phenomenological proof, in which Hegel's 
requirement of totality can be satisfied or be thought to 
have been satisfied. In Appearance and Reality, for 
example, Bradley more or less demolishes his own 
identification of truth with grasp of the absolute whole 
in the fret part of the book by having recourse in the 
second part to wholly implausible devices for allowing 
some degree of truth when the goal of grasp of the 
absolute is seen to be quite unrealisable (2). Hegel's 
criticism of unrelieved scepticism is, then, run on into 
an argument where approximations to truth are established 
through an ultimate standard of an absolute, total 
comprehension which seems quite absurd. Having argued 
this, I have nothing more to add in this vein. The. 
important points lie in adopting another tone. 
When Russell repeats McTaggart's interpretation (which he 
had indeed some hand in fashioning), it is in a history 
of philosophy which can find no real philosophical 
interest in Hegel (3). On Hegel, Russell's comments are 
certainly a failure in historical understanding, but 
their more important failure is in the account of the 
contemporaneous resources and programme of philosophy to 
which the History of Western Philosophy leads. On my 
reading, the role of truth which Hegel shows is an 
indispensable part of critique is played by an absolute 
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or literal totality to which successive determinate 
negations are approximations. This truth is an absurd 
one - but in recognising this we are not thereby entitled 
to disregard the problems of epistemological criticism to 
which it is an unsatisfactory solution. It was, of 
course, Russell's conviction that Hegel (and Kant) held 
rationalist beliefs which were pre-Humean in the sense 
that Humean criticism could virtually destroy them (4), 
however unpleasant it then was to be subsequently left 
with Humean scepticism (5). Russell's progamme was, in 
the light, to give up hope of rapid speculative success 
in philosophy, a hope nurtured basically by theological 
modes of thought, and to be content with the slower and 
ultimately restricted progress available through 
scientific thinking (6). Who can disagree with Russell's 
circumspection? But this admirable attitude is, I hope 
it is now clear, itself one which it is quite impossible 
to realistically, practically or common-sensically hold. 
It is precisely the unavailability of even these limited 
comforts on the basis of anything like a consistent 
Humean position that puts (Kant and) Hegel at the centre 
of the contemporary programme of epistemology and 
philosophy of science. The collapse of Russell's various 
attempts to provide an idea of truth which dodges around 
the fundamental scepticism of his epistemologcal position 
does much, in my opinion, to confirm this. 
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APPENDIX 
ADORNO ON THE STYLE OF HOLISM 
Adorno has made the most arresting response this century 
to the dogmatism of the Absolute in Hegel's thought""a 
piece of sarcasm which is the more telling for being 
derived from Hegel's own famous words: "the whole is the 
false" (1). More than half a century of critical 
theoretical work on Hegel's legacy, exposing the Absolute 
as the thwarting of determinate negation at the point of 
its consumation in Hegel's philosophy (2), is given its 
best expression in Adorno's writing and, in fine, in this 
reworked aphorism. 
More over, the very style of minima Moralia is formed by 
eschewing any possible claim to an absolute system (3). 
However, we can see that this renunciation has been 
transmogrified by a most wide and profound pessimism (4) 
into a rejection of confidence in truth at all. The 
anti-system of (only) negative dialectics* (5) is a 
tragically unbalanced notion, one which (perhaps 
intentionally provocatively) tends to cut away the ground 
of even a sense of truth which seeks self-awareness of 
its historicality in its urge to criticise absoluteness. 
Adorno's commitment to negative thinking and immanent 
criticism is not intended to be a disavowal of truth, but 
it is hard to see on what grounds it can stop short of 
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being such. This is one of the aspects of Adorno's work 
that pushes it away from certain constructive themes that 
are otherwise found to be quite characteristic of 
critical theory. 
Having shown the possibilities of determinate negation, 
Hegel immediately closes these by moving to the negation 
of the negation in an Absolute that in fact contradicts 
critical thinking. Adorno's way of re-opening these 
possibilities overall fails to recover the full sense of 
actualisable truth which is given an unacceptable form in 
the Hegelian Absolute. This sense must, however, be 
conveyed even by a militantly non-absolute truth if the 
promise of determinate negation, the securing of the 
power of the negative in the sureness of its positive 
contribution, is to be realised. There is an extant 
formulation of this requirement in critical theory (6) 
which, by its paradoxical construction, testifies to the 
difficulty of the condition's satisfaction: "the whole is 
the true, and the whole is false" (7). There is a very 
imporant way in which critical theory has been formed by 
the gross falseness of the totalitarian social whole 
which has contradicted the triumph of reason proclaimed 
by Hegel (8). However, I think that critical theory has 
principally shown that any totality must be false. The 
problem remains to restructure the condition of truth 
which this idea of totality illusorily satisfies in a way 
which criticises the goals of absoluteness. 
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APPENDIX C' 
ON SOME MARXIST ATTITUDES TOWARDS SCEPTICISM ABOUT THE 
MATERIAL WORLD 
In some comments about what I believe to be a set of 
fundamentally mistaken attitudes to Kan"t's epistemology, 
I would now like to make more clear my claim that there 
is in Hegel a more sound foundation for empirical knowing 
than is to be found in the certainly more empirically 
minded Kant. 
I will first take up Lenin's famous location of a 
profound ambivalence between idealism and materialism in 
Kant's epistemology (1). Lenin's admittedly brief 
remarks set up a metaphor of Kant's thought being poised 
on a knife-edge between idealism and materialism, with 
the possibility of its being tipped over to either side. 
Hence in addressing himself to Kant's ambivalence, Lenin 
simply criticises him for not being enough of a 
consistent materialist (2). But in reaching this 
conclusion Lenin's interpretation seems to take over the 
understandings which motivated the oppositional, because 
equally tendentious, responses to Kant which I have 
traced through Fichte and Schelling and which Lenin 
himself identifies as "idealism" and "mechanical 
materialism", with the novel factor that Lenin mentions 
both. In doing this there is the immediate benefit of 
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pointing out a tension in Kant, but holding that this 
tension could have been resolved simply by Kant's taking 
a more staunch materialist line is harly adequate to 
Kant's thought. There can be no doubt about the strength 
of the materialist impulse of the critical philosophy, 
and the ambivalent way in which this is ultimately 
maintained in that philosophy arises from Kant's being 
sensitive, in a way in which Lenin clearly was not, to 
the obstacles to workable materialism. 
Lenin's own materialism is founded upon a criticism of 
the possibility of granting the thing-in-itself even a 
wholly negative place in epistemology, and then running 
this denial of its noumenal status into a declaration of 
its being phenomenally available. But though I would say 
that this is the correct way in which to move, of itself 
it can amount to only a covering up of the fundamental 
problems of the distance between the to-be-known and 
creative cognition which lead to Kant's positing of the 
thing-in-itself in the first place. Lenin's basic idea 
that Kant is a materialist when he assumes that the 
thing-in-itself corresponds to our ideas is vague enough 
to lend itself even to a broadly pragmatist epistemology 
quite. different from the position he wants to take up. 
Lenin gives no indication of what it is, if anything, 
that distinguishes his disposal of the thing-in-itself 
from the similar efforts made by either the idealist or 
(especially) the mechanical materialist oppositional 
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currents of the interpetation of Kant which he 
identifies. Furthermore his later acquaintance with the 
sources of Hegel's contributions to this issue seem to 
occasion no valuable change in this respect (3). All 
this, then, leaves a great void just at the point where a 
new development is needed, and into this void almost 
anything can be put. If these remarks seem harsh, it is 
because Lenin's simplistic confusion of an interesting 
preliminary comment with a fully worked out position must 
be opened up if new developments in this area of the 
study of (Hegel and) Marx are to be made. 
For example, it was quite open for Della Volpe to deepen 
Lenin's examination of Kant (4) and insist that there is 
a strong materialist reference present in the critical 
epistemology which in the history of the development of 
empirical (social) science suffered profound suppression 
in Hegel (5) and was revived only in Marx (6). But when 
Colletti rather insensitively took over the same broad 
thesis with reference to Lenin (7), but without Della 
Volpe's awareness of Kant's limitations in making 
materialism workable (8), the result of the ensuing 
attempt to directly link Marx to the materialist intent 
in Kant is -a Kantianism. Though derived from Della 
Volpe to a pronounced degree, Colletti's intellectual 
history of Marx's epistemology is a regression and not a 
development from Della Volpe. What for Della Volpe are 
positions requiring improvement are taken by Colletti to 
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be statements of a practicable materialism. 
For Della Volpe, the "materialism" of Hume is as 
important as that of Kant, and this speaks volumes of the 
acute historical sense informing his account kpc Marx's 
epistemology. Della Volpe's discussion of Kant rather 
unusually - at least to British readers - attempts to 
outline the fundamentals of the critical philosophy by 
focusing upon Kant's attitude to Leibnizian rationalism, 
which in contemporaneous German philosophy was known 
through Wolff. Della Volpe stresses that the vigorous 
empirical impulse in Kant which inspires his 
attack upon Wolff is derived from Hume (9). The 
materialist intent of the thought of both Hume and Kant 
is made clear, but coupled with an acknowledgement that a 
material reference in epistemology is very substantially 
vitiated as a resource for empirical science without a 
clear understanding of how that reference is available 
for and determines knowledge. 
Bearing this in mind, I should now like to mention the 
antipathy to Bhaskar's recent attempt to give a 
transcendental realist basis to science (10) displayed in 
Ruben's Marxism and Materialism. I am concerned here 
with only the first of a number of arguments which Ruben 
marshals against Bhaskar's transcendental mode of 
argument (11). I should perhaps make it clear at the 
outset that I think Bhaskar's efforts are an example of 
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just the sort of ontological inquiry that might be made 
on the basis for realism which Hegel provides, and that I 
regard it as important that such efforts be recognised as 
developments from a position fundamentally far more sound 
than that taken by Ruben. This latter is a position we 
will recognise. 
Ruben believes, with Lenin (12), that the possibility of 
a materialist epistemology turns on the strength of a 
necessary presumption of an objectivity distinct from the 
subject. Given what is common-sensically known about 
human beings, Ruben says, sceptical empiricist 
epistemology is literally incredible. In order to 
forestall the sceptical retort that such common-sense 
belief is open to doubt, Ruben argues that though this 
point can certainly be successfully made, this means that 
the* whole project of foundationalism must not be answered 
but rejected. He is quite blunt; objectivity cannot have 
a philosophical justification (13). But it is, I submit, 
quite unacceptable that an argument should be rejected 
because it is successful, and actually this is not what 
Ruben does. Beneath his blunt statement of presumption 
he is in fact offering a challenge to empiricism based on 
common-sense expierence's philosophical significance and 
empiricism's characteristic inability to come to terms 
with this. His argument as such is stunted - and Ruben 
offers no criticism of scepticism which can even be 
compared to that of Hegel (14) - because it is couched in 
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what he takes to be self-sufficiently blunt terms. For 
Ruben, philosophy is reasoned thought, but reasoned 
though can be dismissed as merely academic when it 
conflicts with being-in-the-world. The better way of 
putting this is, of course, to argue fo'the reason in 
being-in-the-world. 
That Ruben's case take this form at first glance appears 
to be because he identifies philosphical defence of 
objectivity with an argument which is non-circular in the 
sense of in na way having its conclusions bound up in its 
premises (15). As Sý%askar himself retorts (16), this 
stipulation is rather unclear in that it would seem to 
rule out not only what are generally taken to be 
illegitimately circular arguments but also, certainly 
distinguishable from these, a great range of broadly 
deductive arguments, including aspects of mathematics and 
logic, and transcendental deductive arguments involved in 
the philosophical task of revealing and clarifying the 
bases of given positions. And again I do not think Ruben 
really says what he means. Since he accepts the 
possibility of scepticism, in that he allows that as 
knowledge of objectivity must be founded in knowing and 
cannot have a ground elsewhere it is open to unrelievable 
doubt, Ruben's tack is to found objectivity upon a blunt 
presupposition. I think we can see that he is forced to 
do this by his paradoxical acceptance of the 
unassailability of the argument he wishes to dispute. 
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Though couched in marxist terms and taking its 
inspiration for a strong presumption of materialism from 
Lenin, Ruben's argument is in fact none other than a 
repetition of Moore's attempt to common-sensically ground 
our belief in the external world (17). We should be 
familiar with the weakness of this position because 
Moore's defence itself is, I would say, in substance no 
improvement on Hume's doctrine of natural belief. This 
would certainly explain Ruben's readiness to give up the 
idea of a philosophical defence of materialism, 
preferring to argue his case non-philosophically, a 
contradiction in terms which can be understood only 
within a Humean context. However, in the light of 
Hegel's discussion of these matters, I believe that we 
are able on the one hand to pay empiricism more respect 
than does Ruben, in that we can discuss its positions, 
and on the other hand have less respect for its 
conclusions. For we can say that it is going too far to 
allow that there is an irremediable element of 
indefensible presumption in materialism when the point 
makes sense only in the discredited terms of the 
criterion of truth demanded by empiricism. Thus we are 
no longer hindered by the sort of scepticism which Ruben, 
in his own defence, has in the end to insist can be 
levelled at materialism. 
The course of the full development of Rubens position 
from his initial failure to properly confront scepticism 
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is, I hope, easily recognisable to us. As he allows 
scepticism he cannot defend any particular understanding 
of the ontology of knowing, and hence his rejection of 
the very idea of work such as Bhaskar's and his believing 
it necessary to flatly assert common-sense, intuitive 
understanding. If, however, we follow Hegel to the 
establishment of determinate negation, we find opening up 
a whole area of debate which Bhaskar enters, which Ruben 
tries to close, and, with regard to the interests of this 
particular study, where, as we have 
seen, Marx's commitment to the premise of real men in 
empirically perceptible conditions involves his 
uncovering a range of discussable properties of human 
beings which becomes one of the principal grounds upon 
which he then departs from Hegel. It is not that the 
existence of objectivity is mediated by consciousness, 
but our knowledge of even its independent existence 
obviously is. Ruben is in error if he supposes that the 
acceptance of materialism will be guaranteed by 
surrendering philosophic explication of consciousness, 
the only ground upon which this acceptance may be won. 
I feel sure that Ruben would agree that it is at best an 
unavoidable shortcoming of Marxism and materialism that 
its statement of materialist presumptions tends to have a 
dogmatic form which is not entirely sanctioned by the 
literal incredibleness of the scepticism they are 
intended to displace. The whole tradition which I have 
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called the classical epistemological project, and the 
thought of Hegel as well, is ultimately dismissed by 
Ruben on the grounds that it articulates a bourgeois 
understanding (18). 
Whilst this may be so, such a point is hardly directly 
pertinent to the truth*of the beliefs thus criticised. 
In the face of accepting the strength of empiricist 
scepticism, to reject the consequences of this because 
they stem from a bourgeois understanding in opposition to 
the presumptions needed to underpin marxist materialism 
is, to put the point strongly, a rather poor recourse to 
name-calling in the absence of a workable criticism. If, 
as I argue, Hegel, who we have seen had to face in 
Schelling similar intuitive approaches to establishing 
truth as that of Ruben, makes possible rational debate in 
this area, then I feel that this should be welcomed. 
But, perhaps more than this, the possibility of Ruben's 
materialism being at all convincing (outside of- the 
Humean miasma which still clings to British studies in 
epistemology) turns on this. If it is the characteristic 
of modern epistemology that we must begin with 
subjectivity, then Hegel has shown that this must and can 
be the ground of philosophically defensible realism. 
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APPENDIX XC 
DIALECTICS OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND NATURE 
In the light of certain developments of avowedly Hegelian 
dialectic, it is important to stress, on the basis of 
what has been revealed about the structure of dialectic, 
that this process can be one of only consciousness. 
Hegel depicts a process of developing understanding, 
change in belief and therefore also of change in object, 
this latter being understood in the only meaningful 
epistemological fashion as an object for-consciousness. 
We must affirm that it is only as change in an object 
for-consciousness that a dialectical alteration of 
objects can be at all comprehensible, for it is the very 
differentiation of object and object for-consciousness 
that Hegel makes his fundamental contribution to the 
understanding of knowing. Change in an object 
for-consciousness is both comprehensible (though not 
fully worked out from a materialist point of view) and 
helpful to epistemological studies. 
By way of contrast, it is quite unintelligible to suppose 
that such change could actually take place in a natural 
object. Except at the most broad analogical level such 
as is given in the general meanings of "movement", 
"development", "change", etc., that is to say precisely 
where' the specificity of "dialectical" peters out, the 
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labelling of natural change as dialectical is untenable. 
Whereas we are informed by being referred to the actual 
process of knowing as one of dialectic, no such 
information about natural changes is passed on by a 
similar reference. In the light of this, the dialectics 
of natural objects can amount to only trivial, indeed 
misleading, redescriptions of changes whose actual 
mechanisms are incomparably better described and 
explained in other terms. Dialectic understood as 
covering natural objects is metaphysical in a literal, 
and in this case thereby derogatory, sense. It is only 
by, in fact quite vulgarly, replacing consiousness with 
materiality without concern for what it is about 
consciousness that makes it open to be informatively 
described as a dialectic that one can arrive at the 
dialectics of nature (1). 
There undoubtedly are passages in Hegel that encourage 
the extension of dialectic to cover nature (2). However, 
there are two responses which I believe a sympathetic 
interpretation of Hegel's philosophy must make to such 
passages. One is to note, as we have already noted, that 
it is of the greatest importance to Hegel's overall 
conception of Spirit that the Philosophy of Nature 
describes a flat exteriority and not a dialectical 
movement. Following from this is a second point. Though 
I do not think that on balance one could claim that 
Hegel's conception of the Philosophy of Nature is of a 
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dialectic, even if one could do so it would constitute a 
closing off of the positive resources of his description 
of consciousness. Of course, one should not guide 
interpretations by what one wants to find in the text. 
However, one should also not fail to take into account 
the way in which what can reflexively be seen to be a 
shift from a strong to a weak argument can be an 
invaluable guide to interpretation. In this respect 
Engels' view of the dialectic is certainly strongly 
influenced by persistent cosmological interests in the 
wider philosophic culture of his time. My own 
interpretation is guided by a rejection of these and an 
overall concern with broadly hermenutic problems. 
However, after Hegel I do not think this has to be a 
statement of the relativism of interpretation but can be 
one of a process of learning. Of course, whether it is 




MEPHAM ON IDEOLOGY AS A CAMERA OBSCURA 
In an article which first appeared in Radical Philosophy 
in 1972 (1), Mepham argues that the concept of ideology 
which Marx employs in Capital is radically different to 
that which he and Engels employed in The German Ideology. 
This latter concept is expressed by the simile of a 
camera obscure: 
If in all ideology men and their relations appear 
upside 'down as in a camera obscure, this phenomena 
arises just as much from the istorical life 
process as the inversion of objects upon the retina 
does from their physical life-process. (2). 
mepham objects to the directness of the inversion of the 
true into the false in ideological understanding which 
this simile implies, for he claims that this relegates 
the false to realm of spurious illusion. In Capital, an 
organic connection between the true and the false which 
the true itself necessarily produces is. central to the 
concept of ideology. I have tried to argue in Chapter 8 
that a very broad idea of the inversion of ordinary 
consciousness is common to more or less all of Marx's 
thought, so it may seem that I should have to challenge 
mepham's argument. This is true, however, only in a very 
limited fashion. I feel that what Ihepham has to say 
about the requirements of a theory of ideology is 
interesting and may well be valuable, and I do not 
propose to dissent from it. There is no need to, for 
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what we must recognise is that these are Mephams's ideas 
and not Marx's (though they depart from Marx). mepham's 
substantive comments on ideology, whilst claiming to 
represent Marx's views, are undoubtedly substantially 
Mepham's own. It is absurd to claim that the two words 
"camera obscura" can themselves generate the model of 
ideological production which Mepham ascribes to them, and 
it is even more so to claim that Capital works with what 
are clearly ideas of interpollation derived from 
structuralist semiotics. Of course, I do not deny that 
validity of the type of effort Mepham is making as 
independent thought (though indebted to Marx - but whose 
independent thought is not indebted? ). Nor am I claiming 
that Marx's ideas are better because they are Marx's. But 
my aim actually is - as mepham's is not - the elucidation 
of Marx's beliefs, and this aspect of the simile of the 
camera obscura and the metaphor of inversion needs an 
interpretation sensitive to literary nuance and not just 
to conceptual ratiocination. 
Mepham does on occasion seem to almost allow that we may 
really only be dealing with figures of speech (3), 
important figures certainly, but not necessarily ones 
whose importance lies in their ability to be pursued on 
into coherent theory. But his whole argument turns on 
challenging "camera obscura" as if it were such a theory, 
and the debate his article has generated has certainly 
followed this line (4). This is an instance - all too 
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typical of Althusser himself - when the structuralist 
reading of signs runs riot and collapses into 
self-parody. Not only must a word articulate a 
problematic, but that problematic must be able to be 
expressed in the most precise ways, even when it is clear 
that the precision is being supplied by the interpreter 
rather than the interpreted. All the possibilities of 
interpretation revealing literary allusion of various 
sorts are removed from this type of scientistic 
structuralism (which thus does much to detract from the 
best of the structuralist readings of literature). I 
have tried to argue in this work that there is every 
reason to think that Marx took over a vocabulary of 
inversion and its synonyms as a literary expression of a 
way of thought derived from Hegel. There is, in fact, a 
particular reason for not holding that Marx thought the 
particular simile of the camera obscure original to 
himself, for it is found in the editor's introduction to 
Feuerbach's notorious Thoughts on Death and Immortality, 
which, although they do not mention it in their writings, 
it is very likely indeed that Engels and Marx had read 
(5). 
I cannot leave this topic without mentioning a 
particularly unfortunate motif of mepham's Althusserian 
attitude to the text - extremely selective quotation. As 
part of his argument that Capital does not work with the 
direct inversion metaphor of the camera obscura, Mepham 
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cites the following: 
Labour is the substance, and the immanent measure of 
value, but has itself no value. In the expression 
"value of labour", the idea of value is not only 
completely obliterated, but actually reversed. It 
is an expression as imaginary as the value of the 
earth. These imaginary expressions arise, however, 
from the relations of production themselves. They 
are categories for the phenomenal forms of essential 
relations. (6). 
This is. simply disingenuous, for in the edition of 
Capital he uses, and other translators of Capital and I 
myself would agree that the rendering is acceptable, this 
passage is concluded thus: 
That, in their appearance things often represent 
themselves in inverted form is pretty well known in 
every science except Political Economy. 
Let me repeat that I am not denying the validity of the 
criticisms which mepham makes of the concept of ideology 
which he identifies as the "inversion" or "camera 
obscure" concept. But I very strongly object to the 
passing of these observations off as Marx's own thought. 
They are nothing of the sort. But pretending that they 
are makes it impossible to get at the resources to be 
uncovered by exploring what Marx means by the use of the 
metaphor of inversion. 
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APPENDIX \-2-- 
THE SEPARATION OF USE- AND EXCHANGE-VALUES IN THE INTIAL 
INTERPRETATION OF CAPITAL 
An appreciation of the distinction between use-value and 
exchange-value as turning on the separation of the 
natural and social elements of the commodity was the 
principal theme of the initial interpretation of Capital. 
Engels' comments on Capital, were, strictly speaking, the 
first commentary on the book. However, these can hardly 
be said to amount to a full interpretation of the 
economic content of the work - the third part of his 
review, for example, never appeared. By the initial 
interpretation I mean that body of economic explication 
and extension of Capital produced around the time of the 
publication of volume three and the life of the Second 
International. This includes a range of national and 
theoretical currents, but these can, I think, be shown to 
be united in their concern with a number of specific 
lines in the interpretation of Capital. I refer the 
reader ro Kautsky's textbook on Marx's political economy 
as perhaps the principal general formulation of the 
initial interpretation (1). 
The issue of separating use-value and exchange-value is 
particularly to the fore in Hilferding's reply to 
Bdhm-Bawerk (2). For Hilferding and his marxist 
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contemporaries overt polemic' against a focus on general 
use-values which suppressed conscious consideration of 
historically specific social relations of production was 
an even more pressing concern than it had been for Marx. 
Though Gossen published his book in 1854, it was of 
course only after Jevons, urenger and Walras published in 
the early 1870s that marginalism became such an important 
force. Within two years of Engels' making available the 
third volume of Capital, Böhm-Bawerk put forward his 
criticisms, in which the discussion of price calculation 
serves as the occasion for an argument that utility is a 
far more defensible central concept of economic analysis 
than is value (3). Hilferding himself certainly paid 
more attention in his reply to this obviously more 
fundamental issue than to the transformation problem 
itself (4). 
The polemical character of this response to marginalism 
of course embraces an important element of Marx's 
criticism of fetishism. However, I believe that it also 
speaks of a partiality in the initial interpretation of 
the separation of use-value and exchange-value. This 
interpretation essentially claims that Marx registers the 
use-value of a commodity in order to relegate this 
element to a background of the general, ahistorical 
production of goods conterminous with human life. 
Against this background, the exchange-values which arises 
when a good is produced as a commodity is shown to be the 
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specific element indicating the individual capitalist 
made of production. The focus of political economy is 
upon the latter. Against the characteristic tendency of 
bourgeois political economy to conflate use-value and 
exchange-value, the initial interpretation focuses more 
or less exclusively on the specific social relations of 
production. Whilst, let me repeat, there is much in this 
that has made the sense of Marx's concept of fetishism 
available to us, I think it fails to grasp the way in 
which Marx tries to explain social relations as 
definitely linked to a particular level of human 
knowledge of, and ability to work within, nature. 
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APPENDIX %3 
BÖHM-BAWERK ON MARX'S INSISTENCE UPON THE PROPORTIONAL 
REGULATION OF EXCHANGE 
The same point as is at issue in Marx's criticisms of 
Bailey is at the bottom of his discussion of Aristotle's 
treatment of value in the Nicomachean Ethics (1). 
However, Marx is rather more sympathetic to Aristotle's 
failure to grasp the importance of the key to 
proportional regulation of exchange than he is to 
Bailey's, for important reasons which were discussed in 
chapter 10. Marx's formal case for the necessity of 
reduction of equivalence in order that exchange may take 
place has obvious parallels with Aristotle's similar 
insistence upon the requirement of commensurability. 
However, Aristotle was driven to relinquish this 
argument, and to regard money as merely a makeshift 
estimate of value fixed on by custom, when faced with the 
qualitative differences of the articles exchanged. 
Aristotle's deliberations lapse more into philology than 
social analysis at this juncture (2), but I will not take 
up Marx's proferred explanation for this, as I mention 
the above only to draw attention to part of Böhm-Bawerk's 
criticism. 
The Theories were not, of course, available to 
Böhm-Bawerk as he wrote 'On the Conclusion of the Marxist 
Soo 
System'. With such a lack of the materials of knowledge 
of what has gone before, remarkable ironies of historical 
repetition can occur, and one surely does, linking Bailey 
and Bohm-Bawerk, when the latter criticises Marx's 
attraction to an equivalence theory of exchange as 
"scholastico-theological". He attributes this attraction 
to Aristotle's influence, obviously meaning Aristotelian 
in the bad sense (3). Böhm-Bawerk leaves no doubt that 
he thinks this equivalence theory is flatly wrong. Why, 
he asks, when there is equivalence between goods, should 
there be exchange? This argument seems to be deceitful, 
as Böhm-Bawerk appears to be completely overriding the 
qualitative difference between use-values which Marx 
gives as the motive for the exchange of equivalent 
quantities. But it is, or course, precisely this dualism 
of use-value and exchange-value which Böhm-Bawerk holds 
to be at issue, referring prices directly to scarcity. ' 
Though there is, to my knowledge, no direct reply to this 
particular position in Bohm-Bawerk made by any of those 
contributing to the intitial interpretation, an indirect 
reply to it is central to their critiques of marginalism, 
and I should like, to register it here. Capitalistic 
economic conduct, it is alleged, typically has no 
reference to utility at all, being conducted purely in 
terms of exchange-value with an aim to accumulate. The 
separation of use-value and exchange-value, and the 
establishment of the pressing reality of the latter, not 
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least when it obviously contradicts the former, are vital 
for the appreciation of this principal determinants of 
bourgeois economic life. The initial interpretation 
involves a stress, then, on a specifically capitalist 
construction of exchange-value, distinct from and often 
in opposition to use-value, as governing bourgeois 
economic activity. The heavy-handed ridicule to which 
works of the initial interpretation are able to subject 
attempts to give marginalist explanations of the conduct 
of major companies, that is to say in terms of concern 
for use-value provision (4), is proof enough of the 
superior productivity of the social explanations put 
forward by the former. 
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APPENDIX I4. 
ON BOHM-BAWERK'S READING OF MARX ON LABOUR 
In his criticisms, B6hm-Bawerk argues that the passages 
of Capital we have just discussed contain more or less as 
many errors or even falsifications as words (1). He 
allows that the basis of exchange cannot be directly 
derived from the natural properties of goods. He own 
rather more sophisticated marginalism turns on relating 
prices to scarcity, scarcity being determined both by 
natural supply of and individual demand for a good (2). 
Searching for the error in Marx's political economy from 
which the shortcomings in price calculation which he 
believes he has revealed in Capital stem, Böhm-Bawerk 
attempts to lodge it here, in the adoption of value based 
on labour as the denominator of exchange rather than 
allowing scarcity this role, a move which pushed volume 
three into all sorts of difficulty in order to reconcile 
volume one with reality (3). 
Böhm-Bawerk centrally argues that Marx did not take up 
the possibility of giving psychological explanations of 
the worth placed upon commodities which would explain 
their exchange-value (4). In Sombart, the marxist 
response to such a claim was to contrast Marx's 
"objective" treatment of value td this "subjective" one, 
arguing that the former and not the latter was the proper 
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one for political economy. Subjective valuations of 
commodities, even supposing that such data were 
scientifically corrigible, were still uninteresting 
unless set in the context of the objective, in the sense 
of socially rather than individually based, determinants 
upon those valuations. The very principles by which 
subjective valuations were reached remain to be explained 
without the objective investigation. Much of the 
especially epistemological apparatus of this contrast of 
social and individual has proven not only inadequate, as 
is the fate of all ideas, but very dangerously mistaken, 
reflecting a principal shortcoming in the philosophical 
explication of marxism after Marx's death, and would not 
repay discussion. However, I would say that it is an 
achievement to have even posed this contrast. I will not 
say it was posed as a problem, for taking what were only 
the beginnings of analysis as something solidly cemented 
was a principal reason for the unsatisfactory state of 
the treatment of the social and the individual by these 
marxist writers. Nevertheless, they show, correctly I 
think, that in the psjchologistic reconstruction of 
economic valuation, the boundaries within which the 
psychology may correctly apply are left quite unexamined, 
for they are, in fact, the ultimate basis of the 
explanation of the valuations put forwwrd. That these 
boundaries themselves call for an explanation which it 
would seem has to be social rather than psychological is 
the principal thrust of these marxist criticisms of 
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mac5inalism (5). 
I would add that if these criticisms are good ones, then 
remedying the shortcomings of marginalist accounts of 
exchange-value cannot be a question of adding a social 
component to a given psy. hology. For that psychology is 
arrived by a negation of social determinants, and thus 
misunderstands its own data. What are social influences 
on the psychology of the bourgeois individual in his or 
her economic life are-taken to be directly psychological 
phenomena; that is, as structures of consciousness, 
structures of nature. Recognition of social 
determinations on psychological phenomena would have to 
intrinsically alter our understandings of those very 
phenomena. The obvious facts of economic life of which 
Bdhm-Bawerk makes so much crumble away from his 
purportedly commonsensical refutations of Marx's analysis 
when we see that those facts claim to be "facts" in this 
absolute sense only because they embody conceptions of 
their own character which, far from being the arbiters of 
science, are inevitably condemned as bad consciousness by 
radical scientific efforts to understand. 
Böhm-Bawerk's objections 
Firstly, he notes that 
argument by elimination, 
for the position of 
Bohm-Bawerk quite rightly 
are given in two stages. 
Marx presents his case as an 
elimination of other claimants 
denominator leaving value. 
observes that this type of 
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argument must satisfy a rather difficult boundary 
condition if it is to be valid, the condition of 
considering each and every possibility. This condition, 
it is claimed, Marx entirely fail's to observe. When 
examining commodities, Marx surreptitiously includes only 
the direct products of labour in the set of relevant 
objects, which set is not, as Marx would have us think, 
the same as the set of all commodities. Examination of 
the former set may allow value to emerge as the common 
denominator, but examination of the latter, which 
includes gifts of nature, certainly would not (6). We 
have dealt with this point as one of the seeming 
anomalies for the labour theory of value, and I will not 
repeat myself. However, I would like to say that as 
Böhm-Bawerk is approaching these passages of volume one 
of Capital from volume three, it is a failing that he 
provides no discussion of Marx's account of the value 
determination of the commodity exchange of gifts of 
nature. Though the point is surely not made very clear 
in the first chapter of Capital, - 
it would be a better 
reading to relate the many pages of volume three on rent 
to this first chapter than to imply that they do not 
exist, their theoretical space being filled in by a piece 
of dialectical sleight of hand. At the bottom of this 
failing there is the fact that Bohm-Bawerk does not seem 
to be able to countenance value as other than a flat 
measure of exchange-value in terms of a substance 
composed of amounts of labour. If we were to allow that 
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value is such a measure, then Bohm-Bawerk would be right, 
and Marx would look so foolish in holding to such an 
obviously absurd position that it would seem that could 
reach his conclusions only through self-delusion at best 
(7). 
It is on this understanding of value that Böhm-Bawerk 
repeats these mistakes in respect of another of Marx's 
anomalous cases, arguing that value cannot be composed of 
labour because in some cases labour creates no value as 
its product cannot be exchanged, and concluding that this 
profoundly embarrasses the labour theory of value (8). 
Knowing that Marx himself was aware of this case does not 
alter Bdhm-Bawerk's opinion (9). Such a reading is 
fashioned by Böhm-Bawerk's not stepping away from the 
marginalist concern to rationalise capitalistic 
assessments of value when turning to a theory which 
centrally tries to distance itself from and therefore to 
explain the very idea and the form of such assessments. 
If marginalism can construct some measure of value which 
is able to arrive at decisions rather like exchange 
valuations, it considers itself to have explained the 
later. Thus for Böhm-Bawerk, Marx's theory cannot be 
empirically justified because it is impossible to 
construct on grounds of impeccable logic and mathematics 
a scale of value of units of labour which can plausibly 
recreate exchange valuations. The aim of Marx in the 
labour theory of value, to try and understand why 
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economic organisation takes the form of value and what 
value assessments are, is completely lost. Marx, as we 
shall see, in an important sense accords to value a great 
advance in eonomic organisation; but this is a vast 
scientific distance away from the presumption that value 
is (the only form of) rational economic judgement. 
Indeed, it is the inability to imagine economic judgement 
in any other form than value that underpins Bohm-Bawerk's 
marginalism and his submersion of Marx's attempt to open 
up value for investigation. 
At this stage of the argument Marx has, says Bohm-Bawerk, 
managed to include labour amongst the list of candidates 
for the position of denominator of commodity exchange, a 
candidacy which it does not actually deserve. Let us now 
follow Böhm-Bawerk's exposition of how Marx makes labour 
the successful candidate, the second stage of the 
former's objections to the labour theory of value. 
Böhm-Bawerk sets out the abstraction from use-values and 
the conclusion that after this abstraction all 
commodities have to tell us is that they are congealed 
labour. The error by which this conclusion is reached, 
is, according to Böhm-Bawerk, a confusion of abstraction 
from the genus and abstraction from specific forms in 
which the genus manifests itself. Thus when we abstract 
from the use-value of a commodity, this is not to say 
that we abstract from the category of use-value itself, 
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which can remain common to all commodities and mediate 
their exchange, though in this mediation we no longer 
consider use-values' particular forms. The conclusion 
that labour is the only common denominator of commodities 
is therefore wrong (10). However, again Bbhm-Bawerk does 
not grasp what is actually going on in the passages which 
he criticises. On his own understanding, labour must be 
the only common denominator of commodities if it is to 
serve the function of calculating their exchange-values. 
If we are attempting to construct some such means of 
calculation, then Bohm-Bawerk's objections again are 
sound. But Marx is not. Thus, instead of taking it as 
evidence of a gross inconsistency, as Bohm-Bawerk does 
(11), that Marx in fact allows use-value in general to be 
common to all commodities, we can see that Marx can do 
this and still abstract from use-value as such. The 
great deal of time which Bbhm-Bawerk spends in trying to 
prove a common quality of use-value in commodities 
against Marx, though realising that Marx allows this, can 
count for little, for Marx is able nevertheless to 
abstract from this quality on ontological grounds for the 
purposes of explanation. The validity of the abstraction 
can indeed be proven only by its explanatory power, but 
such an abstraction cannot be closed off or even really 
adjudicated by the formal disquisitions on the logic of 
common properties which Böhm-Bawerk provides. Again, 
however, I must say that the possibility that value is to 
be investigated in its form and not just used in its 
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given form in order to recalculate prices is simply 
beyond Bohm-Bawerk's attempt to read the labour theory of 
value, testimony enough to the complete obliteration of 
these concerns in marginalist thought. 
In his reply to Bohm-Bawerk, Hildering shows, far more 
lucidly than Marx himself does in the relevant passages 
of Capital it must be said, that the issue of value is 
the social relations of the division of labour under 
commodity production, relations whose principal 
characteristic is that they conceal their social 
character under a naturalistic form (12). 
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APPENDIX 15 
WICKSTEED ON THE LABOUR THEORY 
Wicksteed's criticism of the labour theory of value 
antedates B6hm-Bawerk's essay by some twelve years, and 
of course therefore was made on the basis of knowledge of 
only volume one of Capital. That Wicksteed looks forward 
to the resolutions to be offered in the later volumes to 
the contradictions between obvious economic phenomena and 
the theses of volume one, and that Bohm-Bawerk considers 
these resolutions casuistic, obviously makes the latter's 
criticism the more complete. It is perhaps more apt, 
then, to compare Wicksteed's paper with the chapter of 
Capital and Interest on Marx which appeared almost 
simultaneously. However, I want to draw attention to the 
overall similarity of Wicksteed's arguments of 1884 and 
those of Böhm-Bawerk of 1896 for this is the more fit 
standard for Wicksteed. 
For, after setting out the argument by which Marx reaches 
the labour theory of value, Wicksteed identifies the 
central mistake of that argument as that which we have 
seen Böhm-Bawerk call confusing abstraction from the 
genus with abstracting from instances in which the genus 
is manifested. In short, Wicksteed says that though Marx 
is right to abstract from individual use-values, he is 
wrong to think that this means abstracting from the 
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category of utility, which category must in fact be used 
in explanations of exchange-value (1). 
Wicksteed's application of this to abstract labour goes 
as follows. Having taken Marx's argument up to abstract 
labour, he says that he awaits the later volumes of 
Capital in order to set the surprising-conclusion that 
labour is the sole constituent element of value in 
illuminating context. However, displaying the tolerance 
characteristic of his article and of his political and 
academic attitudes more generally, he proceeds to go on 
to find in Marx a less surprising conclusion on the 
content of value. This is provided when Marx says that 
labour which actualises no use-value cannot have a value, 
into which Wicksteed proceeds to read the whole apparatus 
of accounts of exchange-value in terms of utility. Not 
surprisingly, he finds that this other line which he 
finds in Marx surrenders the previous analysis. Abstract 
labour, on Wicksteed's new understanding is "abstractly 
useful work", conferring "abstract utility" on wares. 
Despite Wicksteed's constructive tone, there is no doubt 
that criticism such as this represents virtually the 
negation of hermeneutics. Obviously Wicksteed's paper 
collapses into the complete reading of his own positions 
into Marx's text. My point is that this is the fate of a 
constructive attitude to Marx that departs from the same 
positions as Böhm-Bawerk's destructive one, for these 
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positions are given by a complete inability to hold value 
up as an investigable form, and consequently to grasp 
that Marx may not wish to give immediate accounts of 
exchange-value but to inquire into what exchange-value 
can mean. 
By way of contrast, I refer the reader to the initial 
interpretation's most substantial understanding of 
abstract labour, that of Rubin (2). Not only does this 
remain the foremost explication of Marx's meaning in the 
concept of abstract labour, but in making this meaning 
clear it is one of the most important books setting out 




ON SOCIALIST EVALUATIONS OF MARX AND MARGINALISF 
The way in which the initial interpretation of Capital 
has stressed the importance of social relations to Marx's 
conception of political economy, in polemic against what 
are typically treated as flat distortions in marginalism, 
has obscured this uniting ground which must of course be 
grasped in order to understand how Marx's economics 
actually do - as I am sure they do - constitute an 
improvement over marginalism. In minimising this 
admittedly very briefly dealt with element of Capital, 
the initial interpretation has contributed to a fracture 
which has been the principal feature of marxist political 
economy in this century. 
A great deal of the marginalist determination of the 
magnitude of price is of course to be found in Fabianism, 
certainly the most explicitly socialist development of 
welfare economics. A particularly clear case is the 
collapse of Shaw's almost light-hearted scorn for the 
principle of utility (1) into more or less total 
acceptance of this principle upon appreciating the place 
of competition in marginalist theory (2). Perhaps for us 
now the most important task set by this fact is the 
assessment of the productive resources of welfare 
economics as a response to the socialisation of 
51Lr 
capitalist production. However, a description of the 
theoretical positions actually adopted at the time would 
have to conclude that Fabianism fell very far indeed 
beneath the social understanding being generated in the 
initial interpretation, and that the valuably organic 
conceptions of socialist development which Fabianism 
maintained remained poorly articulated. One has only to 
recall the unconvincing optimism by which mysteriously 
democratised state action is so often invoked to fill in 
the gaps left by these conceptons. Perhaps the most 
important characteristic of the Fabian attitude to Marx 
was, amidst all the admiration, an almost total failure 
to understand the first part of Capital. The 
consequences of this for the popular comprehension of 
Marx in Britain are perhaps best displayed in the 
ludicrous inadequacies of Russell's account of the labour 
theory of value (3). But even Cole, in my opinion 
perhaps the best of Fabian intellectuals, though he saw 
fit to work on an edition of volume one of Capital, gave 
an introduction to the text which contains about as many 
mistakes as words in respect of all those issues of 
social analysis illuminated by the initial interpretaton 
(4). 
The complete scorn for marginalism in the initial 
interpretation, most strikingly present in the tone of 
Bukharin's The Economic Theory of the Leisure Class, had 
then its socialist opposite in a Fabian distaste for 
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those parts of Capital beyond its marginalist 
comprehension, which Fabianism came to regard as 
metaphysical or some such positivist synonym for 
nonsense. Represented here is the fracture in marxist 
political economy at which I am trying to drive. If 
central elements of Fabianism had access to relatively 
popular understanding, they did so by falling far beneath 
Marx (and Marx's own drawing upon theoretical products of 
British labour history), and standing on day to day 
opinions about price which it turned to socialist 
purposes as far as it could. The initial interpretation 
accompanied its depth of knowledge by refusing to allow 
everyday conceptions of value any other place than that 
of ideology in the most derogatory sense. Standing 
thereby in opposiion to, rather than a development of 
popular consciousnesses, this most vital area of marxist 
theory militated against its own popular understanding, 
even in the in other respects most favourable political 
situation in which initial interpretation addressed its 
audience. 
Still the outstanding (and here Marx's comments on J. S. 
Mill must apply) attempt to forge any links between these 
two stances on common understandings of price and their 
explanation by the labour theory is Bernstein's 
Presuppositions of Socialism. Bernstein's biography 
tells of a surely unequalled opportunity to both 
recognise the necessity of a far better marxist response 
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to marginalist economics and to provide such a response. 
When at one point Bernstein quotes a sentence from volume 
three of Capital in which Marx makes consideration of 
use-values intrinsic to important political economic 
issus and adds the comment: "This sentence alone makes it 
impossible to make light of the Gossen-Bohm theory with a 
few superior phrases", we are given a, to my knowledge 
unique, attempt of the period to reach some-cross 
fertilisation (5). Bernstein was in an excellent 
position to draw on the milieu of the initial 
interpretation as well as of Fabianism, and the 
historical failure of his attempt to make any real 
progress in economic, if not in political, theory must be 
regarded as being due very substantially to his own 
shortcomings. For Bernstein himself continually falls 
beneath the social understandings available in German 
theoretical marxism into a philosophically naive defence 
of the given empirical so little theoretically re-worked 
as to be more or less ideologically reproduced. Given 
Bernstein's advantages, the character of his articles and 
book go some way to warranting the contumely with which 
they came to be held. Unfortunately, this was almost the 
direct opposite of the reaction which would have been 
most fruitful. 
Rather similar positions, indeed including some directly 
influenced by Fabianism and by Bernstein, were taken up 
in what is known as "legal marxism". Certainly the 
5n 
political economy of the likes of Tugan-Baranowsky (6) 
bear little comparison with the flat inadequacies found 
in Bernstein. But equally certainly legal marxism's 
economic and political theories have been as much the 
object of polemical attack by marxist orthodoxy as 
Bernstein himself. Attempts to utilise marginalist 
insights were rejected as the watering down of marxism 
(7). As one might suspect, there are far more than 
merely theoretical questions involved here; but 
nevertheless legal marxism has been substantially lost to 
present assessments of marxism's historically developed 
theoretical resources. As the waning of Stalin's baneful 
influence has lead to the excellent works of such as 
Rubin, Pashukanis and Voloshinov being made available in 
the west, perhaps a waning of those influences of Lenin 
of similar character will allow of a reconsideration of 
Struve and others. 
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APPENDIX 0 
CLARKE ON MARX AND MARGINALISM 
There have recently been a number of marxist examinations 
of the development of neo-classical economics that have 
shared a similar interpretative tack. Writing against an 
intellectual background, in economics at least, in which 
Marx's work is dismissed as ideological as opposed to the 
science put forward in neo-classicism and its 
underpinnings in sociology, these works have tried to 
reverse the labelling. I trust that it is clear that my 
sympathies are, on the whole, on the side of this 
reversal, but I must also confess to a certain impatience 
in reading these works. Though concerned to be 
historical, they are sadly lacking in knowledge of their 
own history - of the evaluations of economic theory to be 
found in the initial interpretation of Capital which they 
more or less repeat. This would not matter so much were 
it not that this lack of self-awareness reflects the fact 
that all the potential productive issues of critique in 
this area are more or less lost in the repetition of a 
wholly unsympathetic line, and that the possible dialogue 
- however limited - between two bodies of thought which 
seem typically only to swap derogatory epithets is 
frustrated. I have three books in mind - Katouzian's 
Ideology and Method in Economics, Fine's Economics and 
Ideology and Clarke's Marx, marginalism and modern 
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Sociology (1). I will focus upon the latter, for its 
particular stress on sociology brings out the essential 
social issues most clearly, but what I have to say I 
would say of all three books. 
The characteristic themes of the critical - in the 
derogatory sense - marxist interpretation of the history 
of late-nineteenth and early twentieth century social 
thought are virtually all displayed in Clarke's work. 
His book is set out as something of a purported reply to 
The Structure of Social Action as a history of ideas 
(2), and its central thesis is that Parsons, though 
certainly correct in identifying the emergence of a 
voluntaristic theory of action, is wrong to identify this 
as a scientific development (3). Parsons in fact missed 
the real scientific development in nineteenth century 
social thought - by Marx (4). Let me repeat that I am 
sure that there is a great deal that is defensible in 
this. Indeed, as it is developed into an exposure of the 
essentially abstract character of the voluntaristic 
theory (5), it is novel and illuminating. But this 
valuable defensible element is not made the basis of a 
generous attitude towards the criticised thought, but is 
rather only the springboard for intentionally hostile, 
destructive criticism. 
The essential issue is Clarke's attitude towards reform 
informed by marginalism. This attitude is deprecatory, 
'S 
ld 
focusing upon the undoubted limits which such reform 
accepts and works within (6). But if it is not difficult 
to see how this criticism is to work as criticism, it is 
difficult to see what purpose such criticism is meant to 
serve. 
If it is meant to argue for the superiority of Marx's 
science, it adopts the unfortunate form of preaching to 
the converted and reviling the unconverted for their 
sins. No real effort is made to speak to marginalists on 
any other basis that they initially reject their own 
beliefs, so the potential for winning conviction in the 
superiority of Marx's thought is lost. This hardly suits 
a book written for a series which proclaims that it "aims 
to create a forum for debate between different 
theoretical and philosophical taditions in the social 
sciences" (7). Of course, the celebration of Marx's 
correctness may have a ritual function. 
If, on the other hand, Clarke's book is meant to help the 
development of marxist theory, then its form is equally 
unsuited to its task. An essential correctness of the 
positing of revolution from which all reform can be 
condemned for being such is the starting point of 
Clarke's main thesis. Even if we accept the fundamental 
correctness of this evaluation on the most general terms, 
this does not carry Clarke's point. It is surely 
impossible to argue that twentieth century marxism has 
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had any real success is specifying the precise mechanisms 
of revolution in the western (or for that matter, the 
eastern) world. When assessing real social improvements, 
the type of revolutionary marxism Clarke seems to have in 
mind does not have a list of achievements which even 
begins to compare with the reformism he deprecates. This 
is not to celebrate the limits of reformism but to draw 
what I cannot but feel is the obvious lesson here: that 
the task facing us is to deepen both revolution and 
social reform. If the limited ambitions (and ultimate 
frustrations whilst having such ambitions) of the latter 
can benefit from dialogue with the former, the former, 
probably to a greater degree, requires some teaching on 
how to immerse itself, or rather to find itself, in the 
given social world. A dogmatic stress on their own 




HABERFAS ON THE THEME OF CRITIQUE IN MARX 
In Habermas's relatively recent writings, an explication 
of Marx's dialectic through an analogy with learning has 
been put forward in some detail. Historical materialism 
is shown to involve a core idea of technical learning in 
the sphere of production, and Habermas wishes to 
complement this with a more sensitive appreciation of 
learning in the normative sphere (1). These writings 
clearly have affinities with the discussion of Marx's 
dialectic in this work. However, these are not so close 
as it may initially seem, and in elucidating the 
differences I hope to make clear my argument on the 
crucial topic of how Marx's work stands as a critique of 
bourgeois society. 
"Explication" is perhaps the wrong way to describe what 
Habermas does, whereas I would apply it rather strictly 
to my intentions in this work. Habermas himself calls 
his efforts a "reconstruction" (2), and this is certainly 
more apt. He brings a wide range of ideas from 
traditions other than hegelianism and marxism into his 
treatment of historical materialism, and, whilst he 
insists on the overall marxist location of his thought 
(3), it is clear that Habermas' historical materialism 
involves very many elements which are, in the strongest 
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sense, novel to marxism. This is not, of course, in 
itself a criticism, for Habermas' mastery of, and ability 
to productively run together, a great many intellectual 
traditions has always been a strength in his work and in 
no small way contributes to the substantive power of his 
reconstructed historical materialism. But it is as well 
to be wholly clear about the nature of Habermas' attitude 
to Marx. The necessity for the eclecticism displayed in 
Habermas' discussion of historical materialsm follows 
from a motif characteristic of more or less all his work; 
a consciousness of the shortcomings in attempts to 
directly use even Marx's marxism (not to mention diamat, 
etc. (4)) as a critique of contemporary capitalism. 
There are two principal components of Habermas' 
reservations about marxism. One is that he argues that 
the development of capitalism has produced forms of 
crisis outside of marxism's sphere of competence to 
comprehend (5). The other is that Marx's central concept 
of "labour" shows serious internal deficiencies in that 
it does far too much social theoretical work, and these 
deficiencies subvert its aspirations of critique. Of 
course these internal deficiencies to some extent account 
for marxism's inability to copy with transformations 
within capitalism, but I propose to, as far as possible, 
separate these two issues and deal only with Habermas' 
internal criticism of marxism. 
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In Knowledge and Human Interests Habermas traces through 
some of the principal lines of Marx's epistemological, in 
a broad sense, developments from Hegel. He argues that 
Marx takes a general idea of active self-constitution 
from Hegelian phenomenology (6) (which in itself is a 
reworked Fichtean theme (7)), but that Marx then locates 
self-constitution in a new existential context. Though 
labour as such does have an important place in the 
Phenomenology, Marx's tack in responding to Hegel is to 
rebut idealism by expanding the role of labour such that 
it services as the general medium of human existence (8). 
Habermas goes on to identify a somewhat Kantian motif in 
Marx's work in the recognition of an irreducible 
materiality in the nature which faces humanity as an 
object (9). Labour constitutes an epistemological 
synthesis in Marx's ideas, for through it humanity 
carries out its subjective self-constitution in the 
objective natural world (10). I do not want to bother 
making clear to what extent I agree or not with this 
account of the genealogy of Marx's epistemological 
position, but rather to move on to what, from this basis, 
Habermas then has to say of marxism as critique. 
Habermas is convinced that Marx's idea of labour is too 
wide. Labour as the medium of synthesis embraces all of 
human existence (11), and this is a mistake. Habermas 
argues that Marx makes labour cover what are two (or, in 
fact, as we shall later see, three) logically separable 
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ontological elements of human self-formation. These 
elements can be revealed by considering the results of 
taking two distinct interests in the pursuit of 
knowledge. An interest in the prediction of the 
behaviour and in the control of processes treated as 
objects leads to the pursuit of the empirical-analytic 
sciences, whereas an interest in understanding leads to 
pursuit of the hermeneutic sciences (12). This is not a 
separation of the natural from the social sciences, for 
whilst the natural sciences are clearly the foremost 
exemplar of the empirical-analytic sciences, an interest 
in control can certainly be part of certain social 
sciences (13). Habermas is putting forward a distinction 
between types of stance taken in the pursuit of knowledge 
relating to two different activities in human 
self-production. Labour is the ontological domain of 
that particular human activity which is the object of the 
empirical-analytic sciences, but it is the radically 
different domain of communicative interaction that 
grounds an interest in understanding. Obviously Marx's 
idea of labour does embace both of these domains, but in 
doing so, Habermas argues, it embodies a serious 
confusion. What should be dealt with as hermeneutic 
issues tend to fall under the aspect of the 
empirical-analytical sciences, so that Marx's social 
materialistic intent tends to collapse into a 
technocratic, social control approach to social issues 
(14). This has considerable consequences. Habermas 
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distinguishes a third ontological element of human 
self-formation as authority or power, and a critical 
attitude to given power relations follows from an 
interest in emancipation. Marx's ability to take such a 
critical attitude to capitalistic power is hampered as 
his thought contains more or less a capitulation to the 
ideology of that power, which is precisely a technocratic 
consciousness or scientism, a domination of all knowledge 
and all human effort by the technocratic pursuit of 
prediction and control. 
I am certain that Marx's thought is beset by unwanted 
naturalistic inclusions, but I do not think that 
Habermas' way of identifying these can lead to an 
ultimately productive way of fashioning a better form of 
contemporary critique. Before going on to say why, let 
me preface my remärks with the obvious caveat that as 
Habermas' work broaches the most fundamental issues of 
social theory in an original way, it is inevitable that 
that work be subject to criticism, and when I undertake 
such criticism let this be understood in the most 
intentionally helpful sense. 
Though Habermas of course takes a critical distance from 
the Geisteswissenschaften and later hermeneutic 
developments, it is, as a matter of intellectual history, 
only as a rather direct borrowing from this tradition 
that we can understand his rigorous distinction of labour 
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and interaction and with this the empirical-analytic and 
hermeneutic sciences. For this distinction follows the 
opposition of erklären and verstehen. To the extent that 
this is so, however, it cannot be thought that Habermas 
has, as he himself would probably agree, made a wholly 
happy theoretical appropriation. As I have mentioned, 
Habermas does not intend to draw a line between the 
natural and social sciences by his distinction of the 
empirical-analytic and the hermeneutic sciences. But he 
does tend to base his account of the empirical-analytic 
sciences on an idea of method which is little more than a 
positivist account of the natural sciences. Habermas 
always discusses labour in its most technocratic aspects, 
and in fact he identifies it with that principal object 
of earlier Critical Theory - instrumental reason 
(15). 
He concedes positivism the accuracy of its description of 
natural science, but then refuses to treat the 
empirical-analytic sciences he sets up as having this 
method as the paradigm of all knowledge. This is a 
crucial flaw in his, and in fact in all Frankfurt 
philosophy (with the exception of Schmidt). It is only 
on the basis of this identification of the 
empirical-hermeneutic sciences that Haberas can propose 
to demarcate labour an interaction in his strict way. 
Only the domination of Habermas' thought by this idea of 
labour being accurately captured in the notion of 
instrumental reason can explain, I would say, his rather 
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insensitive responses to the criticisms of the narrowness 
of his definitions of the empirical-analytic and 
hermeneutic. sciences which have been made. Gadamer's 
thought embodies a central idea of the -exoansion of 
verstehen from a special historiographical method into 
the hermeneutic circle as a condition of any sort of 
communication at all. This provides, in my opinion, a 
most sound philosophical underpinning to the central 
thrust of the emphasis on hermeneutic problems intrinsic 
to the natural sciences in post-empiricist philosophy of 
science (though of course the significance of Gadamer's 
work is not limited to this). We can, of course, 
distinguish a technocratic from an interpretative stance, 
but it would seem to be just wrong to allow that the 
former does not always involve interpretative problems, 
which makes a rigorous separation of labour from 
interaction quite unworkable. Putting this the other way 
round, some idea of predictability and control, though 
certainly in weaker forms than technocratic 
measurability, is intimately bound up in the 
intelligibility and rationality of action, for generally 
shared ideas of appropriate responses in given 
circumstances are integral to understanding. Habermas, 
most valuably and correctly, is seeking to completely 
disrupt the currently dominant identification of 
potential solutions to social problems in technocractic 
improvements by locating the real social problems facing 
us as the expansion of autonomy through mutual public 
5ICAW 
understanding. To sum up the significance of these two 
observations, it would seem that, though we can allow 
Habermas' identification of two different 
knowledge-constitutive stances, we cannot allow the force 
of the criticism of Marx's idea of labour. For this 
turns on demaracting two discrete ontological domains, 
and the distinguishing of these domains as such seems 
impossible. Habermas has of course to allow, to mention 
only this, the universality of hermeneutics, that is to 
say, the presence of issues of understanding within 
labour. But he treats this as an instance of more 
co-presence, and not as, as Marx centrally argues and as 
I would say is still more correct, as an instance of 
mutual constitution. 
The whole point of Habermas' stress on 
knowledge-constitutive interests is the disruption of any 
claims to the universality of their form of knowledge by 
either the empirical-analytic or the hermeneutic 
sciences. These claim are relativised by their forms of 
knowledge being shown to turn on the taking up of 
different interests in the pursuit of knowledge, for it 
is precisely by making such inflated claims as to the 
universality of their knowledge that positivism (16) or 
idealist hermeneutics (17) display inflated pretensions. 
The self-clarification which stems from recognising 
interests in the pursuit of knowledge immediately leads 
on to consideration of the third interest in human 
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emancipation, for in this case we have a paradigmatic 
case of liberation from self-misunderstanding. It is as 
the self-reflexive correction of such misunderstanding 
that Habermas identifies critical theory, a form of 
knowledge which follows from an interest in expanding 
self-knowledge and consequently social autonomy. For 
Habermas, critical theory's object is established power 
in the form of ideologically distorted communication and 
its aim is the expansion of self-reflection. 
Habermas' setting out of critical theory along these 
lines has expanded enormously in his successive writings. 
In Knowledge and Human Interests a presentation of 
critical theory on an analogy with pscyho-analysis was 
attempted (18). The method of acknowledgement of 
hitherto unconscious compulsions through therapy was 
taken as a model for the recomprehension of ideological 
misunderstandings through critical theory. The common 
object of psycho-analysis and critical theory which makes 
this analogy possible is distorted communication (19). 
Both efforts seek an ideal speech situation in whichm*in 
principle wholly undistorted comprehension and expression 
is possible. But these efforts are necessary because 
there are unwanted restrictions on generalised 
communicative competence (20). Habermas has detailed the 
conditions of an ideal speech situation through 
investigation of what he calls "universal pragmatics" 
(21), by which he means the general structures which are 
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the enabling framework of every possible communicative 
act. I do not want to say anything about the character 
of universal pragmatics, except to register my opinion 
that it constitutes the foremost development of a theory 
of discourse informed by a genuinely Hegelian insistence 
on internal reflexivity and as such is of the foremost 
importance. What I want to go on to discuss is the 
possibility of formulating an idea of critical theory on 
the basis of universal pragmatics. 
That Habermas' idea of emancipation should take the form 
of a critical attitude to restrictions on communicative 
competence follows quite directly from his restriction of 
labour to instrumental reason and his consequent 
identification of interaction with communication. As all 
materiality is located within labour, interaction can 
have only ideal elements. Existing power has the form of 
ideology, for this is the fashion of placing distortions 
within given patterns of interaction. Critical theory 
removes these distortions, with the goal of making the 
dialogical character of interaction real in the ideal 
speech situation, actualising dialogue by generalising 
communicative competence. I have tried to briefly show 
that the foundation of this representationo}labour, 
interaction and therefore of critical theory involves 
some radical ontological mistakes. However, of more 
importance to the contemporary problems of critique are 
the historical difficulties into which Habermas' 
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conceptions now run as a consequence of those ontological 
mistakes. 
Habermas' criticisms of Marx's idea of labour allege that 
that idea involves certain ontological confusions. Now, 
as I have tried to say in this entire work, Marx's views 
on historical explanation necessarily must, and derive 
strength from the way they actually do, express a 
certain ontology. But the project of a systematic 
ontology always remained on the boundaries of Marx's 
thought, and the way in which he employs the concept of 
labour stems from specific historiographical 
preoccupations. The wide sense Marx gives to labour - 
or, to render this more in Marx's vernacular, to 
production - emerges because he makes an explanatory 
claim in his guiding thread about the place of material 
life in the social determinations of pre-history. Though 
Habermas is sure that it is a mistake for Marx to treat 
labour as embracing all the ontological elements of human 
self-formation (22), he makes virtually nothing of the 
peculiarly' historical themes in Marx's writings, which of 
course make an other than a directly ontological 
understanding of Marx's efforts possible. Habermas is, 
of course, aware of the materialist thrust of Marx's 
forms of explanation, but I suggest that he is not 
sufficiently sensitive to why Marx felt he had to adopt 
this form. That Habermas tries to add a moral element on 
historical materiaism would seem to testify to his 
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holding the idea that Marx tended to restrict his 
explanations to a specific social domain. In one sense 
this is right, but this is not a matter of ontological 
principle. Rather Marx felt he had to address the sociE: l 
totality in a specifically materialist specific fashion 
for explanatory reasons, and Habermas does not really 
come to terms with why. 
This means that Habermas fails to incorporate some of the 
central strengths to be found in Marx in his critical 
theory. Marx centrally rejects the treatment of 
ideological problems at only the level of consciousness, 
but Habermas overall must be thought to do so, or rather 
to treat of them as of discourse theory. Two things must 
be said. 
One of these is that psycho-analysis is in an important 
respect inappropriate for contemporary social critical 
theory. Leaving aside Freud's work on neuropathology, 
the obstacles to the analysand's self-comprehension are 
subjective in a sense in which the social factiticity of 
ideology is not, and analyst and analysand are united in 
the project of therapy in a way that classes are not over 
the project of emancipation. Habermas has indeed 
subsequently acknowledged that a greater acknowledgement 
of entrenched interests (in the more common usage) should 
have been part of his psycho-analytic model (23), but he 
does not seem to thereby recognise how profoundly at 
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cross-purposes the psycho-analytic presumption- of an 
interest in consensus is with the social contradictions 
which presently beset efforts at emancipation. 
The second thing which I would like to say follows on 
from my observations about the psycho-analytic model, but 
is perhaps best made in the context of some comments on 
universal pragmatics. The assumption of essentially 
united interests in any instance of therapy is 
generalised in universal pragmatics, and it is, I would 
say, the very universality of Habermas' specifications of 
the conditions of ideal speech that is a serious weakness 
in the critical theory that he erects on this basis. For 
this universality appeals in fact to a community of all 
humanity - it is in their interest that generalised 
communicative competence be realised. This is, in the 
Hegelian sense, the most real of interests, but it leaves 
the problem of the connection of this interest to 
empirical interests in the given world, a connection 
which is surely necessary if Habermas' work is to have 
progressive social effect. 
Habermas sees critique as being bound up in the, as it 
were, measurement of ideology in society which can be 
provided by assessing how far the conditions of ideal 
speech are absent in that society. Ideology critique is 
effected by advocacy of the erection of those conditions. 
Habermas is not here immediately presuming the concrete 
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existence of an interest in general communicative 
competence in all societies. He recognises that the 
potential level of universality in specific societies is 
bounded by a particular historical context. But he 
argues that whatever that level is, it can provide 
critical ammunition against any given conditions (24). 
These ideas of Habermas may be thought to constitute a 
scheme of progressive. critique rather after the pattern 
of determinate negation sought after by Hegel, but in 
fact it is something rather like the opposite of this. 
Habermas does not generate critique from given patterns 
of social conflict, which he may by all means then go on 
to show as positing the enlargement and ultimate 
universalisation of communicative competence. Rather he 
specifies the conditions of that competence and then 
reconstructs the past with the counterfactual assumption 
of the existence of those conditions serving as a 
standard by which to judge the given. The distance 
between the actual conditions and the ideal speech 
situation is Habermas' creation, not the actors'. 
Let me be precis 
as the theme of 
Habermas is quite 
is implicitly the 
Consensus is the 
terms. But Hegel 
e about why I feel this is not the same 
progression sought after by Hegel. 
correct to say that genuine consensus 
true goal of all communication (25). 
reality of all dialogue in Hegel's 
seeks to generate the potentials for 
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universality from the given; Habermas does just the 
opposite. The counterfactuality of ideal speech is 
purely retrospective, and who the actual audience for the 
advocacy role could be remains, in my opinion, 
irremediably obscure, as does what such an audience would 
do were they able to listen to Habermas. 
This point is the key, I think, to the many rather 
mundane empirical criticisms of Habermas' work that have 
continously been made, which all merge into an allegation 
that he generalises to too great a degree in the face of 
inadequate study of the actual conditions which the 
generalisations are, presumably, to illuminate. I am 
wary of substantiating these criticisms to any degree at 
all, because they undoubtedly in large part turn of 
falling beneath the level at which Habermas pitches his 
work. But a point of importance does seem to remain, and 
it is that Habermas' project does seem to actively 
encourage disregard for concrete circumstances and their 
detailed comprehension. Perhaps the force of the 
argument here is best illustrated by noting that even 
when we allow Habermas' generalisations, such as the 
typology of crises in Leoitimation Crisis, it still 
remains difficult to see how their explanatory force can 
be put to use. 
These remarks lead, I think, to another common, and often 
vulgar, criticism of Habermas, one made by marxists who 
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allege that Habermas' work disregards class struggle. 
Habermas' personal politics have become increasingly 
quietist, that this may be thought irresponsible. I 
doubt whether personal inclination as such plays a major 
role in the determination of Habermas' politics; rather 
the gulf between his thought, which aspires to 
universality, and the brute reactions which presently 
face western socialism atrophies interest in political 
tactics, if not strategy. This is, let me make it clear, 
a criticism; but one that can hardly be pressed too far. 
The central theme of Habermas' work is, I would say, that 
he presumes social universality, and any legitimate 
criticism of his work as a whole can turn, I would say, 
only upon disputing whether or not this is a legitimate 
presumption. The overall plausibility of strictly 
separating labour and interaction surely relates to the 
potential domination of objective tasks of work that is 
within the grasp of humanity, and a consequent ability to 
theoretically treat all important social issues in terms 
of communicative interaction. By contrast, though Marx's 
work points to this position in human development, his 
concerns are, quite understandably, with the final settling of 
material issues as the basis for further human 
development. It is to come to terms with an alienation 
which he ultimately locates in material life that Marx 
makes production central to his guiding thread. 
Criticism of Habermas arises because he pays only 
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marginal attention to these issues which are crucial to 
Marx. This may "seem like a retraction of just those 
advances which Marx makes against Hegel, but the social 
terms of reference which determine the ultimate 
defensibility of these fundamental stances have, of 
course, changed since the early nineteenth century. My 
opinion is that Habermas' stress on interaction is 
socially premature, and for this reason"I both make the 
criticisms which I have in this appendix and think it 
necessary to return to Hegel and Marx rather than 
undertake reconstruction in Habermas' sense. But for 
self-professed marxists to depracate Habermas' work is 
self-defeating to a peculiar degree, for that work is the 
social theory of the future envisaged by Marx. However, 
Habermas obviously knows that issues of alienation are by 
no means redundant, and still continues to face them. 
His work is, in my opinion, inadequate to this sort of 
critique, for that work is fit only for critique when all 
humanity as a whole faces its tasks. Habermas shows us 
our future, but though his projections are organically 
linked to the present through being developments of 
central marxist themes, those projections avoid 
confronting the present obstacles to their realisation. 
Ironically, Habermas recognises this problem as it besets 
Hegel's claims about the rationality of his world, and 
sees the necessity of Marx's attitude to Hegel (26). The 
conclusion is inescapable, however, that Habermas' 
historical imagination suffers from the defects, as well 
benefits from the strengths, of an attitude to the world 
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The chief defect of all previous materialism (that 
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Cf. HF, pp. 124-34; GI, pp. 38-41; and LF, p. 597. 
(25) On the place of consciousness in Marx's philosophic 
anthropology vide I. Meszaros, Marx's Theory of 
Alienation, London, Merlin Press, 1975, pp. 162-73. 
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There is a continual movement of growth in 
productive forces, of destruction of social 
relations, of formation in ideas. The only 
immutable thing is the abstraction of movement - 
mors immortalis. 
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(32) I1857, p. 50: 
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(33) N. b. G, pp. 471-514; and idem_, Ethnological 
Notebooks, ed. L. Krader, Assen, Van Gorcum, 1972 
henceforward cited as EN). 
(34) E. g. C1, pp. 452-4; and idem_ Capital, vol. 3, tr. 
Fernbach, intr. Mandel, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 
1981, pp. 448-55,728-48 (henceforward cited as C3). 
(35) Cl, pp. 871-926; and C3, pp. 917-50. Cf. G, pp. 
488-9. 
(36) GI, pp. 32-5,64-74; Marx and Engels, 'Manifesto of 
the Communist Party', (henceforward cited as MCP) in CW, 
vol. 6, pp. 483-96; G, pp. 158,161-2,245,515,539-42; 
and CPE, pp. 21-2. 
(37) Idem., 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', 
in CW, vol. 11,1979, p. 103 (henceforward cited as 
EBLB) : 
Men make their own history, but they do not make it 
just as they please. They do not make it under 
circumstances chosen by themselves, but under 
circumstances directly encountered, given and 
transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the 
dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the 
brain of the living. 
Cf. GI, p. 54. 
(38) Idem., 'Wage-labour and Capital', in CW, vol. 9, 
1977, p. 211 (henceforward cited as WLC): 
Capital consists of raw materials, instruments of 
labour and means of subsistence of all kinds, which 
are utilised in order to produce... So say the 
economists. What is a Negro slave? A man of the 
black race. The one explanation is as good as the 
other. A Negro is a Negro. He becomes a slave 
only in certain conditions. A cotton-jenny is a 
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production, take place. 
(39) EPM, p. 299: 
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individual is the social being. His manifestations 
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with others - are therefore an, expression and 
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Cf. GI, pp. 31-2,35-7,41-5,50,53-4; PP, pp. 165-6; 
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(43) Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism, Sussex, 
Harvester Press, 1979, pp. 34-56. 
(44) Idem., 'Wages, Price and Profit', in SW, pp. 187-8 
(henceforward cited as WPP): 
(According to Weston) If in one country the rate of 
wages is higher than in another, in the United 
States, for example, than in England, you must 
explain this difference in the rate of wages by a 
difference between the will of the American 
capitalist and the will of the English capitalist, a 
method which would certainly very much simplify not 
only the study of economic phenomena but of all 
other phenomena. But, even then, we might ask why 
the will of the American capitalist differs from the 
will of the English capitalist? And to answer this 
question we must go beyond the domain of the 
will... The will of the capitalist is certainly to 
take as much as possible. What we have to do is not 
to talk about his will, but to inquire into his 
power, the limits of that power, and the character 
of those limits. 
(45) GI, p. 54: 
... each stage (of history) contains a material 
result, a sum of productive forces, a historically 
created relation to nature and of individuals to one 
another, which is handed down to each generation 
from its predecessor; a mass of productive forces, 
capital funds and circumstances, which on the one 
hand is indeed modified by the new generation, but 
on the other also prescribes for it its conditions 
of life and gives it a definite development, a 
special character. It shows that circumstances make 
men as much as men make circumstances. 
571 
(46) P1859, p. 181. 
(47) GI, p. 36: 
In direct contrast to German philosophy which 
descends from heaven to earth, here it is a matter 
of ascending from earth to heaven. That is to say, 
not of setting out from what men say, imagine, 
conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, 
imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in 
the flesh; but setting out from real, active men, 
and on the basis of their real life processes 
demonstrating the development of the ideological 
reflexes and echoes of these life-processes. 
(48) Vide Timpanaro, On materialism, cit., chs. 1 and 
2. 
(49) Ibid., p. 31: 
The first premise of all 
course, the existence of 
Thus the first fact to be 
physical organisation of 
consequent relation to th 
course, we cannot go here 
physical nature of man, o 
conditions in which many 
oro-hydrographical and so 
writing must set out from 
their modification in the 
the action of men. 
human history is, of 
living human individuals. 
established is the 
these individuals and their 
e rest of nature. Of 
into either the actual 
r into the natural 
finds himself - geological, 
on. All historical 
these natural bases and 
course of history through 
(50) Vide K. Soper, 'Marxism, Materialism and Biology', 
in J. Mepham and Ruben, eds., Issues in Marxist 
Philosophy, vol. 2, Sussex, Harvester Press 1979, ch. 3. 
(51) Ibid., p. 40: 
... the nature that preceded human history... is 
nature which no longer exists anywhere (except 
perhaps on a few Australian coral islands of recent 
origin)... 
(52) Ibid., p. 39: 
Even and objects of the simplest "sensous certainty" 
are only given... through social development, 
industry and commerical intercourse. The 
cherry-tree, like almost all fruit trees, was, as is 
well know, only a few centuries ago transplanted by 
commerce into our zone, and therefore only by this 
action of a definite society in a definite age has 
it become "sensous certainity"... 
(53) Vide Plamenatz, Karl Marx's Philosophy of Man, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975, pp. 71-8. 
(54) C1, p. 283: 
(the human being) acts upon external nature and 
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changes it, and in this way he simultaneously 
changes his own nature. 
(55) EPm, p. 303: 
History itself is a real part of natural history - 
of nature developing into man. Natural science will 
in time incorporate into itself the science of man, 
just as the science of man will incorporate into 
itself natural science : there will be one science. 
(56) Vide Lefebvre, The Sociology of Marx tr. N. 
Guterman, London, Allen Lane, 1968, ch. 2! 
(57) GI, p. 41: 
As far as Feuerbach is a materialist he does not 
deal with history, and as far as he considers 
history he is not a materialist. With him, 
materliasm and history diverge completely... 
(58) P1859, p. 181: 
It is not the consciousness of men that determines 
their being, but in the contrary their social being 
that determines their consciousness. 
(59) Vide Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, op. 
cit., p. 27; and idem., Marx =s Basic Ontological 
Principles, op. cit., pp. 17-8,27-8. 
(60) Marx, Theories of Surplus Values pt. 1, tr. E. 
Burns, ad. Ryazanskaya, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 
1963, p. 288 (henceforward cited as TSV1): 
Man himself is the basis of material production, as 
of any other production that he carries on. All 
circumstances, therefore, which affect man, the 
subject of production, more or less modify all his 
functions and activities, and therefore too his 
functions and activities as the creator of material 
wealth... In this respect, it can in fact be shown 
that all human relations and functions, however and 
in whatever form they appear, influence material 
production... 
(61) Vide Carver, Engels, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1981 , P. 63. 
(62) P1859' p. 181: 
My investigation led to the result that legal 
relations as well as forms of state are to be 
grasped neither from themselves nor from the 
so-called general development of the human mind, but 
rather have their roots in the material conditions 
of life... 
(63) Vide e. g. Parker's introduction to M. Stirner, The 
Ego and Its Own, tr. S. Byington, intr. S. E. Parker, 
London, Rebel Press, 1982. 
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(64) Vide D. McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, 
London, Macmillan, 1969; and idem., Marx before Marxism, 
London, Macmillan, 1980. 
(65) GI, p. 43: 
The production of life... appears as a twofold 
relation: on the one hand as a natural and on the 
other as a social relation - social in the sense 
that it denotes the co-operation of several 
individuals, no matter under what conditions, in 
what manner and to what end. It follows from this 
that a certain mode of production, or industrial 
stage, is always combined with a certain mode of 
co-operation, or social stage... 
(66) WLC, p. 211: 
These social relations into which the producers 
enter with one another, the conditions under which 
they exchange their activities and participate in 
the whole act of production, will naturally vary 
according to the character of the means of 
production. 
Cf. PP. 166. 
(67) 11857, P. 71: 
... production in its one-sided form is also determined for its part by other moments. For 
example, if the market, i. e. the sphere of exchange, 
expands, then production grows in extent and is more 
thoroughly compartmentalised. Production varies 
with variations in distribution; for example with 
the concentration of capital, with a different 
distribution of population between town and country, 
etc. 
(68) Vide L. Goldmann, 'The Social Structure and the 
Collective Consciousness of Structures', in idem., Method 
in the Sociology of Literature, tr. W. Q. 8oelhower, 
Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1981, pp. 85-9. 
(69) P1859, PP. 181-2: 
At a certain stage in their development, the 
material productive forces of society come into 
conflict with the existing relations of 
production... From forms of development of the 
productive forces these relations turn into their 
fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. 
Cf. GI, pp. 74,81-3; Marx, 'Marx to Annenkov, 28 
December, 1846', tr. P. and B. Ross, in CW, vol. 38, 
1982, pp. 96-7; and MCP, p. 489. 
(70) 11857, p. 83: 
Dialectic of the concept of productive force (means 
of productionrnd relations of production .. 
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(71) E. g. Lefebvre, Dialectical Materialism, op. cit., 
pp. 86-109. 
(72) Pace e. g. K. R. Popper, The Open Society and Its 
Enemies, vol. 2, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966, 
p. 320. 
(73) Vide R. W. Balogh, Dialectical Phenomenology, London, 
Routledge and Kagan Paul, 1979; and I. Berlin, Karl Marx, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 99. 
(74) C1, p. 287: 
... the instruments and the object of labour are. 
means of production... 
(75) G, p. 706: - Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, no 
railways, electric telegraphs, self-acting mules, 
etc. These are the products of human industry; 
natural material transformed into organs of the 
human will over nature, or of human participation in 
nature,. They are organs of the human brain, created 
by the human hand; the power of knowledge, 
objectified. 
(76) C1, p. 287: 
Although a use-value emerges from the labour-process 
in the form of a product, other use-values, products 
of previous labour, enter into it as means of 
production... Products are therefore not only the 
results of labour, but also its essential 
conditions. 
(77) Ibid., p. 285: 
The worker makes use of the mechanical, physical and 
chemical properties of some substances in order to 
set them to work on other substances as instruments 
of his power, and in accordance with his purposes. 
(78) N. b. P1859, p. 181 . 
(79) Vide G. A. Cohen, Karl Iarx! s Theory of History, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978, pp. 150-60. 
(80) Vide E. J. Hobsbawm, 'Karl Marx's Contribution to 
Historiography', in Blackburn, ed., Ideology in Social 
Sciences op. cit, pp. 273-80. 
(81) GI, pp. 82: 
... in the whole development of history (there is) a 
coherent series of forms of intercourse, the 
coherence of which consists in this: an earlier form 
of intercourse, which has become a fatter, is 
replaced by a new one corresponding to the more 
developed productive forces... a form which, in its 
turn becomes a fetter and is thus replaced by 
5, T(, 
another. Since these conditions correspond at every 
stage to the simultaneous development of the 
productive forces, their history is at the same time 
the history of the evolving productive forces taken 
over by each new generation, and is therefore the 
history of the development of the forces of the 
individuals themselves. 
(82) Id.,: 
The conditions under which individuals have 
intercourse with each other, so long as this 
contradiction (between forces and relations of 
production when. the latter are a fetter) is absent, 
are conditions appertaining to their individuality, 
in no way external to them; conditions under which 
alone these definite individuals, living under 
definite relations, can produce their material life 
and what is connected with it, are thus the 
conditions of their self-activity and are produced 
by this self-activity. The definite condition under 
which they produce thus corresponds, as long as the 
contradiction has not yet appeared, to the reality 
of their conditioned nature, their one-sided 
existence, the one-sidedness of which becomes 
evident only when the contradiction enters on the 
scene... 
(83) Vide P. Corrigan et al., Socialist Construction and 
Marxist Theory, London, monthly Review Press, 1978, pp. 
1-6; and Sayer, Marx's Method, Sussex, Harvester Press, 
1979, pp. 80-7. 
(84) E. g. Brewster's glossary to Althusser and Balibar, 
Reading 'Capital', op. cit., p. 317. 
(85) Vide M. merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 
tr. C. Smith, London, Routledge and Kagan Paul, 1962, p. 
171 n. 1. 
(86) Vide Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, off. cit., 
vol. 1. P. 
(87) Vide K. Federn, The Materialist Conception of 
History. 
(88) N. b. the debate over "the asiatic mode of 
production", on which vide A. M. Bailey and J. Llobera, 
eds., The'Asiatic= of Production, London, Routledge 
and Kegan Pau1,1981 and the bibliographies given 
therein. 
(89) Pace N. Poulantzas, Political Power and Social 
Classes, tr. T. O'Hagan, at. al., London, New Left Books, 
1973, intr. 
(90) P1859, p. 183. 
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(91) Vide Sayer, 'Science as Critique', in Mepham and 
Ruben, eds., Issues in Marxist Philosophy, vol. 3, 
Sussex, Harvester Press, 1979, ch. 2. 
(92) Vide Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971, p. 13. 
(93) Vide Williams, Marxism and Literature, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1977, pp. 75-82. 
(94) E. g. F. Jakubowski, Ideology and Superstructure, tr. 
A. Booth, London, Allison and Busby, 1976. 
(95) Pace e. g. Althusser, 'Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses', op, cit., pp. 129-31. 
(96) P1859, p. 181: 
At a certain stage of their development, the 
material productive forces of society come into 
conflict with the existing relations of 
production... From forms of development of the 
productive forces these relations turn into their 
fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. 
With the change of the economic foundation the 
entire immense superstructure is more or less 
rapidly transformed. 
(97) Vide Korsch, Karl Marx_, New York, Russell and 
Russell, 1963, ch. 1, cf. ch. 5. 
(98) C3, pp. 927-8: 
The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus 
labour is pumped out of the direct producers 
determines the relationship of domination and 
servitude, as this grows directly out of production 
itself and reacts back on it as a determinant. On 
this is based the entire configuration of the 
economic community arising from the acutal relations 
of production, and hence also its specific political 
form. It is in each case the direct relationship of 
the owners of the conditions of production to the 
immediate producers -a relationship whose 
particular form naturally corresponds always to a 
certain level of the development of the type and 
manner of labour, and hence to its social productive 
power - in which we find the innermost secret, the 
hidden basis of the entire social edifice, and hence 
also the political form of the relationship of 
sovereignty and dependence, in short, the specific 
form of the state in each case. This does not 
prevent the same economic basis - the same in its 
major conditions - from displaying endless 
variations and gradations in its appearance, as the 
result of innumerable different empirical 
circumstances, natural conditions, racial relations, 
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historical influences acting from outside, etc., and these can only be understood by analysing the 
empirically given conditions. 
(99) MCP, p. 482. 
(100) His manuscript pieces are given in EN. 
(101) Engels, 'The Origin of the Family, Private Property 
and the State', in SW, pp. 449-583 (henceforward cited as 
OF). 
(102) EPM, p. 320. 
(103) Vide Plamenatz, Karl Marx's Philosophy of Man, op.. 
cit., ch. 6. 
(104) EN; OF; and AD, pp. 222-6,242-4,248-53. 
(105) For such discussion vide E. Terray, Marxism and 
"Primitive" S eties, tr. M. Klapper, London, Monthly 
Review Press, 1972; and M. Sahlins, Stone-Age Economics, 
London, Tavistock, 1974. 
(106) EPM, p. 321: 
Precisely in the fact that division of labour and 
exchange are aspects of private property lies the.. proof... that human life required private 
property for its realisation... 
(107) Ibid., pp. 270-83. 
(108) GI, pp. 44-5. 
(109) Ibid., p. 46: 
Division of labour and private and property are, 
after all, identical expressions: in the one the 
same thing is affirmed with respect to activity as is affirmed in the other with reference to the 
product of activity. 
(110) EPM, pp. 279-80: 
... though private property appears to be the 
reason, the cause of alienated labour, it is rather its consequence... Later this relationship becomes 
reciprocal. 
(111) C3, pp. 1025-6. 
(112) Vide Mandel, From Class Society to Communism, tr. 
L. Sadler, London, Ink Links, 1977, p. -23. 
(113) MCP, p. 482: 
Freeman and slave, patrician and plebian, lord and 
serf, guildmaster and journeyman, in a word, 
oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant 
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opposition to one another, carried on an 
uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight 
that each time ended either in a revolutionary 
reconstitution of society as a whole or in the 
common ruin of the contending classes. 
(114) 
(115) GI, p. 47: 
... as soon as the division of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere 
of activity which is forced upon him and which he 
cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a 
shepherd or a critical critic, and must remain so 
if he does not want to lose his means of 
livelihood. By contrast, in communist society, 
where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity 
but can become accomplished in any branch he 
wishes, society regulates the general production 
and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing 
today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, 
fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, 
criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind... 
(116) C3, pp. 958-9: 
The realm of freedom really begins only where 
labour determined by necessity and external 
expediency ends; it lies by its very nature just 
beyond the sphere of material production proper. 
Just as the savage must wrestle with nature to 
satisfy his needs, to maintain and reproduce his 
life, so must civilised man, and he must do so in 
all forms of society and under all possible modes 
of production. This realm of natural necessity 
expands with his development, because his needs do 
too; but the productive forces to satisfy these 
expand at the same time. Freedom, in this sphere, 
can consist only in this, that socialised man, the 
associated producers, govern the human metabolism 
with nature in a rational way, bringing it under 
their collective control instead of being dominated 
by it as a blind power; accomplishing it with the 
least expenditure of energy and in conditions most 
worthy and appropriate and their human nature. But 
this always remains a realm of necessity. The true 
realm of freedom, of the development of human 
powers as an end in itself, begins beyond it, 
though it can only flourish with his realm of 
necessity as its basis. The reduction of the 
working day is the basic pre-requisite. 
(117) G, p. 611: 
(Smith)... is right, of course, that in its 
historic forms of slave-labour, serf-labour and 
wage-labour, labour always appears as repulsive, 
always as external forced labour, and not-labour, 
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by contrast, as "freedom and happiness". This 
holds ... for labour which has not yet created the... conditions for itself... in which labour 
becomes attractive work, the individual's 
serf-realisation. This in no way means that it 
becomes mere fun, mere amusement, as Fourier with 
the naivete of a shop-girl, puts it. Really free 
work, e. g. composing, is at the same time the most 
damned seriousness and the most intense exertion. 
(118) CHPL, p. 29: 
Democracy is the solved riddle of all 
constitutions. Here, not merely implicitly and in 
essence but existing in reality, the constitution 
is constantly brought back to its actual basis, the 
actual human being, the actual people, and 
established as the people's own work. The 
constitution appears to be what it is, a free 
product of man. 
(119) Marx and Engels, 'The Alleged Splits in the 
International', tr. R. Sheed, in Marx, The First 
International and After, ed. Fernbach, Harmondsworth, 
Penguin Books, 1974, p. 314 (henceforward cited as FIA): 
To all socialists anarchy means this: the aims of 
the proletarian movement - that is to say the 
abolition of social classes - once achieved, the 
power of the state, which now serves only to keep 
the vast majority of producers under the yoke of a 
small minority of exploiters, will vanish, and the 
functions of government will become purely 
administrative. 
Cf. MCP, 516. 
(120) Marx, 'First Draft of The Civil War in France', in 
FIA p. 250: 
The Commune : the reabsorption of the state power 
of society as its own living forces instead of as 
forces controlling and subduing it, by the popular 
masses themselves, forming their own force instead 
of the organised force of their suppression - the 
political form of their social emancipation, 
instead of the artificial force (appropriate by 
their oppressors) (their own force opposed to and 
organised against them) of society wielded for 
their oppression by their enemies. 
Cf. CHPL, pp. 30,120-1. 
(121) GI, pp. 36-7: 
Consciousness (das Bewusstsein) can never be 
anything else than conscious being (das bewusste 
Sein), and the being of men is their actual life 
process... It is not consciousness that determines 
life, but life that determines consciousness. 
(122) P1 859, P. 1 81 : 
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The mode of production of material life conditions 
the social, political and intellectual life process 
in general. It is not the consciousness of men 
that determines their being, but, on the contrary, 
their social being that determines their 
consciousness. 
(123) GI, p. 36: 
Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, 
etc., that is, real, active men as they are 
conditioned by a definite development of their 
productive forces and of the intercourse 
corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. 
(124) Vide Williams, Marxism and Literature, op. _ cis 
ch. 4. 
(125) E. g. 11857, pp. 84-7. 
(126) Vide J. McCarney, The Real World of Ideology, 
Sussex, Harvester Press, 1980, ch. 3. 
(127) Vide J. Larrain, Marxism and Ideology, London, 
Macmillan, 1983, pp. 113-8. 
(128) GI, pp. 47-8: 
... fixation of social activity... consolidation of 
what we ourselves produce into a material power 
above us, growing out of our control, thwarting out 
expectations, bringing to nought our calculations, 
is one of the chief factors in historical 
development up till now. 
(129) C3, p. 311: 
The finished configuration of economic relations, 
as these are visible on the surface, in their 
actual existence, and therefore also in the notions 
with which the bearers and agents of these 
relations seek to gain an understanding of them, is 
very different from the configuration of their 
inner core, which is essential but concealed... 
(130) C3, p. 956: 
... all science would be superflous if the form of 
appearance. of things directly coincided with their 
essence... 
(131) Cl, p. 167: 
The belated scientific discovery that the products 
of labour, in so far as they have values, are 
merely the material expressions of the human labour 
expended to produce them, marks an epoch in the 
history of mankind's development, but by no means 
banishes the semblance of objectivity possessed by 
the social character characteristics of labour. 
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(132) Marx, 'Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's 
Philosophy of Law - Introduction', (henceforward cited as 
CHPLI), in CW, vol. 3, p. 182: 
The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace 
criticism by weapons, material force must be 
overthrown by material force; but theory also 
becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped 
the masses. 
(133) TF no. 4, p. 4: 
Feuerbach starts out from the fact of religious 
self-estrangement, of the duplication of the world 
into a religious world and a secular one. His work 
consists in resolving the religious world into its 
secular basis. But that the secular basis lifts 
off from itself and establishes itself as an 
independent realm in the clouds can be explained 
only by the inner strife and inner 
contradictoriness of this secular basis. The 
latter must, therefore, itself both be understood 
in its contradiction and revolutionised in 
practice. Thus, for instance, once the earthly 
family is discovered to be the secret of the holy 
family, the former must then itself be destroyed in 
theory and in practice. 
(134) TF11, p. 5: 
The philosophers have only interpreted the world in 
various ways; the point, however, is to change it. 
(135) CHPLI, p. 177: 
(Left Hegelianism's) basic deficiency may be 
reduced to the following: It thought it could make 
philosophy a reality without superceding it. 
(136) NW, p. 198: 
... I do not divide value into use-value and 
exchange-value as antitheses into which the 
abstraction "value" splits, rather I divide the 
concrete social form of the labour-product; 
"commodity" is, on the one hand, use-value, and on 
the other hand value... 
(137) Cl, p. 174, n. 34: 
(I distinguish scientific political economy from) 
the vulgar economists who only flounder around 
within the apparent framework of (economic) 
relations, ceaselessly ruminate on the materials 
long since provided by scientific political 
economy, and seek plausible explanations of the 
crudest phenomena for the domestic purposes of the 
bourgeoisie. 
(138) 11857, pp. 78-9: 
Bourgeois society is the most developed and the 
most diverse historical organisation of production. 
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The categories which express its relations and an 
insight into its artangement, allow at the same 
time an insight into the arrangement of production 
and the relations of productions of all extinct 
forms of society... Thus bourgeois economy offers 
the key to (the economy of) antiquity. However, by 
no means (is this revealed) by the approach of 
economists who obliterate all historical 
differences and see in all forms of society the 
bourgeois forms. One can understand tribute, 
tithes, etc., if one is acquainted with ground 
rent. However, one must not identify them (with 
each other). 
(139) G, p. 159: 
... if we did not find concealed in society as it is 
the material conditions of production and the 
corresponding relations of exchange pre-requisite 
for a classless society, then all attempts to 
explode (bourgeois society) would be quixotic. 
(140) GI, pp. 38-9,49: 
... for... the communist, it is a question of 
revolutionising the existing world, of practically 
coming to grips with and changing things found in 
existence... Communism is not for us a state of 
affairs which is to be established, an ideal to 
which reality (will) have to adjust itself. We 
call communism the real movement which abolishes 
the present state of things. The conditions of 
this movement result from the now existing premise. 
(141) Vide Appendix 11. 
(142) GI, p. 36 
If in all ideology men and their relations appear 
upside-down as in a camera obscure ... 
(143) C1, p. 680: 
We may therefore understand the decisive importance 
of the transformation of the value and price of 
labour-power into the form of wages, or into the 
value and price of labour itelf. All the notions 
of justice held by both the worker and the 
capitalist, all the mystifications of the 
capitalist mode of production, all capitalism's 
illusions about freedom... have as their basis the 
form of appearance discussed above, which makes the 
actual relation invisible, and indeed presents to 
the eye the opposite of that relation. 
(144) Ibid., p. 677: 
In the expression "value of labour", the concept of 
value is not only completely extinguished, but 
inverted, so that it becomes it contrary. It is an 
expression as imaginary as the value of the earth. 
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These imaginary expression arise, nevertheless from 
the forms of production themselves. They are 
categories for the forms of appearance of essential 
relations. That in their appearance things are 
often presented in an inverted way is something 
fairly familiar in every science, apart from 
political economy. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 
(1) G, pp. 881-2; CPE, pp. 27-8; idem., 'The Commodity', 
in idem., Value: Studies Karl Marx, tr. A. Dragstedt, 
London, New Park, 1976, pp. 7-8 (henceforward cited as 
C); idem., 'The Value-form, tr. M. Roth and W. Suchting, 
Capital and Class, no. 4,1978, p. 134 (henceforward 
cited as VF); and Cl, pp. 125-6. 
(2) 'Vide Appendix 12. 
(3) Cl, p. 89. Cf. SL, p. 67. 
(4) C1, p. 90. 
(5) NW, pp. 198-9. 
(6) CPE, p. 27; C, p. 7; and Cl, p. 125. 
(7) Idem., Theories of Surplus Value, pt. 3, tr. J. 
Cohen and Ryazanskaya, ed. Ryazanskaya and Dixon, London, 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1972, p. 112 (henceforward cited as 
TSV3); and id_ 'Results of the Immediate Process of 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 12 
(1) C1, pp. 164-6: 
The mysterious character of the commodity-form 
consists... in the fact that the commodity reflects 
the social character of men's own labour as 
objective characteristics of the products of labour 
themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these 
things... this fetishism of the world of commodities 
arises from the peculiar social character of the 
labour which produces them. Objects of utility 
become commodities only because they are the 
products of labour of private individuals who work 
independently of each other. The sum total of the 
labour of all these private individuals forms the 
aggregate labour of society. Since the producers do 
not come into social contact until they exchange the 
products of their labour, the specific social 
characteristics of their private labours appear only 
within this exchange. In other words, the labour of 
the private individual manifests itself as an 
element of the total labour of society only through 
the relation which the act of exchange establishes 
between the products, and, through their mediation, 
between their producers. To the producers, 
therefore, the social relations between their 
private labours appear as what they are, i. e. they 
do not appear as direct social relations between 
persons in their work, but rather as material 
relations between persons and social relations 
between things. 
(2) TSV2, p. 388: 
Since living labour... is incorporated in capital, 
and appears as an activity belonging to capital from 
the moment that the labour-process begins, all the 
productive powers of social labour appear as the 
productive powers of capital, just as the general 
social form of labour appears in money as the 
property of a thing. Thus the productive power of 
social labour and its special forms now appears as 
productive powers and forms of capital, of 
materialised labour, of the material conditions of 
labour - which, having assumed this independent 
form, are personified by the capitalist in relation 
to living labour. Here we have once more the 
perversion of the relationship, which we have 
already, in dealing with money, called fetishism. 
(3) Ibid., p. 390: 
... from the standpoint of... the general form of 
capitalist production... the means of production, the 
material conditions of labour - materials of labour, 
instruments of labour (and means of subsistence) - do not appear as subsumed to the labourer, but the 
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labourer appears as subsumed to them. He does not 
make use of them, but they make use of him. And it 
is this that makes them capital. Capital employs 
labour. Capital is not a means for him to produce 
products... But he is the means of capital - partly to maintain its value, partly to create surplus 
value, that is, to increase it, to absorb 
surplus-labour. 
(4) WLC, pp. 211-3: 
Capital consists of raw materials, instruments of 
labour and means of subsistence of all kinds, which 
are utilised in order to produce new raw materials, 
new instruments of labour and new means of 
subsistence. All these component parts of capital 
are creations of labour, products of labour, 
accumulated labour. Accumulated labour which serves 
as a means of new production is capital. So say the 
economists. What is a Negro slave? A man of the 
black race. The one explanation is as good as the 
other. A Negro is a Negro. He becomes a slave only 
in certain relations. A cotton-spinning jenny is a 
machine for spinning cotton. It becomes capital 
only in certain relations... Capital... is a bourgeois 
production relation ... Are not the means of 
subsistence, the instruments of labour, the raw 
materials of which capital consists, produced and 
accumulated under given social conditions... And is 
it not just this definite social character which 
turns the products serving for new production into 
capital... It is domination over direct, living 
labour that turns accumulated labour into capital. 
Capital does not consist in accumulated labour 
serving living labour as a means for new production. 
It consists in living labour serving accumulated 
labour as a means for maintaining and multiplying 
the exchange value of the latter. 
(5) Idem., 'Marx to Kugelmann', 9 March 1865', in 
p. 212. 
(6) MCP, p. 487: 
The bourgeoisie... has been the first to show what 
man's activity can bring about. It has accomplished 
wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman 
aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals; it has conducted 
expeditions that put in the shade all former 
exoduses of nations and crusades. 
(7) RIPP, p. 1037: 
The material result of capitalist production, apart from the development of the social productive forces 
of labour, is to raise the quantity of production 
and multiply and diversify the spheres of 
productions and their sub-spheres. For it is only then that the corresponding development of the 
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exchange-value of the products emerges - as the 
realm in which they can operate or realise 
themselves as exchange-value. 
(8) G, p. 749: 
... the development of the productive forces brought 
about by the historical 
development of capital itself, when it reaches a 
certain point, suspends the self-realisation of 
capital instead of positing it. Beyond a certain 
point, the development of the powers of production 
becomes a barrier for capital; hence the capital 
relation a barrier for the development of the 
productive powers of labour. When it has reached 
this point, capital, i. e. wage-labour, enters into 
the same relation towards the development of social 
wealth and of the forces of production as the guild 
system, serfdom, slavery, and is necessarily 
stripped off as a fetter. 
(9) C1, p. 929: 
... capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a natural process, its own 
negation. 
(10) G, pp. 749-50: 
the material and mental conditions of the negation 
of wage-labour and of capital... are themselves the 
results of capital's production process. The 
growing incompatibility between the productive 
development of society and its hitherto existing 
relations of production expresses itself in bitter 
contradictions, crises, spasms. The violent 
destruction of capital, not by relations external to 
it but rather as a condition of its 
self-preservation, is the most striking form in 
which advice is given it to be gone and to give room 
for a higher state of social production. 
(11) MCP, pp. 489-90: 
In crises there breaks out an epidemic that, in all 
earlier epochs, would have seemed an absurdity - the 
epidemic of over-production. Society suddenly finds 
itself put back into a state of momentary barbarism; 
it appears as if a famine, a universal war of 
devastation, had cut off the supply of every means 
of subsistence; industry and commerce seem to be 
destroyed; and why? Because there is too much 
civilisation, too much means of subsistence, too 
much industry, too much commerce. The productive forces at the disposal of society no longer tend to 
further the development of the conditions of 
bourgeois property; on the contrary, they have 
become too powerful for these conditions, by which they are fettered... 
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(12) TSV2, p. 528: 
It is the unconditional development of the 
productive forces and therefore mass production on 
the basis of a mass of producers who are confined 
within the bounds of necessary means of subsistence 
on the one hand, and on the other, the barrier set 
Lip by the capitalists' profit, which forms the basis 
of modern over-production. 
(13) G, pp. 704-5: 
The exchange of living labour for objectified labour 
- i. e. the positing of social labour in the form of 
the contradiction of capital and wage-labour - is' 
the ultimate development of the value-relation and 
of production resting on value. Its presupposition 
is - and remains - the mass of direct labour time, 
the quantity of labour employed, as the determinant 
factor in the production of wealth. But to the 
degree that large industry develops, the creation of 
real wealth comes to depend less on labour time and 
on the amount of labour employed than of the power 
of the agencies set in motion during labour time, 
whose "powerful effectiveness" is itself out of all 
proportion to the direct labour time spent on their 
production, but depends rather on the general state 
of science and on the progress of technology, or the 
application of science to production... Real wealth 
manifest itself... and large industry reveals this - 
in the monstrous disproportion between the labour 
time applied and its product, as well as in the 
qualitative imbalance between labour... and the power 
of the production process it superintends. Labour 
no longer appears to be so much included in the 
production process; rather, the human being. comes to 
relate to the production process more as watchman an 
regulator... No longer does the worker insert a 
modified thing as a middle link between the object 
and himself; rather, he inserts the process of 
nature, transformed into an industrial process, as a 
means between himself and inorganic nature, 
mastering it. He steps to the side of the 
production process instead of being its chief actor. 
In this transformation, it is neither the direct 
human labour he performs nor the time during which 
he works, but rather the appropriation of his own 
general productive power... which appears as the 
great foundation-stone of production and of wealth. 
The theft of alien labour time, on which present 
wealth is based, appears as a miserable foundation 
in the face of this new one, created by large-scale 
industry itself. As soon as labour in the direct 
form has ceased to be the great well-spring of 
wealth, labour time ceases and must cease to be its 
measure, and hence exchange-value must cease to be 
the measure of use-value. 
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(14) C3, pp. 359,368: 
If the capitalist mode of production is therefore a 
historical means for developing the material powers 
of production and for creating a corresponding world 
market, it is at the same time the constant 
contradiction between this historical task and the 
social relations of production corresponding to 
it... The development of this productive forces of 
social labour is capital's historic mission and 
justification. For that very reason, it unwittingly 
creates the material conditions for a higher form of 
production. 
(15) MCP, p. 485: 
The modern bourgeois society... has not done away 
with class antagonism. It has but established new 
classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of 
struggle in place of the old ones... the epoch of the 
bourgeoisie. .. however. " . has simplified the class 
antagonisms. Society as a whole is splitting up 
more and more into two great hostile camps, into two 
great classes directly facing each other: 
Bourgeoisie and Proletariat. 
(16) C3, p. 132: 
The capitalist... is only a capitalist at all, and 
can undertake the process of exploiting labour, only 
because he confronts, as proprietor of the 
conditions of labour, the worker as a mere owner of 
labour-power. 
(17) Vide Giddens, The Class Structure of the Advanced 
Societies, London, Hutchinson, 1973, p. 31. 
(18) C3, p. 1025: 
The owners of more labour-power, the owners of 
capital and the landowners... f orm the three great 
classes of modern society based on the capitalist 
mode of production. 
(19) TSV2, p. 153: 
... capital property... is a factor of and fulfills a function in capitalist production; this does not 
hold good of landed property... because modern landed 
property is in fact, feudal property, but transformed 
by the action of capital upon it... 
(20) C3, p. 379: 
Merchant's or trading capital is divided into two 
forms or sub-species, commercial and money-dealing 
capital, which we shall go on to distinguish in such 
detail as is needed to analyse capital in its basic 
inner structure. This is all the more necessary in 
so far as modern economics, and even its best 
representatives, lump trading"capital and industrial 
capital directly together and completely overlook 
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trading capital's characteristic peculiarities. 
(21) C1, p. 794: 
The relative surplus production exists in all kinds 
of forms. Every worker belongs to it during the 
time when he is only partially employed or wholly 
unemployed... we can identify three forms which it 
always possesses: the floating, the latent and the 
stagnant. 
(22) Ibid., p. 797: 
... the lowest sediment of the relative surplus 
population (the stagnant) dwells in the sphere of 
pauperism. Apart from vagabonds, criminals, 
prostitutes, in short the actual lumpenproletariat, 
this social stratum consists of three 
categories... those able to work... orphans and pauper 
children (and) the demoralised, the ragged and those 
unable to work... 
(23) The laws of (the) centralisation of capitals, or of 
the attraction of capital by capital, cannot be 
developed here. A few brief factual indications 
must suffice. The battle of competition is fought 
by the cheapening of commodities. The cheapness of 
commodities depends, all other circumstances 
remaining the same, on the productivity of labour, 
and this depends on the scale of production. 
Therefore the larger capitals will beat the smaller. 
It will further be remembered that with the 
development of the capitalist mode of production 
there is an increase in the minimum amount of 
individual capital necessary to carry on a business 
under its normal conditions. The smaller capitals, 
therefore, crowd into spheres of production which 
large-scale industry has taken control of only 
sporadically or incompletely. Here competition 
rages in direct proportion to the number, and in 
inverse proportion to the magnitude, of the rival 
capitals. It always ends in the ruin of many small 
capitalists, whose capitals partly pass into the 
hands of their conquerors and partly vanish 
completely. 
(24) Vide V. Allen, 'The Differentiation of the Working 
Class', in A. Hunt, ed., Class and Class Structure, 
London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1979, pp. 61-80. 
(25) C1, pp. 253-5: 
The simple circulation of commodities - selling in 
order to buy - is a means to a final goal which lies 
outside of circulation, namely the appropriation of 
use-values, the satisfaction of needs. As against 
this, the circulation of money as capital is an end 
in itself, for the valorisation of value takes place 
only within this constantly renewed movement. The 
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movement of capital is therefore limitless. As the 
conscious bearer of this movement, the possessor of 
money becomes a capitalist. His person, or rather 
his pocket, is the point from which money starts and 
to which it returns. The objective content of the 
circulation we have been discussing - the 
valorisation of value - is his subjective purpose, 
and it is only in so far as the appropriation of 
even more wealth in the abstract is the sole driving 
force behind his operations that he functions as a 
capitalist, i. e. as capital personified and endowed 
with consciousness and a will. Use-values must 
therefore never be treated as the immediate aim of 
the capitalist; nor must the profit on any single 
transaction. His aim is rather the unceasing 
movement of profit making. 
(26) TSV3, p. 514: 
The bourgeois... does not perceive that the 
production relations themselves, the social forms in 
which he produces and which he regards as given, 
natural relations, are the continuous product - and 
only for that reason the continuous pre-requisite - 
of this specific social mode of production. The 
different relations and aspects not only become 
independent and assume a heterogeneous mode of 
existence, apparently independent of one another, 
but they seem to be the direct properties of things; 
they assume a material shape. 
(27) RIPP, p. 990: 
,.. the capitalist... has his roots 
in the process of 
alienation and finds absolute satisfaction in it... 
(28) Id.: 
The self-valorisation of capital... is... the 
determining, dominating and overriding purpose of 
the capitalist, it is the absolute motive and 
content of his activity... a highly impoverished and 
abstract content which makes it plain that the 
capitalist is just as much enslaved by the 
relationships of capitalism as is his opposite pole, 
the worker, albeit in quite a different manner. 
(29) EPM, p. 324: 
That which is mine through the medium of money - 
that for which I can pay (i. e. which money can buy) 
- that am I myself, the possessor of the money. The 
extent of the power of money is the extent of that 
power. Money's properties are my - the possessor's 
- properties and essential powers. Thus, what I am 
and wht I am capable of is by no means determined by 
my individuality. I am ugly, but I can buy myself 
the most beautiful of women. Therefore I am not 
ugly, for the effect of ugliness - its deterrent 
power - is nullified by money... I am bad, dishonest, 
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unscrupulous, stupid, but money is honoured, and 
hence its possessor. Money is the supreme good, 
therefore its possessor is good. 
(30) C1, p. 739: 
... the capitalist... in so far as he is capital 
personified, his motive force is not the acquisition 
and enjoyment of use-values but the acquisition and 
augmentation of exchange-values... Only as a 
personification of capital is the capitalist 
respectable. As such, he shares with the miser an 
absolute drive towards self-enrichment. But what 
appears in the miser as the mania of an individual 
is in the capitalist the effect of a social 
mechanism in which he is merely a cog. 
(31) Ibid., p. 381: 
Under free competition, the immanent laws of 
capitalist production confront the individual 
capitalist as a coercive force external to him. 
(32) RIPP, p. 990: 
To an extent the worker stands on a higher plane 
than the capitalist from the outset, since the 
latter has his roots in the process of alienation 
and finds absolute satisifaction in it, whereas 
right from the start the worker is a victim who 
confronts it as a rebel and experiences it as a 
process of enslavement. 
(33) MCP, pp. 495-6: 
... the bourgeoisie is unfit any longer to be the 
ruling class in society and to impose its conditions 
upon society as an overriding law... Society can no 
longer live under this bourgeoisie, in other words, 
its existence is no longer compatible with society. 
(34) C1, p. 929: 
... capitalist production begets, with 
the 
inexorability of a natural process, its own 
negation. 
(35) Ibi= pp. 929-30: 
The transformation of scattered private property 
resting on the personal labour of the individuals 
themselves into capitalist private property is 
naturally an incomparably more protracted, violent 
and difficult process than the transformation of 
capitalist private property... into social property. 
In the former case, it was a matter of the 
expropriation of the mass of the people by a few 
usurpers; but in this case we have the expropriation 
of a few usurpers by the mass of the people. 
(36) C3, pp. 567: 
Formation of joint. -stock companies. This involves... 
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Transformation of the actual functioning capitalist 
into a mere manager in charge of other people's 
capital, and of the capital owner into a mere owner, 
a mere money capitalist... function is completely 
separated from capital ownership... 
(37) TSV3, p. 497: 
Capitalist production itself has brought it about 
that the labour of superintendence walks the 
streets, separated completely from the ownership of 
capital, whether one's own or other people's. It 
has become quite unnecessary for capitalists to 
perform this labour of superintendence. It is 
actually available, separate from capital... in 
the... separation between industrial managers and 
capitalists of every sort. The best demonstrations 
of this are the co-operative factories built by the 
workers themselves. They are proof that the 
capitalist as functionary of production has become 
just as superflous to the workers as the landlord 
appears to the capitalist with regard to bourgeois 
production. 
(38) C3, p. 373: 
... the'growing accumulation of capital involves its 
growing concentration. Thus the power of capital 
grows, in other words the autonomy of the social 
conditions of production, as personified by the 
capitalist, is asserted more and more as against the 
actual producers. Capital shows itself more and 
more to be a social power, with the capitalist as 
its functionary -a power that no longer stands in 
any possible kind of relationship to what the work 
of one particular individual can create, but an 
alienated social power which has gained an 
autonomous position and confronts society as a 
thing, and as a power whih the capitalist has 
through this thing. The contradiction between the 
general social power into which capital has 
developed and the private power of the individual 
capitalists over these social conditions of 
production develops ever more blatantly, whilst this 
development also contains the solution to this 
situation, in that it simultaneously raises the 
conditions of production into general, communal, 
social conditions. 
(39) Ibid., p. 567: 
Formation of joint-stock companies. This involves: 
1. Tremendous expansion in the scale of production, 
and enterprises which would be impossible for 
individual capitals... 
2. Capital, which is inherently based on a social 
mode of production and pre-supposes a social 
concentration of means of production and labour 
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power, now receives the form 
contrast to private capital, 
appear as social enterprises 
ones. This is the abolition 
property within the confines 






social capital... in 
d its enterprises 
opposed to private 
capital as private 
the capitalist made 
(40) Cl, p. 799: 
... within the capitalist system... all means 
for the 
development of production undergo a dialectical 
inversion so that they become the means of 
domination and exploitation of the producers; they 
distort the worker into a fragment of a man, they 
degrade him to the level of an appendage of a 
machine, they destroy the actual content of his 
labour by turning it into a torment; they alienate 
from him the intellectual potentialities of the 
labour process in the same proportion as science is 
incorporated in it as an independent power; they 
deform the conditions under which he works, subject 
him during the labour process to a despotism the 
more hateful for its meanness; they transform his 
life-time into working-time, and drag his wife and 
child beneath the wheels of the juggernaut of 
capital. 
(41) CHPLI, p. 186: 
the proletariat cannot emancipate itself without 
emancipating itself from all other spheres of 
society... 
(42) C1, p. 380: 
... experience shows to the intelligent observe how 
rapidly and firmly capitalist production has siezed 
the vital forces of the people at their very roots, 
although historically speaking it hardly dates from 
yesterday. Experience shows too how the 
degeneration of the industrial population is 
retarded only by the constant absorption of 
primitive and natural elements from the 
countryside... 
(43) Vide Hobsbawm, Labouring Men, London, Widdenfield 
and Nicolson, 1968, chs. 5 -7; and Thompson, The Making 
of the English Working Class_ Harmondsworth, Penguin 
Books, 1968, ch. 10. 
(44) Vide e. g. Strachey, Contemporary Capitalism, c 
cit., p. 119. 
(45) Pace e. g. P. H. Vigor, 'Marx and Modern Capitalism', 
in D. Thomson, ed., Political Ideas, Harmondsworth, 
Penguin Books, 1969, pp. 170-2. 
(46) G, p. 453: 
The worker emerges not only not richer (from the 
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process of production), but emerges rather poorer 
from the process than he entered. For not only has 
he produced the conditions of necessary labour as 
conditions belonging to capital; but also the 
value-creating possibility, the realisation which 
lies as a possibility within him, now likewise 
exists as surplus value, surplus product, in a word 
as captal, as master over living labour capacity, as 
value endowed with its own might and will, 
confronting him in his abstract, objectless, purely 
subjective poverty. He has produced not only alien 
wealth and his own poverty, but also the relation of 
this wealth as independent, self-sufficient wealth, 
relative to himself as the poverty which this wealth 
consumes, and from which it thereby draws new vital 
spirits into itself, and realises itself anew. 
(47) W, p. 422: 
The position of the worker relative to the 
capitalist worsens, and the value of the things 
enjoyed is relative. 
(48) EPM, pp. 271-2: 
The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he 
produces, the more his production increases in power 
and size. The worker becomes an ever cheaper 
commodity the more commodities he produces. The 
devaluation of the world of men is in direct 
proportion to the increasing value of the world of 
things. 
(49) WLC, p. 216: 
A house may be large or small; as long as the 
surrounding houses are equally small it satisfies 
all social demands for a dwelling. But let a palace 
arise beside the little house, and it shrinks from a 
little house to a hut. The little house shows now 
that its owner has only very slight or no demands to 
make; and however high it may shoot up in the course 
of civilisation, if the neighbouring palace grows to 
an equal or even greater extent, the occupant of the 
relatively small house will feel more and more 
uncomfortable, dissatisfied and cramped within its 
four walls. A noticeable increase in wages 
presupposes a rapid growth of productive capital. 
The rapid growth of productive capital brings about 
an equally rapid growth of wealth, luxury, social 
wants, social enjoyments. Thus, although the 
enjoyments of the worker have risen, the social 
satisfaction that they give has fallen in comparison 
with the increased enjoyments of the capitalist, 
which are inaccessible to the worker, in comparison 
with the state of development of society in general. 
(50) Cl, p. 799: 
... in proportion as capital accumulates, the 
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situation of the worker, be his payment high or low, 
must grow worse. 
(51) WLC, p. 216: 
Our desires and pleasures spring from society; we 
measure them, therefore, by society and not by the 
objects which serve for their satisfaction. Because 
they are of a social nature, they are of a relative 
nature. 
(52) WPP, p 225: 
... the very development of modern industry must 
progressively turn the scale in favour of the 
capitalist against the working man... 
(53) C1, p. 792: 
The relative surplus population is... the background 
against which the law of supply and demand of labour 
does its work. It confines the field of this law to 
the limits absolutely convenient to capital's drive 
to exploit and dominate the workers. 
(54) Ibid., p. 798: 
The relative mass of the industrial reserve 
army... increases with the potential production of 
wealth. But the greater this reserve army in 
proportion to the active labour-army, the greater is 
the mass of the consolidated surplus population, 
whose misery is in inverse proportion to the amount 
of torture it has to undergo in the form of labour. 
The more extensive, finally, the pauperised sections 
of the working class and the industrial reserve 
army, the greater is official pauperism. This is 
the absolute general law of capitalist accumulation. 
(55) WPP, p. 225: 
... 
the general tendency of capitalistic production 
is not to raise but to lower the average standard of 
wages, or to push the value of labour to more or 
less its minimum limit. 
(56) Id.: 
given) the tendency of things in (the capitalist) 
system, is this saying that the working class ought 
to renouce their resistance against the 
encroachments of capital, and abandon their attempts 
at making the best of the occasional chances for 
their temporary improvement? If they did, they 
would be degraded to one level mass of broken 
wretches past salvation... By cowardly giving way in 
their everyday conflict with capital, they would 
certainly disqualify themselves for the initiating 
of any larger movement. 
(57) C1, p. 274: 
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This peculiar commodity, labour-power, must now be 
examined. Like all other commodities it has a 
value. How is that value determined? The value of 
labour-power is determined, as in the case of every 
other commodity, by the labour-time necessary for 
the production, and consequently also the 
reproduction, of this specific article... 
Labour-power exists only as a capacity of the living 
individual. Given the existence of the individual, 
the production of labour-power consists in his 
reproduction of himself or his maintenance... the 
value of labour-power is the value of the means of 
subsistence necessary for the maintenance of its 
owner. 
(58) Ibid., p. 275: 
In contrast, therefore, with the case of other 
commodities, the determination of the value of 
labour-power contains a historical and moral 
element. 
(59) WPP, p. 222: 
Besides (a) mere physical element, the value of 
labour is in every country determined by a 
traditional standard of life. It is not mere 
physical life, but it is the satisfaction of certain 
wants springing from the social conditions in which 
people are placed and reared up. 
(60) Id. _ 
This historical or social element entering into the 
value of labour may be expanded, or contracted, or 
altogether extinguished so that nothing remains but 
the physical limit. 
(61) C2, p. 486: 
... in periods of prosperity, and particularly 
during 
the phase of hyper-activity... not only the 
consumption of necessary means of 
subsistence... rises; the working class (in which the 
entire reserve army of labour has now been enrolled) 
also takes a temporary share in the consumption of 
luxury articles that are otherwise for the most part 
"necessary" only for the capitalists. 
(62) Vide e. g. Rosdolsky, The Making of Marx's 'Capital', 
op. cit., ch. 20 appendix. 
(63) E. g. C1, p. 275: 
... the number and extent of (the worker's) so-called 
necessary requirements, as also the manner in which 
they are satisfied, are themselves products of 
history, and depend therefore on the level of 
civilisation attained by a country... 
(64) E. g. ibid., pp. 808-11. 
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(65) Ibid., pp. 276-7: 
The ultimate or minimum limit of the value of 
labour-power is formed by the value of the 
commodities which have to be supplied every day to 
the bearer of labour-power, the man, so that he can 
renew his life-process. That is to say, the limit 
is formed by the value of the physically 
indispensable means of subsistence... It is an 
extraordinary cheap kind of sentimentality which 
declares that this method of determining the value 
of labour-power, a method prescribed by the very 
nature of the case, is brutal... 
(66) COGP, p. 325: 
It is well known that nothing of the "iron law of 
wages" is Lassalle's except the word "iron" borrowed 
from Goethe's "great eternal iron laws"... As Lange 
has already shown, shortly after Lassalle's death 
(the iron law) is the Malthusian theory of 
population (preached by Lange himself). But if this 
theory is correct, then I cannot abolish the law 
even if I abolish wage-labour a hundred time over, 
because the law then governs not only the system of 
wage-labour but every social system. Basing 
themselves on this, the economists have been proving 
for fifty years or more that socialism cannot 
abolish poverty, which has its basis in nature, but 
can only make it general, distribute it 
simultaneously over the whole surface of society. 
(67) WPP, p. 221-2: 
... the periodical resistance on 
the part of the 
workers against the reduction of wages, and their 
periodical attempts at getting a rise in wages, are 
inseparable from the wages system, and dictated by 
the very fact of labour being assimilated to 
commodities, and therefore subject to the laws 
regulating the general movement of prices... 
(68) Ibid., pp. 225-6: 
... the working class ought not to exaggerate to themselves the ultimate fruitfullness of these 
everyday struggles (over money wages). They ought 
not to forget they are fighting with effects, but 
not with the causes of those effects; that they are 
retarding a downward movement, but not changing its 
direction; that they are applying palliatives, not 
curing the malady. 
(69) Cl, p. 793: 
The movement of the law of supply and demand of 
labour... completes the despotism of capital. Thus 
as soon as the workers learn the secret of why it 
happens that the more they work, the more alien 
wealth they produce, and that the more the 
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productivity of their labour increases, the more 
does their very function as a means of the 
valorisation of capital become precarious; as soon 
as they discover that the degree of intensity of 
competition amongst themselves depends on the 
pressure of the relative surplus population; as soon 
as, by setting up trade unions, etc., they try to 
organise planned co-operation between the employed 
and the unemployed in order to obviate or to weaken 
the ruinous effects of... capitalist production on 
their class, so soon does capital and its sycophant, 
political economy, cry out at the infringement of 
the "eternal" and, so to speak, "sacred" law of 
supply and demand. Every combination between 
employed and unemployed disturbs the "pure" action 
of this law. 
(70) WPP, p. 226: 
Instead of the conservative motto "a fair day's wage 
for a fair day's work" (the working class) ought to 
inscribe on (its) banner the revolutionary watchword 
"Abolition of the wages system". 
(71) MCP, pp. 493-4: 
... entire sections of the ruling classes are, 
by the 
advance of industry, precipitated into the 
proletariat, or are at least threatened in their 
conditions of existence. These also supply the 
proletariat with elements of enlightenment and 
progress. 
(72) Ib id, p. 494: 
... in times when the class struggle nears 
the 
decisive hour, the process of dissolution going on 
within the ruling class, in fact within the whole 
range of old society, assumes such a violent, 
glaring character, that a small section of the 
ruling class cuts itself adrift and joins the 
revolutionary class, the class that holds the future 
in its hands. Just as, therefore, at an earlier 
period, a section of the nobility went over to the 
bourgeoisie, so now a portion of the bourgeoisie 
goes over to the proletariat, and in particular a 
portion of the bourgeois ideologists who have raised 
themselves to the level of comprehending 
theoretically the historical movement as a whole. 
(73) Idem_, 'Provisional Rules of the International 
Working Men's Association', in FIA, p. 82: 
... the emancipation of the working classes must be 
conquered by the working classes themselves... 
(74) PP, pp. 210-1: 
The first attempts of workers to associate among 
themselves always take place in the form of 
combinations... the maintenance of wages, this common 
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interest which they have against their boss, unites 
them in a common thought of resistance - 
combination. Thus combination always has a double 
aim, that of stopping competition among the workers, 
so that they can carry on general competition with 
the capitalist. 
(75) MCP, p. 493: 
... the worker beging 
to form combinations... against 
the bourgeois; they club together in order to keep 
up the rate of wages... Now and then the workers are 
victorious, but only for a time. The real fruit of 
their battles lies not in the immediate result but 
in the ever expanding union of the workers. 
(76) WPP, p. 226: 
Trades Unions work well as centres of resistance 
against the encroachments of capital. They fail 
partially from an injudicious use of their power. 
They fail generally from limiting themselves to a 
guerilla war against the effects of the existing 
system instead of simultaneously trying to change 
it, instead of using their organised forces as a 
lever for the final emancipation of the working 




em. 'On Trade Unions', in idem., Selected 
Writings, ed., McLellan, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1977, p. 538: 
Trade unions are the schools of socialism. It is in 
trade unions that workers educate themselves and 
become socialists, because under their very eyes and 
every day the struggle with capital is taking place. 
(78) PP9 p. 211: 
Much research has been carried out to trace the 
different historical phases that the bourgeoisie has 
passed through, from the commune to its constitution 
as a class. But when it is a question of making a 
precise study of strikes, combinations and other 
forms in which the proletarians carry out before our 
eyes their organisation as a class, some are seized 
with real fear and others display a transcendental 
disdain. 
(79) Id. _ 
Economic conditions had first transformed the mass 
of the people of the country into workers. The 
domination of capital has created for this mass a 
common situation, common interests. This mass is 
thus already a class as against capital, but not yet 
for-itself. In the struggle... this becomes united, 
and constitutes itself as a class for-itself. 
(80) Idem., 'Inaugural Address of the International 
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Working Men's Association' (henceforward cited as IAFI); 
in FIA, p. 80: 
To conquer political power has therefore become the 
great duty of the working classes. 
(81) C1, ch. 14, sec. 4. 
(82) Ibid., ch. 13. 
(83) Ibid., ch. 15. 
(84) MCP, p. 491: 
Modern industry has converted the little workshop of 
the patriarchal master into the great factory of the 
industrial capitalist. Masses of labourers, crowded 
into the factory, are organised like soldiers. As 
privates of the industrial army they are placed 
under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers 
and sergeants... they are daily and hourly enslaved 
by the machine, by the overlooker, and, above all, 
by the industrial bourgeois manufacturer himself. 
The more openly this despotism proclaims gain to be 
its end and aim, the more petty, the more hateful 
and the more embittering it is. 
(85) C1, p. 453: 
From the standpoint of the peasant and the artisan, 
capitalist co-operation does not appear as a 
particular historical form of co-operation; instead 
co-operation itself appears as a historical form 
peculiar to, and specifically distinguishing, the 
capitalist process of production. Just as the 
social productive power of labour that is developed 
by co-operation appears to be the productive power 
of capital, so co-operation itself, contrasted with 
the process of production carried on by isolated 
independent workers, or even by small masters, 
appears to be a specific form of the capitalist 
process of production. 
(86) RIPP, p. 1024: 
The social productive forces of labour, or the 
productive forces of directly social, socialised 
(i. e. collective) labour come into being through 
co-operation, division of labour within the 
workshop, the use of machinery, and in general the 
transformation of production by the conscious use of 
the sciences, or mechanics, chemistry, etc., for 
specific ends, technology, etc., and similarly 
through the enormous increase of scale corresponding 
to such developments. 
(87) Cl, ch. 32. 
(88) IAFI, pp. 79-80: 
We speak of the co-operative movement, especially 
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the co-operative factories raised by the unassisted 
efforts of a few bold "hands". The value of these 
great social experiments cannot be overrated. By 
deed, instead of by argument, they have shown that 
production on a large scale, and in accord with the 
behests of modern science, may be carried on without 
the existence of a class of masters employing a 
class of hands; that to bear fruit, the means of 
labour need not be monopolised as a means of 
dominion over, and of extortion against, the 
labouring man himself; and that, like slave labour, 
like serf labour, hired labour is but a transitory 
and inferior form, destined to disappear before 
associated labour plying its toil with a willing 
hand, a ready mind and a joyous heart... At the same 
time... co-operative labour, if kept within the 
narrow circle of the casual efforts of private 
workmen, will never be able to arrest the growth in 
geometrical progression of monopoly, to free the 
masses, nor even to perceptibly lighten. the burden 
of their miseries... To save the industrious masses, 
co-operative labour ought to be developed to 
national dimensions, and, consequently to be 
fostered by national means. Yet the lords of land 
and the lords of capital will always use their 
political privileges for the defence and the 
perpetuation of their economical monopolies. 
(69) GI, p. 81: 
Communism differs from all previous movements in 
that it overturns the basis of all earlier relations 
of production and intercourse, and for the first 
time consciously treats all naturally evolved 
premises as the creations of hitherto existing men, 
strips them of their natural character and 
subjugates them to the power of the united 
individuals. 
(90) Marx, 'The Class Struggles in France 1848-50', in 
CW, vol. 10, p. 127: 
... socialism is the declaration of 
the permanence of 
the revolution, the class dictatorship of the 
proletariat as the necessary transit point to the 
abolition of class struggles generally, to the 
abolition of all the relations of production on 
which they rest, to the abolition of all the social 
relations that correspond to those relations of 
production, to the revolutionising of all the ideas 
that result from those social relations. 
(91) COGP, p. 320: 
... defects are 
inevitable in the first phase of 
communist society as it is when it has just emerged 
after prolonged birth pangs from capitalist 
society... In"a higher phase of communist 
society,... the enslaving subordination of the 
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individual to the division of labour, and therewith 
also the antithesis between mental and manual 
labour, has vanished... labour has become not only a 
means of life but life's prime want... the productive 
forces have also increased with the all-round 
development of the individual... all the springs of 
co-operative wealth flow more abundantly... 
(92) EPM, p. 306: 
Communism has the position of the negation of the 
negation, and is hence the actual phase necessary 
for the next stage of historical development in the 
process of human emancipation and rehabilitation. 
Communism is the necessary form and dynamic 
principle of the immediate future, but communism as 
such is not the goal of human development, the form 
of human society. 
(93) COGP, p. 327: 
Between capitalist and communist society-lies the 
period of the revolutionary transformation of the 
one into the other. Corresponding to this is also a 
political transition period in which the state can 
be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the 
proletariat. 
(94) Idem. _ 'Conspectus of Bakunin's Statism and 
Anarchy', in FIA, p. 333: 
,.. so long as the other classes, especially the 
capitalist class, still exists, so long as the 
proletariat struggles with it (for when it attains 
government power its enemies and the old 
organisation of society have not yet vanished), it 
must employ forcible means, hence governmental 
means. It is itself still a class and the economic 
conditions from which the class struggle and the 
existence of classes derive have still not 
disappeared and must forcibly be either removed out 
of the way or transformed, this transformation 
process being forcibly hastened. 
(95) MCP, p. 495: 
All previous historical movements were the movements 
of minorities, or in the interest of minorities. 
The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, 
independent movement of the immense majority, in the 
interest of the immense majority. The proletariat, 
the lowest stratum of our present society, cannot 
stir, cannot raise itself up, without the whole 
superincumbent strata of official society being 
sprung into the air. 
(96) GI, p. 88: 
In all appropriations up to now, a mass of 
individuals remained subservient to a single 
instrument of production; in the appropriation of 
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the proletarians, a mass of instruments of 
production must be made subject to each individual, 
and property to all. Modern universal intercourse 
cannot be controlled by individuals, unless it is 
controlled by all. 
(97) HF, p. 36: 
When the proletariat is victorious, it by no means 
becomes the absolute side of society, for it is 
victorious only by abolishing itself and its 
opposite. Then the proletariat disappears, as well 
as the opposite which determines it, private 
property. 
(98) I have discussed the issues raised here in 
'Rationality, Democracy and Freedom in Marxist Critiques 
of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', Inquiry, forthcoming 
March, 1985. 
(99) Rubin can be credited with presenting an, as it 
were, complete - if abridged - finished version of 
Theories of Surplus Value in his own history based on the 
Theories and meant to be read in conjunction with them. 
Vid I. I. Rubin, A History of Economic Thought, tr. D. 
Filtzer, aftw. C. Colliot-Thelene London, Ink Links, 
1979. 
(100) Vide Appendix ký. 
(101) IAFI, p. 78: 
... the Ten Hours-Bill was not only a great 
practical success; it was the victory of a 
principle; it was the first time that in broad 
daylight the political economy of the middle class 
succumbed to the political economy of the working 
class. But there was in store a still greater 
victory of the political economy of labour over the 
political economy of property. We speak of the 
co-operative movement... 
(102) Vide e. g. A Sanchez Vasquez, The Philosophy of 
Praxis, tr. M. Gonzalez, London, merlin Press, 1977, n. b. 
pp. 234-8. 
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(1) EPM, pp. 270-1. 
(2) N. b. cf. ibid., pp. 326-46; and PS, ch. S. 
(3) N. b. cf. EPI'1, pp. 270-883; and Feuerbach, The 
Essence of Christianity, tr. M. Evans, intr. K. Barth, 
New York, Harper and Row, 1957, ch. 1, sec. 1. 
(4) W. Godwin, Enquiry concerning Political Justice, ed. 
I. Kramnick, Harmon rth, Penguin Books, 1976, bk. 1 
n. b. ch. 4. 
(5) Pace e. g. Hook, From Hegel to Marx, op: cit. chs. 7 
and B. For a fairer evaluation v_ McLellan, The Young 
Hegelians and Karl Marx, op. cit., pp. 85-116. 
(6) Feuerbach, 'Towards a Critique of Hegel's 
Philosophy', in idem., The Fiery Brook, tr. Z. Hanfi, New 
York, Anchor Books, 1972, Pp. 53-96. 
(7) Idem., 'On "The Beginning of Philosophy"', in idem., 
The Fiery Brook, op. cit., pp. 135-44. 
(8) Idem., The Essence of Christianity, op. cit., ch. 1, 
sec. 1. 
(9) Ib id., passsim; idem., 'The Necessity of a Reform of 
Philosophy , in idem., The Fiery Brook, op. cit., pp. 
145-52; idem 'Preliminary Theses on the Reform of 
Philosophy , in idem The Fiery ýBrook op, ci 
t. _ pp. 
153-74; and idem., 'Principles of the Philo-sophy of the 
Future', in idem., The Fiery Brook, op. cit., pp. 
175-246. 
(10) Vide A. Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx, tr. 
Fowkes, London, New Left Books, 197-1t pp. 76-93. 
(11) E. g. GI, pp. 38-9,57-8. 
(12) Feuerbach, 'Principles of the Philosophy of the 
Future', Op. Cit., pp. 208-9: 
The Hegelian philosophy is inverted, that is, it is 
theological idealism... It posited the essence of the 
ego outside the ego, that is, in separation from it, 
and it objectified the ego as substance, as God... in 
so doing, it expressed - indirectly and in reverse 
order the divinity of the ego, thus making it... nto 
an attribute or form of the divine substance, 
meaning that man's consciousness of God is God's own 
self-consciousness. That means that-the being 
belongs to God and the knowing to man. But the 
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being of God, according to Hegel is actually nothing 
other than the being of though, or thought 
abstracted from the ego, that is, the thinker. The 
Hegelian philosophy as turned thought, that is, the 
subjective being - this, however, conceived without 
subject, that is, conceived as a being different 
from it - into the Divine and Absolute Being. 
(13) Ibid., p. 199: 
... if I... say the deity or, what amounts to the same thing, the absolute being or absolute truth is an 
object of and for reason alone, then I declare God 
to be a rational thing or a rational being, and in 
so doing I indirectly express only the absolute 
truth and reality of reason. Hence, it is necessary 
for reason to turn to itself with a view to reverse 
this inverted self-recognition, to declare itself 
directly to be the absolute truth and to become, 
without the intervention of any intermediary object, 
its own object as the absolute truth. 
(14) Idem., 'Preliminary Theses on the Reform of 
Philosophy', op. cit., p. 154: 
The method of the reformative critique of 
speculative philosophy as such does not differ from 
that used in the Philosophy of Religion. We need 
only turn the predicate into the subject. and thus 
as subject into object and principle - this is, only 
reverse speculative philosophy. in this way we have 
the unconcealed, pure, and untarnished truth. 
(15) E. g. cf. the above quotation with CHPL, p. 23: 
Had Hegel started from real subjects as the basis of 
the state, then he would not have found it necessary 
to let the state subjectify itself in a mysterious 
way... Hegel subjectifies the predicate, the objects, 
but he objectifies them in separation from their 
true subject. Consequently, the true subject 
appears as a result, whereas the point is to start 
with the true subject and deal with its 
objectifications. 
(16) E. g. idem., 'Marx to Feuerbach, 11 August, 1844', 
tr. J. Cohen, in CW, vol. 3, p. 354. 
(17) Feuerbach, 'Towards a Critique of Hegel's 
Philosophy', op.. cit., pp. 76-9. 
(18) Althusser, 'Feuerbach's, Philosophical Manifestoes', 
in id_. _ Fore Marx, op.. cit., pp. 41-8. 
(19) Idem., 'Marxism and Humanism', in id em, F_or_ Marx, 
op.. cit., pp. 219-47.. 
(20) Idem., 'Contradiction and Overdetermination', op. 
cit., pp. 102-4. 
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(21) Colletti Marxism and Hegel. op. cit., passim. 
(22) C1, pp. 102-3: 
... just when I was working at the first volume of 
Capital, the ill-humoured, arrogant and mediocre 
epigones who now talk large in educated German 
circles began to take pleasure in treating Hegel in 
the same way as the good Moses Mendelssohn treated 
Spinoza in Lessing's time, namely as a "dead dog". 
I therefore openly avowed myself a pupil of that. 
might thinker, and even, here and there is the 
chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the 
mode of expression peculiar to him. 
(23) G, pp. 831-2: 
The fact that in the development of the productive 
powers of labour the objective conditions of labour, 
objectified labour, must grow relative to living 
labour... appears from the standpoint of capital not 
in such a way that one of the moments of social 
activity - objective labour - becomes the ever more 
powerful body of the other moment, subjective 
labour, but rather... that the objective conditions 
of labour assume an ever more colossal 
independence... and that social wealth confronts 
living labour in more powerful portions as an alien 
and dominant power. The emphasis comes to be placed 
not on the state of objectified, but on the state of 
being alienated... the monstrous objective power 
which social labour itself erected opposite itself 
as one of its moments belongs not to -the worker, but 
to the personified conditions of labour, i. e. to 
capital. To the extent that, from the standpoint of 
capital and wage-labour, the creation of the 
objective body of activity happens in antithesis to 
the immediate labour capacity (then) this twisting 
and inversion is a real phenomenon and not merely a 
supposed one existing merely in the imagination of 
the workers and the capitalist. But obviously this 
process of inversion is merely a historical 
necessity, a necessity for the development of the 
forces of production solely from a specific 
historical point of departure, or basis, but in no 
way an absolute necessity of production; rather a 
vanishing one, and the result of this process is to 
suspend this basis itself, together with this form 
of the process. The bourgeois economists are so 
much cooped up with the notions belonging to a 
specific historical stage of social development that 
the necessity of the objectification of the powers 
of social labour appears to them as inseparable from 
the necessity of their alienation vis-a-vis living 
labour. But with the suspension of the immediate 
character of living labour as merely 
individual... with the positing of the activity of 
individuals as immediately general or social 
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activity, the objective moments of labour are 
stripped of this form of alienation; they are 
thereby posited as... the organic social body within 
which individuals reproduce themselves as 
individuals, but as social individuals. 
(24) E. g. C1, pp. 929: 
... capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a natural process, its own 
negation. 
(25) Vide e. g. Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, 
London, Hutchinson, 1976, pp. 12-3. 
(26) Marx, 'Marx to Engels, 31 May 1873', in Marx and 
Engels, Letters on 'Capital', tr. A. Drummond, London, 
New Park, 1983, T. 176. 
(27) E. g. C1, p. 423: 
".. the possessor of money or commodities actually 
turns into a capitalist only where the minimum sum 
advanced for production gratly exceeds the known 
medieval maximum. Here, as in natural science, is 
shown the correctness of the law discovered by 
Hegel, in his Logic ' that at a certain point merely 
quantitative differences pass over by a dialectic 
inversion into qualitative distinctions. 
(28) Vide Taylor, Hegel, op. it_, pp. 546-58. This 
formulation must be distinguished from the one put 
forward in G. Hawthorn, Enlightenment and Despair, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University-Press,, 19? 6, ch. 3, which 
does not appreciate the strength of Marx's distinguishing 
of alienations and objectification, when driving towards 
a similar criticism. 
(29) Vide e. g. R. Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in 
Industrial Society, London, Routledge and Kagan Paul, 
1959, n. b. pt. 1. 
(30) Vide e. g. the shift in Poulantzas' writings from 
Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes op. cit.; 
through iderfi., Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, tr. 
Fernbach, London, New Left Books, 1975; to idem., State, 
Power, Socialism, tr. P. Camiller, London, New Left 
Books, 1978. 
(31) Vide e. g. M. Kidron, Western Capitalism Since the 
War, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1970, in which all 
elements of economic planning are continually evaluated 
only from the most negative point of view. 
(32) Vide e. g. the debate over the class location of the 
middle class collected in P. Walker, ad., Between Labour 
and Capital, Sussex Harvester Press, 1979. As the tit e öf the collection indicates, all the contributions remain 
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commonly rooted in static conceptions of Marx's class 
analysis, and the, for them especially, difficult issues 
posed by the growth of the middle are increasingly 
desperately pushed into these. 
(33) Vide e. g. on the respective sides of this debate: D. 
Bell, The End of Ideology, Glencoe, Free Press, 1962; 
idem., The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, London, 
Heinemann, 1974; and idem., he Cultural Contradictions 
of Capitalism, London, Heinemann, 1976; and J. 
Westergaard and H. Resler, Class in a Capitalist Society, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1976. 
(34) Consider the following quotation from the preface to 
Bell and I. Kristöl, eds., Capitalism Today, London, 
Basic Books, 1971, p. viii: 
Hedonism has never been regarded as one of the 
bourgeois virtues, yet the economics of modern 
bourgeois society has more and more come to rest an 
hedonist premises. A Marxist might say, with the 
benefit of hindsight, that this "contradiction" was 
inherent in capitalism from the outset. But, in 
fact, most Marxist predictions were pointed in quite 
the opposite direction: the "contradictions" of 
capitalism were supposed to arise out of progressive 
immiseration not progressive enrichment. 
This idea is at the heart of Bell's whole idea of 
"post-industrialism", and, incidentally, also runs 
through Bell, Marxian Socialism in the U. S. Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1967. Without going so far 
as to say that Bell may not have a point against "most 
marxist predictions", his understanding of Marx is 
risible. 
(35) Strachey, Contemporary Capitalism, Op. cit., p. 154. 
(36) Ibid., pp. 235-9. 
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